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 Abstract 
 
“Your bodies may at last turn all to spirit”: Medical Science and the Anatomia Animata 
in Milton's Paradise Lost 
 
This thesis takes issue with the standard critical attribution to Milton of a backward 
Aristotelian scientific paradigm for his work, demonstrating that body and soul represented in 
Paradise Lost are inscribed in terms of radical contemporary medical theories of vitalism. 
Milton’s close friendship with his doctor, Nathan Paget, links him to Paget’s colleague, Francis 
Glisson, Regius Professor of Physic at Cambridge University, an academic and practising 
physician who was closely involved in cutting-edge contemporary medical research. Not only 
can Glisson’s heretical notion of the energetic, living nature of substance be seen to match the 
dynamic scale of nature represented in Paradise Lost, but in fact Milton’s animist materialism 
corresponds precisely to the chemical innovations made by Glisson in the anatomy of blood and 
bodily fluids and spirits.  
Exploring Milton’s representation of body and soul, spirit and matter, in the light of 
these contemporary medical innovations, this thesis focuses upon the way that his theodicy is 
supported by this most heretical natural philosophy. Milton’s vital anatomia animata is shown 
to be central to the harmonious integration of science and theology in Paradise Lost; it 
complements the literalism of the poem and provides a non-satanic logic of self-determination.  
Beginning with the basic evidence of Milton’s materialism of the soul in the Christian Doctrine, 
the first chapter correlates the theological assertions made with the language of natural 
philosophy that Milton uses to make them. The next chapter addresses the problem of the 
antinomy between the material soul proposed by Milton and the Aristotelian terminology with 
which he describes it, arguing that the latter is more heterogeneous than literary critics have 
acknowledged. The third chapter examines several versions of vitalism in order to delineate a 
working, medical model of the active matter presupposed by Milton’s body-soul composites and 
the wider natural philosophy of Paradise Lost. This model of active matter and spirit is then 
used in chapter four to illuminate the representation of Creation, demonstrating the acute 
accuracy with which Milton’s Creation draws upon contemporary medical research into 
conception. Chapter five extends the analysis to compare early notions of chemical digestion 
with the metabolic transformations of paradise. The final chapter demonstrates that the 
physiological and psychological corruptions of the Fall correspond to the effects of the putrid or 
poisonous ferment, while Milton’s representation of regeneration calls upon the vital, generative 
anatomia animata. 
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Introduction 
 
Milton and the New Physic 
 
Milton suffered two debilitating illnesses in the last twenty years of his life, 
and my dissertation is going to argue that this fact is relevant to the natural philosophy 
of the animate human body of Paradise Lost. That he finally went completely blind in 
1652 is well documented, and the lament for his lost sight at the beginning of Book 3 of 
Paradise Lost, with its paean to the visual beauty of the natural world and the wisdom 
that is available from studying it, makes the depth of the loss painfully apparent: 
 
                           Thus with the year 
Seasons return, but not to me returns 
Day, or the sweet approach of even or morn, 
Or sight of vernal bloom, or summer’s rose, 
Or flocks or herds, or human face divine; 
But cloud instead, and ever-during dark 
Surrounds me, from the cheerful ways of men 
Cut off, and for the book of knowledge fair 
Presented with a universal blank 
Of nature’s works to me expunged and razed, 
And wisdom at one entrance quite shut out.1
 
 
The beauty of nature, human conviviality and the wisdom available in the ‘book of 
knowledge’ of the world are the central losses in this passage. There are well known 
descriptions of both his earlier and final attempts to slow or arrest the deterioration of 
his sight. One of the most famous is that of his nephew, Edward Phillips, who notes that 
during Milton’s exchange with Salmasius, 
 
his Sight, what with his continual Study, his being subject to the 
Head-ake, and his perpetual tampering with Physick to preserve it, had 
been decaying for above a dozen years before, and the sight of one for 
a long time clearly lost.2
 
 
                                                            
1 Paradise Lost, ed. Alastair Fowler, 2nd edn. (Longman: Harlow, 1997), 3. 40-50. All references to 
Paradise Lost are to this edition, and will hereafter be given parenthetically in the text. 
2 The Early Lives of Milton, ed. Helen Darbishire (London: Constable & Co, 1932). 72. 
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Tentative diagnoses of amaurosis or gutta serena were made at the time and have been 
repeated in more current analyses. Milton himself intimates just such a diagnosis in the 
description of his blindness in the sequence of verse quoted above: “So thick a drop 
serene hath quenched their orbs, / Or dim suffusion veiled” (PL 3. 25-6). James 
Hanford’s study of Milton’s blindness and the medical evidence we have concerning it 
remains a most accurate survey of the issue.3 He describes the orthodox, Galenic 
analysis of the illness thus:  “A redundant humour in the brain flowed down into the 
optic nerve and congregated there, preventing the ‘spirits of sight’ from finding access 
to the eyeball. This humour was itself the ‘gutta serena’ or clear drop – clear because it 
could not be seen outwardly.”4 Arnold Sorsby comments on Milton’s self-diagnosis in 
Paradise Lost, that “Drop serene and dim suffusion are not so much alternate diagnoses 
as different names for very much the same thing, for gutta serena was the name for 
blindness with a transparent (i.e., non-obscured) pupil and suffusio nigra stood for 
blindness in which the pupil was black (and not grey).”5
 
 
Less often commented on are Milton’s years of suffering from gout. As with 
his blindness, an accurate diagnosis is extremely difficult to make. F. Dudley Hart 
observes that “although Sydenham (1624-89) was able to distinguish between acute 
rheumatism and gout, the latter term continued to embrace a large and undefined 
collection of syndromes throughout most of the 18th century.”6 The fundamental feature 
of gout is that of intense and agonising periods of pain in the joints (particularly the 
feet) and Milton’s death in 1674 was probably caused by associated renal failure.7
 
 
Significantly, both disorders were thought to stem from the same problem of errant 
phlegmatic humours which, originating in bad digestion, excreted out of the brain and 
collected in the wrong areas of the body. Sorsby quotes a nineteenth century source to 
explore the link between the two conditions suffered by Milton: 
The Arabians, who had adopted generally the humoral pathology of 
Galen, conceived both these diseases to be the result of a morbid 
rheum or defluxion falling on a particular part of the visual orb, in one 
case producing blindness with obscurity, whence the name of an 
obscure rheum or gutta, and in the other without obscurity, whence the 
                                                            
3 James H. Hanford, ‘Milton Forswears Physic’, Bulletin of the Medical Library Association 32.1 (1944), 
23–34.  
4 Hanford, ‘Milton Forswears Physic’, 24. 
5 Arnold Soresby, ‘The Nature of Milton’s Blindness’, British Journal of Ophthalmology, 14. 7 (1930), 
339-354, 340. 
6 F. D. Hart, ‘William Harvey and his Gout’, Annals of the Rheumatic Diseases 43 (1984), 125-127. 
7 Barbara Lewalski, The Life of John Milton (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 536. 
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contrary name of a transparent or serene rheum or gutta. But as 
various other diseases and particularly of the joints were also 
supposed to flow from a like cause, and were far more common, the 
term gutta and rheuma were afterwards emphatically applied and at 
length altogether limited to these last complaints: whence the terms 
gout and rheumatism.8
 
  
This etymological link is thus part of a theoretical link; the blindness Milton suffered 
would have been diagnosed as having the same causal origin as the agonising gout that 
was to end his life. There is considerable contemporary evidence to support this 
connection; in 1649 Culpeper prescribes hot, dry remedies for gout, but these are often 
given as remedies for eye complaints too. For “Gout and other cold afflictions of the 
joints,” he prescribes “Herba Campborata,” noting that it “is of a drying faculty, and 
therefore stops defluxions either in the eyes or upon the lungues, the gout, cramps, 
palsies, aches, strengthens the nerves.”9
 
  
It will be useful to pause and examine the other treatments that Milton’s 
doctors would have taken from the orthodox, Galenic tradition of medicine. Because 
gutta serena and gout were held to have the same cause, treatments of them are often 
similar or identical. First published in the sixteenth century, but republished in 1616, 
Walter Baley’s work demonstrates the links between the conditions. For amaurosis and 
gutta serena he prescribes an electuary (a sweetened medicine) that is “commended to 
comfort the stomach, and to preuent the ingendring of grosse phlegme in the braine.”10
 
 
He admits that the eye condition is incurable, but proposes certain treatments: 
Amaurosis is commonly an hindrance to the whole sight, without any 
appearance at all in the eye, for the apple appeareth sound and 
vnchanged, onely the Neruus opticus is stopped: this disease is 
vncurable, because there are no remedies therefore... [nevertheless] 
wherefore as yet the humor being not setled as Aetius doth testifie, 
that he saw one that did recouer the sight, onely with the applying of 
cupping glasses with scarification. Remedies are not to be neglected, 
often purgation... the braine must be dryed with a cappe fit for the 
same, cautiers must be applyed at the roote of the eare... When the eye 
is exasperated, annoynt it with fresh butter, and instilling therein 
womans milke, also the muscilage of philium, of quinces, of 
                                                            
8 Soresby, ‘Milton’s Blindness’, 340. His source is given as  J. M. Good, The Study of Medicine (London, 
1822),  3: 219. 
9 Nicholas Culpeper, A physicall directory, or, A translation of the London dispensatory made by the 
Colledge of Physicians in London (London, 1649), 136. 
10 Walter Baley, Two treatises concerning the preseruation of eie-sight. The first written by Doctor Baily 
sometimes of Oxford: the other collected out of those two famous phisicions Fernelius and Riolanus 
(London 1616), 44. 
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fenugreek, and of tragagant are to be applied, let the Muscilage be 
drawne in the decoction of Mallowes, Holy-hocks, Violets &c.11
 
 
In addition to various purgatives and ointments, Baley mentions scarification, cupping 
and cauteries as well as a ‘cap’ which is fitted to dry the brain, but he does not say 
exactly what they entail. Paré, another sixteenth-century doctor whose work was 
reissued in the seventeenth century, gives a little more detail.  
 
Writing of gutta serena, as well as other diseases of defluxion of the humours, 
Paré observes that if the humours are travelling under the skull then the condition is 
incurable, but if the humours are between the skull and the skin, a skilful doctor 
 
applyes astringent medicines to the shaved crown, as Empl. contra 
rupturam, which may streighten the veines, and as it were suspend the 
phlegme, useth cupping, and commands frictions to bee made towards 
the hinde part of the head, and lastly, maketh a Seton in the necke. 
There are some who cauterize the toppe of the crowne with a hot iron, 
even to the bone, so that it may cast a scaile, thus to divert and stay the 
defluxion.12
 
 
Most of Paré’s remedies involve traumatising the skin to encourage the production of 
pus, which was essentially thought to be already there in the ‘defluxion’, causing the 
problem. Scarification is the infliction of grazes and cuts for this purpose; cupping 
glasses (still used today in various, mainly non-European, forms of medicine) were 
heated cups placed on the skin to create warmth and suction that were thought to bring 
the humours to the surface. Cauteries, recommended by Baley to be applied at the base 
of the ear and by Paré to the top of the head, were heated metal implements intended to 
cauterise, or rather burn, the skin. Paré advises they “be made a triangular Iron, sharpe 
at the end, that it may the more speedily penetrate” and warns that the patient’s head 
must be held firmly.13
 
 Cauteries and ‘issues’ are both also prescribed by Paré for the 
treatment of gout.  
Many have found benefit by issues; for the Arthritick malignity flowes 
forth of these, as by rivelets... If any had rather use an actuall cautery, 
let him take such an one as is triangular and sharpe, that so hee may 
with more speed and lesse paine performe that which hee intends, and 
let him thrust it through a plate of iron which hath a hole therein, and 
                                                            
11 Baley, Two treatises, 44. 
12 Ambroise Paré, The workes of that famous chirurgion Ambrose Parey translated out of Latine and 
compared with the French (London, 1634), 645. 
13 Paré Workes, 649. 
5 
 
let the place bee marked lest hee should err; the ulcer shall be kept 
open by putting in a pill of gold, silver, lint, of the root of orris, 
hermodactiles, gentian, waxe, wherewith some pouder of vitrioll, 
mercurie or allum shall be incorporated, lest it should fill up with flesh 
sooner than the Physician shall thinke  fit.14
 
 
I am going into considerable detail for a number of reasons, but the primary one here is 
to try to bring to life something of the actual experiences of those using Galenic 
medicine in the seventeenth century. Twenty-first-century medicine has, in Europe at 
least, made such stories a distant horror, vaguely noted, but we know that these 
treatments were part of Milton’s “perpetual tampering with physic.” The evidence here 
shows that, having struggled perpetually with such treatments for more than a decade in 
an unsuccessful effort to save his sight, the onset of gout would, in traditional classical 
medicine, have prescribed the same treatments over again. Milton, with the help of his 
doctor, would – I believe – have researched other bodies of knowledge rather than 
repeat again the unsuccessful treatments of the 1640s. This dissertation proposes that 
such a painfully embodied existence, and the many efforts made to alleviate the 
disability and pain, contributed to Milton’s assertion of the monist system of body and 
spirit which characterises his representation of the human body and soul in Paradise 
Lost. In short, his animist materialism bears the features of medical knowledge at the 
cutting edge of research in the 1650s and 1660s. 
 
There is evidence of a major change of diagnosis that came after the loss of 
Milton’s sight. The anonymous biographer, describing the final loss of Milton’s sight in 
the midst of polemical duels, remarks defensively 
 
his Eysight totally faild him; not through any immediat or sudden 
Judgement, as his adversaries insultingly affirm’d; but from a 
weakness which his hard nightly study in his youth had first 
occasion’d, and which by degrees had for some time before depriv’d 
him of the use of one Ey: And that Issues or Seatons, made use of to 
save or retrieve that, were thought by drawing away the Spirits, which 
should have supply’d the Optic Vessels, to have hastn’d the loss of the 
other. Hee was indeed advis’d by his Physitians of the danger, in his 
condition, attending so great intentness as that work requir’d.15
 
  
The same biographer adds later that his blindness ‘proceeded from a Gutta Serena’ but 
the previous treatment is now thought to have damaged the sight rather than preserving 
                                                            
14 Paré, Workes, 706. 
15 Darbishire, Early Lives, 28. 
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it.16 Here the treatments in question are ‘issues and seatons’ both of which are 
mentioned by Paré. A seton relies upon the same humoral logic of the other treatments 
we have examined. John Kirkup describes it thus: “Two parallel incisions were made... 
leaving a wide skin bridge beneath which threads of horsehair, pack thread or coarse 
wool were passed. The ends were left long for easier replacement, if required and also 
to facilitate daily back-and-forth movement of the threads in order to provoke a 
permanent discharge.”17
 
 I propose that from this last passage of the biography we can 
see that his ‘tampering’ became more carefully researched than critics have heretofore 
noted, and that the changing natural philosophy that informed seventeenth-century 
medicine in particular, can be seen in the natural philosophy of Paradise Lost and also 
in relation to the materialist theology of the Christian Doctrine. Certainly, through the 
years of unsuccessful treatment his medical regime seems to have changed from one 
which validated issues and setons to one which re-diagnosed them as harmful. 
There is a clear shift of emphasis in the anonymous biography and James 
Hanford observes that this re-diagnosis 
 
may well reflect the advanced opinion of some of Milton's friends 
among the new men of science. If the Anonymous Biographer was 
indeed, as some have believed, Dr. Nathan Paget, Milton's own 
physician in his later years, he may here be giving the substance of a 
professional opinion of his own. Paget was one of the group that 
collaborated with Glisson in the preparation of his classic study of 
rickets.18
 
 
That Paget had some sort of friendship with Milton is well documented, but Hanford 
makes a clear case for Milton’s close relationship with Paget over a number of years, as 
does Christopher Hill. Both cite Paget’s arrangement of Milton’s third marriage to his 
cousin, Elizabeth Minshull, and his involvement in obtaining an introduction to Milton 
for the Quaker Thomas Ellwood as evidence of genuine intimacy. Both note the close 
professional connection between Paget and Glisson. Hill makes a study of the contents 
of Paget’s library, noting clear interests in socinian ideas, anti-trinitarianism and 
mortalism, as well as numerous medical texts that showed him to be a “liberal, 
                                                            
16 Darbishire, Early Lives, 32. 
17 John Kirkup, The Evolution of Surgical Instruments (San Francisco: Norman Publishing, 2006), 403. 
Kirkup also gives an account of the issue that is parallel with Paré’s: “Issues… [were] artificially 
produced by incision or by actual or potential cautery to create an indolent infected sore that discharges 
imagined deleterious humours... If the burn mortified the outer table of the skull, dead bone would act as 
a foreign body sequestration to provoke a long period of discharge” (402-3). 
18 Hanford, ‘Milton Forswears Physic’, 30. 
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reforming, chemically minded doctor”; he concludes that “His library, and his 
friendship with Quakers, suggest he was interested in exactly the area of radical thought 
to which Milton belongs.”19 Hanford extends his investigation of the relationship to 
show further evidence of Milton’s relationships with figures such as Henry Oldenburg, 
Samuel Hartlib and Robert Boyle: his conclusion is that Milton had a sustained social 
interest in medical experimentation and research, including the work of the early Royal 
Society.20
 
  
I propose that we think again about the connections Milton had with radical 
elements of the medical profession, in particular his links with Nathan Paget. John 
Rogers points to Paget as a direct link between Glisson and Milton; in 1651 there is a 
brief note to the Examinations Committee of the Council of State in which there is a 
recommendation for the reprinting of one of Milton’s tracts (probably the Defence of the 
English People). Included in the same note is a complaint that one Peter Cole has been 
printing an unauthorised English translation of Glisson’s first medical treatise, De 
Rachitude, the patent of which was actually owned by William Dugard, Milton’s 
printer.21 Critics speculate reasonably that Milton was protecting the interests of his 
friend Paget as well as those of his printer, for Paget was one of a group of eight men 
from the College of Physicians who contributed to De Rachitude.22  Fifteen years later, 
during the plague of 1665, he and Glisson were named as some of the few brave enough 
to remain in London to treat the ill and dying. 23
                                                            
19 Christopher Hill, Milton and the English Revolution (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), 493-495. 
 Paget also had a copy of Glisson’s 
Anatomia hepatis (1654) in his library, as well as a revised version of 1657 which 
20 James H. Hanford, ‘Dr. Paget’s Library’, Bulletin of the Medical Library Association 33.1 (1945), 90–
99,  98. 
21 John Rogers, The Matter of Revolution: Science, Poetry and Politics in the Age of Milton (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1996), 105. This connection has also been noted by Hill, Milton and the English 
Revolution, 492; also by William Riley Parker, John Milton: A Biography, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1968), 2: 979. 
22Francis Glisson, A Treatise of the Rickets, trans. Philip Armin (London, 1651). Those named in the 
preface are Francis Glisson, George Bate, Nathan Paget, Assuerus Regimorter, Thomas Sheaf, Edmund 
Trench, Robert Wright and Jonathan Goddard. 
23Guido Giglioni, ‘The Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, Ph.D. thesis, John Hopkins 
University, 2002, 18. This study of Francis Glisson’s philosophy and practice is rare in its translations 
and detailed analyses of Glisson’s actual texts; I use it extensively. Glisson had a career that spanned 
decades, so when using Giglioni’s translations I note the source materials from which he is working in 
order to retain a sense of the time at which Glisson’s work was produced. For this information Giglioni 
cites Nathanial Hodges, LOIMOLOGIA sive Pestis Nuperae apud Populum Londinensem Grassantis 
Narratio Historica (London, 1672). “Neque vero deerant insuper Insignissimi et Clarissimi viri, qui 
privatam in Peste compescenda (periculi tanti Consortes) operam navarunt, e quorum numero (non sine 
honoris praefatione nominandi) erant Viri eruditi et sagacissimi Franciscus Glisson, Prof. Reg. Cantab. 
Nathan Pagetius, Thomas Whartonus, Petrus Earwickius, Humphredus Brookes, et alii haud vulgaris 
famae etiamnum hodie in vivis” (18-19). 
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included a study of the lacteals, which implies a sustained and detailed interest in 
Glisson’s work.24
 
 This treatise contained many of the central ingredients of Glisson’s 
theory of vital, active matter and was one of the earliest anatomical texts to use the 
notion of chemical fermentation in the fluids and spirits of the body. ‘Ferment’ is a term 
which was used consistently to describe the explosive political events of the Civil War 
and Interregnum; it continues to be a popular term for the unrest of the period. It also 
became a popular medical topic through the 1660s and it is usually associated with the 
work of the neuro-anatomist Thomas Willis; however, his De Fermentatione (1659) 
was not published until five years after Glisson’s tract on the liver. 
The change of diagnosis noted in the anonymous biography was not an 
unlikely occurrence. The ferociousness of the debates and power struggles in the 
medical profession of the period has been well documented. Academically trained 
physicians faced competition and often criticism from healers of all sorts: at the 
respectable end of the scale were clergymen and clerical doctors, surgeons and 
apothecaries; also offering forms of physic were midwives and charitable gentlewomen, 
astrologers and those offering chemical solutions and medicines, such as distillers, 
itinerant drug-sellers and peddlers.25 In the developing medical market place of the 
Interregnum the new “chymistry” was frequently expressed as an entirely new approach 
to natural philosophy, one based on observation and analysis of physical processes, the 
truth value of which transcended systems of traditional Galenic physic and Aristotelian 
categories.26
 
 As the conflict continued after the Restoration Milton’s friend 
Marchamont Nedham entered the fray on the side of the chymical practitioners, 
claiming that:  
                                                            
24 Bibliotheca Medica, Viri Clarissimi Nathanis Paget, M. D. (London, 1681). 
25 The social, professional and political conflict between different groups is clear in almost any study of 
the history of medicine of this period. Perhaps the most famous texts on this subject are Harold J. Cook, 
Decline of the Old Medical Regime in Stuart London (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Charles 
Webster, The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine and Reform 1626-1660 ( New York: Holmes & 
Meier, 1976).  
26 William R. Newman notes that the contemporary term ‘chymistry’ marks the crossover process from 
medieval alchemical practice into proto-modern concerns with interacting substances: “Lawrence 
Principe and I have been using this archaic word for nearly a decade to refer to early modern alchemy-
chemistry, a discipline that still viewed the transformation of base metals into gold (chrysopoeia) as 
viable and yet contained much in addition that is identifiable to us moderns as chemistry” (Atoms and 
Alchemy: Chymistry and the Experimental Origins of the Scientific Revolution [London: University of 
Chicago Press, 2006], xi). For reasons of clarity I will also adopt this archaic term, since the stage of 
development of alchemy/chemistry in the medical works I am studying is precisely within the 
epistemological shift that Newman describes. 
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it was the Interests of the Collegiate Corporation of Physitians, who 
lived in ease and Splendour, practising with old Maxims and 
Medicines, not to permit a new laborious Sect of Philosophers, 
working Knowledge out of the fire, by their Industry and Successes, to 
bring a reproach upon them for their Idleness and Superstitious 
devotion to their old heathenish Authors.27
 
 
The bitterness of the debate is clear, and the radical religious critique of pagan sources 
made by proponents of the chymical art is evident.28
 
 Practitioners and theorists such as 
Paracelsus and later Van Helmont and Fludd combined Christian theology with their 
alchemy and experimentation, claiming for example that the separation of substances 
functioned as the biblical accounts of creation by separation: 
Whereas Galenic doctors usually create their remedies by combining 
different substances in order to graduate the qualities of hot and cold, 
moist and dry in the compound, he [Paracelsus] devotes himself not to 
compounding, but to extracting. He aims at separating what is already 
present in matter rather than creating something that does not exist in 
nature. In his conception alchemical scheidung also assumes a 
religious significance: the doctor… simply re-enacts, in an earthly 
dimension, the original scheidung of beings according to Genesis.29
 
 
Much emphasis and support were lent to the proponents of the ‘philosophy of fire’ by 
idealistic members of the Hartlib circle and religious enthusiasts. The process of 
purification was going to reverse the effects of the Fall itself. Working amidst these 
debates was Paget’s one time colleague, Francis Glisson, Regius Professor of Physic at 
Cambridge University, Fellow of the College of Physicians and early member of both 
the “1645 group” and the Royal Society. In the struggle between orthodox Aristotelian 
natural philosophy and the new spagyrical philosophy of fire that raged around him, 
Glisson worked hard to find a middle ground.30
                                                            
27 Marchamont Nedham, Medela Medicinae, A Plea for the Free Profession, and a Renovation of the Art 
of Physic (London, 1665), 9. 
 In 1654 he defended traditional 
medicine, whilst simultaneously proposing the chymical elements as the ultimate 
components of the universe, declaring that Galen’s four humours were “idly clamoured 
by divers chemists upon the mistake that they contradict their 5 principles. Which 
28 For a detailed account of the earlier medical debates of the 1620s that shows the interconnection of 
experimentalism, medicine, chemical philosophy and religious doctrine between Mersenne and Gassendi 
in France and Robert Fludd in England, see Allen G. Debus, The Chemical Philosophy: Paracelsian 
Science and Medicine in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 2 vols. (New York: Dover, 1977), 1: 
260-279. 
29 M.L.Bianchi, ‘The Visible and the Invisible. From Alchemy to Paracelsus’, in Alchemy and Chemistry 
in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, ed. P. Rattansi and A. Clercuzio (London: Kluwer, 1994), 17-
50, 21. 
30 Probably of Paracelsian coinage, ‘spagirical’ philosophy is the philosophy of alchemy. 
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indeed they do not, nor yet Aristotle’s 4 elements, since they are intended but for 
intermediate and not ultimate elements”.31
 
  
In 1639 Glisson had been among the first to accept and teach Harvey’s 
research on the circulation of the blood.32 Glisson’s 1654 publication of Anatomia 
hepatis, in which he uses a chymical notion of the blood’s composition, was early in the 
field, since, unlike Harvey, he was also one of the first in the orthodox medical 
profession to absorb and use the doctrine of the chymists.33
 
 Clericuzio notes 
By the end of the 1650s most English physicians no longer questioned 
the importance of chemistry for both medicine and natural philosophy. 
Willis, Bathurst, Power and Charleton conceived chemical principles 
as the ultimate ingredients of mixed bodies although they gave a 
corpuscular interpretation to this theory.34
 
 
Nevertheless, Nedham’s tract in particular caused a storm of controversy because of the 
virulence of its attacks on orthodox, Galenic medicine. The complexity of the factional 
debate can be seen in Nedham’s attempts to ally his work with that of eminent 
contemporaries: “The numerous references to Willis and Boyle in a book which was 
meant to promote Helmontian medicine show that Nedham’s effort was to legitimate 
Helmontian iatrochemistry as part of the new experimental science”.35
                                                            
31 Francis Glisson, Anatomia hepatis, in English Manuscripts of Francis Glisson: 1. From Anatomia 
hepatis (The Anatomy of the Liver), 1654, ed. A. Cunningham (Cambridge: Cambridge Wellcome Unit, 
1993), 75. 
 There was in fact 
a conciliatory position taken by some elements of the medical establishment from an 
early point of the debate; George Castle, Francis Glisson, George Ent and Thomas 
Wharton were among many who worked using aspects of both chymistry and Galenism. 
Caught between warring factions, Glisson extended his definition of anatomy (which 
already mediates between the abstract divisions of logic and the divisions of the body 
into constituent parts) to include “Anatomia spagyrica” as a chymical anatomy of the 
different constituent parts of a given substance, here that of the blood; briefly he notes 
32 Roger French, William Harvey’s Natural Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 
286-7. 
33 Various sections of this are available in English in English Manuscripts of Francis Glisson: 1. Page 
references are to this edition.  Giglioni’s study of Glisson’s work provides a number of detailed 
translations from those sections which were until then only available in Latin. In fact the text originated 
as a series of lectures given in English. It was Glisson’s friend and colleague George Ent who translated 
the text into Latin for publication.  
34 Antonio Clericuzio, “From Van Helmont to Boyle. A Study of the Transmission of Helmontian 
Chemical and Medical Theories in Seventeenth-Century England,” British Journal for the History of 
Science 26 (1993), 303-334, 313. 
35 Clericluzio, ‘Van Helmont to Boyle’, 323. 
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the all-important “elements of the mixture, as they call them: spirit, oil, water, salt and 
dead earth.”36
 
 This inclusiveness, and in particular the careful combination of 
Aristotelian natural philosophy with a new attention to the dynamic matter of the 
chymists, matches Milton’s own in both Paradise Lost and the Christian Doctrine. 
Milton uses the tropes and ontological categories of natural philosophy and chymistry in 
conceiving of the body-soul composite and his work is both Galenic and Aristotelian. 
This is often taken as an indication of his lack of scientific awareness: both Galenic 
medicine and Aristotelian natural philosophy have too often been perceived by 
historians of medicine (and literary critics) as vehicles of backward-looking orthodoxy, 
in direct conflict with the radical proto-scientific heroics of figures such as William 
Harvey and Robert Boyle. I argue, on the contrary, that this is a reductive position to 
take. 
Kester Svendsen takes the standard line in his statement that Milton’s “medical 
allusions are traditional, even old-fashioned, familiar and acceptable to a mid-
seventeenth-century reader if not to a late seventeenth century scientist.”37
                                                            
36Anatomia hepatis, 19. 
 This is a 
mistake of the literary critic: Svendsen is underestimating the complexity of Milton’s 
engagement with natural philosophy; his own investigation often consists of lists of 
cross-correlated examples which lack depth of analysis. It is also a mistake of the 
historian of science in that Svensen ignores the interplay between the new chymical 
philosophy and older modes of understanding embodied ontology; he underestimates 
the degree to which the Galenic and Aristotelian basis of seventeenth-century natural 
philosophy supported radical experimental enquiry, particularly in the realm of 
biological enquiry. The physiological discoveries of now valorised figures such as 
William Harvey (as well as more obscure ones such as Francis Glisson) emerged from 
an Aristotelian and Galenic basis. There is a distinct match of source and process 
between Milton’s vitalistic conception of the body-soul composite and the vitalist 
natural philosophies that were emerging from anatomy and medical research at the same 
time. Milton is no mechanist, but as Guido Giglioni has observed of the standard critical 
approach to Harvey’s natural philosophy: “Starting from the assumption that the 
corpuscularian and mechanistic world-view represents the telos towards which 
seventeenth-century natural philosophy was irresistibly drawn, it is easy to characterise 
37 Kester Svendsen, Milton and Science (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), 210. 
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alternative views as traditional and outdated.”38 Walter Pagel has shown that the anti-
Aristotelian force of seventeenth-century empirical enquiry took a different, less 
antagonistic form in the developments of biologists than in those of other sciences, a 
form which led to a tendency towards vitalist solutions.39 In fact this vitalism has been 
shown to be part of a significant shift in epistemology that was both philosophically 
fertile and politically radical in its relation to notions of the body politic.40
 
 To dismiss 
such enquiry because it did not lead in a clear line of experiment and discovery to what 
we as readers assume to be true progress (that is, towards a science we recognise and 
valorise as part of a tradition which led to our own world view) is to lose a richly 
significant thread of thought which holds a place in history in its own right and can 
illuminate another level of coherence and beauty in the organisation of Milton’s poem. 
Milton’s materialism has been the subject of a number of excellent studies in 
recent years. John Rumrich has made fundamental contributions to the study of Milton’s 
animist materialism and its theological coherence, referring in particular to the Hebraic 
traditions which inform it.41 Michael Lieb’s study, The Sinews of Ulysses, examines the 
sources and syntheses of transcendent Platonic form and the material forms of the 
Aristotelian tradition in Milton’s work with philosophical verve and precision; his 
Dialectics of Creation offers much detail on the bodiliness of Milton’s poetics and 
contains a fertile but incomplete appendix on the presence of alchemy in Milton’s 
natural philosophy.42
                                                            
38 Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 71.  
 The most outstanding elucidation of Milton’s materialism, 
however, is that of Stephen Fallon’s Milton Among the Philosophers, which delicately 
and coherently uncovers the profound and interdisciplinary logic of Milton’s materialist 
39Walter Pagel, ‘The Reaction to Aristotle in Seventeenth Century Biological Thought: Campanella, Van 
Helmont, Glanville, Charleton, Harvey, Glisson, Descartes’ in Science, Medicine and History. Essays on 
the Evolution of Scientific Thought and Medical Practice Written in Honour of Charles Singer, ed. E. 
Ashworth Underwood, 2 vols. (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), 1: 489-509.  
40 Rogers, The Matter of Revolution has most recently illustrated the political resonances between medical 
theory and the shifting representations of the body politic through the turbulence of the seventeenth 
century. D. P. Walker has explored the political implications of the doctrines of reward and punishment in 
the afterlife in The Decline of Hell: Seventeenth-Century Discussions of Eternal Torment (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964). Pagel proposes that this vitalism as antecedent to the monads of 
Liebniz (‘Reaction to Aristotle’, 503).  
41 John Rumrich, The Matter of Glory: A New Preface to Paradise Lost (London: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1987). For a psychoanalytic approach to similar themes see Rumrich, Milton Unbound: 
Controversy and Reinterpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
42 Michael Lieb, The Sinews of Ulysses: Form and Convention in Milton’s Works (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
UniversityPress, 1989); Dialectics of Creation: Patterns of Birth and Regeneration in Paradise Lost 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970). 
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position.43
 
 Locating Milton’s work in relation to contemporary philosophical and 
theological debates provoked by the mechanist theories of Descartes and Hobbes, as 
well as the less dualistic stance taken by the Cambridge Platonists More and Cudworth, 
Fallon explicates the way that Milton’s animist materialism compares to that of Hobbes 
but finds as well a theological analogue in the Augustinian tradition of evil as 
ontological deprivation. My study everywhere presupposes and relies upon the work 
Fallon has done on Milton’s monism in humans, angels and the natural world, while 
exploring it in relation to Milton’s Aristotelianism (which Fallon only touches on) and a 
particular set of medical theories that were at the forefront of experiment and research in 
the contemporary natural philosophy of the animate body.  
While Svensen’s Milton and Science remains the foundational work on Milton 
and medicine, his attribution to Milton of a backward and stolid medical science has 
been challenged more recently by John Rogers. Rogers has made an innovative 
contribution to the study of Milton’s natural philosophy; building on the work of 
Christopher Hill, which initiated serious scholarly interest in Milton’s radicalism, 
Rogers includes Milton’s Paradise Lost in his study of what he terms the ‘Vitalist 
Moment’ in the natural philosophy of the Interregnum. Rogers reasonably equates 
animist materialism with vitalist natural philosophy, observing that it 
 
holds in its tamest manifestation the inseparability of body and soul 
and, in its boldest, the infusion of all material substance with the 
power of reason and self motion. Energy and spirit, no longer 
immaterial, is seen as immanent within bodily matter, and even non-
organic matter, at least for some vitalists, is thought to contain within 
it agents of motion and change.44
 
 
What Rogers offers in particular is a re-invigorated study of the notion of the body 
politic, one which takes up the links between contemporary chymistry and 
contemporary political radicalism and rereads the long-noted ‘alchemical’ motifs of 
Milton’s greatest poetry in the light of this contemporary explosion of radical natural 
philosophy and medicine. He observes that in contemporary medical science 
 
The brain, the heart, the stomach – all the traditional centres of bodily 
control – are dethroned as the agents of the body’s government. In 
their place rise the random, disparate masses of body tissue that find 
                                                            
43 Stephen Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers: Poetry and Materialism in Seventeenth-Century 
England (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
44 Rogers, Matter of Revolution, 1-2. 
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themselves capable of actions and reactions independent of any 
efferent centre of command.45
 
 
The radical implications of a vital, decentralised body politic have been argued well 
both in Rogers’s work and in that of Hill.46
 
 My study diverges from Rogers’s 
foundational work on two issues: to begin with I have not, here, explicated the full 
political implications of a re-reading of Milton’s vitalism; my study is rather centred 
upon the coherence between Milton’s natural philosophy of the body and soul and his 
theology of free will. Milton is definitely a vitalist poet, but I suggest, contra Rogers, 
that his vitalism is not characterised by random masses of body tissue, but is a logical 
system that supports his depiction of the relation between humankind and God, rather 
than conflicting with it. My second point of divergence is in the definition of vitalism; 
this study will pick out from a number of vitalist theories the work of Francis Glisson, 
which offers the closest analogue to the biology of Adam and Eve and the natural 
philosophy of the unfallen paradise in which they live. Other theories of active matter 
proposed by mechanists or, in particular, iatro-mechanists like Thomas Willis, will be 
used to read the sequences of the poem which deal with the Fall and fallenness. 
The differentiation that I make is based upon the fact that contemporary 
medicine offered a number of different ways of accounting for biological causality. 
Nevertheless, there were also some particular, foundational discoveries and changes in 
the natural philosophy and medical precepts of the mid seventeenth century that were 
particularly relevant to most versions of what we can call vitalism. Harvey’s discovery 
of the blood’s circulation had been accepted in many quarters, and for those who 
accepted it, the Galenic system of humours emanating from bodily organs was totally 
disrupted.47
                                                            
45 Rogers, Matter of Revolution, 107. 
 If the blood circulated, the venous blood could not be emanating from the 
liver while the arterial blood originated in the heart. Famously, Harvey declared the 
blood to be the spirit, drawing on his anatomical investigations to assert that the 
functions and effects of the blood in the body showed that it must “clearly appear that 
the remarkable virtues which the learned attribute to the spirits and the innate heat 
46 Christopher Hill, ‘William Harvey and the Idea of Monarchy’ in Past & Present, no. 27 (April, 1964), 
54-72. See also Hill, Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution Revisited (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997). 
47 For a detailed examination of the development and reception of Harvey’s researches in Britain and 
throughout Europe, see French, William Harvey’s Natural Philosophy, chapter 6 ‘Early reactions in 
England’, 114-149; and chapter 9 ‘Circulation throughout Europe’, 227-285. 
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belong to the blood alone.”48  Harvey made contradictory statements at other times, but 
he and those following in his footsteps and developing his theses were some of the most 
inventive and experimental of those exploring the implications of where or what spirit 
might be if it was not the immaterial principle of the Cambridge Platonists or Cartesian 
mechanists. Harvey’s study of animal reproduction had begun to show that the heart and 
liver were not formed before traces of blood appeared in the egg, so the Aristotelian 
teaching of the primacy of form and the passive, non-active nature of matter was in 
question. Increasingly accurate anatomical research had started to build on these 
discoveries and alarming evidence was emerging to illustrate that there was no 
appreciable difference between human and animal brains.49 Finally, what J. B. Van 
Helmont, the controversial physician and revisionist of Paracelsus, named ‘the madness 
of catarrh’, that is the sort of reliance upon models of the bodily humours that we have 
seen in Milton’s early diagnoses and treatments, was subject to a new anatomical 
precision that showed that there were no passages by which these deleterious humours 
could pass from the brain to the eyes or the joints.50 Walter Pagel’s study of the work of 
Van Helmont notes that in his work on the chymical anatomy of the body, Van Helmont 
had, “with an imposing array of observations and arguments… demonstrated that this 
concept had been based on a humour that did not really exist, on channels freely 
invented, and a production and propagation… just as fictitious as the channels along 
which it was supposed to travel.”51
 
 The field of medicine had been thrown wide open, 
and into the fray stepped another explanatory system: that of fermentation. 
A more ‘modern’ diagnosis than the Galenic one that we have glanced at 
would have the anatomical complexity to assume that different bodily cavities (torso 
                                                            
48 William Harvey, The Works of William Harvey. I have used the 1874 edition, ed. R. Willis (Whitefish: 
Kessinger Reprints, 2009), 510.  
49 This alarming discovery is turned around and used by Willis to argue for the necessary existence of the 
immaterial soul. In his dedicatory letter to Gilbert Sheldon, Archbishop of Canterbury, Willis states that 
“Concerning the Soul, I have enter'd upon a great and difficult thing, and full of hazard; where we may 
equally fear the Censures of the Church, as the Schools.” Later he notes that: “as we have shewn, by 
comparing the Corporeal Soul of the Brute, with the Rational of Man, what vast difference there is 
between them, perhaps it might be to the purpose, to compare the Brains of either, and to observe their 
differences. But... we have noted little or no difference, in the Head of either, as to the Figures and 
Exterior Conformations of the Parts, the Bulk only excepted; that from hence we concluded, the Soul 
Common to Man with the Brutes, to be only Corporeal, and immediately to use these Organs.” (Thomas 
Willis, Two discourses concerning the soul of brutes which is that of the vital and sensitive of man, trans. 
S. Pordage [London, 1683], A2). 
50 For an examination of early alchemical revisions of this theory see Walter Pagel, Paracelsus: An 
Introduction to Philosophical Medicine in the Era of the Renaissance, 2nd edn. (Basel: Karger, 1982), 
166-8. 
51 Walter Pagel, Joan Baptista Van Helmont: Reformer of Science and Medicine (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 137. 
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and head) were separate and humours could not move so easily from one area to 
another. Doctors such as Thomas Willis, Walter Charleton, or Charleton’s colleague 
and one-time inspiration, Frances Glisson, redefined the originary causes of the illness, 
turning from the Galenic balance of humours to the hot medical topic of chymical 
transformations in the body, and attributed gutta serena to a ferment in the blood, 
causing tartareous or ‘morbific’ dregs to build up in vulnerable areas. Paget, too, who 
owned books by these and many more radically chemically minded authors, would have 
been aware of this change. When Willis examines the brain looking for the causes of 
blindness or other sensory deprivation his focus is upon the flow of animal spirits in the 
nerves that connect the eyes and brain: “it plainly appears, that the Offices of the 
Interior Motions, and Senses, as well as the Exterior, are acted by the help of the 
Animal Spirits, ordained within certain and distinct Paths, or as it were small little 
Pipes.”52
 
 The move from prescribing issues and seatons to drain the morbific matter to 
one that expressed a concern that this treatment had caused the removal of necessary 
spirits for the other eye would fit easily into this shift in medical knowledge.  
In his Experimental Philosophy (1664) Glisson’s student, Henry Power, in fact 
notes precisely Milton’s disease in a digression from his main subject which is the 
power of fermentation in the substances and spirits of the body ands the wider natural 
world. This is a rare reference to disease since Power is writing in this publication as a 
natural philosopher rather than as a physician. He notes that the eye is full of animal 
spirits and that 
 
Dimness of sight comes from deficiency of them, though the parts of 
the eye otherways be entire enough, as in sick and old persons, and in 
those troubled with an Amaurosis, or Gutta Serena. I had the last year 
a patient... who fell casually stark blind in his right eye; in which you 
could outwardly discover no fault at all (the Disease being Amaurosis, 
or obstruction of the Optick Nerve) for, that Nerve being by successful 
means disobstructed and relaxed, so that the Animal Spirits were able 
to flow to the Retina again, he shortly after recovered his sight.53
  
 
Power declines to elaborate upon the actual means by which the visual nerve is 
‘disobstructed’ and relaxed but the diagnosis of cause no longer concentrates upon 
phlegmatic humours from the digestion or the brain; instead, the focus of the problem is 
                                                            
52 Willis, Two Discourses, 27. 
53 Henry Power, Experimental Philosophy, In Three Books containing New Experiments Microscopical, 
Mercurial, Magnetical, With some Deductions and Probable Hypotheses, raised from them, in 
Avouchment and Illustration of the now famous Atomical Hypothesis (London, 1664), 68. 
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on a lack of animal spirits. The change of diagnosis in the anonymous biography (in 
which the Galenic treatments were supposed to have increased the blindness by further 
reducing the animal spirits) matches this shift.  
 
Thomas Willis, a founder member of the Royal Society and an early pioneer of 
the study of neuro-anatomy, was part of a new generation of doctors whose research 
synthesised chymistry, corpuscularian doctrine and the Aristotelian and Galenic 
foundations of contemporary medicine. He was at the forefront of the new, experimental 
philosophy. In his study of the pathology of fever Willis makes a succinct summary of 
the shift from one model of causality to another: 
 
it hath been far otherways taught, by the Opinion of the Vulgar, to wit, 
that fumes and vapors are raised up from the Chyle, or Humors 
growing hot within the Viscera of Concoction, which cloud the 
Brain... this Opinion easily falls, since the Circulation of the Blood, 
and the more plentiful Suffusion of it on the Brain, have been known; 
and that the rather, because a passage from the Stomach into the Head, 
thorow so many Inwards, and bony Cloysters, like stops,  seem 
impervious, or not passable for the sending up of fumes. Without 
doubt, much the greatest part of the Humor, with which the Brain is 
watered, and the Spirits inhabiting it, over-turned, during Sleep, is 
carried by the Arteries, and distilled in immediately from the Mass of 
Blood.54
 
 
This shift affects not only the diagnosis of blindness, but also, of course, that of arthritic 
complaints such as gout. Instead of anatomically unverifiable floating humours, the 
problem must be in the chymical composition of the blood, which does travel through 
recognisable passages to the brain. By 1672 and the publication of Thomas Willis’s De 
anima brutorum, Willis is elaborating on the ‘modern’ opinion that gout is caused by a 
ferment in the blood, and citing the build up of a salty deposit on the joints and a 
connected pathological acidity in the juice of the nerves, which activates the disease: 
“according to the opinions of... [the] Moderns, it be affirmed, that some impurities 
falling off from the heated Blood, and received by the joints, is the material cause of the 
                                                            
54 Thomas Willis, Dr. Willis's practice of physick being the whole works of that renowned and famous 
physician, trans. S. Pordage, (London 1684),  91. Willis published his major tracts on fermentation and 
fever in Latin in a compendium of 1659; All citations (apart from those to Two Discourses, Pordage’s 
translation of De anima brutorum, which is cited as an individual publication as stated above) are taken 
here from Samuel’s Pordage’s English translation published some years later in which the tracts remain 
individually paginated. For a succinct introduction to Willis’s work and its religious and political 
background see, James P B O'Connor, ‘Thomas Willis and the background to Cerebri Anatome’ in 
Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 96. 3 (2003), 139-143.  
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Goutish pain.”55 Of course the publication of this research post-dates the production of 
Paradise Lost by several years. But Willis was far from being the first to propose that 
the fluids of the body distilled spirit out of themselves. In Glisson’s work, too, the 
Galenic model is rejected because it “presupposes a pervasive motion of phlegmatic 
humors outside the vessels.”56
 
  
Giglioni’s analysis of Glisson’s teaching notes or determinationes of the early 
1650s shows that arthritic diseases such as gout were already being re-diagnosed as a 
problem of fermentation. The humoral theory is not entirely dispensed with; indeed 
Glisson, just like most other doctors of the time, continues to use the languages of the 
older tradition fairly regularly. However, humoral theory is superseded in terms of 
identifying the pathological cause of gout: 
 
Glisson considers that in themselves, bile, phlegm, melancholy, and 
serum, even when they become dominant in the mass of blood... do 
not cause arthritis. The real cause is a process of fermentation 
occurring in the blood, and especially in the serum, which brings the 
mass of the blood to a ‘vinous condition’. This is also proven by 
excesses of wine and sex, which increase the disposition to arthritis by 
facilitating the fermentation of the blood and consequently the 
exaltation of the spirits. The result of this fermentation is a tartareous 
residue which takes the form of a calculous sedimentation in the 
joints.57
 
  
The active, vital matter of humans, angels and the natural world of Paradise Lost is, I 
will argue, formulated in the terms of precisely this sort of medical research. The 
continued respect for Aristotle in the sphere of cutting edge contemporary physic and 
the powerful religious determinants of chymical research make it possible for Milton to 
cohere his theological imperatives with the natural philosophy that underpins them. 
 
 
 
                                                            
55 Willis, Two Discourses, 214. 
56 Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 149. 
57 Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 149. Giglioni cites MS Sloane 3310 
(“Arthritidis causa non est necessario frigid”), ff. 45r-50r. Glisson’s teaching notes are described thus: 
“Among Glisson's manuscript papers there are more than 250 of his ‘solutions’ (determinationes) of 
students' disputations on various topics, ranging from recent discoveries in anatomy to materia medica, 
from new developments in therapeutics to prophylaxis, from the penetration of revolutionary ideas in 
medicine to the proper way of administering bloodletting. Relying on the dates that some of the 
determinationes have and on internal evidence, we can assume that Glisson wrote most of his 
determinationes between the end of the 1640s and the beginning of 1660s” (104). 
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Thesis overview  
 
Each chapter of my dissertation explores different areas of Paradise Lost, but 
each chapter also revisits certain central passages and themes in the light of new layers 
of natural philosophy, medical doctrine and research. Satan’s attempt upon the sleeping 
Eve provides one of the most detailed representations of the workings of body and spirit 
in Paradise Lost; the borders between chaos and the created world and the interactions 
of light and matter in the cosmology of Paradise Lost give a wider context of natural 
philosophy in which to place the human body-soul composites and the angels they 
encounter; Raphael’s comments on angelic love and digestion and his “one first matter 
all” speech are for me, as for many students of Milton, invaluable resources in 
understanding the natural philosophy of the body and the natural world in the poem. 
Finally, Milton’s insistence in the Christian Doctrine on the coincidence of nature, 
Aristotelian causality and divine agency is a central motif in this study, which aims to 
set Milton’s representation of body and soul harmoniously within the context of both 
contemporary medical theory and his own fundamental theological criteria. 
 
Chapter 1 begins with an examination of Milton’s comments on the soul and its 
embodiment in the Christian Doctrine; noting his consistent use of the language of 
natural philosophy in describing the body-soul composite, this chapter explores the way 
that natural philosophy serves Milton’s materialist theology. Focusing on his evident 
traducianism, in which the rational soul is produced through the same process of 
generation that produces the body, the chapter notes the amalgamation of the 
traditionally immaterial rational spirit with the bodily spirits of medical tradition and 
charts some of the objections that this heresy drew from other commentators. 
Traducianism relied upon the theory that out of matter or material forms could come, 
eventually, rational thought, and thus it demanded a re-evaluation of the ontological 
status of matter as active, or even vital. This ‘hylozoism’ was defined by Ralph 
Cudworth (amongst others) as one of the four fundamental heresies that support 
atheism, but for Milton the orthodox theory of creationism (or indeed any theory of 
generation that attributes the origin of the fallen soul to God) could not be integrated 
with a coherent theodicy. Comparing Francis Glisson’s ‘hylozoistic’ natural philosophy 
to Milton’s animist materialism, I note that there are fundamental similarities between 
Glisson’s vitalism and the natural philosophy expressed in Raphael’s “one first matter 
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all” speech. Finally I turn from Milton’s declared monism to note the seeming 
discrepancy between this monism and the Aristotelian language with which he describes 
the body-soul composite, asking if and how this monism can be coherent in an 
Aristotelian framework. 
 
Having observed Milton’s Aristotelian natural philosophy of the animate body-
soul composite and his concurrent commitment to monism, Chapter 2 goes on to 
investigate this antinomy. Charting critical difficulties in reconciling the dualism of 
form and matter and the related problem of transcendence and immanence of body-soul 
ontology in Milton’s work, this chapter opens up the question of the heterogeneity of 
the Aristotelian inheritance in seventeenth-century science and observes that the 
innovations of the medical tradition evolved out of a more measured and respectful 
response than that given by other areas of developing ‘science’ to the classical heritage 
that was being gradually overturned. The central dualism with which Milton must 
contend in order to make his monist natural philosophy, and thus his theory of body and 
soul, consistent is that of matter and form; this is relevant to his natural philosophy as a 
whole, but to generation and the traducian heresy in particular. Examining this more 
closely prepares us for a reading of the causal modes in both the creation and the natural 
philosophy of unfallen paradise. From a brief examination of the coherence between 
theology and the cosmology described in Paradise Lost emerges a natural philosophy in 
which Aristotelian structure is made dynamic with elements of contemporary chymical 
theory. This is a combination characteristic of Glisson’s work and the chapter explores 
further how Aristotelian categories of form and matter are re-interpreted in his 
physiology as similary (unformed) fluids and spirits and (formed) organs. Looking in 
particular at the representations of Eve in Paradise Lost we can chart significant 
similarities between physiology in the poem and that described in Glisson’s medical 
research. Any immediately identifiable dualist concepts are reserved for the action of 
Satan upon Eve or the serpent. The adjustments to notions of form and matter in 
Glisson’s work and in Milton’s poetry match, but they also also rearranged in the same 
way in Milton’s Art of Logic. While it has remained something of a neglected text, the 
Art of Logic explores directly Milton’s interpretation of the Aristotelian causal modes, 
giving us a sense of how he is reinterpreting notions of causality in a philosophical 
sense. Again, his innovations and adjustments repeat those of the radical, chymically-
minded physician.  
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Having shown that Milton’s ‘science’ is not as backward or as orthodox as 
critics such as Hunter and Svensen have claimed, the dissertation offers a closer, more 
detailed scrutiny of contemporary medical vitalism. Chapter 3 takes up Roger’s 
attribution to Milton of a radical vitalist materialist natural philosophy, but seeks to 
elaborate the somewhat unsophisticated version of vitalism that he offers. Demarcating 
different strands of vitalism within contemporary medical discourse, this chapter 
explores the underlying determinants of Francis Glisson’s vitalist philosophy with a 
new attention to the breadth and detail of his work. His re-evaluation of the intrinsic 
power of matter is made by vitalising an essentially Aristotelian structure (in particular 
the productive relations between form, matter and vital heat) with the independent 
interactive material forces observed in chymical medical theory. Standard models of 
force and bio-mechanism in the body are re-defined into a dynamically vital but 
stratified ontological order of spirit and thicker substance. This model of the causal 
power of matter and spirit is shown to be coherent with Milton’s natural philosophy of 
matter and spirit as they are represented in the cosmological meeting point of chaos and 
holy light in Paradise Lost. The chapters that follow will use this essential model of 
vital matter to elaborate comparisons between medical processes as they were re-
imagined by vitalist physicians and the representations of bodily processes and 
animation in various areas of Paradise Lost.  
 
Chapter 4 is the first to do so, and it examines the parallels between the new 
theories of conception that were being developed (most famously by Harvey, but also 
by Glisson and others) and various accounts of Creation in Paradise Lost. In comparing 
the different medical theories of conception, this chapter begins by observing that the 
Aristotelian dualism of form and matter met distinct problems in the experimental work 
done by Harvey in his research for Generatione animalium. It goes on to show that 
Glisson’s chymical anatomy of the blood both emerged from and worked to 
authenticate such research by modifying this Aristotelian doctrine. The chapter 
demonstrates parallels between the physicians’ vital fluid of conception and the warm 
prolific humours of the Creation and between the creative agencies of Holy Spirit, vital 
spirit and light. Thus the ‘mixt’ of active and vital fluid and spirit, which transforms 
itself into blood and, eventually, organs, gives a basis in the natural philosophy of the 
body for the divine spirit and matter that enact the work of Creation in Paradise Lost. 
Overall, the chapter seeks to place the work of Glisson and of Milton in harmony with 
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each other, thus validating both the scientific knowledge base of the poetry and the 
religious intent of the medical work.  
 
In reading Milton’s Creation, vitalism gives us a model of how body emerges 
from spirit in Paradise Lost; the same medical vitalism can also be read alongside the 
emergence of spirit out of body, a dynamic that works throughout the natural 
philosophy of unfallen paradise, in what Fallon describes as the “metabolism of the 
animate world,” as well as in the metabolism of humans and angels.58
 
 A dualism that is 
more obviously relevant to human body and soul, is that of the anima, or bodily 
animation and its relation to the notion of nous, or abstract, rational faculty. My 
approach to this relation between one order of animation and another will be through an 
exploration of the dynamic of digestion, for it is Raphael’s natural philosophy of 
nutrition which links the human rational faculty (as well as his own superior intellect) 
into the dynamic order which includes the lower faculties. In all areas, medical, 
philosophical and poetic, what we find is an Aristotelian basis which has been vitalised 
(and thus radicalised) by chymical theories of medical knowledge and substance 
transformation. 
Building on the work of Fallon, and Schoenfeldt, chapter 5 begins with a focus 
upon the way that Paradise Lost uses digestion as a fundamental model for physical and 
spiritual transformation. The body-soul composite of Paradise Lost sublimes lower 
level spirit and matter into blood, organs and, finally, intellectual activity. The first 
section of this chapter analyses the process of sublimation as it was proposed by more 
radical elements (both vitalist and mechanist) of the medical establishment, exploring 
their appropriation and reinterpretation of this alchemical concept. It demonstrates how 
the successive sublimations in the radical medical body-soul composite match and 
substantiate those represented in unfallen paradise. The second section goes on to 
consider the implications of certain key concepts and phrases borrowed from the radical 
medical tradition. The “spirits odorous” of the flowers and fruit of paradise are 
considered in the light of the Helmontian notion of the ‘odour’ as an active element of 
the ferment. The particular responses of the different angels to the odorous sweetness of 
paradise open up an analysis of the differences and similarities between angelic and 
human physiology and psychology in Milton’s materialist paradigm. The examination 
of Milton’s material angels, and their capacity to interpenetrate one another, leads to a 
                                                            
58 Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, 106. 
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consideration of the contemporary debate on the penetration of substances; in direct 
conflict with both Aristotelian orthodoxy and the emerging mechanist models, the 
material spirits of both Milton and Glisson rely for their vital interactions and 
sublimations upon this mutual penetrability. 
 
The final section of chapter 5 investigates the similarities and differences 
between ideas of matter in vitalist monism and corpuscular mechanism. The mechanists 
are shown to have borrowed much from chymical doctrine, but Milton’s position is 
located in the theological connection between vitalism and free will as opposed to the 
voluntarist theology that supported the mechanist proponents of active matter. Chapter 6 
continues the investigation into corpuscular versions of active matter in the body; the 
focus is upon the dualism inherent in the works of Walter Charleton and Thomas Willis 
on the corporeal soul. The vitae chorea (dance of life) that Glisson envisages in the vital 
interactions of the body’s substances is re-modelled to incorporate the battles between 
the (rational) spirit and the flesh that characterise orthodox Pauline dualism. This 
discordance is shown to correlate with corruption and increasing distance from God in 
Milton’s schema of sprit and matter; it is also correlated with the notion of the 
corrupting ferment in medical research. This chapter delineates the differences between 
the ferment as productive of perfecting vital heat in the healthy body-soul composite 
and the toxic fermentation that brings disease. Once again, Glisson’s work correlates 
most closely with Milton’s natural philosophy of spirit and matter, this time because he 
differentiates most carefully between the perfecting action of the body’s fluids and 
spirits and the corrupting influence of the putrefying ferment. The physiological effects 
of the fruit can thus be read through the lens of this theory of poisonous fermentation. 
This notion of the ferment itself stands upon various determinants; it retains something 
of the Galenic notion of disease as a self-causing imbalance, but it also demonstrates the 
contemporary development of ideas of external infection. Like the ferment, the fruit’s 
spirits cause a hallucinatory exhilaration of the highest spirits of the body (and thus a 
concomitant loss of rationale), which leads to a sulphurous burning of the blood and, 
finally, to the build up of stony deposits in the animate body. 
 
Exploring again the literal linkage between matter and spirit in the 
macrocosmic Creation and the microcosmic animate body, this chapter shows how 
demonic reduction of sulphur and nitre (the ingredients of life) in heaven and hell 
parallels the feverish action of the diseased blood in contemporary medicine. The 
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ubiquitous and fertile nature of the ferment solves the problem of how the Fall might 
infect not only Adam and Eve’s offspring with natural evil, but the wider natural world 
in which they live. This corruption and the newly conflicting relation between different 
levels of spirit and matter in the body-soul composite leave it in a literally chaotic state. 
The final section of the chapter, however, turns to healing and regeneration, considering 
the medical significance of the action of prevenient grace on the human heart. Drawing 
a comparison between the vitalist Creation of chapter 4 and Milton’s distinctly vitalist 
representation of the regeneration of the body-soul composite, this chapter turns once 
again to Glisson for an analogous natural philosophy. Corruption is shown to be the true 
curse of the Fall; Milton’s Michael offers Adam and Eve a process of growth and 
change that is a ripening rather than a decomposition and physical death appears as 
much a final mercy as a punishment. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Theological imperatives and natural philosophy 
 
 
i. The material soul of the Christian Doctrine 
 
The animist materialism of the body-soul composite in Paradise Lost is 
theorised in the Christian Doctrine. Without wishing to use the Christian Doctrine as a 
‘gloss’ on Paradise Lost, this study seeks rather to uncover new levels of congruity and 
coherence between the two works. There are three central points that appertain to the 
materiality of the human form that are both directly stated in the work of doctrine and 
represented in the poem. Perhaps one of the most well known is that of Mortalism; 
implied, but never directly stated in Paradise Lost, it is a point of doctrine argued at 
some length in the Christian Doctrine. The rational soul, as the primary agent of sin, 
receives the same punishment as the rest of the human form; this aspect of the soul will 
be explored in chapter 6. Another striking aspect of the soul that Milton describes is its 
profoundly embodied state; the terminology used to describe it uses medical lore and 
categories of natural philosophy. Finally, Milton’s natural philosophy and his theology 
both demand the support of the traducian heresy, that is, the material origin of the 
rational soul itself. 
 
In the Christian Doctrine, Milton makes his fundamental point that man “is 
not… composed of two different and distinct elements, soul and body… the whole man 
is the soul, and the soul the man: a body, in other words, or individual substance, 
animated, sensitive and rational.”59
 
 The drive of Milton’s argument is towards his 
famous and peremptory conclusion that: 
                                                            
59 All references are made to Complete Prose Works of John Milton, ed. Don M. Wolfe et al. 8 vols. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1953-1982), 6: 317; hereafter cited as CPW by volume and page numbers. 
This is a different system to the orthodox Galenic/Aristotelian triumvirate of vegetative, vital and rational. 
As we shall see later, this indicates, in fact the anatomy of the late seventeenth century proposed both by 
vitalists and by certain mechanists who attributed activity and motive force, if not life, to matter. 
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The idea that the spirit of man is separate from his body, so that it may 
exist somewhere in isolation, complete and intelligent, is nowhere to 
be found in scripture, and is plainly at odds with nature and reason.60
 
 
There could not be a more clearly phrased opposition to the orthodox assertion of an 
abstract intelligence which inhabits an instrumental body, and which ascends (or 
descends) at the moment of bodily death; the spirit here must be an integral part of the 
physical entity. In Milton’s biblical exegesis of the term, he does not simply use the 
more materialistic biblical terminology of the Old Testament.61
 
 He states that 
man himself, the whole man, I say, when finally created is specifically 
referred to as a living soul. Hence the word soul is interpreted by the 
apostle, I Cor. xv. 45, as meaning animal. And all the properties of the 
body are attributed to the soul as well: touch… the ability to eat… 
hunger… thirst… [and] apprehensibility.62
 
 
This soul is not trapped within a body, it is bodily; one of the most heretical aspects of 
this body-soul composite is its emergence out of the material bodies of human parents. 
God, in Milton’s reading, ceased direct creation of everything, including the human 
soul, on the seventh day: 
 
On the seventh day God ceased to create and completed the entire 
work of creation... the human soul is generated by the parents in the 
course of nature, and not created daily by the immediate act of God.63
 
 
This denial of creationism was extremely problematic to orthodox writers in both 
religious and medical disciplines. Thomas Willis and Ralph Cudworth both bring the 
traducian heresy up in order to criticise and dismiss it. Willis’s dismissal is 
comparatively brief; anxious about the implications of his study of the brain and 
nervous system he insists on the first page of his treatise that 
 
some deserving very ill of themselves, have affirmed the Souls of Man 
and the Beasts only to differ in degrees of Perfection; and so that 
either alike must be either Mortal or Immortal, and alike propagated 
ex traduce or from the Parent.  Wherefore that the Dignity, Order, and 
Immortality of the Rational Soul, discriminated from the Corporeal, 
may be vindicated, and likewise that we may make a way to the 
                                                            
60 CPW  6: 319 
61 On the whole (although not exclusively) the Old Testament has a tendency to treat the soul as a 
physical entity, either as the holistic ‘living soul’ or as the blood (‘soul’ designates a living human being, 
for example, at Genesis 2:7, Exodus 1:5, Leviticus 17:15 and animation, or life is equated with the blood 
at Genesis 9:4, Leviticus 17:14, Deuteronomy 12:23). 
62 CPW 6: 318. 
63 CPW 6: 319. 
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remaining Pathology, or Method of Curing of the Brain and Nervous 
Stock... therefore at present, we shall endeavour to deliver a certain 
Doctrine of the Soul64
 
 
Willis is keen to differentiate his study from the accusations of atheism that physic often 
attracted. From Thomas Browne’s wry comment upon “the generall scandall of my 
profession” through to theatrical conflation of the anatomist and the atheist in 
Tourneur’s attempt to imagine a totally amoral character in The Atheist’s Tragedy 
(1611) there is, throughout various genres of Renaissance literature, a fascinated 
tendency to associate the medical practitioner with a dangerous godlessness.65
 
 This 
tendency still emerges in the modern critical tradition although the ‘atheistic’ attempt to 
escape the confines of religious doctrine and taboo is now more often celebrated as a 
proto-modern concern with rational thought and scientific rigour, rather than a scandal.   
 Cudworth, in contrast to Willis’s brief disclaimer, devotes his immense study 
to the discovery of scandalous atheism, which, it seems, lurks deviously in almost all 
forms of materialist thought, and in particular that which concerns the soul. He is clear 
about the relationship between materialist versions of the soul and atheism; modern 
atheist doctrine, he states, declares that 
 
life and animality, soul and mind, being all but accidents and 
affections in this matter (as if therefore they had no real entity at all in 
them), are generable out of nothing, and corruptible into nothing, so 
long as the matter, in which they are, still remains the same. The result 
of which is no less than this, that there can be no other gods or god 
than such as was at first made or generated out of senseless matter and 
may be corrupted again into it... here indeed lies the grand mystery of 
Atheism.66
 
 
If life and animation, as well soul and mind are effects of matter (which is traditionally 
endowed with a negative or lesser ontological force than immaterial agents such as 
                                                            
64 Willis, Two discourses, 1. 
65Thomas Browne, Religio Medici (London, 1642). For more detailed discussions on the various angles of 
this problem see Guido Giglioni, ‘Anatomist Atheist? The ‘Hylozoistic’ Foundations of Francis Glisson’s 
Anatomical Research’ in Religio Medici: Medicine and Religion in Seventeenth-Century England, ed. 
Grell and Cunningham (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1996) pp115-135; Jonathon Sawday, The Body 
Emblazoned: Dissection and the Human Body in Renaissance Culture (London: Routledge, 1995) see 
especially Chapter 4 ‘Execution, Anatomy and Infamy’; John Henry, ‘Medicine and Pneumatology: 
Henry More, Richard Baxter and Francis Glisson’s Treatise on the Energetic Nature of Substance’ in 
Medical History 31 (1987), 15-40. 
66 Ralph Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe: wherein all the Reason and Philosophy 
of Atheism is Confuted (1678). I have used the 1820 edition (Whitefish: Kessinger Reprints, 2010), 1:257-
8. 
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Aristotelian form, Platonic ideas or Holy Spirit) then everything of traditionally 
immaterial being including abstract thought and ultimately God can be corrupted back 
into nonentity. In orthodox thought, creationism ruled that the rational soul was inspired 
by God into each new human life; it was normally carefully partitioned off from the 
lower orders of animation that were shared with the rest of the living world, and 
reserved for the concern of theologians. Willis must concern himself with the rational 
soul because of the nature of his research, but physicians and natural philosophers 
would normally ensure that they had made some sort of disclaimer to any knowledge of 
or concern with the rational soul in their writings.67
 
  
Speculation on the crossover between the notion of rational spirit that 
constituted the orthodox soul (and was related by implication, particularly through the 
Creation narrative, to the notion of Holy Spirit), and the notion of medical spirits in the 
body drew vitriolic responses from orthodox writers of both medicine and theology. 
Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy puts it thus: 
 
Hierome, Austin, and other Fathers of the church, hold that the soul is 
immortal, created of nothing, and so infused into the child or embryo 
in his mother's womb, six months after the conception; not as those of 
brutes, which are ex traduce, and dying with them vanish into nothing. 
To whose divine treatises, and to the Scriptures themselves, I rejourn 
all such atheistical spirits. 68
 
 
Although various writers of the Renaissance did articulate this cross-over of ideas about 
spirit (often those whose work occupied the borders between medicine and theology, 
such as Michael Servetus), they were, as Walker notes, unusual and extremely 
heretical.69
 
 Milton, however, cannot accept creationism for reasons of theodicy. This 
infusion of the soul into the foetus (and pre-existence, the Platonic position) both imply 
that since the Fall, the soul which originates with God must either be created impure 
and thus fallen, which would imply God’s responsibility for its impurity, or it must be 
created pure and then trapped in a fallen body. Milton argues with some passion that: 
to create pure souls which lack original righteousness, and then put 
them into contaminated and vicious bodies, to surrender them to the 
                                                            
67 Maurice Kelley notes that Creationism “became the prevailing view of the medieval church and of 
Reformation Calvinism” (CPW 6: 316,  n. 58). 
68 Burton, Anatomy of Melancholy, section i, memb. ii, subsect. ix, ‘of the rational soul’ 
(http://www.psyplexus.com/burton/6.htm [16/03/08]). 
69 Walker, ‘Medical spirits’, 289. 
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body as to an enemy, imprisoned, innocent and unarmed, with blinded 
intellect and with will enchained, quite deprived, in other words, of 
the strength which is needed to resist the body’s vicious tendencies – 
to do all this would argue injustice as much as to create them impure 
would argue [God’s] impurity.70
 
 
A soul newly or directly created by God could not be impure or fallen, for that would 
impugn God’s own purity, and the infusion of innocent souls into ‘contaminated and 
vicious bodies’ would equally impute to God a cruel injustice. The harsh truth of evil, 
suffering and death that Milton lays at the door of the Fall must not be imputed to God’s 
direct action, therefore the rational soul itself must emerge from the natural, material 
process of generation. Repeatedly, Milton insists that “if sin is transmitted from the 
parents to the child in the act of generation, then... the original subject of sin, namely the 
rational soul, must also be propagated by the parents.”71
 
  
The arguments made by Cudworth, as well as less complex ones made by 
lesser figures such as Burton, assume that the material is ontologically deficient because 
it grows, changes and corrupts. Milton, in contrast, attributes to matter an originary 
purity because of its necessarily divine origin, and thus retains a certain amount of 
changeability within the category of the divine itself.72 Matter cannot have been a prior 
factor independent of an infinite creative God, and the corruptions to which it is subject 
are not part of its essence. Instead, when it “has become the property of another, what is 
there to prevent its being infected and polluted, since it is now in a mutable state, by the 
calculations of the devil or of man... which proceed from these creatures themselves.”73 
Matter that is not under the direct control of God is vulnerable to pollution, infection 
and misuse, but free will is a mutable state since it demands that God should not directly 
control material ontology. Yet material ontology originates with God as all things do; in 
one aside, Milton declares that “God is as truly the Father of the flesh as he is of the 
spirits of the flesh.”74
 
 There is no other, immaterial realm dividing matter from God; 
consequently spirit and flesh are not the dual ontological categories for Milton that they 
are in all areas of contemporary orthodoxy. 
                                                            
70 CPW 6: 321. 
71 CPW 6: 321. 
72 See chapter 2 and chapter 6 for Milton’s rejection of the scholastic notion of God as Actus Purus. 
73 CPW 6: 309. 
74 CPW 6: 324. 
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Milton’s reference to the “spirits of the flesh” adds a peculiar twist to the 
Pauline notion of spirit. To begin with, these spirits are multiple, rather than a singular 
category of spirit; these spirits are also of the flesh, which leaves them barely distinct 
from the category of flesh at all. I would like to explore the language with which Milton 
describes spirit, soul and body in the light of his consistent use of the terms and 
concepts of the natural philosophy of the body. In his explication of the biblical use of 
the term ‘spirit’, Milton makes a clear appeal to contemporary natural philosophy of the 
body:  
 
In Holy Scripture that word spirit means nothing but the breath of life, 
which we breathe; or the vital or sensitive or rational faculty, or some 
action or affection belonging to them.75
 
 
Relentlessly excluding the singular, immaterial and abstracted theories of spirit, this 
definition marks the joining together of religious spirit and bodily spirits. Inherent in 
Milton’s materialist description of the soul-body composite are the ontological 
categories of spirit that we only otherwise meet in medical discourse. He states that:  
 
in a context where ‘body’ means merely physical trunk, “soul” may 
mean either the spirit or its secondary faculties, such as the vital or 
sensitive faculty. So to avoid confusion, “soul” is as frequently 
distinguished from “spirit” as it is from “body.”76
 
 
This statement defines contextual usages of the terms as opposed to their ‘actual’ 
meaning. Even when one is in the context of ‘body’ meaning mere ‘physical trunk’, 
soul does not simply mean ‘will’ and neither does spirit equate directly to intellect, 
despite the fact that the will is enacted by the vital motion of the body, and the spiritual 
faculty of reason deals with the intelligible. We can assume that his reference to ‘the 
spirit’ is to the primary order, the rational faculty, but (and here we depart from 
theological orthodoxy and approach rather the Aristotelian) the terms ‘spirit’ and ‘soul’ 
may also both refer to secondary faculties, either vital or sensitive. We begin to see 
Milton’s explication of theological terms within the order of natural philosophy: all 
three ontological categories (vital, sensitive and rational), whether traditionally material 
or immaterial are indicated by the term ‘soul’.  
 
                                                            
75 CPW 6: 317. 
76 CPW 6: 318-9. 
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The overall argument gives a combination of theological imperatives – the 
necessity of working from the Genesis account of creation with accuracy and the 
necessity of theodicy – which are then supported by a matrix of natural philosophy in 
the form of Galenic categories and Aristotelian materialism. It is no surprise that Milton 
should have a notion of the body-soul composite that supports his theodicy, nor that he 
should have worked it out and represented it in some detail. Milton’s final comments in 
this discussion turn to the Aristotelian conception of the soul as defined by the 
scholastic position, anima est tota in toto, et tota in qualibet parte:  
 
which I think a very strong one indeed, that if the soul is wholly 
contained in all the body and wholly in any given part of that body, 
how can the human seed, that intimate and most noble part of the body 
be imagined destitute and devoid of the soul of the parents.77
 
 
This scholastic tag obviously resonates with Milton’s assertion that the whole man is the 
soul and the soul the whole man; this coincidence of body-soul models is taken further 
however when Milton mentions the materiality of Aristotelian form. Briefly, he 
comments that “nearly everyone agrees that all form – and the human soul is a kind of a 
form – is produced by the power of matter.”78
 
 But, of course, the fact is that while forms 
per se were conceived of as material, or rather that the division of form and matter were 
given by Aristotelian orthodoxy as only divisible by intellectual abstraction, the human 
soul was consistently conceived of as the exception to this rule. 
 
 
ii. The contemporary medical body: some terminology 
 
Since Milton’s representation of the body-soul composite is couched in terms 
of natural philosophy, let us look at the words in some very early contexts to build up a 
sense of their original meanings. In the opening paragraphs of Galen’s On the Natural 
Faculties he gives a compact series of definitions of his own terminology thus: 
 
I mean by an effect that which has already come into existence and 
has been completed by the activity of these faculties - for example, 
                                                            
77 CPW 6. 321-2. Milton continues, qualifying this basic statement with the paternalist note “or at least of 
the father, when communicated to the son in the act of generation”. This is one of many examples of how 
Milton’s belief in rational human free will and his patriarchal assumptions occasionally confound each 
other; as it is an aside I shall leave it as one. 
78 CPW 6: 322. 
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blood, flesh, or nerve. And activity is the name I give to the active 
change or motion, and the cause of this I call a faculty. Thus, when 
food turns into blood, the motion of the food is passive, and that of the 
vein active. Similarly, when the limbs have their position altered, it is 
the muscle which produces, and the bones which undergo the motion. 
In these cases I call the motion of the vein and of the muscle an 
activity, and that of the food and the bones a symptom or affection, 
since the first group undergoes alteration and the second group is 
merely transported.79
 
 
‘Faculty’ is given as a cause here. Galen is concentrating, in this text, upon the natural 
faculties, and those of generation, nutrition and growth, rather than any of the higher 
faculties. Before Harvey’s discovery of the circulation, the food was envisaged as 
turning into blood through the vegetative action of the liver and venous system; the 
heart vitalised the arterial blood.80 An ‘activity’ is an active motion in the body, 
impelled through an active part such as the muscle; the symptom, or affection, is the 
motion of that part which is acted upon and moved, such as the food. The Aristotelian 
schema of cause, act and effect clearly orders this conception of the body’s functioning, 
and the binary order of passive substance (matter) which is acted upon by a cause of 
motion (form) is clearly present. Milton’s inclusion of the faculties, and of the ‘actions’ 
and ‘affections’ belonging to them, in his definition of the soul identifies his comment 
as being underpinned by the Galenic/Aristotelian medical tradition. 81 The notions of 
vital, sensitive and rational faculties and the concomitant ‘actions’ and ‘affections’ are 
drawn straight from medical orthodoxy, but they include the rational faculty in a 
distinctly unorthodox way. Nevertheless, while it is true that according to Galen, the 
cause of actual change in the body is named a ‘faculty’, in fact Galen is quite explicit 
about the emptiness of the term, noting that: “so long as we are ignorant of the true 
essence of the cause which is operating, we call it a faculty”.82
                                                            
79 Galen, On the Natural Faculties, section 2. (http://classics.mit.edu/Galen/natfac.1.one.html [01/04/08]). 
 Milton, as we shall see, 
was more precise about how what impels action in the body-soul composite. While 
Galenic medicine was grounded in Aristotelian natural philosophy, one fundamental 
problem shared with metaphysical philosophy and theology (a problem that the notions 
80 Gail Kern Paster, ‘Nervous Tension: Networks of Blood and Spirit in the Early Modern Body’ in The 
Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe, ed. D. Hillman and C. Mazzio 
(London: Routledge, 1997), 116-7. 
81 It is not the work of this thesis to define Aristotle or Galen’s original (and sometimes distinctly 
different) conclusions concerning the body and its animation, but rather to explore some of the relevant 
interpretations contemporary with Milton’s work. Although there are areas of contention between 
Aristotelian ideas and those of Galen, we shall assume that: “it was largely with Aristotle’s philosophy 
that Galen had put Hippocratic precepts and practice into a rationalised understanding of the natural 
world” (French, William Harvey’s Natural Philosophy), 5. 
82 Galen, On the Natural Faculties, section 4. 
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of ‘spirit’ and ‘faculty’ were designed to suture) was that of causality. Motive force and 
the origin of motion were loci about which questions of ancient philosophy and the new 
mechanical philosophy circled continually: the branch of study which included 
medicine was no exception.  
 
Milton’s definition of the word spirit, which identifies the traditionally 
immaterial abstract capacity of the mind with the functions of the body, also demands a 
closer examination of its various contemporary meanings. In contemporary thought 
medical spirit is conceived of as a substance of sorts, but it is volatile, rarefied and 
active: it occupies the border between the potential motive force and actual impact and 
motion. The classical body of medical knowledge inherited by the seventeenth century 
was made up of a tripartite system of interlocking orders of animation where faculties 
were motivated by different sorts of spirit. Walker gives a fairly concise definition of 
medical spirits as 
 
very fine, hot vapour, deriving from the blood and breathed air... They 
are usually divided into three kinds: natural, vital and animal… the 
vital spirits are manufactured in the heart and conveyed by the 
arteries; their main function is to distribute innate or vital heat to all 
parts of the body. Animal spirits are elaborated from these and are 
contained in the ventricles of the brain, whence through the nervous 
system they are transmitted to the sense-organs and muscles; their 
functions are motor-activity sense-perception and, usually, such lower 
psychological activities of appetite, sensus communis and imagination. 
They are the first, direct, instrument of the soul.83
 
  
We must add some detail to the ‘lowest’ order of spirit, the natural spirits. In the 
original Galenic schema they are produced in the liver; they emanate through the veins 
with the venous blood and function in the order of nutritional and reproductive faculties. 
These faculties we share not only with animals but also with plant life, thus the 
designation of this ‘lowest’ order of animation as the ‘vegetative soul’.84
                                                            
83 D. P. Walker, ‘The Astral Body in Renaissance Medicine’ in Music, Spirit and Language in the 
Renaissance, ed. Penelope Gouk (London: Varorium Reprints, 1985), 119-133, 121. 
 The vegetative 
faculty deals entirely with involuntary functions, primarily those of the lower abdomen, 
and often does not gain the critical attention demanded by the more dramatic faculties of 
voluntary motion, sense perception and imagination. Nevertheless we can see the basic 
84 For a wider exploration of the orders of spirit and faculty which preceded Harvey’s discovery of the 
circulation of the blood see Paster, ‘Nervous Tension’, 107-125; John Henry, ‘The Matter of Souls: 
Medical Theory and Theology in Seventeenth-Century England’, in The Medical Revolution of the 
Seventeenth Century, ed. French and Wear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 87-113. 
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tripartite structure in Walker’s description of natural, vital and animal spirits of medical 
tradition. Faculty’, then, holds a similar place to the term ‘spirit’ in that both seek to fill 
the motive gap which precedes a detectable effect (structurally comparable to the 
Aristotelian category of efficient cause) without necessarily proffering a mechanical or 
observable explanation of how they motivate action.85 Where mechanist philosophies 
elaborated dualist solutions, Milton and Glisson propose an ensouled body animated by 
the interactions of spirit and thicker substance; Milton extended this model to include 
the rational spirit, endowing it with both a material origin and a material function.86
 
 
Such solutions were deeply unpopular. There was some uneasy debate between 
the natural philosophers’ use of the term spirit and that of the theologians. Walker has 
shown that it was precisely the category confusion between body and soul which was 
potentially problematic in the notion of ‘spirit’ as it was being used throughout the 
Renaissance. He notes that the tradition of thinking in terms of medical spirits, 
 
is especially likely to lead to… confusions, since one of its main uses 
was to bridge the metaphysical gap between body and soul, matter and 
mind, while for any Christian thinking about medical spirits, there 
were also present the well established meanings of spirit as the highest 
divine part of the soul or as part of the godhead, the Holy Spirit.87
 
 
Such attempts, he states, led to “strange and philosophically audacious conceptions of 
the human soul, and theologically unorthodox conceptions of God.”88 There were, even 
within the arena of university medicine, many variations between different models; for 
example Galen’s assertion of a rete miribile, a cluster of veins and arteries in the neck 
as the organ where vital spirits were transformed into animal spirits was shown by 
Vesalius to be a discovery of animal anatomy, not a feature of the human form.89
                                                            
85 French notes that the term ‘faculty’ “was naturally a butt of the rhetoric of the new philosophers” and 
that Glisson’s colleague George Ent compared it to a deus ex machina; nevertheless the term was still 
current and without satisfactory replacement in the work of what French calls the “non-traditional 
physicians” (William Harvey’s Natural Philosophy, 177). 
 The 
primacy of the organ in the motive action of the body, however, remained fairly 
constant until the chymical philosophy of the seventeenth century provoked a number of 
different theories of active or vital matter. Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of the 
86 See chapter 5. 
87 D. P. Walker, 'Medical spirits in philosophy and theology from Ficino to Newton', in Music, Spirit and 
Language in the Renaissance, ed. Penelope Gouk (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985), 278-306, 288. 
88 Walker, ‘Medical spirits’ 288. 
89 Walker notes that Melanchthon, to whom Milton refers repeatedly, followed Vesalius with regard to the 
theory of the rete mirabile  (‘Medical Spirits’, 300). Milton’s Eve has animal spirits exhaling directly 
from the blood rather than transforming through the action of an organic bodily structure (PL, 4. 805). 
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blood in 1628 and his reassertion, defence and development of his work twenty years 
later was to completely destabilise the Galenic system of emanation from organic bodily 
centres, showing that the nutritional faculty could not be based on the liver as organic 
centre to the system of veins, venous blood and natural spirits. Nevertheless, a triple 
order of faculty and spirit remained the basis of thought upon which the body was 
imagined, observed and then reconceived throughout the seventeenth century. 
 
The key notion in a vitalistic conception of the body (as we have seen in 
Milton’s notion of the material soul) is that of spirit as substance, or a rarefied, active 
degree of matter. The interplay between the various spirits and substances of the body 
seem to be the very process of life in Glisson’s vision. The natural spirits of the body 
receive the flow of vitalising vital spirits through the blood in a process which is a 
struggle for and against assimilation, part conflict and part seduction. The natural spirits 
do participate in their vitalisation, but they also struggle against it. In De Rachitude, 
Glisson sketches a process which seems to give a bodily unconscious within the flow 
and pulse of the blood, where the force of life, part aggressive, part sexual, works to 
assimilate the matter and vegetative spirit of the body into its own higher, more vital 
substance: 
 
Inborn [natural/vegetative] spirits, like a bride, entice and at the same 
time repulse the vital spirits, which in a sense play the role of the 
bridegroom; on the other hand, the vital spirits, stimulated by their 
heat and urged by the force of the pulses, assail the inborn spirits in a 
way which is bolder and more daring than usual, and penetrate 
stealthily into the inborn spirits’ territory. In the meantime, the inborn 
spirits receive them not without a certain pleasure (although 
discreetly, unwillingly, and reluctantly). Indeed, the bodily pleasure 
itself is based on an amorous wrestling, and the most important part of 
life itself lies in such a battle concerning the mutual union of both 
spirits.” The vital constitution is the result of the struggle between the 
two kinds of spirit, of their tendencies and counter-tendencies (nixus 
and renixus).90
 
 
The vital spirit of the blood (traditionally the arterial blood) is imagined as pulsing with 
the forces of desire and conquest; unlike a modern conception of the body, the blood 
does not feed, it seems rather to pillage or seduce the lower order of spirit. However the 
desired result is the vitalisation of that natural spirit – in being assimilated it attains a 
higher order of vitality. 
                                                            
90Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 76-77. Giglioni cites De 
Rachitide, 107-110. 
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iii. Material and immaterial spirits 
 
Of course there are many and various gaps and inconsistencies in the tripartite 
model; not only of motive causality (that is, how the body is impelled to action by its 
spirits) but of what they are made, and how they flow about the body. In a dualist 
version, the upward motion, assimilating of the bodily spirits is arrested as the animal 
spirits meet the rational spirit, or the orthodox soul. From being causal agents of 
transformation in the body they become ‘instruments of the soul’, which acts upon them 
conversely, with a top-down motion.91
 
 In his tract of 1659, Immortality of the Soul, 
Henry More also traverses the fault lines between religious notions of spirit and those of 
philosophy and natural philosophy in the following definition:  
WE have done with the notion of that Infinite and Uncreated Spirit we 
usually call God; we come now to those that are Created and Finite, 
as the Spirits of Angels, Men and Brutes, we will cast in the Seminal 
Forms also, or Archei, as the Chymists call them, though haply the 
world stands in no need of them. The Properties of a Spirit, as it is a 
notion common to all these, I have already enumerated... [as] Self-
motion, Self-penetration, Self-contraction and dilatation, and 
Indivisibility, by which I mean Indiscerpibility: to which I added 
Penetrating, Moving, and Altering the matter. We may therefore 
define this kind of Spirit we speak of, to be A substance Indiscerpible, 
that can move it self, that can penetrate, contract, and dilate it self, 
and can also penetrate, move, and alter the matter.92
 
 
For More, all movement of matter originates with spirit, which is a kind of substance 
different altogether to both divine Spirit (which is infinite and uncreated) and to the dull 
material it animates. It can best be defined in opposition to ‘body’: “if we divide 
Substance in generall into these first kindes, viz. Body and Spirit, and then define Body 
to be A Substance impenetrable and discerpible. Whence the contrary kind to this is 
fitly defined, A Substance penetrable and indiscerpible.”93
                                                            
91 Thomas Willis and Walter Charleton both theorise a power struggle between the different orders of 
spirit in the body. See chapter 6. 
 Where body is essentially 
impenetrable, spirit moves through other substances material and immaterial; where 
92 Henry More, The Immortality of the Soul, so farre forth as it is demonstrable from the Knowledge of 
Nature and the Light of Reason (London, 1659), 25. 
93 More, The Immortality of the Soul, 16-17. 
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body is ‘discerpible’, or divisible, spirit must be, in contrast, be indivisible and elastic.94
 
 
As in the religious and medical models, spirit is the active force, body is inert, yet oddly 
intractable in its impenetrability.  
Glisson too, shows himself to be well acquainted with the iridescent signifying 
of the word spirit but, unlike More, he embraces the new chymical definition. From his 
earlier, animistic images of the spirits’ activities in the body, comes a more 
scientifically nuanced version of active substance. In Anatomia hepatis he shows that 
his professional usage of the word draws meanings from his early training in classics 
through to his later interest in chymistry. Giglioni translates thus:  
 
“The word spirit”, Glisson writes, “insofar as it is attributed to the 
bodies, has different meanings”. It can generically refer to any kind of 
body which has been rarefied to the point of becoming volatile (in this 
respect “wind, air, breath and exhalations in general” were rightly 
viewed by the ancient authors as sorts of spirit). It can also mean “any 
body that is subtle, active, and very penetrating”. Finally spirit can 
also mean “that element which, after a due process of fermentation, 
but not before, strives upwards spontaneously, and becomes volatile”. 
This is “the most precise meaning of the word spirit, in that it is 
understood as an elementary part of a compound. The chemists call it 
mercury”.95
 
 
Carefully beginning by locating his work as natural philosophy, Glisson gives a set of 
definitions that shows how, even when clearly demarcated from theological concerns, 
the term, like the body it describes, is subtle, active and penetrating. Glisson does not 
define spirit in terms of a binary opposition to body or matter. The natural world is full 
of spirituous breath; the classical definitions are included, but, unlike Henry More’s 
account, Glisson’s spirit also validates the newest domain of medical theory with its 
chymical definition. 
 
It is, as we shall see, this expansion into the realm of the chymistry of 
interacting elements that enables Glisson to develop his conception of living, 
perceptive, motivated matter. The formulation of his system of vitalist natural 
philosophy came to its peak in his late tract De Natura Substantiae Energetica, 
                                                            
94 More makes this definition of ‘discerpible’ early in his Immortality of the Soul: “By Actuall Divisibility 
I understand Discerpibility, gross tearing or cutting one part from another. These are immediate properties 
of Matter” (12-13).  Milton’s angels are not quite what More would call ‘indiscerpible’ as they do get 
wounded in the account of the war in heaven, although angelic substance heals without the suffering of 
human flesh; angelic substance is also capable of becoming less rarefied and grosser with repeated sin.  
95 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 124. 
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published in Latin in 1672. Although the tract itself postdates the publication of 
Paradise Lost, its conclusions give a matrix of natural philosophy that supports 
precisely the sort of theological assertions made by Milton in his poetry and prose. It is 
an unforgettable moment of Raphael’s teaching where he explains that from the “one 
first matter all, / Indued with various forms, various degrees / Of substance” emerges 
life, which becomes 
 
                              flowers and their fruit 
Man’s nourishment, by gradual scale sublimed 
To vital spirits aspire, to animal, 
To intellectual, give both life and sense, 
Fancy and understanding, whence the soul  
Reason receives, and reason is her being. 
(PL 5. 471-87) 
 
The assertion of a variety of spirits and the inclusion of the rational faculty in the whole 
category of living soul in the Christian Doctrine are restated and elaborated to create the 
category of intellectual spirits. These spirits take a mediating position between the 
intelligential spirits of the angels and the medical spirits which transform the stuff of 
food into the organic body and that into the sentient, rational self. While vegetation is in 
the early stage of this process, human natural spirits are missing from this schema (a 
point to which we will return later), but intellectual spirits have been conceived of as a 
continuation of the upward process of transformation, creating a physical link between 
the sub-organic process of nourishment, the sentient self and the faculty of rational 
thought.  
 
This scale of nature is materially dynamic in the same way that Glisson’s 
perceptive matter is dynamic. Giglioni paraphrases, translating from De Natura 
Substantiae Energetica: 
 
Glisson regarded matter as an inherently living and perceptive 
substratum... as the organic efflorescence of forms is only a 
progressive and temporary superposition originating from matter 
itself, so the living modes (‘modes vitalis’), the ‘souls’, are the result 
of inner self-modification of life that ‘does not live on a borrowed life 
but on itself’.96
 
 
                                                            
96 Glisson in Guido Giglioni, ‘Anatomist Atheist? The Hylozoistic Foundations of Francis Glisson’s 
Anatomical Research’, in Religio Medici: Medicine and Religion in Seventeenth-Century England, ed. 
Grell and Cunningham (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1996), 115-135, 126. 
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The dynamic force of the “one first matter all” and the materiality of spirit are 
explicated with an almost uncanny precision. Pagel catches the essence of this tract with 
his summary thus: 
 
It is his endeavour to demonstrate the identity of all functions in 
principle which separates Glisson by a wide gulf from Descartes… To 
Glisson, ‘soul’ is but one aspect, one grade of the living, i.e. of the 
‘energetic substance’. There is no difference in kind between these 
aspects and grades, from the lowest stage of matter endowed with the 
most ‘dim perceptions’ to the higher forms of consciousness in the 
living animal. In Glisson’s philosophy, matter appears as much 
‘spiritualised’ as soul is ‘materialised’, so that the contrast between 
them is only artificial.97
 
 
 
Cudworth’s response to this heretical philosophy is almost identical to the objection we 
saw earlier to the notion of a material soul. Defending the dualist thesis, Cudworth 
declares that the notion of active, animate substance assumes a world where: 
 
By reason of which life (not animal, but only plastical), all parts of 
matter being supposed to form themselves artificially and 
methodically... and therefore also sometimes by organisation to 
improve themselves further into sense and self-enjoyment in all 
animals, as also to universal reason and reflexive knowledge in men; it 
is plain that there is no Necessity at all left either of any Incorporeal 
Soul in Men to make them Rational, or any Deity in the Universe to 
solve the Regularity thereof.98
 
 
The notion that matter has the power to bring forth living forms is treated as a denial of 
divine agency. To this anxious religious philosophy is added a political dimension when 
Cudworth attacks the notion that living matter can organise itself into ever more 
complex forms and organisms. Cudworth asserts the impossibility that “greater 
perfections and higher degrees of being should rise and ascend out of lesser and lower” 
without the total “overthrow of the natural order”.99
 
 This accusation is not without some 
sort of basis, certainly in the work of Milton and even in that of Glisson. 
                                                            
97 Walter Pagel, ‘The Reaction to Aristotle in Seventeenth-Century Biological Thought: Campanella, Van 
Helmont, Glanvill, Charleton, Harvey, Glisson, Descartes’, in Science, Medicine and History. Essays on 
the Evolution of Scientific Thought and Medical Practice Written in Honour of Charles Singer, 2 vols. ed.  
E. A. Underwood (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), 1: 489-509, 507. 
98 Cudworth, The true intellectual system, 233-4. Cudworth’s notion of ‘plastic nature’ gives God instead 
a delegated spiritual force in the world to perform these tasks. 
99 Cudworth quoted in Giglioni, ‘Anatomist Atheist’, 127. 
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In his teaching notes from Cambridge, Glisson gives a social metaphor to 
express his conviction that the body’s spirits struggle to exalt themselves and the 
substance of their foods; in short that they “sublime by gradual scale” the matter and 
natural spirits of food into vital and thence animal spirit. He notes: 
 
It is not absurd to think that in the natural polity (nautralis politia) 
parts advance in the same body from a lower degree of rank to a 
higher one. Like in the civil state (respublica civilis), it is not 
improper that the same citizen is promoted from a baser function to a 
more distinguished one.100
 
 
Social transformation in the 1650s is for Glisson an unassailable and positive truth, 
implicitly linked to the notion of meritocracy. This is the sort of linkage between the 
political and the bodily that Rogers finds in the work of Milton, and which conservative 
contemporary commentators such as Cudworth deplored as liable to set the world 
upside down.101
 
 The distrust of animist materialism, or vitalism, united many mechanist 
philosophers with their conservative contemporaries. Although he lacks Cudworth’s 
fervour for the hunting down of atheism, Robert Boyle was to contend that matter that 
moved itself was a dangerous notion: 
… [T]he erroneous idea of nature would, too often, be found to have a 
strong tendency to shake if not to subvert, the very foundations of all 
religion; misleading those, that are inclined to be its enemies, from 
overlooking a necessity of God, to the questioning, if not to the denial 
of his existence.102
 
 
Nevertheless, Boyle does not make the confident assertion that all vitalists are atheists – 
he rather describes vitalism as error which may logically lead to a questioning of God’s 
action or existence.103
                                                            
100 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 77. Giglioni cites MS 
Sloane 3310, f. 229v. It is worth noting here that Francis Glisson was, like Milton a product of the middle 
class. He was almost certainly the son of a taylor from Bristol. See R. Milnes Walker, ‘Francis Glisson 
and His Capsule’, in Annals of the Royal College of Surgeons of England", 38 (1966), 71-91, 72. 
 The accusation of ‘atheism’ was ubiquitous as was the 
101 Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 77. Glisson was not a blazing 
revolutionary. His belief in social transformation is balanced by his description his work on fever, in 
which his metaphor is of “tumultuous and seditious” motions of the blood, and pathological fermentation 
in the body is described as “a civil war aroused among the elements of the mixt”. Giglioni cites MS 
Sloane 3308, f.304v; 3308, ff. 303r-304r and De Ventriculo, 574-576. 
102 Boyle quoted in Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the 
Experimental Life (Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1985), 202. 
103 Boyle’s uneasy approach to vitalism looks mild in comparison with that of Newton in the late 1660s: 
“Hence it is not surprising that Atheists arise ascribing that to corporeal substances which solely belongs 
to the divine. Indeed, however we cast about we find almost no other reason for atheism than this notion 
of bodies having, as it were, a complete, absolute and independent reality in themselves” (Leviathan and 
the Air Pump,  203). 
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assumption that if the res ipsa (thing in itself) had caused its own existence then the 
power of God was somehow nullified. It is, after all, Satan’s claim to be self-created 
that is the foundation of his apostasy. However vitalist monism and self- determining 
matter do not necessarily deny God’s position as creator. It is essential to the theological 
aspect of this debate to differentiate between the self-causing theory of the apostate 
Satan and the self-determining state of Milton’s human body-soul composites. Let us 
ask, then, how Milton can claim that the self-determination of a material body-soul 
composite, generated out of vital matter and spirit, does not preclude the causal agency 
of divinity. The following chapters will examine more closely the representation of 
cause in the works of both the poet and the doctors who were his contemporaries to see 
if the causal agency of divinity can be retained within a traducian paradigm.  
 
This association of vital matter with the denial of God’s existence is not 
necessarily made through irreproachable logic. Giglioni has claimed that the 
development and acceptance of the practice of anatomy was inevitably a secularising 
process in medicine because, “otherwise anatomy becomes a subset of natural theology” 
but it is possible to argue that, during the period of Glisson’s practice, natural theology 
was a definition of their work that anatomists would have welcomed.104 Certainly, 
medical writers made clear efforts to preface and explain their work as respectful and 
devout investigations of God’s creation; to write all this off as cynical pandering to 
religious hegemony seems reductive. To imply that “Glisson was upholding atheistic 
doctrines” would hold more in common with the accusations levelled by More and 
Cudworth than with Glisson’s own assertions.105
                                                            
104 Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 68. 
 Medical practice and theory were 
challenging to religious orthodoxy in many ways; the power shifts in the body of man 
have been shown to relate to the power shifts in the contemporary body politic, 
certainly, but both the contemporary scandal and the modern celebration seem to codify 
the relation into a binary opposition between a suspiciously simplistic godless physic 
and an unconvincingly hegemonic ‘religion’.  For our purposes, the reassessment of this 
‘rift’ means an investigation of doctrinal notions which can be found encoded in 
contemporary ‘scientific’ works as well as the theological implications of materialism; 
perhaps in this matter, Milton’s work using materialism as a support for his theodicy in 
the Christian Doctrine can illuminate the religious dimension of Glisson’s radical 
theory of biousia (the life of matter) which drew such vitriolic accusations of atheism.  
105 Giglioni, ‘Anatomist Atheist’, 124. 
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The different discourses of theology and natural philosophy (amongst many 
others) are, in Paradise Lost, supposed to stand together like the inadequate concepts of 
the intellect that Glisson works with. In the Christian Doctrine Milton directly states 
what is everywhere else implied in his work: that a biblical description or a theological 
perspective may stand without excluding a supplementary explanation drawn from 
natural philosophy, indeed the natural philosophy must support the religious doctrine. 
This employment of making multiple discourses coherent then starts to approach 
scientia, or an inductive process for the reader, if all the representations of science lead 
back to the same principle (a good, merciful and all powerful God juxtaposed with free 
human consciousness) arrived at by the theological framework. This interdependence of 
natural philosophy of the body and theological commitments is in evidence throughout 
the Christian Doctrine. For example, the assertion that God can be said to shape a child 
in the womb without excluding the truth value of ‘natural causes’ must then infuse those 
natural causes with the work of God, giving the divine as immanent and the ‘natural’ as 
divinely ordered. 106
 
  This finally leads us to one of Milton’s strongest statements on the 
matter of the coherence of different disciplines. In Chapter 8 of the Christian Doctrine, 
he notes of God’s general providence that:  
God’s ordinary providence is that by which he maintains and 
preserves that constant and ordered system of causes which was 
established by him in the beginning... This is commonly and indeed 
too frequently called Nature; for nature cannot mean anything except 
the wonderful power and efficacy of the divine voice which went forth 
in the beginning, and which all things have obeyed ever since as a 
perpetual command.107
 
  
We have here a notion of divine cause that includes a system of semi-independent 
causes emerging from it. This statement, again, insists upon the coincidence of the four 
Aristotelian causes, notions of nature (and by implication natural law) and the eternal 
resonance of divine command is given as that by which this system is maintained and 
preserved. The “efficacy of the divine voice” implies the efficient cause, but the 
creation and God’s providence are here modelled as being the initial establishment of 
the system of causes itself. Causality, natural process and divine command are different 
languages but one process, just as poetry, natural philosophy and theology are different 
                                                            
106 God “did not merely breathe that spirit into man, but shaped it in each individual as a fundamental 
attribute, and separated its various faculties, making it beautiful and orderly” (CPW 6: 317). 
107 CPW 6: 340. 
43 
 
discourses that can describe the same ultimate referent. Thus the final question is 
whether or not the poem manages to make these models coherent in the natural 
philosophy of the body and the created world, and if it does, how precisely does it do 
so? 
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Chapter 2 
 
Aristotelian Soul and some problems of monism 
 
 
We have touched upon the problems of heresy that monism evoked in the 
seventeenth century and concede with John Rogers and Christopher Hill that the 
proliferation of monist models of natural philosophy were part of the ‘Vitalist Moment’ 
that issued an uncomfortable challenge to authoritarian structures of power, whether 
monarchic political models or determinist theologies. Having located Milton’s monism 
of body and soul within a framework of natural philosophy, we have noted that it bears 
the hallmarks of Aristotelian organisation of knowledge in the system of causes, the 
notions of vital, sensitive and rational faculties, their actions and affections, and the 
impelling power of ‘spirit’ in body and world. There are, however, several areas of 
Aristotelian orthodoxy that Milton himself modifies or even reverses. Most fundamental 
of these is the thesis of the non-activity of matter and the corresponding form/matter 
dualism. In his representation of generation we find a careful modification of the theory 
of eduction of forms, and in the Christian Doctrine a revision of the tradition of God as 
Actus Purus (and an associated attribution of divine origin to matter) which undoes the 
corresponding Christian elaboration of form/matter dualism. Milton counters and 
reorganises these problems in the philosophical mode of the Art of Logic and in the 
poetic mode of Paradise Lost in the same ways that Glisson and Harvey do, providing 
less detail, but also giving a theological framework that both supports and demands 
such a system of natural philosophy. In fact what we will see is that in the medical 
context Aristotelian thought offers monism a wide, flexible inheritance of thought – 
specifically a system of four causal modes rather than just the binary of form and 
matter. There is, moreover, a corpus of observational natural history and philosophy 
identified by Newman and Pagel within this tradition, which seems to contribute more 
to the burgeoning ‘scientific revolution’ of the seventeenth century than has been noted 
by Milton criticism.  
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Critics have raised a number of questions about the materiality of the human 
soul proposed by Milton and his use of natural philosophy to support his case. While 
Svendsen simply argues that Milton’s natural philosophy is Aristotelian and thus dated 
by the standards of science in the mid seventeenth century, William B. Hunter has 
argued that Milton’s Aristotelian world view is fundamentally conventional in its 
dualism of form and matter.108
 
 John Rogers, in contrast, has located in Paradise Lost a 
focus upon notions such as fermentation, thus suggesting a much more contemporary 
scientific influence in the politicised vitalism of the poem’s natural philosophy. He does 
supply a refreshing corrective to the conclusions drawn by critics such as Svendsen 
though his description of Milton’s radical vitalism requires closer examination. 
Interestingly, much of the argument he makes for the radical dissonance between 
Milton’s materialism (and its political connotations) and his theology repeats, in a 
different register, the claims made by contemporary commentators and modern critics: 
that is, that living, active matter must not need – and must therefore preclude the 
existence of – divine power. This assumption that one ‘natural’ mode of operation must 
exclude the (divine) other is something of a tautology in that it repeats uncritically the 
premises of dualism – sometimes, in the case of modern critics, as they seek to celebrate 
Milton’s monism. 
It is perhaps naïve to assume that Milton is unaware of the equation made by 
contemporary commentators between materialist philosophy and atheism. One moment 
in the Christian Doctrine in which he makes the equation between natural and divine 
causality is in his direct defence of traducianism. Indeed Milton deals directly with such 
a possible dissonance in a passage in which, despite the powerfully argued rejection of 
Creationist theories of ensoulment, he concludes his discussion with a series of 
references to various biblical texts which state that it is God who forms the human in 
the womb. In one of his most eloquent interpretations he asserts that God “did not 
merely breathe that spirit into man, but shaped it in each individual as a fundamental 
attribute, and separated its various faculties, making it beautiful and orderly, Zech xii. 1: 
forming the spirit of man within him.”109
                                                            
108 William B. Hunter, ‘Milton’s Power of Matter’, Journal of the History of Ideas 13. 4 (1952), 551-562. 
 This interpretation of biblical text is rich in the 
language of the body offered by contemporary natural philosophy, but it simultaneously 
109 CPW 6: 317. Other passages noted are:  Job 10: 8-10; Psalms 33: 15; Isaiah 44: 24. Fundamental 
attributes can be defined as “The fundamental and permanent properties of substance, so-called by 
logicians in contradistinction to accidents, which are modifications representing circumstantial properties 
only” (http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/view.jsp?letter=A&artid=2101 [30.12.08]).  
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insists on the creative agency of divinity. Divine action upon the human faculties 
mirrors the divine action upon the abyss of chaos, which is also made beautiful and 
orderly through a process of separation at the Creation in Milton’s defence of original 
matter in the Christian Doctrine.110
 
 It is clear that for Milton divine agency does 
harmonise with a material soul, generated ex traduce, but the question remains of how 
this harmony might work.  
Shortly after describing the coincident action of divine and natural causes in 
foetal development Milton directly deals with this dissonance, noting that “it does not 
follow from these passages that natural causes have not in each case made their usual 
contribution towards the propagation of the body.”111
 
 This is a direct claim that the 
natural and the divine act causally within the same phenomenon; it cannot be a binary 
set of causes because to the ‘natural’ is attributed a plurality of causes. This process is 
presented in an Aristotelian framework, thus requiring four modes of causation: 
efficient, final, formal and material. Multiple causal modes change the very terms of the 
body/soul debate. Despite Milton’s rejection of the Trinity as three beings in one, the 
notion of God (who is in Christian Aristotelian terms, a First Cause) having multiple 
modes of operation was also deeply familiar and theologically satisfactory to many. I 
suggest that the plurality of causal mode in Aristotelian tradition helps to deconstruct 
the binary logic of dualism. We need not reject out of hand, therefore, the traditional 
comments made by critics such as Svensen who emphasise the Aristotelian character of 
Milton’s natural philosophy. We need rather to read how this multiple causality works 
in order, finally, to assess how the Aristotelian heritage might support contemporary 
radical medical enquiry. 
 
 
i. Hylomorphism 
 
To think in terms of multiple causes is not necessarily materialistic or monistic, 
but it gives a way of breaking the binary order of form and matter fundamental to 
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dualism and makes possible the coincidence of God’s orthodox commandment and a 
responsive, active material actuality. When Milton rests his traducianism (and thus part 
of his theodicy) on the “strong argument” that “the soul is wholly contained in all the 
body and wholly in any given part of that body” it is clear that ‘soul’ itself is envisaged 
as working in more than one ontological mode, but this is also one of the moments in 
which he most clearly aligns his thinking in an Aristotelian tradition.112 This tradition 
itself poses a problem to monist vitalism, for as we have noted, much of the Aristotelian 
inheritance is marked by a distinct dualism. Moreover, as Fallon observes, “Christian 
Aristotelians followed Aquinas in excluding the production of the soul from the power 
of matter”.113 Milton is quite clear about his monist stance; indeed the radical vitalism 
that Rogers attributes to Milton’s natural philosophy relies upon monism for 
consistency. It is inescapable, however, that as we saw in the last chapter, Milton insists 
on a coincidence between the “system of causes” – clearly an Aristotelian reference – 
which is “too often called Nature” with “the wonderful power and efficacy of the divine 
voice which went forth in the beginning.” Indeed, he posits that the one cannot mean 
anything but the other.114
 
 In this equation natural causes are identified with the First 
Cause of divinity and clearly placed in an Aristotelian structure. 
Therefore we need to know first how Milton’s vitalist monism can be coherent 
in an Aristotelian framework and then whether that vitalism is coherent in relation to his 
theology, or whether rather the one contradicts the other. The philosophical Aristotelian 
formulation of the soul as anima which acts upon the passive stuff of matter on the face 
of it leaves us with dualism of form (the primary precondition for functional existence 
and life) and matter (the secondary precondition giving potential for existence, or what 
the mechanists would call extension). Pagel summarises the dualism of Aristotle’s De 
Anima to conclude: 
 
Owing to its material composition and organisation a natural object 
contains life and function – potentially. It may attain reality by the 
action of the anima, evidently a functional impulse which ‘perfects’ 
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the body by enabling it to step out into reality. The anima indicates for 
instance a plan inherent in the form and function of a vital organ such 
as the eye. It is not, however, a material body such as the heart.115
 
 
The definition of form as precondition for life may or may not work in a metaphysical 
study, but it takes some peculiar twisting to fit it to evidence of procreation in the 
medical arena. In Aristotelian theories of animation, the fluidity of the semen is ignored; 
it represents “pure form.” The female contribution of menstrual blood is the 
corresponding “pure matter,” and the formative sperm acts upon the matter of the blood 
in the womb to create the foetal heart. The semen can act in this way because it contains 
pneuma; it is “a pneumatic substance – full of life-giving spirit and it is the final most 
potent product of the blood’s concoction”.116
 
 There is a mismatch between soul-as-form 
and soul-as-vital-heat here, and Fallon traces this fracture to a conflict in the vast 
Aristotelian corpus inherited by the seventeenth century. 
Fallon differentiates Aristotelian hylomorphism (that is, the soul-as-first-act, or 
form as precondition for animate life) from Milton’s materialism: “the soul for Milton is 
a substantial, corporeal entity, not an abstract combination of the shape, internal 
organisation, or faculties of the body.”117 Clearly marking Aristotle’s equivocation on 
the bodily status of the soul, Fallon quotes from De Anima, where the soul is: “a ratio or 
formulable essence, not a matter or subject… the soul cannot be without a body, while it 
cannot be a body; it is not a body but something relative to a body.”118
 
 This soul as 
abstract three dimensional plan recalls Pagel’s definition, but Fallon finds a more 
materialist version of ‘soul’ in his quotation from his De generatione animalium. Here, 
as he points out, soul is some sort of intermediate substance between the ethereal and 
the bodily: 
Now as far as we can see, the faculty of Soul of every kind has to do 
with some physical substance which is different from the so-called 
‘elements’ and more divine than they are; and as the varieties of Soul 
differ from one another in the scale of value, so do various substances 
concerned with them differ in their nature. In all cases the semen 
contains that within itself that which causes it to be fertile,… the 
pneuma which is enclosed within the semen or foam-like stuff, and the 
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natural substance which is in the pneuma; and this substance is 
analogous to the element which belongs to the stars.119
 
 
This was and still is a much-quoted passage from Aristotle. Harvey makes use of it in 
his own De generatione animalium, as he speculates on the power of bodies to generate 
young. We can thus see, even having looked only briefly at the different definitions of 
‘soul’ in the Aristotelian tradition, that the label ‘Aristotelian’ is insufficient in a 
detailed discussion of Milton’s natural philosophy. It is, I argue, the tendency to treat 
Milton’s Aristotelian heritage as univocal, rather than heterogeneous and often 
contradictory, ignoring the ideological forces at play and accepting the rejections of its 
contemporary detractors, which can lead to a reduction or dismissal of Aristotelian 
thought.  
 
In the medical usage of the notion of soul there is a model of soul-as-form, but 
the notions of pneuma or vital heat may also signify animation. Moreover, the 
stubbornly amorphous materiality of bodily fluids disrupts the sort of relation of form 
(anima) to matter that Hunter claims is adopted by Milton in his approach to natural 
philosophy. In a dualist philosophy, the ‘power of matter’ is almost an oxymoron, for 
that ‘power’ is pure potentiality, the passive part of a system whereby “the formal 
element represents the activity or actuality of each entity; the material element is 
passive, with a characteristic capacity for being formed.”120 Hunter appreciates the 
heretical audacity that Milton shows in insisting that the human soul is, like other forms, 
“produced from the potency of matter.” He opens his discussion by insisting that this 
power of matter cannot be thought of as the material cause, and continues it by arguing 
that the power of matter to which Milton refers is straight Aristotelian potentia materiae 
(the inert creative potential of substance as opposed to the active creative agency of 
form) and is consistent with an orthodox, scholastic Aristotelian dualism.121 He touches 
on Milton’s use of various traditions in a single footnote that concedes a departure from 
Aristotelian orthodoxy, stating that in the Art of Logic “in one important passage he 
seems to use the Platonic conception: ‘the efficient produces the form not yet existing 
and induces it into the matter’” and suggesting that he may be “trying to reconcile the 
two systems.”122
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how the definition of form “combines the Platonic and the Aristotelian.”123
 
 Milton is 
evidently quite comfortable with revising received notions of form and matter, and as 
will become clear, he does so in much more radical ways than this. 
Michael Lieb, in contrast to Hunter, points to precisely this quotation in his 
exploration of the dichotomy of matter and form in Milton’s work (specifically in the 
Art of Logic). His study has more breadth than that of Hunter, and he argues 
convincingly that Milton does as he says: uses motifs of thought both Platonic and 
Aristotelian. However, his chapter, ‘The Metaphysics of Form’, lacks a sense of 
Milton’s progression; comparing work from the 1630s with that of the 1660s it thus 
attempts, but never quite achieves, a delineation of how transcendent soul and 
immanent soul are reconciled. Lieb draws most of his examples of anti-Aristotelian 
thought or Platonic imagery of body and soul from Milton’s earliest work, such as the 
Prolusions and the Masque, without positing a development of thought between this 
early work and that which is the focus of this study and came decades later.124
 
 He 
claims that: 
[Milton’s] ontology never loses sight of the material continuity uniting 
all phenomena, even while it is insisting upon such dichotomies as 
body-spirit, external-internal, visible-invisible, corporeal-incorporeal. 
The result is to give credence to those dichotomies by maintaining that 
in fact they do not exist… Even as body becomes spirit, internal 
external, visible invisible, corporeal incorporeal, a continuity underlies 
that movement so categorically that the transcendent, the per quam, 
takes on a meaning it would never otherwise have, a reality that 
language could never bestow upon it.125
 
  
This concluding summary of his study of Milton’s employment of the notion of form 
mystifies as much as it enlightens. We know that the Lady of Comus may rarefy her 
corporeal body by focusing her mind upon heavenly things, or ‘imbrute’ her soul by 
concern with physical satisfaction, but precisely how this Platonised version of the 
transcendent human soul can be made to harmonise with the later assertions of 
Aristotelian immanence of form (in particular the statement that the human soul is a 
material form) is not made clear. I would argue that it is in Milton’s late, great works 
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and particularly in Paradise Lost that immanence and transcendence finally cohere into 
a system in which the natural philosophy of the body-soul composite supports a 
theodicy based on free-will. In Lieb’s statement the question remains: what constitutes 
that ‘continuity’ between categories still structured as binary opposites? The possibility 
stands that it is something very like Glisson’s underlying “natural perception,” with its 
carefully worked out relationship to the various grades of matter that constantly 
metamorphose into new individuations. With reference to Raphael’s “one first matter 
all” speech, Lieb notes that “material refinement from “body” to “spirit” constitutes not 
a dichotomy but a progression.”126
 
 This does describe the dynamic scale of nature 
proposed by Raphael, but leaves open the nature of the dynamism itself, not answering 
the questions of how Milton might resolve contemporary debates about ideas of 
substance, matter, form and causality, or whether there is an overall coherence to the 
various traditions used, although he observes that various traditions are evident. I 
suggest, therefore, a closer examination of the particular problems of posing a monist 
natural philosophy within an Aristotelian paradigm and I propose that Milton’s 
adjustments to the system of causes that he inherited are matched by those of 
developing contemporary medicine. 
 
 
ii. The other tradition 
 
It is clear that the conventional scholastic theories of matter and form were 
becoming increasingly unsatisfactory in the latter half of the seventeenth century. 
Hunter sketches out various objections made in particular to the scholastic theories of 
the productive interactions of form and matter, noting the sceptical enquiries of Daniel 
Sennert, Robert Boyle and Joseph Glanville. A particularly colourful and scathing 
critique is that made by Glanville, who states “all that can be made of this power of the 
matter, is meerly a receptive capacity: and we may as well affirm, that the world was 
educ’d out of the power of the imaginary space; and give that as a sufficient account of 
its Original. And in this language to grow rich were to educe money out of the power of 
the Pocket.”127
                                                            
126 Lieb, Sinews of Ulysses, 19. 
 Packed into Glanville’s statement is a web of different contexts which 
relate to causality and production. Interiority of the imaginary space, myths of origin 
127 Glanville quoted in Hunter, ‘Milton’s Power of Matter’, 556. 
52 
 
and, of course, fiscal economy were all contexts in which scholastic logic was clearly 
becoming inadequate. The classic Aristotelian precept that a form educes further forms 
out of matter could not answer the insistent empiricist and sensualist questions that 
demanded a proof of how a process worked. 
 
If we are to look for the most convincing debunking of Aristotelian natural 
philosophy, we need to turn to Robert Boyle, a man now treated as a founder of modern 
scientific method. Boyle’s mechanist perspective on matter is that it must be understood 
in terms of a binary relationship with motion: 
 
The matter existing in the entire universe is thus one and the same, 
and is always recognised as matter simply in virtue of its being 
extended. All the properties which we clearly perceive in it are 
reducible to its divisibility and consequent mobility in respect of its 
parts, and its resulting capacity to be affected in all the ways which we 
perceive as being derivable from the movement of the parts.128
 
 
This notion of extended matter in motion formed the basis of atomist philosophy and 
has been celebrated as part of the ‘scientific revolution’; much contemporary debate 
concerned the motive force or cause of motion in matter and the relation of that motive 
force to God. The escape from scholastic formulae seems to have been exhilarating, and 
adherence to Aristotelian orthodoxy is described by Glanville as a positive stumbling 
block to the furtherance of knowledge, 
 
Knowledge is capable of far greater Heights and Improvements… 
than it hath yet attain’d; and there is nothing that hath stinted its 
Growth and hindered its Improvements more, than an over-fond, 
superstitious opinion of Aristotle, and the Ancients, by which it is 
presumed that… little or nothing can be added to their discoveries: so 
hereby a stop hath been put upon Inquiry, and men have contented 
themselves with studying their Writings, and disputing about their 
Opinions, while they have not taken much notice of the great Book of 
Nature.129
 
 
There is here, however, a clue to the inadequacy of the critical tradition that writes off 
Milton’s natural philosophy as ‘Aristotelian’, for there is in fact a significant 
contemporary practice of study of the ‘Book of Nature’ that is still within the 
Aristotelian paradigm. Pagel makes it clear that Glanville and other dualist adherents to 
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the new mechanical philosophy of Descartes were reacting violently against the 
‘tyranny of the Stagirite’ and, indeed, that it can seem that “antagonism to Aristotelian 
philosophy appears as the common denominator of all the varied motives, currents and 
trends of thought which made for the advancement of modern science in the seventeenth 
century.”130
 
 The exception to this shift of perspective, however, was in the area of 
biological, and specifically medical, research. 
Boyle himself divides the Aristotelian heritage into two comparable categories, 
commenting in his Origins of Forms and Qualities of 1666: 
 
I here declare once for all, that where… I do indefinitely depreciate 
Aristotle’s doctrine, I would be understood to speak of his physicks, or 
rather the speculative part of them (for his historical writings 
concerning animals I much esteem) nor do I say that even these may 
not have their use among scholars, and even in universities, if they be 
retained and studied with due cautions and limitations.131
 
 
This differentiation, which sections off Aristotle’s observational work on the natural 
world, is significant. It illustrates Pagel’s point again, that the biological inheritance of 
Aristotelian thought, that which dealt with the ‘Book of Nature’, was of more value to 
seventeenth-century scientific development than were the other areas of his philosophy. 
Harvey, now hailed as the father of modern physiology, declared: “the authority of 
Aristotle has always such weight with me that I never think of differing from him 
inconsiderately.”132
 
 Likewise, Francis Glisson’s work shows a genuine respect for the 
‘ancients’ and ongoing attempts to correlate new evidence with old theories. In 
determining a debate for his students at Cambridge he declares: “It is an old saying that 
the truth is the daughter of time. In the last centuries, the principles of the medical art 
found out and openly demonstrated many phenomena of great importance and unknown 
to the ancients.” Nevertheless, his tone is polite and conciliatory as he continues: 
I think it is better to rest upon demonstrated principles than on the 
mere authority of someone. For this reason, in the determination of the 
present quaestio, I am not so much concerned with the authority of the 
ancients as with the truth of the thing, for the determination of such a 
quaestio depends on the circulation of the blood, the distribution of 
the lacteals, and other anatomical findings which were totally 
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unknown to the ancients. There is no doubt that if Hippocrates and 
even Galen, or any other honest physician of the old times had lived 
now and had seen the things discovered in this age, they would have 
reconsidered their opinions in many respects.133
 
 
This shows a distinctly different relationship with the classical heritage to that shown by 
Glanville. Giglioni characterises Glisson’s work as a mediation between Aristotelian 
structure and radical contemporary chymical innovation:  
 
Like Harvey, Glisson was Aristotelian to the core, but unlike Harvey 
he was not suspicious of new scientific trends such as chemistry. 
Whereas Harvey is reported to have been extremely diffident toward 
all chemical neoterics, Glisson showed interest on many occasions in 
the chemical philosophy both for its theoretical implications and for 
its practical and therapeutic uses134
 
 
This use of chymical research, particularly that of the famous chymical philosopher and 
physician Jean Baptiste Van Helmont, was one element of Glisson’s thought that 
allowed him to theorise a much more systematic theory of vitalism than that found in 
Harvey’s various flirtations with the notion. Glisson’s method of writing is often 
scholastic in character, with evidence carefully schematised and logically weighed 
(indeed his original training was in classics), but his research was undoubtedly 
experimental; a membrane of the liver he discovered and recorded retains the name 
‘Glisson’s capsule’ today.135
 
 Despite, or perhaps as part of his conciliatory approach, he 
used chymical experiment and theory to revise in particular the Aristotelian premise of 
form as precondition for life. 
Glisson was far from being the only medical professional to attempt an 
amalgamation of such antagonistic bodies of knowledge; one precedent had been set 
earlier in the century by Daniel Sennert. In his study of the cross-fertilisation of ideas 
between seventeenth-century atomism and alchemy, William Newman notes that 
Sennert’s medicine and natural philosophy draw heavily on Aristotelian thought, and 
that “this tradition was highly Aristotelian in character, and yet it reflected a type of 
Aristotelianism that finds little or no representation in modern histories of 
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philosophy”.136  This tradition, central also to medieval alchemists, “was not the highly 
abstract, even metaphysical natural philosophy of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and De caelo, 
but instead the more empirically oriented parts of the Stagirite’s corpus, such as the 
Meteorology and certain portions of De generatione et corruptione”.137
 
 From the work 
of figures such as Boyle and Glisson, we could add the influence of De generatione 
animalium to this other tradition. Tellingly, throughout his study of the development of 
Glisson’s hylozoistic philosophy of biousia, or the living nature of substance, Giglioni 
refers to these latter sections of the Aristotelian corpus repeatedly, much more often 
than to any other sections of his work. This tradition, with its focus upon the 
transformation of substance, found that Aristotelian thought could support soul as vital 
heat and movement as easily as it proposed soul as form. 
So we have a number of claims made about the ‘science’ of Paradise Lost: 
Svendsen claims that Milton’s ‘science’ is backward and Aristotelian, just as Hunter 
contends that matter, as in orthodox Aristotelian philosophy, is receptive but not active 
or vital in Milton’s natural philosophy. Both of these positions would preclude the vital 
body-soul composites, generated ex traduce, that Milton proposes but neither seems to 
explore in any detail the heterogeneity of the Aristotelian inheritance of the seventeenth 
century. Fallon’s comments on Milton’s vitalism are extensive and illuminating, but do 
not explore the Aristotelian natural philosophy that underpins it. Lieb does, but he does 
not find a system of linkage between the transcendent and the immanent ‘soul’. In the 
next section I will consider first the use to which Milton puts his Aristotelian heritage, 
exploring some of the revisions he has made to Aristotelian orthodoxy and comparing 
them to contemporary medical innovations. Even though direct influence is impossible 
to prove, it is clear that Milton shares some highly idiosyncratic revisions of 
Aristotelian orthodoxy with contemporary medical researchers and he does so in a way 
that harmonises with the demands made by his theodicy.  
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iii. Milton’s Aristotle: the problem of form and matter 
 
The dualism of form and matter is an essential feature of Aristotelian thought. 
This dichotomy informs the history of philosophy inherited by Milton and, as a 
fundamental tool of dualist thinking, must be accounted for if his monism is to be 
coherent. It is pertinent to the body/soul problem faced by Milton and is also of direct 
significance to his representation of Creation because it orders the classical theory of the 
cause of life in conception which preceded and was reformulated by Harvey’s De 
generatione animalium, and the work of Glisson after him. When Milton claims that 
“nearly everyone agrees that all form – and the human soul is a kind of a form – is 
produced by the power of matter,” Fallon notes that he is displaying a disingenuous 
simplicity, for the fact is that while forms per se were conceived of as material, or rather 
while the coincident categories of form and matter were given by Aristotelian orthodoxy 
as divisible only by intellectual abstraction, the human soul was consistently conceived 
of as the exception to this rule.138
 
 Moreover, Milton follows this statement with the 
striking assertion that 
I do not see why anyone should make the human soul into an 
anomaly. For, as I have shown above, God breathed the breath of life 
into other living things besides man, and when he had breathed it, he 
mixed it with matter in a very fundamental way, so that the human 
form, like all other forms, should be propagated and produced as a 
result of that power which God had implanted in matter.139
 
 
The demand that the human soul should not be treated as an anomaly in an ensouled 
world works to deny the specificity of the rational nous, but the first question that 
emerges from this statement is that of the ‘power which God had implanted in matter’. 
What is this power? Milton’s formulation proposes that God breathes the breath of life 
then mixes it with matter in such a way that new forms can then be produced by the 
power of that matter. This power of matter must contain a force which allows allows his 
creatures, as enjoined by God, to ‘go forth and multiply’, and Milton clearly represents 
this matter as being able to produce bodily form and the rational soul. It can propagate 
and produce form, and from thence the faculty of abstract thought. To endow matter 
with force is problematic in Aristotelian terms. Emphasising the innovative character of 
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Glisson’s comparable philosophical manoeuvre, Giglioni states, “According to 
Aristotle, the soul (and consequently life) can belong only to an organic body, that is, a 
body morphologically differentiated and capable of being used as an instrument 
(organon)”.140
 
 The contemporary discourse that offers a model of productive spirit and 
matter is that of medical research, particularly that on generation. 
In orthodox medical discourse, as elsewhere, the form/matter binary opposition 
is thoroughly gendered; vital spirit and perfection of form are associated with 
masculinity, whilst inert matter and vegetative spirit are ascribed to the female. In 
Aristotelian thought the matter (the supposed contribution of the female in 
reproduction) is not capable of activity; life does not inhere in matter, only in form. As 
we have seen Hunter argue, the potential of matter is simply its suitability for being 
formed; the possibility is there that a masculine, spiritual form with abstract and active 
existence will educe more forms out of it. Balme discusses this issue at some length, 
noting that in On the generation of animals the female matter is the menstrual blood, 
which is “passive” and “is capable only of nourishing, so can produce growth but not 
articulation.”141
 
 In the natural philosophy of the body, the male semen is prioritised over 
matter, which is at most receptive, since semen provides the movements to provoke 
forms out of the matter, just as theological Calvinists and thinkers like Cudworth 
prioritise the spirit with an active and valuable ontology in comparison to the dead 
weight of flesh. However, as we shall see, there were distinct problems of coherence 
between this philosophical dualism and the experiments and evidence of the new, 
anatomical researches in the middle decades of the seventeenth century. 
We have already noted Milton’s direct statement that the human soul is 
generated by its parents, and this shift towards attributing equal value to both 
traditionally male and traditionally female contributions can also be seen in his wider 
natural philosophy in Paradise Lost. He endows the male semen with animating force, 
but does not conclude that the female contribution is inactive. He asks “how can the 
human seed, that intimate and most noble part of the body be imagined destitute and 
devoid of the soul of the parents”, adding as a supplementary comment “at least of the 
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father”.142 In the Art of Logic, his discussion of causality clearly includes both parents 
as causal in generation: “that which procreates or maintains is an efficient cause. Thus a 
father and mother procreate”; the mother’s contribution is not excluded from efficient 
causality, even by being labelled material cause.143 This tendency of Milton’s to include 
both the paternal (traditionally spirit/form) and the maternal (traditionally matter) as 
part of the primary order of cause in both logic and doctrine is elaborated in Adam and 
Raphael’s discussion of cosmology in Paradise Lost. The angel makes it quite clear that 
at the meeting point of myth and natural history, the masculine sun and the feminine 
moon provide “male and female light / Which two great sexes animate the world” (PL 
8. 150-1). The implication of ‘female light’ adds to the mode of Creation whereby for 
Milton God impels both spirit and matter, providing both male and female elements of 
conception, recalling the “coefficient beam” of the invocation to light, and continuing to 
collapse the gendered binary oppositions of Renaissance and classical natural 
philosophy, which so often prioritise the male and denigrate the female. 144
 
 Moreover, 
this comment is situated in an exchange that is gives considerable detail in terms of 
natural philosophy and its relationship to theology.  
Adam takes the opportunity of conversing with an ‘intelligence of heaven’ to 
restate Eve’s earlier question concerning the contemporary issue of geocentric and 
heliocentric models of the universe, but where Eve had simply asked for what or whom 
the stars shine, Adam weighs the question down with value judgements.145
 
 He asks why 
the insignificant earth should receive light from such a glorious display of stars, and: 
How nature wise and frugal could commit 
Such disproportions, with superfluous hand 
So many noble bodies to create, 
Greater so manifold to this one use, 
For aught appears, and on their orbs impose 
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144 We should also take into consideration the ongoing shifting of gender categories in the natural 
philosophy of Paradise Lost: for example at the Creation, although the sun, once created is referred to in 
the masculine (PL 7. 370), the light that the ‘darksome’ though ethereal mould of the sun itself absorbs is 
referred to in the feminine, in fact the light is “Transplanted from her cloudy shrine, and placed / In the 
sun’s orb, made porous to receive / And drink the liquid light, firm to retain / Her gathered beams, great 
palace now of light” (PL 7. 360-3). 
145 Eve asked “wherefore all night long shine these, for whom / This glorious sight, when sleep hath shut 
all eyes?” (PL 5. 657-8). Satan also exploits this question in his attempt to seduce Eve in her dream when 
he characterises the moon and stars as shining “in vain / If none regard; heaven wakes with all his eyes, / 
Whom to behold but thee” (PL 5. 43-45). 
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Such restless revolution day by day 
Repeated, while the sedentary earth, 
That better might with far less compass move, 
Served by more noble than herself, attains  
Her end without least motion, and receives 
As tribute such a sumless journey brought 
Of incorporeal speed, her warmth and light;  
Speed, to describe whose swiftness number fails.  
(PL 8. 26-38) 
 
Stating that such notions were repeatedly found in “traditional cosmologies” and citing 
Caxton, La Primaudaye and Lodge among others, Svendsen cites this as an example of 
Milton’s reliance on the encyclopaedic tradition, part of his use of “widely known 
conventional material in its conventional associations”.146 Svendsen has, however, 
neglected his own appeal to Milton’s words in the First Defence, where “he warns that 
‘we must not regard the poet’s words as his own, but consider who it is that speaks’”.147
 
 
Despite his wonder, Adam has just made a mistake of evaluation, which is a mistake 
both of theology and of natural philosophy, and Raphael corrects him swiftly. The 
primary error is theological: Adam should not assume that “bodies bright and greater 
should not serve / The less not bright, nor heaven such journeys run” (PL 8. 87-88). The 
‘journeys’, so fast that one cannot compute their speed, are echoed in Raphael’s answer 
when he suggests that “me thou thinkst not slow, /Who since the morning hour set out 
from heaven / Where God resides, and ere midday arrived / In Eden, distance 
inexpressible / By numbers that have name” (PL 8. 110-114). By Adam’s own logic, the 
great, bright angel should not have to bother with ministering to his human charges; 
indeed, by extending this logic one could argue that God should not have to serve his 
creations although the miracle of redemption to be offered to Adam and Eve will rely 
precisely on the Son’s willingness to do so. It is in fact Satan who groans over the 
possibility of the more noble serving the less so when he says of Adam, “oh indignity! / 
Subjected to his service angel wings, / And flaming ministers to watch and tend / Their 
earthy charge” (PL 9. 154-157). This is a clear alignment of a dualist model of spirit and 
body with satanic confusions between power and value. 
Milton’s theology and his natural philosophy match perfectly here. The mistake 
of natural philosophy is intrinsically linked to that of theology and concerns the 
                                                            
146 Svendsen, Milton and Science, 40. 
147 Svendsen, Milton and Science, 4. 
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properties and virtues Adam has ascribed to the bodies of the cosmos, in particular that 
of matter. Raphael asks Adam to 
 
                          consider first, that great  
Or bright infers not excellence: the earth 
Though, in comparison of heaven, so small, 
Nor glistering, may of solid good contain 
More plenty than the sun that barren shines, 
Whose virtue on itself works no effect, 
But in the fruitful earth; there first received 
His beams, unactive else, their vigour find. 
(PL 8. 90-97) 
 
Adam is cautioned not to be impressed by brightness with the warning word 
‘glistering’. Without the despised earth the glorious sun can do nothing, it is ‘barren’ 
and ‘unactive’. Moreover, the earth may even contain more good than the sunlight. The 
key to generation is reciprocity, thus it is the earth’s material fertility that enables the 
sunlight to engender life.148
 
 Satan too notes this process, while making a mistake of 
theology similar to that of Adam. Gazing at the effect of light on earth he soliloquises to 
the earth herself that the light is 
              Light above light, for thee alone, as seems, 
In thee concentrating all their precious beams 
Of sacred influence: as God in heaven 
Is centre, yet extends to all, so thou 
Centring receiv’st from all those orbs; in thee 
Not in themselves, all their known virtue appears 
Productive in herb, plant, and nobler birth 
Of creatures animate with gradual life 
Of growth, sense, reason, all summed up in man.  
(PL, 9. 105-113) 
 
Satan, despite his vitriolic outbursts about earthy humanity, shares Raphael’s angelic 
fascination with the visible world that God has created, the slow transformations of 
material form that ascend out of water, earth and light, from plant up to rational spirit. 
This is not to say that he (or Raphael) understands it fully. Like Adam, Satan has missed 
                                                            
148 Marjara’s wide-ranging study of science and Milton’s representation of the stars and the sun in 
Paradise Lost explores this sequence as part of the highly topical contemporary debate between newer 
heliocentric, Copernican models of the universe and older Ptolemaic, geocentric ones. While the breadth 
of information is extremely valuable, his actual analysis gets caught in trying to prove Milton as “biased 
towards [right, good, modern] Copernicanism”; he declares Raphael’s answer as posing “The basic 
question… [of] whether or not the solid earth, both in itself and by virtue of its being inhabited by man, 
contains anything ‘of solid good” (Harinda Singh Marjara, Contemplation of Created Things: Science in 
Paradise Lost, [University of Toronto Press: London, 1992], 137). In fact the sun is clearly “barren” 
without the earth, which contains “more” plenteous good. 
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the fundamental quality of loving humility that characterises spiritual greatness, for this 
muddled theology once again refuses God’s divine position as Creator, comparing 
God’s centrality to the earth’s cosmic position (as it would be in the Ptomelaic system at 
least). Satan thereby misses the difference between the creation’s blessing of receiving 
life and God’s position as source and origin of life, which extends glory outwards to his 
creation, or such portions of it that will accept and revel in it. Satan articulates this 
confusion about the origin of life in his own claim that the angels are ‘self begot’ and 
the muddle of values between what creates and what is created is restated in the 
temptation scene, in which Eve herself is proposed as divine. The intrinsic theological 
significance of the contemporary debates on the causes of motion or being is laid bare in 
the struggles of men and angels to understand the worlds they live in. To underestimate 
the value or power of matter is a mistake in terms both of natural philosophy and of 
theology. 
 
The sun can only act in relation to the fertile good of the material earth; there is 
also another layer of significant natural philosophy in Milton’s representation of the 
sun. It is a popular Renaissance figuration of divine power, and while it has here in 
Milton’s poem neither the direct identity with divinity bestowed upon it by radicals such 
as Overton, nor the uncritical association made by Neoplatonists such as Ficino, the 
analogy is potent and complex.149  Endowed by Aristotle with the power to emit heat 
that is analogous to the generative heat contained by semen, (as opposed to the normal 
heat of a fire), the sun occupies a unique position in Aristotelian natural philosophy.150 
Milton’s sun, often characterised as working to fertilise earth or matter on the edge of 
chaos, is obviously Aristotelian in this sense, but the natural philosophy of the poem 
reduces the ontological dominance of the traditionally masculine formative heat of the 
sun in relation to both ‘female light’ of the moon and the ‘solid good’ of the earth, 
bringing a sense of multiple rather than binary causality to the generative components of 
the cosmos.151
                                                            
149 Overton, Mans Mortalitie (London, 1644); see Nicholas McDowell, ‘Ideas of Creation in the Writings 
of Richard Overton the Leveller and Paradise Lost’, Journal of the History of Ideas 66. 1 (2005), 59-78. 
On Ficino, De Sole (1494) see Dilwyn Knox, ‘Ficino and Corpernicus’ in Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, 
His Philosophy, His Legacy, ed. M. J. B. Allen and V. Rees (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 399-418. 406-10. 
 Moreover, during Satan’s visit to the sun we are given a more detailed 
representation of solar power altogether; one in which a basically Aristotelian paradigm 
is revised in the light of chymical theories of dynamism. Characteristically, the poet 
150 Gad Freudenthal, Aristotle’s Theory of Material Substance: Heat and Pneuma, Form and Soul 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), 116. 
151 See PL 6. 478-81; PL 2. 1034-39. 
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refuses to give a definitive answer to the contemporary question of whether the sun 
moves the stars or they move themselves; the stars either propel themselves to 
 
Turn swift their various motions, or are turned 
By his magnetic beam, that gently warms 
The universe, and to each inward part 
With gentle penetration, though unseen, 
Shoots invisible virtue even to the deep. 
(PL 3. 582-6) 
 
Marjara cites Kepler, Gilbert and Boyle in his analysis of this relation between sun and 
stars, arguing that it encapsulates the Aristotelian “notion of celestial influences, but 
also… the necessity felt in the seventeenth century to find a more satisfactory physics 
for the motions of the heavenly bodies.”152 The revision, of course, is in the ‘magnetic’ 
nature of the sun’s beam, as well as in the attribution to the sun of alchemical activity. 
The radiant sphere of mineral purity and plenitude that Satan encounters has rivers of 
potable gold and the atmosphere is of “elixir pure.” The sun is the “arch-chemic sun” 
and the philosopher’s stone or something very like it (despite the dry comment that it is 
rather more often imagined than seen on earth) can be found in abundance (PL, 3. 591-
612). It is nevertheless worth noting in the wake of Raphael’s lesson, that on the sun the 
gems blaze and the gold might be potable gold, but the glorious, sensuous fertility of 
paradise and heaven are lacking. Nothing matches the “ambrosial fruit / Of vegetable 
gold” of the Tree of Life, for example.153
                                                            
152 Marjara, Contemplation of Created Things, 124. On this question see in particular 123-127. Henry 
More had argued in the Preface to his Immortality of the Soul (1659) for the sun’s immaterial quality, 
stating that it’s mythic position as an eye, watching: “can pretend to no strength at all, unless the body of 
the Sun were Organical, as ours is; when as he is nothing but fluid Light: so that unless he hath a spiritual 
Being in him, to which this Light should be but the Vehicle, this arbitrarious figuring of his fluid Matter 
cannot be effected. But to grant that there is any such incorporeal Substance in the Sun, is to yield me 
what I contend for, viz. That there are Immaterial Substances in the World.” (Immortality of the Soul, 
Preface). Again, here activity can only emerge from organic structure, mechanism or immaterial 
substance. 
 There is here a delicate interrelation of a 
natural philosophy that validates the material with a theology that prioritises humility, 
loving angelic service and Christ’s (and therefore human) incarnation. That natural 
philosophy is marked by its Aristotelian character, but it has been made dynamic with a 
re-interpretation of energy (sunlight, or planetary gravitation and movement) that comes 
from the alchemical evidence of active materials. This integrative natural philosophy of 
the cosmos is also found in the integrative medical theories that respected both the 
Aristotelian heritage and the new, chymical experimentalism. 
153 In heaven the angels drink, “rubied nectar”, again endowing the mineral with a living, sensuous fruit-
like quality (PL 5. 633). 
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iv. Form, matter and the animated human 
 
The form/matter dualism of Aristotelian natural philosophy is clearly difficult 
to sustain in the sphere of medical evidence. The notion of semen as pure form, or as 
containing form cannot be supported by experience, and the vitalising function relies 
upon the attribution of causal force to pneuma or bodily spirit. But there is a way of 
reading the human body in terms of form and matter that is particular to Glisson’s 
anatomia animata. In Anatomia hepatis Glisson does a ‘notional’ or theoretical analysis 
of the constituent parts of the body dividing them into the ‘organic’ and the ‘similary’ 
parts, stating that “the similary parts are only founded in the matter, and the organical in 
the form.”154 It is clear that these are terms in which the notions of form and matter 
were made particular to anatomy and medicine.155 Drawing on Galen, Glisson identifies 
the organic as the structural nature of a body, an organ as we would think of it today, 
and the similary parts of a body to be the simplest substances of which it is made – the 
substance which remains if the form (organical structure) of a body is destroyed.156 
Similary parts would include the basic material of bone, blood, the parenchyma of the 
organs, the substance of the veins and arteries and nerves and so on, whereas an organic 
part would be the liver, the heart, even the hand itself since this has form and 
mechanical function. Tellingly, Glisson begins his discussion of the conceptual division 
of the body by explaining that although it may be usual to exclude the humours and 
spirits from the category of ‘parts’ “as not [being] animated,” he will instead “take the 
word ‘body’ in a more extended sense as including whatsoever is contained in the body 
as serviceable to life.”157
                                                            
154 Anatomia hepatis, 45. In fact Glisson devotes four chapters (Chapter 4, Of the notions of matter and 
form of the parts; Chapter 5, What is meant by the notions similary, dissimilary, organical, inorganical; 
Chapter 6: How the similary, dissimilary; organical, inorganical parts are founded; and Chapter 7: How 
the similary parts represent the whole matter of the parts, and the organical the form) to this discussion. 
 Glisson therefore sets up and uses the organic/similary 
paradigm, deliberately relating it to the form/matter binary, but even as he does so the 
traditional ascription of ensoulment to the organic parts only is being traversed and 
155 Glisson notes various ways of ‘dividing’ the body conceptually: referring to Galen for the notion of 
situated parts, Laurentius for nourished, nourishing and impelling parts, Hippocrates for containing, 
contained and impelling parts and common custom for solid parts, humours and spirit he nevertheless 
settles on similary and organic for the purposes of his tract (Anatomia hepatis 25-29).  
156 He draws on more recent medical authorities to include the oppositions ‘dissimilary’ and ‘inorganic’ in 
his analysis, but discounts their practical or positive use since they are only negative oppositions to the 
positive descriptive terms. That is, a dissimilary part is a mixed body, such as the various (ultimately 
similary) metals that constitute a watch, or the various (ultimately similary) parts of a hand, the blood, 
bone, tendon etc. which make it up. Likewise ‘inorganic’ simply means without a structural form, which 
brings us back to similary substance. (Anatomia hepatis 43-47). 
157 Anatomia hepatis, 25. 
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modified so that bodily fluids and spirits can be treated as active and living in the way 
that the organic body is. The same medical version of the form/matter dichotomy orders 
the anatomies of Paradise Lost, but here again form (that is, the organic) is not 
prioritised in terms of being a site of animation or the site of soul.  
 
It is a point of feminist concern that it is Eve’s body, rather than Adam’s which 
is normally subject to the gaze of natural philosophy in Paradise Lost. We are given a 
view of Eve’s creation whilst Adam’s remains in the mythic background; certainly, the 
description of his creation lacks the physical detail that characterises that of Eve. 
Moreover, Eve’s creation is an intermediate point between Adam, the first human 
creation, and the generations of their descendents in that God did not breathe the 
peculiarly human rational soul into her. Milton is quite clear that God does this once 
and once only: “God made the mother of all things living out of a simple rib, without 
having to breathe the breath of life a second time Gen. ii. 22.”158 The term ‘simple’ in 
medical terms refers to similary substance; a substance of the body that is similary 
matter, which is how bone is categorised. Therefore while Eve’s animation relies of 
course on her formation, the breath of life is replaced with the power of the already 
living substances of Adam’s body, the “rib, with cordial spirits warm, / And life-blood 
streaming fresh” (PL 8. 466-467). In the poem this bone, blood and spirit supply 
sufficient animation for the formation of a new human being, including that element of 
the rational faculty that had been breathed in to Adam at his creation. The account in 
Paradise Lost matches the account in the Christian Doctrine: Eve’s rational soul will 
emerge from the re-formed simple substances of bone, cordial spirit and life-blood: God 
(spirit) acts upon simple substance to produce a living, rational form.159
 
  
To give a more detailed view of how the binary order of organic and similary 
substance is represented in Paradise Lost we might think of Satan’s first attempt upon 
Eve as she sleeps and he squats next to her ear: 
 
Assaying by his devilish art to reach 
The organs of her fancy, and with them forge 
Illusions as he list, phantasms and dreams, 
Or if, inspiring venom, he might taint 
                                                            
158 CPW 6: 320. 
159 Michael Lieb observes that this creation is paralleled by the Satanic creation of Pandemonium, where 
the fallen “Op’nd into the Hill a spacious wound / And dig’d out ribs of Gold” (PL 1. 465-467); Lieb also 
notes that debased industrial alchemy is the mode of working whereby the “Fabrick huge / Rose like an 
Exhalation” (PL, 1. 710-711) (Dialectics of Creation, 243-244). 
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The animal spirits that from pure blood arise 
Like gentle breaths from rivers pure, thence raise 
At least distempered, discontented thoughts . 
(PL 4. 801-7) 
 
Without, for the moment, looking at the mechanics of how Satan is attempting to 
penetrate Eve’s mind/body, what is immediately clear is that Eve has mental organs – 
presumably parts of her brain, considering Adam’s analysis of fancy and reason in their 
later discussion (PL 5. 100-121).160 The animal spirit was also sometimes termed an 
organ; Ambrose Paré, for example, states that:  “The principall Organe, or Instrument, is 
the Animall spirit diffused by the nerves into each severall part of the body, by which… 
actions are performed.”161 One may not find the animal spirit’s form in an anatomy as 
one would find the form of the liver, but it is nevertheless treated as a single, 
differentiated organ. Paré describes it in the singular; it is categorised as a causal force, 
and therefore analogous to the category of form. This model of the animal spirit’s 
function follows a schema that is more indebted to ideology and dogmatic Aristotelian 
analysis than to the evidence gleaned from early modern experiment and anatomy; it 
also corresponds with the top-down model of spirit and flesh proposed by Calvinism in 
theological terms (which itself parallels monarchy in political terms). Proponents of the 
mechanical philosophy followed the earlier dualists by imagining a model where the 
animal spirit was elaborated out of the vital through the cooling action of the brain, only 
to come into fearsome conflict with the rational soul before they then moved downward 
through the body, controlling it.162
 
 Nevertheless, for them, as for the vitalist physicians 
and Milton’s Eve, spirits are plural, material and active, rather than singular and 
categorised as an organ. As he squats by her sleeping animate body, Satan attempts to 
access Eve’s rational faculty through the upward transformations in the body’s similary 
substances. The bio-mechanics of this attempt will be the subject of a closer analysis in 
Chapter 6, but here we can note that Milton’s model differentiates organ from spirit, 
referring rather to the exhaling of plural ‘spirits’ and, emphasising the upward rise of 
animal spirits from the blood towards Eve’s mental organs; he represents, in short, the 
motion of the animated body as the upward motion modelled by medical vitalism.  
                                                            
160 For a more detailed appraisal of Satan’s attempts on Eve’s animal spirits see chapter 6. 
161 Paré, Workes, 24. 
162 See More, Immortality of the Soul, 25; Charleton, Natural History of the Passions (London, 1674), 22; 
Willis, Two Discourses, 1-5.  
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Ambrose Paré had also categorised the animal spirit as an organ since it works 
as an instrument of the soul, but while Satan treats both organs and spirits of the blood 
as sites of vulnerability, there is a clear differentiation made by Milton between Eve’s 
animal spirits and the ‘organs of her fancy.’ Her mental organs are treated by Satan as 
instruments with which he is attempting to create dreams and illusion; Karen Edwards 
notes the mechanistic approach made by Satan here, suggesting an organ as a musical 
instrument as one interpretation.163 However, Glisson’s lengthy contemporary 
consideration of the medical term organic as pertaining to form means that this 
mechanistic, instrumental attempt is also shaped by the medical notion of the organic. It 
also carries implications of industrial alchemy: the verbs ‘assaying’ and ‘forging’ recall 
the less respectable history of alchemy as a means of making weaponry and increasing 
productivity of corrupted alloys of silver and gold. Satan attempts to take control of 
Eve, to remake her thoughts with a process of industrial alchemy and forging that is 
both forming in a mechanical sense and implicitly fraudulent in the homonymic appeal 
to forgery. This process of entering her, assaying and forging, recalls the “impious 
hands” of Book 1, which “Rifled the bowels of their mother earth / For treasures better 
hid” invoked to describe the travesty of Creation that is the construction of 
Pandemonium (PL 1. 686-688).164
 
 The direct attempt to use Eve’s mental organs is 
similar to that with which he overcomes the serpent, although one is through the mouth 
and the other through the ear. In terms of natural philosophy of body and soul both 
attempts are characterised by his use of the top down model of active intelligence and 
instrumental body.  
We are told “in at his mouth / The devil entered, and his brutal sense, / In heart 
or head, possessing soon inspired / With act intelligential; but his sleep / Disturbed not.” 
(PL. 9. 187-191).165
                                                            
163 Karen Edwards, Milton and the Natural World: Science and Poetry in Paradise Lost, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 25. 
 This is the first representation of a body and a spirit in Paradise 
Lost which uses an Aristotelian formula of intelligential act and subjected animal 
consciousness uncomplicated by sublimation or other such vitalist or chymical 
concepts. Satan works through the animal’s breath to engage in an unnatural imposition 
164 This web of metaphoric allusions, which includes the industrial alchemy associated repeatedly with 
Satan and Hell, is described by Lieb as “the degenerate tradition of alchemy as a charlatan’s art used to 
dupe others for the purposes of material aggrandisement” (Dialectics of Creation, 238). It is only 
biological sublimation of the living mind/body composite that is treated as unfallen chymical process. 
Also used are images of music, exhalation, and that of a brutal debasement of a maternal body similar to 
that which is enacted upon Sin by both Death and the hell hounds. 
165Fowler notes that “in Aristotelian psychology, act was limited to rational agents” (PL, 9. 190, n. 190). 
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of his own intelligential faculty on to the sleeping serpent’s more animalistic sensory 
consciousness.166 This parody of God’s breath of rational intellect breathed into Adam 
at his creation reserves control for Satan; the true rational faculty was a gift freely given 
by God to humanity, becoming part of the dynamic body-soul system. 
Characteristically, Milton refuses to be drawn on the question of whether the heart or 
the head is the central location of the serpent’s sensory mode of animation, although he 
marks the debate itself. However, what is made clear is that the “spirit intelligential” 
uses the serpent as vessel and instrument; at the temptation the poet proposes that 
Satan’s words are made “with serpent tongue / Organic, or impulse of vocal air” (PL. 9. 
529-530). The debate, again indicated but not resolved, is whether or not the serpent’s 
tongue is shaped to make human speech; Milton suggests the use of the serpent’s form 
as organon, but offers the option that the angel uses the air itself, using the serpent as a 
miming puppet.167
 
 This equivocation marks a difference from his attempt upon Eve, as 
the serpent’s organs may not really be fit for his purpose. Eve’s organs of fancy, 
however, give his intelligential substance a more suitable (if more resilient) set of 
instruments with which to create illusion. 
The top-down attempt at possession, in which Satan attempts to control Eve’s 
organic brain and thus her bodily actions, also differs from that made on the serpent in 
that it is supplemented by an attempt upon Eve’s bodily fluids. Her thoughts may be 
reached through her similary parts: her animal spirit, arising from her blood, is an 
alternative, if less direct route to her mental processes within her body-soul composite. 
Both of these aspects of Eve’s ontology are ‘soul’: when Adam later tries to make sense 
of her dream, he is without doubt talking about her soul, for he begins: “in the soul / Are 
many lesser faculties that serve / Reason as chief; among these fancy,” echoing the 
definition of ‘soul’ in the Christian Doctrine as various different physical and mental 
‘faculties’, ‘actions’ and ‘affections’ (PL 5. 100-3). Medical theories of the body are of 
                                                            
166 For a detailed appraisal of different levels of intellect in the Aristotelian schema see Pamela Huby, 
‘Soul, Life, Intellect: Some Thirteenth Century Problems’ in The Human Embryo. Aristotle and the 
Arabic and European Traditions, ed. Gordon Reginald Dunstan, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 
1990), 113-157. Huby notes that “Aristotle and his Greek followers had but one word for intellect, 
namely nous. But in medieval Latin the two words intelligentia and intellectus are in play. By and large, 
but not universally, intellectus is used of the human intellect, including the agent intellect. Intelligentia, 
on the other hand, is reserved for entities at superhuman levels: in the Aristotelian scheme these were God 
and the intelligences that controlled the movements of the heavens. In the Christian world angels would 
play a part as well” (118). 
167 For a full discussion of the background to this debate and its place in Paradise Lost see Joad 
Raymond, ‘“With the tongues of angels”: Angelic Conversations in Paradise Lost and Seventeenth 
Century England’, in Angels in the Early Modern World, ed. Peter Marshall and Alexandra Walsham 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 256-281. 
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central importance to this schema and we can see in Satan’s attempt to make the serpent 
and Eve’s soul “the property of another” the anatomical schema specified by Glisson in 
Anatomia hepatis of organ as form/instrument and similary substance as vital 
fluid/matter.168
 
 In Paradise Lost the orthodox terminology of Aristotelian dualism is 
used only to represent an unnatural and demonic possession. This, as we shall see, 
contrasts with the use of chymical and vitalist motifs which characterise divinely 
sanctioned transformations within the natural order. Finally, Satan attempts to use both 
organic brain and similary blood and spirits in his assault on her rational soul: both form 
and matter of her body-soul composite are sites of vulnerability which may lead to or 
affect her rational mind, neither taking final priority. 
 
 
v. Form, matter and causality 
 
The breakdown of the Aristotelian form/matter binary is present in this sketch 
of Eve as Satan perceives her, but is more directly demonstrated in other areas of 
Milton’s work.169 The four causal modes are fundamental tools of seventeenth-century 
thought and the rejection or reinterpretation of Aristotelian natural philosophy cannot be 
appreciated without a clear working definition of them. We can take this moment to 
define Milton’s use of the four modes of causality at the heart of Aristotelian 
philosophy; his organisation and deployment of them illustrate his ‘medical’ thinking. 
Their precise definition is dealt with directly in the Art of Logic. Here he pauses briefly 
to delineate them, stating “A cause is not badly defined as that which gives existence to 
a thing.” He then specifies the modes of cause as “the power or ability… by which, 
from which, through which, or on account of which a thing is”.170
                                                            
168 As early as Reason of Church Government of 1642 Milton had referred to the soul’s “principall 
organick parts” being vulnerable to worldly joys as “a diet puffing up the soul with a slimy fleshiness” 
(CPW 1: 846). 
 The phrase ‘by 
which’ refers to the efficient cause: this cause, as maker or first impulse to movement, is 
not included in the effect. The phrase ‘from which’ signifies the material cause, the 
substance out of which something is made; ‘through which’ refers to the form and thus 
the functional capability of a body; ‘on account of which’ refers to the ‘final cause’, the 
end goal or overall intention of the motion.  
169 For a detailed study of the dissolution of this dualism in the Creation sequences see chapter 4. 
170 CPW 8: 222.  
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Central to my argument is the fact that Milton self-consciously proposes this 
order as different from the classic Aristotelian organisation into extrinsic causes, which 
are efficient cause and final cause, and the intrinsic causes of form and matter. 171 By 
applying a logic of temporal process, which begins with efficient and material causes 
and then leads to formal and final causes, Milton shifts the emphasis from an 
arrangement which implies an individual (and somewhat anthropomorphic) agent 
making a thing, to a more naturalistic arrangement of two always already divinely 
animated categories of substance: matter (material cause) and spirit (efficient cause) 
from which emerge form and function.172 He pairs the efficient cause with the material 
cause as “the first genus of cause”, that is, initialising impulsions, causes that deal with 
beginnings. This pairing is followed by “the second, consisting of form and end”, giving 
the formal and final causes as structure (and thus functional capability) and desired 
outcome, to do with utility and teleology respectively.173 The Creation is figured 
through tropes of bodily conception and thus it is significant that Harvey, who juggles 
endlessly (and often in a contradictory fashion), with the different modes of causality in 
the Generation of Animals, notes that this is how physicians re-order the traditional 
Aristotelian causal modes.174
 
 This arrangement, as we shall see, orders the two main 
accounts of the Creation in Paradise Lost. 
The unusual priority given by Milton to material causality in the Art of Logic is 
congruous with the materialism of both Paradise Lost and the Christian Doctrine. The 
rebuke given by Raphael, that the material element of creation should be given its due 
value and significance as a genuine cause of life, is in fact a point expounded at some 
length in the Christian Doctrine. In a philosophical meditation on Romans 6:36, “from 
him and through him and in him are all things”, Milton notes:  
 
There are, to begin with, as everyone knows, four kinds of causes, 
efficient, material, formal and final. Since God is the first, absolute 
                                                            
171 CPW 8: 230. Aristotle gives the division as intrinsic/extrinsic (Physics, 1. 6, 7). Diane McColley notes 
that Thomas Vaughan “chides the followers of Aristotle who ‘look on God as they do on carpenters, who 
build with stone and timber, without any infusion of life. But the world, which is God’s building, is full of 
spirit, quick and living’”. See McColley, Poetry and Ecology in the Age of Milton and Marvell (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2007), 57. 
172 “The form is generated within a thing simultaneously with the thing itself… The rational soul is the 
form of man, because through it man is a man and is distinguished from all other natures” (CPW 8: 234).  
Thus the rational soul must emerge from the material and efficient causes. For further information on 
notions of conception see chapter 4. 
173 CPW 8: 230. 
174 Harvey, Works, 334. 
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and sole cause of all things, he unquestionably contains and 
comprehends within himself all these things.175
 
 
This indicates in a general way that the material cause is at least as divine in origin and 
power as the other modes of cause, as does Milton’s bald statement that the original 
matter “was not an evil thing, nor to be thought of as worthless: it was good, and it 
contained the seeds of all subsequent good.”176 We can note here that seeds are already 
fertile in their own right, and add to this his point that “matter was not, by nature 
imperfect. The addition of forms [which, for Milton are themselves material] did not 
make it more perfect but only more beautiful”.177 This comment demolishes Platonic 
equations of the Good with the Beautiful, and also rejects the Augustinian tradition of 
identifying the material elements of creation with the stain of original sin.178 Matter 
already contains the seeds of all that is good, just as the earth is commanded by God to 
put forth vegetation and fruit trees “Whose seed is in herself upon the earth” before the 
creation of the sun and sunlight (PL 7. 312).179 Moreover, there is no immaterial aspect 
to this model of creation; the ultimate focus of his discussion of the Creation is the 
heretical statement that “not even God’s virtue and efficiency could have produced 
bodies out of nothing… unless there had been some bodily force in his own substance, 
for no one can give something he has not got”.180
 
 
As in the earlier discussion of the human body-soul, the theological statement is 
formulated in harmony with a basis of natural philosophy. The above is a statement that 
employs what Balme calls “the root of his [Aristotle’s] theory of genesis: anything that 
is produced can only be produced by a similar thing previously existing.”181
                                                            
175 CPW 6: 308. 
 This could 
be (and was) interpreted to support the position that form is a necessary precondition of 
the eduction of further forms, but Milton and Glisson both reinterpret it radically. In a 
176 CPW 6: 308. These seeds are semina – unlike Van Helmont’s semina they are material rather than 
being an immaterial principle which acts on matter, recalling rather Augustinian seminal reasons. 
Nevertheless, the focus on fermentation in the Creation sequences, locates them firmly in the seventeenth 
century. 
177 CPW 6: 308. 
178 Balachandra Rajan and Regina Schwartz argue that the monism of the Christian Doctrine is not 
represented uncritically or without qualification in the chaos of Paradise Lost. See Rajan, Milton and the 
Climates of Reading, (London: University of Toronto Press, 2007), in particular Chapter 7: The Two 
Creations 112-122. Schwartz, Remembering and Repeating: On Milton's Theology and Poetics (London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988). 
179 This fertility of the earth is, like the order of events, strictly conformed to the source material in 
Genesis 1-3. 
180 CPW 6: 309. 
181 Balme, ‘Human is Generated by Human’, 23. 
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reflective motion to Milton’s assertion of God’s bodily force, Glisson interprets the 
same axiom to endow the matter of the blood with animating properties. Rather than 
being separate from the blood, vital spirit is part of the chemical composition of the 
blood. The vital flow of blood must animate the body because: 
 
 if the heart itself (which once was deemed to be the source of life) 
owes its life and vital heat to the vital blood (as is shown by the circuit 
of the blood), it will be very difficult to deny life to the blood. For a 
thing that communicates something to another thing must already 
have in itself what it is communicating: otherwise it will exceed the 
limits of its own activity and give to something else what it does not 
have in its own power.182
 
 
Aristotelian theory of generation is employed by both authors in the assertion of a 
heretical materialism; just as the substance of God must have “some bodily force” in 
order to create materiality, something immanent within the substance of the life-giving 
blood must have the power of animation. Rumrich maintains that we cannot 
underestimate the importance of this innovation. He quotes Aristotle’s statement: “the 
begetter is of the same kind as the begotten… in form… They are different in virtue of 
their matter (for that is different), but the same in form”.183 What Milton – and Glisson 
– have done is to reverse this so that “the begetter is of the same kind as the begotten 
not because they partake of the same form, but because they share the same matter”.184
 
 
Matter is what we share with the universe and, more particularly, those who generate us; 
form (proper form rather than generic form) is what differentiates us into individual 
entities.  
This renovation of the value and active force of matter was a genuine shift 
from orthodox medicine to a new model that emerged from Harvey’s research. The 
traditional model of cause in the generation of life is characterised by “Aristotle’s 
account of generation, which holds that the form pre-exists before an embodied thing 
comes to be in matter.”185
                                                            
182Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 85. Giglioni cites MS 
Sloane 3310 (“Sanguis est summa et principalis pars corporis”) f. 228r. Through this argument we should 
remember that generation was bracketed with nutrition as powers of the natural/vegetative soul, since 
both cause and maintain morphological growth. 
 Milton, like Glisson, follows Aristotle in the assertion of 
likeness between that which generates and that which is generated. In the system of 
causal modes he, like Harvey and Glisson, rethinks their orthodox arrangement into one 
183 Aristotle quoted in Rumrich, Matter of Glory, 65. 
184 Rumrich, Matter of Glory, 65. 
185 Monte Ransome Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 48. 
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which renovates the traditionally morally and ontologically deficient mode of the 
material. Milton asserts that “The form is generated within a thing simultaneously with 
the thing itself.”186  This is a significant departure from the Aristotelian orthodoxy of 
form as a precondition of life and it finds a powerful analogue in the work of Harvey. 
Writing on the development of the chick in the egg, he substantiates his discussion of 
the different causal modes of generation with the observation that “its parts are not 
fashioned simultaneously, but emerge in their due succession and order: it appears, too, 
that its form proceeds simultaneously with its growth, and its growth with its form.”187 
This is a particularly Harveian development from the classical Aristotelian biology 
preceding Harvey, which had insisted that the movements (the pneuma/heat 
movements) that inhere in the semen form the heart first; after this, the soul “centred in 
the heart, controls the further development via the blood.”188
 
 Milton, then, is using a 
carefully adjusted version of Aristotelian causality which has distinct similarities to that 
at the cutting edge of seventeenth-century biological thought. 
The potentia materiae is not only universal within the created world, it has 
divine force: it is the material cause and the material cause is given an unusual priority 
and emphasis in Milton’s accounts of the origins of life. Just as the substance of the 
blood is given as inherently vital and vitalising in Glisson’s work, and the parents are 
both given as functioning in the mode of efficient cause of life in the Art of Logic, so is 
the bodily force of procreation given as the source of the rational soul in the Christian 
Doctrine. Milton’s ‘biological’ approach to the body-soul composite is never clearer 
than in his discussion of God’s creation ex deo and the corresponding defence of matter 
as originating in God and essentially good. The sources of these vitalising revisions may 
be many and ancient, but there is one particularly dramatic revision which clearly 
indicates the influence of chymical philosophy. In his discussion of God’s attributes in 
the Christian Doctrine, Milton refuses the scholastic Aristotelian equation of God with 
the Actus Purus, a formula which identifies God as pure actuality, and thus without 
further potential for perfecting action, on the grounds that “thus he could do nothing 
except what he does do, and would do that of necessity, although in fact he is 
omnipotent and utterly free in his actions.”189
                                                            
186 CPW 8: 234. 
 Of course this contradicts directly a 
187 Harvey, Works, 336. 
188 Balme, ‘Human is Generated by Human’,  24. 
189 CPW 6: 146-7. John Rumrich makes this point (Matter of Glory, 63); see also Dennis Danielson, 
Milton’s Good God, A Study in Literary Theodicy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 42. 
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powerful Christian Aristotelian tradition of God as the Unmoved Mover, as well as the 
Platonic and Neoplatonic notion of the divine as eternally perfect and unchanging in 
contrast to the shadowy flux of time encountered by human consciousness. This 
argument, that to have freedom God has to have potential, enables on a theodical level 
the attribution of materiality to God; it also means that God himself is in some way 
subject to change, a heinous denigration to divinity in orthodox thought. Alexander 
Ross attacks this notion in Medicus Medicatus (1645), noting with ire that: “if any 
matter were in God· then there must be in him a passive possibility, and quantity also, 
and distinction of parts, all which essentially follow the matter.” “What a strange God,” 
he concludes.190
 
 
Another place we find this extremely unusual contradiction of scholastic 
doctrine is in the work of Van Helmont, who, like Milton, finds the imposition of 
motionlessness upon God to be an impossible constriction upon the divine. Rather, God 
is 
  
altogether free, as well as in his beck and motion as in his rest, he 
indifferently and alike powerfully moveth all things: Therefore his 
own unmoveable essence doth not import a necessity required by the 
Schooles, but the mere good pleasure of his glory. For his own 
word… hath departed into Nature, which afterwards is for moving of 
itself.191
 
 
What might at first look like a version of occasionalism turns quickly to a devout 
vitalism. In his study of Van Helmont as chymical philosopher, Debus clarifies his 
motivation thus: “van Helmont was primarily concerned with the problem of freeing the 
Creator from the shackles placed upon him by the Aristotelians.”192
                                                            
190Alexander Ross. Medicus Medicatus: or the physicians religion cured, by a lenitive or gentle potion. 
(London, 1645), 18-19. 
 The parallel 
between this and Milton’s rejection of God as Actus Purus is clear, and the vision of an 
active Nature still responding to the Word of God recalls once again Milton’s 
declaration that “nature cannot mean anything except the wonderful power and efficacy 
191 Van Helmont quoted in Debus, Chemical Philosophy, 315. 
192 Debus, Chemical Philosophy, 317. Despite the intriguing parallels between the two figures, van 
Helmont’s vociferous antagonism to the European Aristotelian heritage, and his declared intention of 
completely rejecting this heritage makes him less appropriate as a source and comparison to Milton than 
Glisson, whose inclusiveness matches Milton’s own. Giglioni makes it clear that where Glisson is a true 
materialist, Van Helmont is rather a Neoplatonist. (Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of 
Life’, 166). For the distinction between monistic materialism and the dualism of much chymistry and 
hermetic philosophy, see McDowell, ‘Ideas of Creation in the Writings of Richard Overton the Leveller 
and Paradise Lost’, 67-68. 
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of the divine voice which went forth in the beginning, and which all things have obeyed 
ever since as a perpetual command”.193
 
 Natural things move themselves in the natural 
philosophy of Milton’s epic poetry, as we shall see in the chapters that follow.  
Overall, the work of Van Helmont himself shows a number of radical 
philosophical divergences from Milton’s particular vitalism. For example, his vitalism 
rests upon a notion of empty matter that is essentially water and active, seminal ideas, 
rather than being a materialist vitalism. Moreover his concept of the ‘archeus,’ which 
dominates much of the notion of the body’s workings, finds no analogues or 
correspondences in Milton’s work. The body’s archeus is: 
 
 the organiser that is concerned with the designing of the individual 
organs and members. He particularises his ‘monarchy’ in accordance 
with the requirements of each of them. He establishes for each part a 
‘stomach’ or ‘kitchen,’ entrusted with the separation and preparation 
of the nourishment carried to the member by the blood… he remains 
as ‘internal president, curator and rector’.194
 
 
This natural philosophy of the body is structurally quite different to that of John Milton, 
although there are some Helmontian concepts and many influences upon the work of 
Glisson that will be relevant to materialist medical vitalism. For now, it is apparent that 
Milton’s revision of the notion of God as Actus Purus and his description of the relation 
between the word of God and the natural world finds itself reflected in the disruptive 
and divisive medical work of Van Helmont, whom Giglioni shows to be the major 
source for Glisson’s expansion into chymical natural philosophy.195
 
 
The vitriolic conflicts between physicians on the one hand and empirics and 
chymists on the other were not, however, the only acrimonious disputes, and medical 
revisions of form and matter from binary categories into a more complex biological 
process did not go unchallenged by conservative commentators. In a highly charged 
attack on Browne’s flirtation with traducianism in Religio Medici, Alexander Ross, 
described by William Kerrigan as “the furious watchdog of convention in seventeenth-
century England”, insists that “a body can no more produce a spirit, then an horse can 
beget a man, they being different species… if the soule were propagated in or by the 
                                                            
193 CPW 6: 340. 
194 Pagel, Van Helmont, 98. 
195 Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’; in particular Chapter 4 ‘Chymical 
Galenism. Innovation and tradition in anatomy,’ section 4. The challenge of the chemical sects and 
section 5. Interpreting Helmont, 120-134. 
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seed, then this were a true enunciation, Semen est animal rationale, and so the seed 
should be man.”196 That is, if it were to propagate the rational soul, semen should 
contain rational thought, and therefore the form of a man who thinks. There is indeed a 
problem if one identifies soul as form and then applies this to the evidence of 
procreating human bodies: it is Milton’s commitment to the vital activity of matter that 
unravels the genuine aporia indicated by Ross’s blunt reductio ad absurdum. To the 
related question of whether body can emanate from spirit, Milton comments dryly that 
this is more likely than the orthodox proposition that it should emanate “from nothing at 
all.”197
 
 Milton’s materialism goes beyond the conventional medical theory of bodily 
spirits attacked here by Ross with such outrage. This re-evaluation of materiality and 
the material cause contradicts orthodox versions of dualism, and contributes to the 
deconstruction of the traditional binary opposition of form and matter.  
Having re-examined the notion of Milton’s ‘science’ being Aristotelian and 
therefore stiff, conventional and old-fashioned, we have found, rather, that some areas 
of experimental research in medicine and physiology had a much less antagonistic 
relationship with its Aristotelian foundations than those in physics, for example. Not 
only this, but where revisions to notions of causality or the qualities of matter and form 
were being made in the medical field, they are often paralleled or reflected by the sort of 
innovations made by Milton in his natural philosophy, whether it is the order of causal 
modes theorised in the Art of Logic or the representation of materiality in the natural 
philosophy of Paradise Lost. Milton’s Eve and the serpent are described in medical 
terms of organic and similary parts, but the only representation of classic Aristotelian 
intellectus imposed upon living material form is made in the unnatural attempt made by 
Satan to insert his own consciousness into control of the animal body. Moreover, the 
traditional form/matter dichotomy breaks down in the representation of Eve as subject 
of possession, since both her organic and her similary parts (blood and spirit) are routes 
to her higher consciousness. Even Milton’s work on doctrine bears the marks of 
chymical, medical revision in the prioritising of God’s absolute freedom over the notion 
of God as pure Actuality, the determinant of form. This sketch of the radical nature of 
Milton’s Aristotelianism will enable us to build a clearer picture of his vitalist natural 
philosophy. What is also evident, of course, is that while the Aristotelian corpus, with 
                                                            
196 Ross. Medicus Medicatus, 46. William Kerrigan, The Sacred Complex: On the Psychogenesis of 
Paradise Lost (London: Harvard University Press, 1983), 247. 
197 CPW 6: 309. 
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its tendency to ascribe to things their own ‘natural intention’, often suggests a sort of 
vitalism, the radical vitalism Rogers identifies in the period is more complex and more 
involved with the empiricism of the English Revolution than that of ‘the ancients’. If, 
therefore, we are to continue Rogers’ rich and compelling thesis that Milton’s vitalism 
can most lucidly be understood in relation to medical vitalism of the period, we must 
examine more carefully the precise features of this vitalism.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Medical vitalism 
 
 
i. Models of vitalism 
 
There is building evidence that Milton’s Aristotelian natural philosophy shares 
much of its innovation (and heretical implication) with that of contemporary medical 
experimentalism. Milton solves a series of problems of monism within an Aristotelian 
framework and these re-evaluations of causality and of matter and materiality in the Art 
of Logic, the Christian Doctrine and in Paradise Lost have a particularly medical 
character; they also imply chymical theories of dynamism more than once. With this in 
mind we will shortly return to the question of what the active matter that constitutes the 
created world looks like in Paradise Lost. First, however, it is necessary to examine a 
little more carefully what contemporary vitalism means. The representation of the 
Creation in Paradise Lost has been linked by Rogers to the vitalist medical research of 
Harvey and Glisson, and although various critics have pointed to the shared vitalist 
materialism of these figures, Rogers is the only critic to explore this linkage in any 
detail. Indeed he creates a new paradigm in which to view Milton’s natural philosophy; 
he also explicates an impressive political allegory out of the association.  
 
Nevertheless, the exploration of Milton’s representation of a vitalist monism 
benefits from a detailed approach in terms of medical theory. Although Rogers’s study 
of Paradise Lost informs much of my own, I would like to investigate with a new 
attention to detail the notion of vitalism as it was proposed by figures such as Glisson. 
This will seem at first to take us some distance from Paradise Lost, but the work of this 
chapter is to delineate a model of medical vitalist materialism that can then be correlated 
with the vitalist materialism in the poem. In order to refine my approach I will take 
Rogers’s use of figures such as Harvey, Glisson, Paracelsus and Van Helmont and focus 
on divergence or conflict between their versions of vitalist thought. Harvey, for example 
did not make use of the chymical researches of Van Helmont; Glisson, who did so 
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extensively, nevertheless dismisses Paracelsus with the words: “either he talks nonsense 
or smacks of the devil.”198
 
 Rather than assuming, as Rogers has done, the concurrence 
of Milton’s notion of vitalism with those of Paracelsus, or Glisson and Harvey (or 
indeed the concurrence of Glisson’s vitalism with that of Harvey) I would like to re-
examine the theoretical structure of Milton’s monist vitalism and its implications for the 
human body-soul composite.  
Rogers states that: 
 
There are moments not only in Christian Doctrine, but in Paradise 
Lost as well in which Milton represents the generous, egalitarian 
vitalism he would have found in texts such as Glisson’s De rachitude 
and Harvey’s Circulatio sanguinis, vitalist works in which matter is 
not segregated by degrees of spiritualization but infused uniformly 
with spirit and energy.199
 
 
Vitalism here is “egalitarian” in the work of both doctors; what makes it so for Rogers 
is that it is a uniform infusion of matter with spirit and energy, rather than a system that 
is segregated into degrees of spiritualisation. Rogers claims, furthermore, that there is a 
profound fracture of logic between this politically radical vitalist natural philosophy and 
the representation of God and concomitant theology of the poem; he makes particular 
reference to the creation sequences and the expulsion of Adam and Eve in the final 
books of the poem. Indeed he states that in his attempt to represent a vitalist materialist 
Creation Milton’s use of tropes of fermentation has “sabotaged his attempt to justify the 
ways of God to men.”200
 
 This sabotage is located in the presence of “tartareous dregs” 
at the Creation, which, Rogers claims, attribute to God the origin of that which is 
adverse to life or even that which is evil. 
The claim that Milton’s vitalist materialism has sabotaged his theodicy is a 
grand one and some of the work of this dissertation is to refute it. Before we look 
directly at the Creation to see if and how Milton’s materialism and traducianism work in 
terms of ‘science’, theology and the relation between them, we need to ask some 
questions. Are these texts by Harvey, Glisson and Milton vitalist? And if they are, what 
form does their vitalism take? Do they represent matter as being uniformly infused with 
                                                            
198 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 127. Giglioni cites: MS 
Sloane 3308, f. 221r; also 3309, f. 100r. 
199 Rogers, Matter of Revolution, 112. 
200 Rogers, Matter of Revolution, 137. 
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spirit and energy? Are spirit and energy analogous, as is suggested here, or do we need 
to investigate the relation between vital heat and vital spirit in more detail? Fallon 
defines vitalism as “the belief that life is a property traceable to matter itself rather than 
to either the motion of complex organisations of matter or an immaterial soul,” thus 
placing it in contrast to atomism, mechanist philosophy and religious dualism.201
 
 I argue 
that Milton has in fact an ordered system of vitalism in his natural philosophy, which, 
out of all the versions of vitalist thought heretofore suggested, adheres most closely to 
that proposed by Francis Glisson, and which does not disrupt or damage, but 
complements and supports his theodicy. I have already shown a number of instances 
where the diffusion and deconstruction of the orthodox form/matter paradigm required 
by Milton’s vitalism is paralleled by similar innovative factors emerging from 
contemporary medical research. Where Rogers sets Milton’s vital matter in opposition 
to the “spheres assigned” and “bounds / Proportioned to each kind” of Raphael’s 
famous speech, I would argue that this vitalism is characterised not by a uniform 
infusion of spirit through matter, but by a scale of matter which includes spirit and 
which has varying vitality and corresponding value, precisely measured by ‘degrees’ 
(PL 5. 491-2).  
Both the dynamic scale of matter/value and the deconstruction of the binary 
form/matter paradigm are in the medical corpus indicated by Rogers, but the relation 
between the natural philosophy of the poem and that of the medical theory can be read 
more subtly than it has been, particularly with regard to Glisson’s work, which 
eventually developed into a coherent system of vitalist natural philosophy. In contrast, 
Harvey’s speculation about the relation of blood and spirit (whether one contained the 
other or whether there was a straightforward identity between them, for example) was 
left without an unambiguous conclusion. In his late work, De generatione animalium, 
Harvey had suggested that either the heart, the blood or both were the original source of 
life; the blood’s position with regard to the soul was explored, but not finally answered: 
the questions of whether the blood was the container of the soul, the embodiment of the 
soul, the first instrument of the soul or the soul itself lay alongside each other without a 
final unequivocal answer.202
                                                            
201 Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, 111. 
 At the heart of this debate about the nature of animation is 
the question of whether life is a transcendent principle or an immanent principle: while 
Harvey toyed with various solutions, Glisson attempted to solve some of the aporias of 
202 Harvey, Works, ‘Exercise the fifty-second: Of the blood as the prime element of the body’, 379-391. 
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Harvey’s experimental work with a theory of vital, self-active, self-producing blood, 
which began his journey towards hylozoism (and thus a solution which gives life as 
immanent to matter). His theory relies upon the notion of fermentation, adopted and 
developed through the seventeenth century by the chymical philosophers, to imagine the 
activity of this vitalising blood.  
 
In his assessment of Milton’s vitalism, Rogers also takes a significant amount 
of detail from the works of Paracelsus and Joan Baptista Van Helmont; the link between 
the different strands of vitalism is, however, far from simple. Paracelsus, although he 
was a founding figure of alchemical philosophy and medicine, is not easily identified as 
a monist vitalist; he believed for instance that there were in man two bodies, one visible 
and one that was invisible and of greater power.203 He also made many wild and 
provocative claims; for example he was criticised by Daniel Sennert for declaring that 
Adam and Eve had no genitals until the Fall.204 Although his influence on the history of 
medical thought is undeniably profound, his theses often clash with what are to Milton 
fundamental doctrinal imperatives. Van Helmont, in contrast, can be located securely in 
the experimental tradition of seventeenth-century medicine and, while still a 
controversial figure, his theorising was more smoothly absorbed by the medical 
mainstream: “in the 1650s Helmontian chemistry was widely adopted by English 
physicians and natural philosophers, mainly those connected with the Hartlib circle.”205 
Nevertheless, his vitalism remains within a dualist paradigm that owes much to 
Platonism. His matter is moved by the immaterial ‘Idea formatrix seminalis’ derived in 
part from the Plotinian tradition.206
 
  In fact Pagel notes that Van Helmont criticised 
Aristotle roundly for the implicit materialism of his thought:  
The issue that prompted Van Helmont’s sharpest criticism of Aristotle 
was the correlation which the latter proposed between body and soul. 
First, Aristotle had postulated that active forces require matter that is 
already ‘disposed’ in a certain way... Van Helmont by contrast refused 
to grant matter – in his view empty water – a share in any forming and 
individualising activity... there could be no ‘natural correspondence of 
the active and passive... nor could matter be endowed with any 
potentiality of acquiring a soul.207
 
 
                                                            
203 Pagel, Paracelsus, 121. 
204 Pagel, Paracelsus, 335. 
205 Clericuzio, ‘Van Helmont to Boyle’, 304. 
206 Pagel, Van Helmont, 31-2. 
207 Pagel, Van Helmont 40. 
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This ‘vitalism’ is not monist vitalism; although iatrochemistry provided materialist 
vitalism with much that was useful in evidence of active substance, Van Helmont’s 
work  rather presupposes that life inheres in the immaterial spiritual forces that act upon 
matter, thus vivifying it.208
 
 We can therefore note to begin with that ‘vitalism’ is itself 
not the uniform theory one might suppose and turn once again to the work of Glisson.  
It is clear that Glisson’s tract on the rickets, researched through the late 1640s 
and published in 1650, does not propose the systematised vitalism of his later work. 
Despite the intriguing coincidence of Milton’s intervention in the licensing of De 
rachitude, the fact remains that to find a precise account of Glisson’s vitalist theories we 
need rather to pay attention to his later works. Giglioni shows that it is later in Glisson’s 
career, in his production of the tract De natura substantiae energetica, seu de vita 
naturae of 1672 that his theory of the innately active, living nature of substance comes 
to maturity. This postdates the publication of Paradise Lost, but Glisson makes it clear 
that this philosophical project had developed in response to and through the course of 
many years of experimental study and research; in short, there are several other texts 
from the intervening eighteen years that have relevant material in them. Anatomia 
hepatis (1654) contains a detailed theory of the chemical composition of the blood, 
which shows the materialist vitalist background from which the philosophy of natural 
perception emerged in Glisson’s work. Furthermore, Giglioni has studied (and made 
numerous translations from) Glisson’s unpublished manuscripts, many of which set up 
and resolve the academic debates, or determinationes, of his students at Cambridge 
throughout the 1640s and 1650s, as well as the unfinished manuscript treatises De 
inadaequatis rerum conceptibus and Disquisitiones metaphysicae, which he describes 
as “papers [in which] we can find the ultimate conceptual structures of Glisson's theory 
of the energetic nature of substance, seen from a purely logical and ontological point of 
view.”209 Also available is Glisson’s treatise on the stomach, De ventriculo et intestinis 
(1677), in which he uses his mature vitalism as a fundamental basis for his anatomical 
research.210
                                                            
208 See Brian Garret, ‘Vitalism and teleology in the natural philosophy of Nehemiah Grew (1641-1712)’, 
British Journal for the History of Science 36. 1 (2003), 63-81. Garret discusses a similar vitalism 
proposed by Nehemiah Grew in the early eighteenth century, where life is the effect of an incorporeal 
principle upon matter, and relates it to the theories of Henry More. 
 Giglioni’s translations of Glisson’s work are extremely valuable material 
for an analysis of what medical vitalism was, but there are also some English 
209 Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 32. We can recall here that Glisson’s 
teaching notes were produced between the end of the 1640s and the beginning of the 1660s (Giglioni, 
‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 104). 
210 Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 35. 
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manuscripts of Glisson’s, in particular a series of lectures on the stomach and the 
process of digestion given late in his career, which, like De ventriculo, presuppose and 
reiterate the system of vitalist philosophy published in 1672.211
 
  
Giglioni’s study of the development of Glisson’s work finds that there are only 
traces of his mature vitalism in De rachitude, primarily to be found in a general interest 
in: 
 
the similary parts of the body (that is, the elementary components of 
the vital economy, prior to the more complex organic articulation) and 
the centrality of the natural constitution with respect to the vital and 
animal constitutions (that is, the pre-eminence of the vegetative 
functions).212
 
 
The fact is that Glisson’s vitalism grows out of his lifelong study of the properties of the 
body’s matter rather than anatomy’s traditional investigations of form. Giglioni 
summarises the philosophical audaciousness of Glisson’s later work, noting that it 
proposes: 
 
the primacy of matter with respect to form; the perpetuity and self-
subsistence of matter; the re-evaluation of the theory of the eduction 
of forms as a thoroughly immanent process, [and] the attribution to 
matter of an autonomous causal power not distinguishable from its 
own being.213
 
 
Glisson’s vitalism, his hylozoic heresy, overturns the traditional relation of form and 
matter and suggests a theory of causality that rests in materiality itself. To explicate this, 
matter takes on a priority in vitalism that form cannot sustain: experimentally, matter is 
the constant, form in contrast is mutable. Matter is no longer seen as necessarily made 
existent by form and form emerges from the power of matter rather than matter being 
subject to the actualising power of form. Finally, this means that the material cause 
gains a certain precedence in significance (in the synchronic model of the four causes, 
for example), but also in sequence (their diachronic action in natural or bodily processes 
such as nutrition or conception): it precedes form as a fundamental initiating cause, 
being capable of autonomously impelling the beginning of life. Here we can recall 
Milton’s re-ordering of the four causes in the Art of Logic, where the efficient and 
                                                            
211 English Manuscripts of Francis Glisson: 2. Lectures and other papers, ed.  A. Cunningham 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Wellcome Unit, 1993). 
212 Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 16. 
213 Giglioni, ‘Anatomist Atheist’, 126. 
83 
 
material cause are bracketed together as initial, prior causes, with formal and final 
causes following in sequence. 
 
Vitalism that emerges from a focus on bodily substance and vegetative 
function is not, however, the vitalism described by Rogers. His description of the 
human soul, given as evidence of vitalism, calls upon the Aristotelian notion anima est 
tota in toto, et tota in qualibet parte, noting that the soul is given by Milton as “equally 
diffused throughout” the whole of the “organic body.”214 This is, however, a standard 
description of animation and was normally taken to refer to the lower grades of soul. 
Milton’s materialism will emerge in his representation of active, perceptive, responsive 
matter at the lowest level of the scale of nature and its relation to traditionally purely 
abstract modes of soul at the top of that scale, rather than in this rather ordinary 
Aristotelian precept. With regard to Glisson’s medical development of vitalism, Rogers 
draws on De rachitude: his model of vitalism is given in a description of the distribution 
of blood (and the vital spirit) through the arteries to unspecified bodily parts that suck 
the blood into their substance. He describes it thus: “after a wilful sucking of 
spiritualised blood, these ‘said Parts,’ no longer the passive lumps of matter imagined 
by the mechanists, are forever ‘co-united with the… Nature of Life’.”215 However in De 
rachitude, which deals with nourishment or malnourishment of the organs in the disease 
of Rickets, the parts of the body receiving the blood are the organs, already formed and 
therefore, in orthodox Aristotelian terms, capable of living and educing further form out 
of matter (in this example the simple stuff of the blood). While in his introduction 
Rogers draws upon the work of Christopher Hill to show the revolutionary political 
potential of Harvey’s new emphasis on the blood rather than the heart as source of life, 
he does not pick out the detail of the philosophical reversal that this change of emphasis 
(and in Harvey’s work it is only a change of emphasis, rather than a true shift of 
philosophical paradigm) implies.216
                                                            
214 Rogers, Matter of Revolution, 113. 
 It is the shift from the hylomorphic model in which 
form is the precondition for life (which led towards the mechanist solutions that 
215 Rogers, Matter of Revolution, 106. Rogers cites the Treatise of the Rickets, 100. 
216 In his discussion of the form of the heart and the heat of the blood, Harvey shows some equivocation, 
stating: “the heart, with the veins and arteries and the blood they contain, is to be regarded as the 
beginning and the author, the fountain and original of all things in the body, the primary cause of life… 
But... I do not believe that the heart is the fashioner of the blood; neither do I imagine that the blood has 
powers, properties, motion or heat, as the gift of the heart” (Works, 137). Moreover, where Harvey 
ascribes body’s vitality to the heat of the blood rather than the form of the heart, he clearly states that this 
is as a thesis not yet experimentally proven, beginning this disquisition with the words, “Meantime, I 
shall only say, and, without pretending to demonstrate it, propound” and finishing it with the words “This, 
however, I do not mean to state absolutely, but only propose it by way of thesis” (Works, 137-138).  
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superseded Aristotelian theory) to the hylozoistic, that of living matter as itself a cause 
of form, that is the heretical, unorthodox, vitalist philosophical manoeuvre. The notion 
that ‘soul’ was in every part of the body and that of the distribution of the vital spirit to 
the bodily parts from the heart via the arterial blood were both parts of a system 
inherited from antiquity; they did not rely upon Harvey’s discovery of the circulation 
and were quite unremarkable in themselves.217
 
 
It was not until 1654, with the publication of Anatomia hepatis and a theory of 
the blood’s innate activity, that Glisson’s work started to pose a genuine challenge to 
the Aristotelian orthodoxy of the necessity of form for the quality of active life to exist.  
While my project seeks to explore and illustrate the close similarity of model and the 
common sources of Milton’s vitalism with medical vitalism, rather than to propose a 
direct causal intertextual link between one man’s work and the other’s, the publication 
date of Glisson’s second major tract, Anatomia hepatis does mean that the ideas it 
contains (if not the developed model of natural perception) were in circulation in 
Milton’s milieu during the years through which Paradise Lost was written. Its 
publication in 1654 dates it four years after that of De rachitude, to which Nathan Paget 
contributed, and two years after Milton’s descent into complete blindness. The tract on 
the anatomy of the liver already shows radical early stages of Glisson’s trajectory into 
vitalist materialism in that it delineates a system whereby different elements of a 
substance might interact to produce life and form. It overturns classical Galenic 
anatomy in its denial of the liver as the source of blood and the venous system and 
centre of the ‘natural’ functions of nutrition and reproduction, instead arguing that the 
liver filters out the body’s bilious impurities.  
 
In Aristotelian terms, the organ, since it has form, may be animated, whereas 
matter, or substance without structure, may not be animated or have the quality of life. 
This was certainly the prevalent paradigm inherited from Aristotle. The perceived 
necessity of form to support life and the corresponding exclusion of matter from ideas 
of life and value were also fundamental to many other schools of thought. John Henry 
quotes Cambridge Platonist Henry More, who, in his argument for an immaterial Spirit 
of Nature, claims that “particular Souls are, according to Aristotle, the Actings of an 
                                                            
217 In fact, because of the experimental evidence of the necessity and power of the blood, the discovery of 
the blood’s circulation was not so challenging to the classical vitalising function ascribed to the arterial 
system, as to the blood formation and nutritional, vegetative function ascribed to the liver and veins. 
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organical Body. But the Punctum saliens, or Life point, discovers not any proper 
sense.”218 The punctum saliens is the first trace of a beating heart – the first flicker of 
pulsation in the bloody matter of the egg, that so fascinated both Harvey and Glisson. It 
is not strictly an organ and in fact it exemplifies the curious moment when life seems to 
be emerging from the power of matter rather than that of form. More’s denial of “proper 
sense” is a direct rebuttal of the vitalist materialism implicit in Harvey’s research and 
the theory of natural perception explicit in Glisson’s.219 This substance, being without 
structure, could have no perception, intention or motion; that seems fairly simple and 
clear but it leaves open the persistent question of how the foetus then develops at all. 
More and Cudworth’s solutions to the relation between the material and the spiritual 
was to be an intermediate incorporeal substance, a Spirit of Nature with plastic force, 
that is, the capacity to mould and form matter. Fallon notes, however, that “the 
Cambridge Platonists cannot make clear the manner in which spirit, whether conscious 
soul or unconscious plastic nature, interacts with bodies”; the proffered solutions were 
clearly unsatisfactory to Francis Glisson, too.220 In the opening address of his Six 
Anatomical Lectures (1677 but written and performed, he notes, in 1662), Glisson asks 
“who will expound to me – without natural perception – how the plastic force forms the 
chick in the egg?”221
 
 Indeed, it was the series of observations made by Harvey on this 
emergence of life out of matter in the development of the chick in Generatione 
animalium, which gave part of the basis for Glisson’s idiosyncratic and heretical 
solution of the perceptive, motive force of matter itself. 
Pagel’s study of Glisson’s tract on the energetic nature of substance gives a 
definition that is carefully drawn from the source materials: 
 
Nature, embracing substance and matter at large, organic as well as 
inorganic beings, ‘has therefore a claim to an even more eminent title, 
namely that of the Vital Principle of Function or of Life-Inherent-in-
Substance.’ This life has no more than one aspect, and in it there can 
be no question of distinction of things physical and spiritual; it is 
therefore ‘simple’, and because it is simple it is perpetual; for decay is 
the separation of component parts, and only composite things are 
liable to corruption. This indissoluble unity of ‘substance’ and ‘life’ 
                                                            
218 More quoted in Henry, ‘Medicine and Pneumatology’, 25. 
219 Harvey had declared that the punctum saliens “when touched with a needle, a probe or finger... or 
subjected to any other molesting circumstance or thing, give[s]  various indications of sensibility, in the 
variety, force and frequency of its pulsations” (Works, 239). 
220 Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, 69. 
221 Glisson, Six Anatomical Lectures, in English Manuscripts of Francis Glisson 2. Lectures and other 
papers, ed. A. Cunningham (Cambridge: Wellcome Unit for the History of Medicine, 1998), 41-180, 41. 
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Glisson notes as biousia. Its elementary functions, common to all 
objects in nature are: Perception, appetence and motion. ‘Substance’ 
first engenders a perception of what has to be done (‘opus 
aggrandendum’); the object perceived is then desired and the desired 
end consummated. Organic life develops by virtue of a ‘duplication’ 
or ‘triplication’ of these functions. ‘Simple’, ‘natural’ perception 
requires no specific organs, nor is it limited in distribution and scope 
by organisation.222
 
 
The Neo-Platonist critique does not account for the fact that the ‘perception’ of this 
matter should not be confused with sensory perception, which does indeed require 
organs (and thus form). Matter has primordial activity because vital motion is its own 
intrinsic quality, although different degrees of matter have different degrees of activity. 
Different degrees of matter form themselves because: 
 
The specific act of constituting each substance in its individuality 
(‘naturae confoederatio sibi soli’), capable of discriminating what is 
one’s own from what is foreign, originates in the energetic nature of 
substance which is ultimately an inner ‘representative’ activity. The 
foundation of natural perception as an original vital function rests on 
the self-representative structure of substance: substance, as deeply 
adherent to its perceptive faculty, is the idea through which it knows 
itself… an idea that is coeval and coexisting with its being.223
 
 
Words (themselves inherently divided from the material) that try to describe the 
movement from a dualist norm into a monist paradigm often fall into traps of dualism or 
into tautology. The natural perception that Giglioni describes here is immanent like the 
intrinsic material form of Aristotle: the idea constitutes the very stuff that it is. 
However, rather than being fixed, as form is, the matter’s ‘ideas’ themselves are 
process, innately mobile and energetic: form emerges from the inherent ability of 
substance to transform itself.224
                                                            
222 Pagel, ‘Reaction to Aristotle’ 505. He continues “The simplest form of organic life i.e. of duplication 
of the primitive life of matter is seen in plants which are endowed with a ‘vis plastica’. Such organic life 
requires the co-operation of the vital functions that take place in the organs and tissues (‘vita insita’) with 
the action of the vital humours (‘vita influens’). Not merely contact, but the intimate union of these two 
‘lives’ is necessary to bring about ‘duplicated’ i.e. organic life. For without the ‘vita influens’ the 
functions of the organs and tissues remain dormant, as it were, ‘fixed’ or ‘crystallised’ inside the rigid 
anatomical structures”( 506). 
 It is this materiality of the ‘ideas’ that differentiates 
Glisson’s vitalism from that of figures such as Van Helmont, and it is the identity of 
matter and energy that underpins this system: “Vita primaeva is simply the other side of 
223 Giglioni, ‘Anatomist Atheist’, 121. The translation and paraphrasing are taken from De natura 
substantiae energetica. 
224 There is an obvious if anachronistic analogy with the popular imagination of DNA. 
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material prima.”225
 
 The doubleness of this notion of matter, its physicality on the one 
hand and its vital formative motion on the other could be argued to be a residual 
dualism, but I would suggest that the problem is rather one of residual dualist 
terminology. When the theory is in the context of medical terms, the body’s substance 
will be imagined as having several thicker elements and more than one volatile, active 
element. The plurality of chymical anatomies of substance will give the basis of this 
diffusion and multiplicity, as we shall see in the discussion of the chymical anatomy of 
the blood and the chymical theory of conception below. The perceptive self-
knowingness of living tissue, its ability to assimilate what is the same as itself and to 
exclude or excrete what is not, is clearly associated not only with Harvey’s work on 
foetal development, but also with one of Glisson’s favourite topics of research, the 
body’s digestive faculty. Digestion, of course, is one topos in which the physical and the 
mental coincide, particularly in Paradise Lost.  Indeed, vital, perceptive matter in the 
body finds itself in something of the same theological paradox as that faced by devout 
seventeenth-century people: totally determined by divine command on the one hand, but 
endlessly engaged in the act of choosing and discriminating on the other. 
As we have noted, Glisson’s theory of natural perception, or the intrinsically 
living and dynamic nature of substance, drew considerable negative criticism on 
religious grounds, but his description of this biousia resonates dramatically with 
Milton’s famous ‘one first matter all’ speech given by Raphael. As Rumrich suggests, 
“Substance for Milton is thus not a static condition of being… it implies a process, the 
working out of God’s will in the stuff of existence.”226
 
 Likewise, Glisson claims that it 
was God who: 
assigned to the first and the most general rudiments of substances an 
adequate and proportionate energetic, that is, vital, nature; although he 
distinguished and adorned nature’s superimposed degrees with 
increasing perfection. In this way he showed the inexhaustible 
treasures of his munificence, when, beginning from such a noble basis 
of nature, he could nevertheless raise his own work from degree to 
                                                            
225Giglioni, ‘Anatomist Atheist’, 120. Pagel observes that “Van Helmont vehemently objected to ‘grades’ 
of soul and matter... [his] immediate target is the famous passage from the third chapter of the second 
book of Generation of Animals, on vital heat as the productive source in semen” (Pagel, Van Helmont, 
41). This, of course, is precisely the passage that was the basis for much materialist speculation and 
theory. 
226 Rumrich Matter of Glory, 68. 
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degree to such an elevated fastigium, by adding from time to time a 
higher and higher dignity.227
 
 
This shows a profoundly devout attitude in Glisson’s most ‘heretical’ work, and it also 
echoes his comparisons of a meritocratic social body with the transformations of spirits 
inside the body. In explaining the gradations of thicker, colder substance and more 
active, rarefied substance Glisson’s model matches structurally the sort of meritocratic 
model that lies at the heart of Milton’s scale of nature: the palpitating motion of the 
blood transforms natural spirits into vital spirits, and Glisson expresses the 
transformation thus: “When they rise to such a high rank, they gain the ‘honor’ of being 
called vital spirits.”228
 
 The most striking aspect of this passage, however, is its 
description of a dynamically vital but stratified ontological order, the work of which is 
to transform by degree the rudimentary material of life back towards an ever increasing 
perfection. It seems that God has, at the very beginning, imbued matter with motion, 
perception and appetite to grow, change and perfect itself more and more. In the 
Christian Doctrine Milton makes an equivalent statement, asserting that since God is 
also the material cause of all things:  
It is a demonstration of supreme power and supreme goodness that 
such heterogeneous, multiform and inexhaustible virtue should exist 
in God and exist substantially (for that virtue cannot be accidental 
which admits various degrees and is, as it were, susceptible to 
augmentation and remission, according to his will)… It is, I say, a 
demonstration of God’s supreme power and goodness that he should 
not shut up this heterogeneous and substantial virtue within himself, 
but should disperse, propagate and extend it as afar as, and in 
whatever way, he wills.229
 
 
Again, we meet God as the source of all matter (and its formative movement) in 
Paradise Lost. Famously, Raphael describes a remarkably similar philosophy of 
transformative substance to Adam, thus: 
 
 
O Adam, one almighty is, from whom 
All things proceed, and up to him return,  
If not depraved from good, created all  
                                                            
227 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Anatomist Atheist’, 124. Giglioni concludes that “Glisson’s theory of 
biusia is a tacit attack on the harmonious ladder of being, since the degrees of organisation do not mirror 
an immutable scale of eternal essences” (‘Anatomist Atheist’, 124). 
228 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 78-9. Giglioni translates 
from Anatomia hepatis, 325; 340-341. 
229 CPW 6: 38. 
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Such to perfection, one first matter all, 
Indued with various forms, various degrees  
Of substance, and in things that live, of life; 
But more refined, more spirituous and pure, 
As nearer to him placed or nearer tending 
Each in their several active spheres assigned, 
Til body up to spirit work, in bounds 
Proportioned to each kind.  
(PL 5. 482-92) 
 
The action of the ‘first and the most general rudiments of substance’ in Glisson’s work 
matches that of the “one first matter” in Paradise Lost and the ‘original matter’ of the 
Christian Doctrine. In Glisson’s hylozoic philosophy, basic substance is given the 
innate energy to transform itself degree by degree, yet this power to raise and perfect 
that vital substance originates in divine action, just as Raphael’s degrees of perfecting 
substance become more refined, spirituous and pure as they ascend, either by their own 
“tending” or more passively by being “placed” nearer to God. This process of active 
spirit-and-matter is represented poetically by Milton as it is theorised by Glisson, and in 
both cases the initial impulsion of God’s command charges matter with the ability to do 
this to itself, with a resulting plurality of substances emerging from the “one first 
matter.”  It is clear, then, that the relation between Milton’s vitalism and Glisson’s is 
peculiarly subtle; De rachitude is not a sufficient source from which to take any precise 
account of vitalism, as we can see from Rogers’s reliance on the very ordinary notion of 
the activity of organs rather than Glisson’s truly radical theory of active substances. 
 
Glisson’s theory of the palpitating, chemically composed blood seeks to 
explain blood flow and heart beat in the wake of Harvey’s discovery: the depiction of a 
struggle between thicker and more rarefied component elements of the blood uses a 
chymical analysis of substance alien to Harvey’s thought (although not to Milton’s), and 
it directly invokes the idea of fermentation to explain the process. The transformative 
action of ever more rarefying spirit matches precisely the picture of bodily spirit painted 
by Raphael in Book 5. It does not, however, describe a uniform infusion of energy in 
matter. This model, rather than proposing an indiscriminate, uniform vitalism, reflects 
and gives a basis of a real, contemporary natural philosophy to Milton’s dynamic 
version of the chain of being. Both his work and that of Glisson support a meritocratic 
system, in which some matters, substances, forms and spheres are more vital and active 
than others, and indeed in which there is sense of increased value about that which is 
most vital. Rogers has misunderstood the vitalism of the period, emphasising its 
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revolutionary potential at the expense of the order of value it retains: the best yearns 
upwards towards God and spiritual existence, the worst struggles against spiritual 
assimilation. There is no clash between this vitalism and the notion of hierarchy, for the 
system’s innate justice relies upon its dynamism and mobility. 
 
There is, however, a closer cohesion between the vitalism of Milton and his 
medical contemporary than that of this ‘final solution.’ Energetic matter answers 
problems of experimental anatomy and is theorised by Glisson in certain ways: through 
a reinterpretation of the Galenic notion of similary attraction, through a chymical 
anatomy of the body’s fluids (of blood in particular) and through a chymical 
reinterpretation of the Aristotelian notion of vital heat. These solutions to the questions 
of how similary substance might act in the body match at every turn the actions of vital 
matter in Paradise Lost in function and terminology. 
 
 
 
ii. Similary Attraction  
 
In medical terms, Glisson attributes to the (healthy) body’s similary substances 
the ability to gather and assimilate that which nourishes it and to exclude that which is 
harmful or extraneous. The concept with which he explains this movement of substance 
in the body is that of similary attraction; not, at first glance, a very innovative move. 
Harvey’s earliest experiments in his study of the blood’s circulation had sought to give 
evidence of the heart as a pump, against the theory of the blood’s faculty of 
‘attraction’.230 Moreover, Harvey had distinctly stated that the “attraction of the likes” 
was not a process by which the growth and nutrition functioned.231
                                                            
230 French, William Harvey’s Natural Philosophy, 108. French notes that “where attraction was denied in 
the body and in machines, it was replaced by impulsion. While Cartesians… relied on the notion of a 
circular thrust of displacement, others thought that the impulsion of the spring and weight of the air. What 
controlled the flow of impulsed motion in the body and machines were valves, highlighted by Harvey’s 
doctrines and Renaissance technology” (356). Attributing agency to matter, the assertion of vitalism 
remains a libertarian response to the impulsions of mechanism. 
 However, Glisson 
specialised in nutrition, and while he was at the forefront of public support for Harvey’s 
thesis, he chose not to discard as ancient or arcane the notion of attraction in other areas 
and processes of the body, but to reinterpret it. In Anatomia hepatis, the similary parts, 
the simple substances of the body, are endowed with a power of perception of that 
231 Giglioni,‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 66. 
91 
 
which is like itself, an attraction to it and an appetite to conjoin with other substance 
that is like itself, as well as a negative repulsion to that which is not. There are sound 
experimental reasons for Glisson’s proposal: the body’s fluids or humours do move, 
collect and congregate or excrete in different places: 
 
When, more than once in the course of the Anatomia Hepatis, Glisson 
has to explain the puzzling mechanism of the secretion of humors, he 
resorts to the notion of similary attraction, a vital process which does 
not occur through organs or organic parts, but ‘derives from the 
similarity, familiarity, and affinity of the attracting body with the 
attracted body’. This similarity, Glisson goes on, ‘is based on the 
similary, not organic constitution of the parts’.232
 
 
It is the similarity (not pure identity) of one substance to another that causes attraction. 
In Glisson's version of this process the notion of similary attraction must answer three 
requirements: that a relationship of “similarity, affinity, or familiarity” occurs between 
two or more bodies; that “a desire to be united to another body is aroused by at least one 
of them”; finally, that, “in order for this arousing to be advantageous, there must be a 
tendency to come together (nixus coeundi), or an actual endeavor (actualis conatus) 
through which the bodies join to each other.”233 Traditionally, purgatives work through 
similary attraction, since the purgative’s acrid nature is similar to that of the bilious 
humour it seeks to remove and will draw it out as it passes through the body: “Purgative 
remedies attract specific humours because of ‘some sort of substantial similarity’ and a 
‘mutual tendency to union’, like that between rhubarb and the bile.”234 Originally the 
theory of attraction was Galenic and was not widely held to be of cutting edge medical 
significance; it was also associated with the mysterious excesses of hermetic alchemy as 
an “occult cause,” emerging in such disreputable forms as that of the weapon salve 
debate.235
                                                            
232 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 63. Giglioni cites 
Anatomia hepatis, 190; 363. 
 Characteristically, however, Glisson correlates the ancient with the new; in 
his theorising, “the similary (also called sometimes magnetic, elective, or even electric) 
233Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 64. Giglioni cites 
Anatomia hepatis, 188-189. Glisson hints that there is a subtler way to explain the process of similary 
attraction than that of ‘mechanical effluvia’ but does not, at this stage, elaborate.  
234 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 64. Giglioni cites MS 
Sloane 3309, ff. 235r-236r; also De ventriculo, 495; 500.  
235 For the weapon salve debate in Paradise Lost see chapter 6, 210-211. For an account of the weapon 
salve debates see Allen G. Debus, The Chemical Philosophy, 246-8; 303-307. 
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attraction is based on the famous principle of ancient physics and medicine according to 
which likes are attracted to the likes”.236
 
 
It is in the collection of terms used to describe this attraction that its richness 
can begin to be seen. Occult qualities could be sneered at by the new philosophy, but 
occult causes had to be admitted while the evidence remained without final explanation. 
Magnetism was a force hotly debated if not understood; originating in the alchemical 
tradition, it finally became a focus for physicists of the ‘scientific revolution’.237 Indeed, 
it has been argued (not least by Leibniz) that Newton’s theory of gravitational force 
derived in part from a background of elective attraction, or action at a distance.238 The 
term ‘elective’, moreover, links this theory of the body back to the political arena of the 
body politic and the political scandal of vitalism with its democratic implications. 
Elective attraction is, in medical terms, part of the motion whereby the suitable parts of 
the blood are absorbed by or engrafted to the suitable parts of the body. If “reason is but 
choosing,” so is elective attraction. It orders the gathering of milk in the breast, the 
nourishing of the foetus and the placing of acidic humours in the correct area of the 
stomach for digestion.239
 
 In the Prolegomena to Anatomia hepatis Glisson lists a 
number of methods for separating ‘mixt’ similary substances and several of them rely 
upon chymical interpretations of the notion of attraction. He states that: 
Parts mixed are severed per magisterium: that is, by casting in another 
ingredient which hath more familiarity with one element of the 
mixture than the other, by means whereof the parts before mixed are 
separated… Separations are made by congregation or attraction 
magnetical. Thus the loadstone separates iron mixed with dust, though 
this be an improper mixture. Thus parts of a like nature easily gather 
together leaving other parts with whom they had less affinity.240
 
 
Iron mixed with dust is an “improper mixture” because the two substances are not 
sufficiently absorbed into each other; in contemporary terms this mixture is a 
                                                            
236Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 63. One might compare 
this inclusiveness with Milton’s own in his representation of a chaos which bears the marks of atomism, 
Platonism, presocratic philosophies and Aristotelian natural philosophy.  
237 John Henry charts some of Robert Boyle’s more exploratory speculations upon the issue of magnetism 
and the doctrine of attraction in ‘Boyle and Cosmical Qualities’, in Robert Boyle Reconsidered. ed. 
Michael Hunter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 119-38. 
238 Joan Hawes, ‘Newton's Revival of the Aether Hypothesis and the Explanation of Gravitational 
Attraction’  Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 23. 2 (1968), 200-212. For Leibniz’s 
attack upon this implication see H. G. Alexander (ed.) The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, Manchester  
1956, ix-x. 
239 Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 65. 
240 Anatomia hepatis, 69-71. 
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‘composition’ rather than the true ‘mixt’ that is so fundamental that it would equate 
more accurately to a chemical compound.241 Nevertheless, Glisson lists occurrences of 
this attraction or congregation in the natural world as including “salt gathering into 
grains,” crystallising sugar, the generation of “minerals, the matter of metals gathering 
into mines which run in veins, leaving the next earth as common” as well as stony 
deposits and the formation of precious stones. 242
 
 
His interpretation of this attraction incorporates both the ancient and the 
experimental accounts of such phenomena. He ponders:  
 
This peculiar attraction, and consequently separation, is commonly 
ascribed to an occult quality magnetical, because of the subtlety and 
eminence of it, though perchance it be no more than the old proverb 
intimates like will to like. Certain it is that in creatures, which have 
life, this quality is most evident, and yet they have organs on purpose 
for it – which little favours the occultness of the action. But as yet I 
can determine nothing of this point.243
 
 
Glisson is some years away from his master work on the energetic nature of substance 
here; he is still puzzled at the difference between the rather evident attractions in the 
world of formed animals and the more mysterious magnetic interactions of inorganic, 
similary matter such as iron. Giglioni states that in Glisson’s work “similary 
attraction… will lose its animistic resonances and will become the originally and 
intrinsically teleological activity of living matter… Glisson will have to distinguish the 
operations of the senses (animal faculties) from those of natural perception and to 
regard perception as a universal property of matter.”244
                                                            
241 Newman, Atoms and Alchemy, ‘A Note on Terminology’, xii; 4. 
 Within the strict parameters of 
natural philosophy Giglioni is right; Glisson does indeed come to propose a theory of 
natural perception that does not rely upon organic structure – and he does this by 
redefining the notion of ‘perception’ as much as by redefining matter. Thus the 
complaints made by figures such as Ross and Cudworth, that matter cannot be sentient 
without organs of sense, break down in the face of the matter dynamically charged with 
energy and a blind urge toward formation described by Pagel in Glisson’s late work. 
However the suggestion that Glisson’s theory of natural perception becomes less 
animistic as well as more intrinsically teleological seems to me to de-vitalise Glisson’s 
vitalism, which at heart is a reformulation of the ensoulment of matter. This model of 
242 Anatomia hepatis, 71. 
243 Anatomia hepatis, 71-3. 
244 Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 58. 
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the animation of substance involves a profound ideological correlation between the 
notion of elective attraction – that is, matter that perceives what is and is not like itself 
and moves, purging or congregating accordingly – and the theological formulation of 
free will. Indeed these echoes and correlations are part of the world view that forms 
when a genuinely monistic philosophy is adhered to, rather than described in still-
dualist terms. The rich constellations of meaning in the act of eating, digesting, learning 
choosing and knowing the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge will be another such moment 
where the bodily reality is obviously fused with traditionally symbolic significance 
through the mediating notion of spirits that are both bodily and rational. 
 
For our current purposes it is the similary action of the blood that is most 
illuminating, for here we can see the same pattern of active substance as that which 
marks out Milton’s philosophy of matter and spirit. Giglioni states that, in his refutation 
of the liver’s role as sanguifying organ, “Glisson explains sanguification as a motion of 
increasing assimilation through which the active matter of the blood multiplies and 
expands itself like a spark that sets light the combustible material.”245 Spiritual 
exaltation is not just a religious state of mind, it is a theory of physiology: in his defence 
of the use of chemistry in physiology Glisson states that in the body (as well as in plants 
and other natural phenomena) “there are some qualities which are superadded to things 
by way of exaltation or eminence… perchance the natural spirits become vital, and the 
vital animal, by eminent impressions”.246 Cunningham glosses ‘eminence’ as “raising to 
a higher degree” and ‘exaltation’ as “rendering more powerful.”247
 
 This exaltation, 
created through the interactions of spirit and substance, is at the heart of the vitalist 
heterodoxy of self-transforming substance, so next we shall investigate these 
interactions in a little more detail. 
 
 
iii. Chymical blood 
 
In Anatomia hepatis Glisson proposes a model of how the ‘mixt’ substance of 
the blood generates action and, eventually, form. The key to this notion of the active, 
                                                            
245 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 65. Giglioni cites 
Anatomia hepatis, 283; 287-288; also MS Sloane 3308, f. 281r. 
246 Anatomia hepatis, 77. 
247 Anatomia hepatis, 77n6. 
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self-producing blood (and indeed to contemporary medical vitalism) was in the re-
evaluation and redefinition of the notion of ‘spirit’. Whilst Harvey’s experimental work 
had opened up the debates out of which vitalism (and indeed many aspects of 
mechanism) emerged, he did not theorise a system of vitalist spirit and matter. He had 
opened Circulatio sanguinis with a brief summary of the orthodox medical account of 
the blood and cardiovascular system, stating that: 
 
no-one denies that the blood as such, even the portion of it which 
flows in the veins, is imbued with spirits… these spirits are 
inseparable from the blood… the blood and spirits constitute one body 
(like whey and butter in milk, or heat [and water] in hot water), with 
which the arteries are charged, and for the distribution of which from 
the heart they are provided, and that this body is nothing else than 
blood.248
 
 
In his later exchanges with Riolan, Harvey veered yet further towards an outright 
materialism, questioning the presence of spirits in the blood, but even then this was on 
the premise of spirits being “vapours or aerial” and he proposed instead pure heat as the 
vitalising principle of the blood, recalling “Aristotle’s example of gruel or milk upon 
the fire.”249
 
 
So what is the conventional Aristotelian relation of the body’s matter, spirit 
and vital heat? Pneuma, a notion that was developed by Stoic philosophers, is 
mentioned by Aristotle in his discussions of higher, rational agents as opposed to the 
lower forms of animate life (where vital heat is mentioned instead); nevertheless this is 
not a clearly maintained distinction in the Aristotelian corpus. Warm, airy “pneuma is 
precisely the substrate capable of carrying vital heat to all parts of the body. Connate 
pneuma in the semen contains generative heat and in the blood it acts as substratum to 
the vital heat: all pneuma, he [Aristotle] says, contains soul-heat.”250
                                                            
248 Harvey, Works 12. 
 However, Glisson, 
like Harvey, rejects the notion that there is airy substance in the blood, although he is 
clear that the vital spirit is the substrate of vital heat. When Glisson debated Van 
Helmont’s identification of vital spirit with his concept of gas, he drew on his 
anatomical expertise and experience to describe the vital spirit as substance which is 
249 Harvey, Works, 37. 
250 Freudenthal, Aristotle’s Theory of Material Substance, 127. For the purposes of this discussion I will 
follow Freudenthal’s definition of the pneuma, which essentially gives it the same function as the Galenic 
vital spirit: that of substrate of vital heat. For a detailed consideration of this problem see chapter 3 ‘Soul, 
Vital Heat and Connate Pneuma’, 106-148. Like pneuma, spirit was often thought of as warm and airy: 
this is the supposition that Glisson denied on grounds of experimental evidence. 
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“intimately intermingled with the blood and does not produce bubbles or foam; rather, it 
blends the other elements of the blood in a homogeneous mixture, enlivens, expands, 
and contracts them uniformly in the course of its palpitating motion (micatio).”251
 
 What 
he does, therefore, is use the developments of chymical theory to resolve the problems 
of theory and experimental evidence that result from Harvey’s work. 
Spirit for Glisson, rather than being airy or just ‘heat,’ like that in hot water, is 
a qualitatively different substance, both fluid and energetic, that has an effect, even a 
range of effects, upon other sorts of substance. Of the blood Glisson says: 
 
Firstly, it is a corpus mixtum, for though it be esteemed a simple 
element… in its physical consideration it is truly mixed, and contains 
parts of a different kind. For there is no part found in man or beast 
which by chemistry… may not be further resolved.252
 
 
Thus when the mixt of the blood is anatomised further by use of chymistry, its 
constituent parts, whilst not ‘parts’ in the formal sense of organs, may be separated and 
analysed. The mixed body is made up of elements, an element being defined as: “a 
substantial ingredient of natural mixture, prepared to unite with other elements… there 
are 2 [sic] kinds of these: intermediate and ultimate.”253 The intermediate elements are 
the classical Aristotelian earth, air, fire and water, and the Galenic humours are also 
classified by Glisson as intermediate elements used by physicians for their practical 
applicability rather than philosophical purity.254
 
 The “ultimate” elements, the minima 
naturalia, however, are those of chymistry, and thus the anatomising of substance 
becomes possible, as does self-active substance. Although he built his thesis upon 
Harvey’s experimental anatomy, the elusive bodily spirits proposed by Glisson are 
neither simple Aristotelian heat, nor are they more complex pneuma; they are those 
appropriated from the chymical sects.  
In his opening definition of anatomy Glisson includes chymical processes since 
“the art of chemistry will also come under the title of Anatomy, in regard it separates 
and tries out the elements of mixture, as they call them: spirit, oil, water, salt and dead 
                                                            
251 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 132. Giglioni translates 
this from De ventriculo, 514. 
252 Anatomia hepatis, 69. 
253 Anatomia hepatis, 67. 
254 Anatomia hepatis, 73-79. 
97 
 
earth.”255
 
 The vitality of the blood is theorised as a naturally balanced process of 
attraction, repulsion and assimilation to the most active element. In Anatomia hepatis, 
Glisson explains: 
Fermentation is heat which originates from within, due to a battle 
between spirits and the thicker parts; whereas the former endeavor 
(conantur) to expand and fly away, the latter oppose that exertion 
(nisus). Similarly, the vital heat comes from internal strife, from a 
conflict between the vital spirits of the blood and its thicker elements, 
and while these spirits unremittingly do this (so that both they and the 
rest of the blood dilate), the thicker elements struggle against this 
endeavor (conatus) with all their strength. Therefore, fermentation and 
vital heat have this in common, that in both cases the spirits strive 
(nitantur) to expand; but this cannot occur without some degree of 
volatility. Volatility means nothing other than the endeavor (conatus) 
of flying away if it is not restrained by something else.256
 
 
This is the vital blood in all its active glory, the vital heat being produced by the 
expansive, assimilative action of spiritual substance, just as fermentation expands 
substance through the interactions of the five chymical elements.  
 
The breadth of this theory involves a rather graceful act of inclusion on 
Glisson’s part, given the severity and bile of the contemporary debates between 
different factions. Even Robert Boyle, who writes seven years later in 1661 with 
extremely careful ‘civility,’ marshals the chymical anatomy of the blood as an argument 
against the validity of the Aristotelian elements, stating: “the blood (and diverse other 
parts) of men and other animals... yield when analysed five distinct substances, 
phlegme, spirit, oile, salt, and earth, as experience has shewn us in distilling man’s 
blood.”257
 
 Glisson in contrast makes an adjustment, identifying Aristotelian and 
chemical elements thus: 
The best way… is, as it seems to me, to reduce the Aristotelian 
principles to the chemical and make both friends. For Aristotle’s 
element of fire holds near proportion with the chemical spirit, the air 
with oil, the water with phlegm, the earth with salt and caput mortuum 
together. For the Aristotelians in burning things, which they did to 
                                                            
255Anatomia hepatis, 19.  Unlike Boyle, Glisson does not here touch on the fact that while the Aristotelian 
system was that of ‘elements’, the chymical philosophers called their basic components of matter 
‘principles’. Boyle chose, with some discomfort, to use the terms interchangeably (Boyle, The Sceptical 
Chymist, 16-27). The different etymologies, however, suggest that the term element described more easily 
the sort of upward movement characteristic of vitalism, while ‘principle’ reverses the emphasis back to a 
top-down movement.  
256 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 78-9. 
257 Boyle, Sceptical Chymist, 27. 
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show the 4 elements, they did not sever the salt from the earth, but 
accounted them both one element; and therefore [one] may extend 
their 4 elements to the Chemist’s 5, by dividing the ashes, which 
indeed are two things (salt and earth), and not one.258
 
 
This correlation of one system with the other is immensely significant both 
ideologically and in relation to the bio-mechanics of Milton’s body-soul composites. It 
was certainly not a conservative, backward Aristotelianism, indeed Glisson’s use of this 
anatomy of the blood is extremely early, but far from unique; over the following decade 
it became a popular formulation. In his Natural History of Nutrition (1659), Glisson’s 
colleague Walter Charleton describes a similar volatility in the bodily spirits, noting the 
emergence of vital heat out of volatile chymical spirit, the attempt of spirit to expand 
itself and the unwillingness of the thicker matter to be so overcome:  
 
thus is the vital Flame kept alive, at no less expence, than a continual 
dissipation of the most volatile spirits of the blood. For, that vital Heat 
ariseth from within, and the most subtile spirits are the first Movers to 
the excitement thereof: the motion by which they do it, being their 
indeavour to expand themselves, and to dilate their bounds, while the 
other grosser elements, or ingredients of the bloud, oppose them 
therein.259
 
 
The link we made earlier between Glisson’s materialist vitalism of the blood and 
Milton’s vitalist materialist Creation is echoed in Charleton’s representation of the 
blood’s most subtle spirits as ‘first Movers’ (a figure of speech which might well have 
inflamed those concerned with the atheism of the medical profession). It is worth noting 
that the more modern notion of the blood as feeding the body with nutrients is often in 
question and becomes eclipsed somewhat by a contemporary vision of blood as having 
a self-consuming nature, with spirits wasting themselves and struggling with each other 
in the vitalising process. Even the perfectly peaceful, unfallen Eve has animal spirits 
(the subtlest and most volatile) exhaling out from her blood, showing a tendency to ‘fly 
away’. In the fallen world of seventeenth-century medicine it is this “strife, or Counter-
activity of the spirits, on one part, and of the grosser ingredients of the blood, on the 
other” that causes the “Mication or Rising and Falling of the blood,” and thus ultimately 
the dilation and contraction of the heart and the arteries.260
                                                            
258 Anatomia hepatis, 79. 
  
259 Walter Charleton, Natural History of Nutrition, 64-65.Charleton eventually subscribes to the 
mechanist philosophy, but in the next chapter this will provide some interesting correlations between 
medical vitalism and medical mechanism.  
260 I am indebted to Giglioni for this correlation of Charleton’s work with that of Glisson. 
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In De rachitude Glisson had delineated a picture of the blood palpitating with 
sexual delight, aggression and submission, a bodily unconscious, complete with death 
drive in the natural spirits’ possible unwillingness to be assimilated into a higher level 
of vitality. What had then been seen as homogenous matter with an unexplained cargo 
of spirit is now, in Anatomia hepatis, treated as a mixed body with several different 
interacting elements in it, some grosser and ‘natural,’ some more volatile and ‘vital’. It 
is this chemical reaction between elements that produces vital heat, which in turn 
incubates, stirs and warms the elements to further activity, expansion and struggle: 
 
Vital heat is caused and maintained by a chemical reaction occurring 
continuously in the blood through its circulation and volatilization. At 
each cardiac contraction, the blood in the heart is kindled as it were 
and becomes arterial and vital. The saline and sulphureous 
components of the blood are extremely active and they are the main 
responsible for its volatilization. “When they rise to such a high rank, 
they gain the ‘honor’ of being called vital spirits.”261
 
 
The division between the natural and the vital is occluded here, since both modes of 
animation include active chymical components, which create a transformative motion 
from one degree to the next. The sulphurous and saline elements of the blood must 
stand in the place of the old Galenic natural spirits, since it is they which become 
volatilised into the higher levels of vital spirit. Vital heat is both the cause and – oddly – 
the effect of activity in this circular (and ascending) system where the blood exalts and 
consumes its own spirit and matter: it seems that the notions of soul as vital heat and 
vital spirit are perhaps more significant than that of form to both Glisson and Milton in 
their representations and theories of dynamic vitalist matter. Vital spirit is not simply 
analogous to energy; there is a circular motion in the body’s fluids whereby the 
interactions of different chymical elements of the blood produce vital heat (within a 
substrate of vital spirit), but these interactions are also the result of the warming 
influence of vital heat. Within the body it flows out of and with the blood, an influx of 
vitality, provoking movement and action in both organs and substances.  
 
This chymical revision is grounded in a careful reading of Aristotelian natural 
philosophy. Freudenthal’s reading of Aristotle holds that vital heat is the informative 
impulsion that prevents the sublunar Aristotelian elements from flying off to their 
respective places (earth downwards, air upwards) and disintegrating form altogether in a 
                                                            
261 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Glisson’s Philosophy’, 78. Giglioni cites Anatomia hepatis, 325, 340-341; 
also MS Sloane 3309, ff. 370r-370v. 
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return to Presocratic chaos.262
 
 Thus vital heat is not the sole preserve of the body. The 
most famous comparison of the vital heat of the body’s substances and the ethereal heat 
of the wider cosmos is given by Aristotle in Generatione animalium. He states: 
The faculty of soul of every kind has to do with some physical 
substance which is different from the so-called ‘elements’ and more 
divine than they are; and as the varieties of soul differ from one 
another in the scale of value, so do the various substances concerned 
with them differ in their nature. In all cases the semen contains within 
itself that which causes it to be fertile – what is known as ‘hot’ 
substance, which is not fire nor any similar substance, but the pneuma 
which is enclosed within the semen or foam-like stuff, and the natural 
substance which is in the pneuma; and this substance is analogous to 
the element which belongs to the stars. That is why fire does not 
generate any animal… whereas the heat of the sun does effect 
generation, and so does the heat of animals.263
 
 
The designation of generation as a vegetative process is complicated by the eventual 
emergence of a formed, vital, and rational human being. Pneuma, brought in to explain 
this dramatic change of category, complicates the medical differential between the 
natural and the vital. Milton himself uses the formulation “animated, sensitive and 
rational,” never mentioning natural spirits at all, although he does refer to a vegetative 
faculty. If we look again at Milton’s representation of vital heat in the cosmology of 
Paradise Lost we can recall that the power of the sun is “arch-chemic” although its vital 
virtue is, according to Raphael, of no fertile power without the “solid good” of the more 
homely earth; the interaction of the sun, stars and planets is also proposed as a magnetic 
force.264
 
 The traditional notions of cosmological ethereal influence and solar vital heat 
have been updated to include chymical concepts; contentious issues such as that of 
magnetism are touched upon lightly, but the ‘scientific’ re-evaluation is clearly there. 
 
 
                                                            
262 Freudenthal, Aristotle’s Theory of Material Substance, 12. 
263 Aristotle quoted in Freudenthal, Aristotle’s Theory of Material Substance, 107. Harvey quotes this 
passage in his Generation of Animals stating “whether we say, or do not say, that the vital principle 
(anima) inheres in the egg, it still plainly appears, from the circuit indicated, that there must be some 
principle influencing this revolution from the fowl to the egg and from the egg back to the fowl, which 
gives them perpetuity. Now this, according to Aristotle’s views, is analogous to the element of the stars; 
and is that which makes parents engender, and gives fertility to their ova... For as the same intelligence or 
spirit which incessantly actuates the mighty mass of the universe, and compels the same sun from rising 
to setting, in his passage over the various regions of the earth, so is there a vis enthea, a divine principle 
inherent in our common poultry, showing itself now as the plastic, now as the nutritive, and now as the 
augmentative force” (Harvey, Works, 285-6). 
264 See Paradise Lost 3. 583-6;  8. 90-97; 3. 591-612. 
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iv. The “kindly heat of various influence”: vital heat in Paradise Lost 
 
If we return to Freudenthal’s assessment of vital heat as a formative force, 
which works somehow to keep the elements together in substantial forms, we can note 
that precisely this point is made about vital heat in the course of Adam’s answer to Eve 
as to why the stars (with their analogous vitalising power) shine through the night.265
 
 He 
describes them thus: 
Ministering light prepared, they set and rise; 
Lest total darkness should by night regain 
Her old possession, and extinguish life 
In nature and all things, which these soft fires 
Not only enlighten, but with kindly heat 
Of various influence foment and warm, 
Temper or nourish, or in part shed down  
Their stellar virtue on all kinds that grow 
On earth, made hereby apter to receive  
Perfection from the sun’s more potent ray. 
(PL 4. 664-673)266
 
 
The total darkness of night to which Adam refers can only be that of chaos (in which 
Night remains the ‘sable-vested’ consort of Chaos). Rogers terms this problem of 
natural philosophy an “ontologically absurd threat” and suggests that it may only make 
sense as a figure for the poet’s fear of encroaching political chaos during the last years 
of the republic.267 It may indeed hold such significance, but we should not forget that it 
is also a problem of Aristotelian natural philosophy of substance, and was thus a focus 
for the investigations of the ‘new science’. The “endemic strife” to which Freudenthal 
refers as the originary state of the Aristotelian elements (he refers here to Meteorologica 
and Generatione et corruptione) is in fact a necessary result of the elements’ differing 
movements, and there is a genuine philosophical problem as to why any of these 
elements sustain any form at all.268
                                                            
265 Marjara notes that Boyle made the same adjustment of adding magnetism to the “Aristotelian principle 
of starry influences” in his The General History of the Air (Marjara, Contemplation of Created Things, 
127).  
 This is a weakness that atomism could address, with 
the notion of atoms which were so shaped that certain of them clung together or slipped 
apart; in terms of the contemporary body politic, this is the Hobbesian thesis. All these 
ideas can be glimpsed in Milton’s chaos, where we have already encountered the threat 
266 In his conversation with the disguised Satan Uriel describes the moon as having the same role of 
fending off Night which would otherwise “invade” paradise (PL 3. 724-732). 
267 Rogers, Matter of Revolution, 142. 
268 Freudenthal, Aristotle’s Theory of Material Substance, 13. 
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of incoherent, unformed matter; in Book 2 Satan surveys and traverses the wild abyss 
where “Hot, Cold, Moist, and Dry, four champions fierce / Strive here for mastery, and 
to battle bring / Their embryon atoms” (PL. 2. 898-900).  
 
The immense mixed heritage of Milton’s wildly dark and fertile chaos cannot 
be dealt with here, but the figure of the threat of chaos held at bay by ethereal warmth 
proposed by Adam is almost a replica of that at the end of Book 2, where Satan emerges 
out of chaos to the borders of the Creation. Here the poet switches from the narrative 
past tense (“he with difficulty and labour hard / Moved on” (PL 2. 1021-2)) into the 
present tense as the first holy light becomes apparent: 
 
But now at last the sacred influence  
Of light appears, and from the walls of heaven 
Shoots far into the bosom of dim Night 
A glimmering dawn; here nature first begins 
Her farthest verge, and Chaos to retire 
As from her outmost works a broken foe. 
(PL 2. 1034-9) 
 
The shift from past into present tense at this moment of transition is significant. By 
fixing the moment not only as one of Satan’s journey, but also as the moment of writing 
and all the possible future moments of reading, the figure of the interaction between 
chaos and holy light is moved out of the sequential mode of time and eternalised: it 
becomes a synchronic model.269
                                                            
269 One of the most famous examples of Milton’s slippage between tenses occurs shortly before this as 
Satan encounters an eternal vacuum in Chaos “and to this hour / Down had been falling” (PL 2. 934). As 
Marjara notes, Satan’s potentially endless fall though a vacuum in chaos cannot be supported by 
Aristotelian physics, which demand either contact with a motive force or air to sustain motion of a body. 
Contemporary physicists supported the possibility; it is Galileo, the only contemporary figure to appear in 
Paradise Lost, who speculates upon the possibility of such a motion and his Simplicio who defends the 
opposite thesis (Contemplation of Created Things 160-1). It is also significant for the purpose of this 
discussion that Aristotle rejected atomism, so this most Aristotelian moment is again disrupted with 
another theory that was proposed by figures in antiquity and was being redefined through the most 
progressive science of the seventeenth century. 
 It is on the border, the liminal meeting place of the 
dark materials and pregnant causes of chaos and the “sacred influence of light” that 
Nature originates as a grace and a blessing that overcomes the dark possibilities of 
Chaos, bringing calm ‘tumult less and… less hostile din” and the beginnings of order 
(PL 2. 1040). The complex web of violent assimilation and fertile embrace between 
matter and spirit that characterises chaos and its final submission to holy light echoes 
the action of the rebellious saline and sulphurous substance and the seductiveness of the 
overcoming vital spirit in Glisson’s model of the vital blood.  
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In his answer to Eve’s question Adam gives something very similar to the 
solution given by Freudenthal: he is emphatic that the aetherial heat acts in several 
different ways, to warm, balance and even nourish life on earth in the shadowy absence 
of the “more potent” “arch chemic” sun, holding chaos at bay.270 The conversation 
wanders on to cover the angel song they hear through the night, giving an increasingly 
Platonic note to the cosmology, but the description of the vital heat of the stars and its 
power to protect and enable the generation of life is distinctively Aristotelian. 
Freudenthal states that vital heat “is the physiological factor underlying all operations of 
soul – nutritive, perceptive, locomotive, imaginative, to a great extent even intellective. 
Vital heat establishes the scala naturae, with more vital heat giving rise to more perfect 
forms – physical and psychical.”271
 
 This explanation of the dynamic scala naturae 
matches those sketched by both Glisson and Raphael, although they both propose 
chymical philosophies of substance to explain the emergence and action of vital heat.  
Freudenthal’s argument and the concomitant one that vital heat involves an 
upward movement in its perfecting motion are criticised with considerable ire by 
Christopher Shields as missing Aristotle’s philosophical significance, and of looking 
“quaint or worse,” mainly because they rely on principles of heat that “no-one today 
will take seriously.”272 Freudenthal’s thesis is also characterised by Shields as one 
which “stresses the physical and chemical character of Aristotle’s theory in ways 
which... are partly contradictory and partly complimentary to more traditionally 
metaphysical interpretations presented in terms of soul and form.”273
                                                            
270 The action of this influence conforms structurally to the function of vital heat in the body, which acts 
to ‘foment’ and warm the gut, preparing the food for the chymical action of the acid ferment, or the 
incubating warmth of the hen, which stirs up and foments the action of the vital fluid in the egg, itself 
analogous to the brooding action of the spirit in the Creation sequence. 
 This concern 
stems from an approach to the history of science that was discussed in the introduction, 
in which only those theories that fit with and authenticate our own sense of scientific 
progress may be treated as valid or illuminating; Freudenthal is indeed studying 
Aristotelian science. Whilst Shields marks the lack of attention to Aristotle’s 
metaphysical philosophy, Freudenthal uses meteorologica, generatione et corruptione 
and generatione animalium as primary sources and this depiction of vital heat resonates 
so strongly with that used by both Milton and Glisson, that it is clear that even now the 
divergence and debate between the ‘scientific’ Aristotle and the ‘metaphysical’ Aristotle 
271 Freudenthal, Aristotle’s Theory of Material Substance, 74. 
272 Christopher Shields, Review of Freudenthal, Aristotle’s Theory of Material Substance  in The 
Philosophical Review 106. 4 (1997), 632-635, 633-4. 
273 Shields, Review of Freudenthal, 633. 
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continue to play out in journals of the late twentieth century. Unlike the modern science 
to which Shields appeals, the seventeenth-century debate could in all seriousness re-
evaluate Aristotelian vital heat in the light of the latest empirical, experimental theories 
and discoveries. The vital heat that impregnates chaos in Raphael’s description of the 
Creation is Holy Spirit, but as we shall see it acts very much like the bodily spirits of 
conception.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Creation and Conception 
 
“It is not any more incredible that a bodily force should be able to issue from a spiritual 
substance, than that something spiritual should be able to arise from a body.”274
 
 
 
i. Body out of spirit 
 
In his defence of matter in the Christian Doctrine Milton makes the 
idiosyncratic assertion that body can emerge out of spirit; he states that it did so at the 
point of Creation and that “that is what we hope will happen at the resurrection”.275
 
 The 
structural emergence of body (which we can only imagine as organic form) from the 
action of spirit has no analogue as precise as that given by Harvey in his musings in De 
generatione animalium and extended by Glisson in the observational, experimental 
account of the earliest life of the foetus. Here the physicians are using their observation 
to work against Aristotelian orthodoxy, since the earliest observable traces of life are 
active fluids – first a pale clear fluid, then blood - which gradually coalesce into 
structure. The problem faced by physicians was the same Aristotelian assertion that 
form – a material form – must act upon matter in order for motion, alteration and 
transformation to occur. In this case, looking at Harvey’s observation of the 
development of the foetus out of liquid substance, or colliquament, there are some 
difficult questions: 
if this juice first produces the blood… it must transform itself into the 
blood, but this seems it cannot happen at all. For nothing acts upon 
itself, nothing moves itself.276
 
 
                                                            
274 CPW 6: 310. 
275 CPW 6: 310 
276 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 84. This is taken from 
Glisson’s notes for his students’ academic disputations at Cambridge in the early 1650s. Giglioni cites 
MS Sloane 3309, ff. 40r-41r. 
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Yet this is precisely the process that Harvey had observed. The problem is one of 
Aristotelian orthodoxy being faced with empirical observation. As Balme comments of 
Aristotle’s theory of insemination, although the semen is supposed to contain 
movements which actualise form out of the matter of the menstrual blood, “in arguing 
for teleology and for some other theories, he does not speculate about how the theory 
works in physical terms… it is not a pictorial description, but a sort of algebraic 
analysis”.277
 
 Harvey’s late work, On generation, had first proposed this problem of the 
disjunction between theory and evidence with a notorious lack of definite answer. 
Although Harvey discusses the Galenic humours and makes various points about 
thicker, darker elements of the blood, serum components, and the effects of heat, he 
gives no definitive anatomy of the blood and develops no system of active matter. 
Before I continue, a brief word about the Galenic theory of conception is in 
order. It was not bound by the equations of form and matter, and often stood as an 
alternative medical theory, in conflict with the natural philosophy of the peripatetic 
tradition.278 There is undoubtedly a central thread of Galenism in the work of both 
Glisson and Milton, not least because Galenic physicians had theorised fluid seed from 
both male and female bodies coagulating in the womb to produce an embryo. 
Nevertheless, besides this central point of foetal emergence from fluid, there are some 
features of the theory that are wildly divergent from the parallel models of conception 
that we meet in Paradise Lost and Glisson and Harvey’s medical work. The liver was 
imagined as the primary organ, and often as the first to appear, although a tripartite 
emergence of liver, heart and brain was also characteristic of Galenic theory and thus 
counter to the Aristotelian primacy of the heart.279
 
 Unlike Aristotelian theory, Galenism 
provided models that were, to some extent, pictorial. Ambrose Paré describes the 
earliest stage thus: 
In the sixe first dayes of conception the new vessels are thought to bee 
made and brought forth of the eminences or cotylidons of the mothers 
vessels, and dispersed into all the whole seede, as they were fibres or 
hairy strings. Those as they pierce the wombe, so do they equally and 
in like manner penetrate the tunicle Chorion. And it is carried this 
way, being a passage not only necessary for the nutriment and 
                                                            
277 Balme, ‘Human Creates Human’, 24. 
278 For some entertaining descriptions of these sometimes fierce debates, see Vivian Nutton, ‘The 
Anatomy of the Soul in Early Renaissance Medicine’, in The Human Embryo: Aristotle and the Arabic 
and European Traditions, ed. G. R. Dunstan (Exeter: University of Exeter Press 1990), 136-157. 
279 Nutton, ‘Anatomy of the Soul’ 141. 
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conformation of the parts, but also into the veines diversly woven and 
dispersed into the skin Chorion.280
 
 
Here the coagulating seed is supplied with ‘nutriment and conformation’ by fibrous 
strings that come from the mother and penetrate it and the walls of the womb, despite 
the fact that Vesalius had long before shown that these cotyledons were one of the 
features that Galen had drawn from animal anatomy, not that of a human.281
 
 Paré was a 
popular medical authority, even in the mid seventeenth century, but neither Milton nor 
Glisson’s Galenism is dated by such details. Moreover, when Paré describes the action 
of the fluids, it recalls rather the boiling milk of Harvey’s fermentation rather than the 
interacting spirit, saline and sulphur of the chymical revision. Paré attributes to the 
action of the cotyledons that 
it commeth to passe that the seed it selfe boileth, and as it were 
fermenteth or swelleth, not onely through occasion of the place, but 
also of the bloud and vitall spirits that flow unto it, and then it riseth 
into the bubbles or bladders, like unto the bubbles which are 
occasioned by the raine falling into a river or channell full of water. 
These three bubbles or bladders, are certain rude or new formes or 
concretions of  the three principall entrals, that is to say, of the liver, 
heart and braine.282
 
 
Paré mentions fermentation here, but he is not talking about the ferment of the chymists; 
this is rather the ‘ferment’ of baking bread and boiling milk. The seed is imagined as 
boiling and bubbling to create three bubbles or blisters that will become the three 
primary organs; this is caused by an influx of vital spirit and blood through the 
cotyledons and the warmth of the womb. Here we can see the influence of the notion of 
warm, airy pneuma, as well as Harvey’s version of fermentation, described with the 
image of boiling milk (and in fact Aristotle also uses the image of boiling milk to 
describe the presence of pneuma in the blood).283
 
 The emergence of the organs relies 
upon the outdated notion of bodily spirit as airy and, despite the divergences from 
Aristotelian theories of form and matter, this is a pictorial description of the cooking-
like concoction of antiquity. 
Glisson’s solution of the vital blood with chymical constituent parts, however, 
makes possible an anatomy of the bodily fluids themselves, and thus an explanation of 
                                                            
280 Paré, Workes, 893. The Chorion is the early manifestation of the placenta. 
281 Nutton, ‘Anatomy of the Soul’, 149. 
282 Paré, Workes, 893. 
283 Freudenthal, Aristotle’s Theory of Material Substance, 122. 
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the ‘warm, prolific humour’ of generation and creation. Arguing from the self-
generation of blood in the foetus towards a theory of the blood as self-generating in the 
adult body, he states: 
 
the blood which is produced is nobler than the previous pale juice and 
it does not differ from it as if it became vital from being not vital; 
indeed the blood is now imbued with a higher and more active degree 
of life. Furthermore, the blood does not act upon itself absolutely; 
rather, the elements of the same mixt struggle among each other and 
produce these changes.284
 
 
It is not, for Glisson, the homogenous matter of the blood acting upon itself, but various 
different modes of matter interacting. This struggle between the ‘elements of the mixt’ 
is that same one that we have seen compared to fermentation, whereby the spirituous 
components of the blood swell, effervesce and become volatile, only to be grounded by 
the thicker elements as they seduce, consume and assimilate them in their expansive 
motion. The sanguification of the foetus emerges from vital spirit and active matter and 
the blood of the developed human form can no longer be assumed as being produced in 
the organs, for the tiny foetus has no organs when it begins to produce blood; that is: 
“the blood is not generated in any parenchyma, but in the blood itself, through the 
blood”.285
 
  
In his development of Harvey’s investigations into the possibility of animate 
blood and the problem of the seemingly fluid, formless origin of a foetus, Glisson 
innovates freely. He diverges from the Aristotelian order of form and matter as well as 
the Galenic concoction of fluids, to describe the action of the seminal matter and vital 
spirit thus: 
 
This vital fluid [also referred to as seminal matter], before it assumes 
the red colour characteristic of the blood, begins to set itself apart 
from the other parts of the egg (with which it is promiscuously 
mingled) and to run through some rivulets or ramifications which 
afterwards become the veins. These rivulets come together and meet 
in one point which is afterward called the leaping point (punctum 
saliens) and heart… As soon as these rivulets join together, the flow 
in them is restrained for a while and then it effervesces and needs a 
larger place. And since the flow cannot go back through the same path 
(because new streams are continually flowing), it necessarily has to 
                                                            
284 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 84. Giglioni cites MS 
Sloane 3309, ff. 40r-41r. 
285 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 84. Giglioni cites MS 
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109 
 
return to the seminal matter from which it had flowed forth after 
having formed new channels. Hence a circumgyration arises, and 
finally the first channels become the veins, the second the arteries; and 
in the point of their confluence, the heart is born.286
 
 
The action of this turbulent active fluid creates a very different version of the punctum 
saliens to that sketched by More. The first thing to note here is that effervescence is a 
primary characteristic of chymical fermentation;287 elements of the ‘mixt’ swell and 
rise, but there is no place here for the Aristotelian precept of conception as a simple 
concoction or ‘boiling,’ and neither are there any cotyledons or evidence of airy bubbles 
of pneuma from the Galenic tradition. The second point is that this effervescent 
vitalised fluid acts in a circumgyration (we might describe its action as circumfluous), 
the more solid matter gathering into the beginnings of a structure while streams or 
rivulets of vital fluid flow, flood and expand, joining those channels to each other in a 
circular motion and streaming out to make new ones. “In its “tendency to unite” 
(congregandi nisus), the primal fluid spread and branched out through rivulets and, as a 
result of the same tendency (conatus), it removed the thickest parts to the lateral sides of 
the channels which condensed into the venous and arterial vessels”.288
                                                            
286Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 83. Giglioni translates 
from Anatomia hepatis, 310-311; he also cites MS Sloane 3308, ff. 226r-228r. Five years after the 
publication of Anatomia hepatis Walter Charleton has obviously been influenced by Glisson’s work; he 
almost replicates the above passage, stating: “This Vital Liquor, before it assumes the colour and forme of 
Bloud, doth begin to separate it self from the other parts of the Egge (to which it is at first promiscuously 
admixed) and to runne its selfe out into certain slender rivulets, or branchings, which afterward become 
Veins. These rivolets concurring in a point, meet altogether at the centre of the Colliquamentum; which 
centre being the principal seat of the Plastique spirit, and acquiring a certain mication, or pulsation, is 
then called Punctum Saliens? And all this is done, before there is any the least appearance of bloud in the 
Egge. So soon, therefore, as these Rivulets are conjoyned, the Flux of the Vital Liquor is, for some time, 
so hindred by, and repressed in them, as that being indefinently [sic] agitated by the Spirit of Life, it 
aestuateth, and indeavours to expand it self and enlarge its bounds: and seeing that it cannot flow back 
againe toward the circumference,  by the same passages, which brought it toward the centre, by reason of 
fresh supplies of Vital Liquor pressing it forward continually in the course begun; it is compelled to force 
it self again into the seminal matter, from whence at first it began its motion, through other slender 
conduits newly for that purpose formed, and then it begins to flow in a round. For, this appears to be the 
true reason of the Circumgyration of the Vital Liquor, from the very beginning. Soon after this, the 
Rivulets or pipes first made, and leading from the circumference to the Centre, become Veins; and the 
others made in the second place, and leading from the centre to the cicumference, become Arteries: which 
yet others disallow, in respect of the fabrick of the valves) and then in the poynt of their concourse or 
confluence, the Heart is framed” (Natural History of Nutrition, 42-43). 
 This process 
Glisson terms the ‘vitae chorea’, or the original dance of life. The efficient cause of the 
attractions, separations and effervescence of this original substance of the (soon to be) 
body is the vital spirit. “The vital spirit (which otherwise lies as it were asleep within 
the thicker matter), stimulated and animated by the external heat from the incubation, 
287 Pagel, Van Helmont, 87. 
288 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’,  85. 
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gradually heats the vital fluid in which it is lodged.”289
 
 The stimulating warmth of 
incubation activates the vital spirit and initiates a process of similary attraction: thicker 
fluid gathers together to that which is thick like itself, and is formed by the circular 
flowing movement of the more volatile component substance, which itself continues to 
effervesce and attempt to rarefy and expand; thus form emerges from fluid and spirit. 
 
 
ii. The embryo earth 
 
There is clearly a comparable discourse of conception ordering Milton’s 
representation of the Creation: in the Creation sequences of Book 7 alone the earth is 
described directly in terms of a womb or embryo four times, besides the proliferation of 
other less human images of pregnancy or birth such as hatching or calving.290 This itself 
is a critical commonplace and should be observed in the context of Milton’s recurrent 
use of images of birth and pregnancy, both positive and negative or monstrous, in his 
poetry and throughout the prose.291
                                                            
289 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’,  83. 
 Nevertheless, the Creation of the visible world is 
literally a foundational event and its centrality is indicated in its position as one of the 
first images of the poem. The poet invokes the Holy Spirit for inspiration and the truth 
claim of Paradise Lost is implicit in the coincidence of this Spirit with that which 
inspired Moses to write the book of Genesis to show, “in the beginning how the heavens 
and the earth / Rose out of chaos” (PL 1. 9-10). Out of all the possible biblical sources 
for representation of the spirit he chooses that of the Creation: “thou from the first / 
Wast present, and with mighty wings outspread / Dovelike satst brooding on the vast 
abyss / And mad’st it pregnant” (PL 1. 19-22). In brooding and inseminating, the Holy 
Spirit enacts both male and female roles in generation and the circular section of infinite 
abyss that has been divided off with the golden compasses of “God’s eternal store” 
stands as the egg (PL 7. 226). The combination of brooding, or giving an incubating 
warmth and also inseminating matches perfectly the double function of vital heat in 
natural philosophy, to both incubate and vitalise through the interaction of spirit and 
thicker matter, ultimately causing movement and formation. 
290 The earth is a womb/embryo at PL 7. 276, 277, 281 and 454; other images at PL 7. 418-9 and PL 7. 
463. 
291 The most obvious are, perhaps the monstrous fertility of Satan, Sin and Death as opposed to the 
glorified fertility of Adam, Eve and paradise itself. In the prose the divorce tracts use recurrent images of 
monstrous fertility as do some of Milton’s less savoury diatribes against Salmasius and More. 
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This is the first of several accounts of the Creation of the visible world: we will 
be investigating the representation of Holy Light as generative force in the invocation of 
Book 3, as well as Uriel’s account in Book 2. The longest and most detailed, however, 
is that given by Raphael in Book 7. In Raphael’s account the imagery clearly calls upon 
medical imagery drawn from contemporary sources. In the central passage describing 
the third day of the earth’s creation, Raphael states that: 
 
The earth was formed, but in the womb as yet 
Of waters, embryon immature involved, 
Appeared not: over all the face of earth 
Main ocean flowed, not idle, but with warm 
Prolific humour softening all her globe, 
Fermented the great mother to conceive, 
Sated with genial moisture, when God said, 
Be gathered now ye waters under heaven 
Into one place, and let dry land appear  
(PL 7. 276-84) 
 
This warm, prolific humour is acting just as Glisson’s vital fluid does. To clarify again, 
a ferment, in contemporary chymical medicine, was a spiritual impulsion which 
adjoined a body; it worked to make the object similar to itself, or to assimilate; it was 
thought to impregnate the body or substance seminally and multiply itself; it was 
thought to effervesce, expand and be acidic in nature.292
 
 This is the chymical tradition 
used by Glisson when he is talking about the ‘effervescence’ of the seminal fluid 
although, unlike the more Platonist Van Helmont, he is unequivocal about the fluid 
materiality of the impelling spirit. In Raphael’s description we see the earth as an 
embryo that is still a globe of fermenting fluid, the form as yet imperceptible (as the 
forming punctum saliens was in the egg), but definitely within. As in Glisson’s 
representation, there is no airy pneuma, although the air itself has already been “spun 
out” into creation; this genial moisture is clearly fluid and although it is richly active, it 
is neither bubbling nor boiling. Milton plays with the sense of scale, correlating the 
planetary immensity of “maine ocean” with the bodily “womb of waters;” this fluid is 
“not idle,” it is “prolific,” “genial” (in the sense of generative) and fermenting, just as 
Glisson’s seminal matter and vital fluid are.   
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There are two possible problems with this comparison. One is that the embryo 
earth is already “formed” in Raphael’s description; therefore the form still has 
sequential priority and the earth is not emerging out of similary substance and spirit. 
The other is that posed by Rogers, that the vitalist matter of the Creation (like the vital 
matter of the physicians) informs itself without reference to the divinity of God, thus 
correlating with the orthodox contemporary argument that the theory of active matter 
implies atheism. Both of these issues can be answered by a closer examination of the 
sequence in its entirety, going back to the very beginning of the Creation process. By 
examining the Creation sequences through the lens of Aristotelian causality as it is used 
in the contemporary theory of conception, I will show that Milton’s God is not 
disproved, but justified by his materialism, which fits into an ordered, well informed 
natural philosophy that is itself coherent with theodicy. 
 
To deal with the first question, the earth is already ‘formed’ at line 276 because 
this is not the beginning of Creation, and neither is it represented in terms of the earliest 
moments of conception. Danielson has pointed out that there are three stages of 
Creation in Paradise Lost, beginning with: 
 
a first stage – not yet creation proper – in which prime matter is in 
some way ‘alienated from God, rendered external from him; a second 
stage in which some but not all of that matter is chosen to be the stuff 
of this visible world; and a third stage in which that stuff receives its 
actual forms. The result of the first stage is Chaos.293
 
 
The first stage is of profound theological consequence, since it is here that the divine 
origin of matter is asserted; as Danielson indicates, God makes the status of chaos clear 
just before the creation, saying: 
 
                        thou my Word, begotten Son, by thee 
This I perform, speak thou, and be it done: 
My overshadowing spirit and might with thee 
I send along, ride forth and bid the deep 
Within appointed bounds be heaven and earth, 
Boundless the deep, because I am who fill 
Infinitude, nor vacuous the space. 
Though I uncircumscribed myself retire, 
And put not forth my goodness, which is free  
To act or not, necessity and chance  
Approach not me, and what I will is fate.  
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(PL 7. 163-173) 
 
Despite its current abandonment to necessity and chance, this deep is still infinite, and 
this is because of its divine origin.294 Unlike the soon to be created visible world, it is 
boundless and although the chaotic stuff of it is of divine origin, God has retired 
himself; just as he chooses not to act upon Adam and Eve’s will, he has chosen not to 
act upon this chaos – until the Creation.295
 
 The abyss has divine origin and God the 
father is thus, in part, potential; as we noted in Chapter 2, if he is to act freely, if he is to 
create rather than being fixed in actuality, if he is to move then potential must exist in 
him. The Son, who is enactor of the Father’s decree, is the Word (as well as being the 
image of the Father) and he is accompanied both by an “overshadowing spirit” and by a 
less defined divine power. This multiplication of divine powers and figures seems to 
suit Milton’s thought better than the Trinitarian formulation, which we know he rejected 
forcefully. In the invocation to Urania in Book 7 there are other figures imagined at the 
brink of Creation: although Urania is circumscribed with the proviso “the meaning not 
the name” being called, she is “Heav'nlie borne, / Before the Hills appeared, or Fountain 
flow'd, / Thou with Eternal Wisdom didst converse, /Wisdom thy Sister, and with her 
didst play / In presence of th' Almightie Father, pleas'd / With thy Celestial Song” (PL 
7. 7-12). 
There are, then, a notable number of different modes of divinity in this passage 
and others of Paradise Lost; what is emphasised is the central doctrinal point that God 
the father is the cause of many causes, including the material. We are told in the 
Christian Doctrine that God “is the first, absolute and sole cause of all things [and] he 
unquestionably contains and comprehends within himself all these causes.”296
                                                            
294 Milton makes his position clear in his arguments against the Trinity that there can be only one infinity: 
that of the one God (CPW 6: 211). 
 In 
Paradise Lost, chaos is a representation of the material cause, the material potential of 
divinity to make manifest, visible, extended reality out of “dark materials” which are 
also already “pregnant causes.” This is the relationship of chaos, the material cause to 
its origin, but what of the other divine causal modes of Creation? The material cause 
meets the efficient cause in the second stage of Creation, when the Son and the 
295 This leaves it both morally and formally as pure potentiality. We see another glimpse of this quality of 
potentiality in the divine when Adam reassures Eve, “Evil into the mind of God or man / May come and 
go, so unapproved, and leave / No spot or blame behind” (PL 5. 117-119). As Danielson argues 
throughout Milton’s Good God, the quality of potential in materiality reflects and substantiates the pure 
potential of free will in both the human and the divine. 
296 CPW 6: 308. 
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“overshadowing spirit” ride into the abyss and the Word speaks, saying “Silence, ye 
troubled waves, and thou deep, peace” (PL 7. 216). The phrase “overshadowing spirit” 
echoes Gabriel’s words to Mary at the Annunciation, another opening moment of divine 
insemination: “The power of the highest shall overshadow thee” (Luke 1:35). The Holy 
Spirit is acting as vital spirit does in the body’s semen and blood. This overshadowing 
spirit is the efficient cause: likewise, in medical terms, Glisson states that “the vital 
spirit is the primary efficient cause and the real principle of sanguification.”297
 
  
The divine entry and command also correspond structurally to Milton’s 
definition of the efficient cause in the Art of Logic, being a primary initialising cause, 
but itself separate from the effect; the material cause, on the other hand, is retained 
within the Creation along with the ontological freedom it substantiates. However, the 
efficient cause seems to be working in more than one mode; Milton describes the 
system of four causes in the created world (too often called Nature) as the “efficacy of 
the divine voice which went forth in the beginning, and which all things have obeyed 
ever since as a perpetual command”.298
 
 The divine voice is also an efficient cause and it 
works through the medium of the divine spirit. The process is imagined richly as a 
coincidence of abstract command, spiritual power and material force, all interacting 
within the same phenomenon. The coincidence of causes is nevertheless systematised: 
there is a structural relation between the relation of God’s command to his word and his 
spirit and the action of vital spirit and heat. Spiritus, or breath is the substratum of the 
Word, just as bodily spirit is the substratum of vital heat. Both Word and heat share a 
substratum of vital spirit. Vital heat is the warming vitalising power which acts upon the 
fertile good of matter (or on various grades of matter), awakening the latent movement 
and fecundity of spirit/matter in it. That fecundity, once awakened, functions by a 
similary attraction, and thus a dynamic interaction of spirit and thicker stuff (figured 
through fermentation), to produce both form and more vital heat with a circular motion: 
as in human generation, the matter and spirit is endowed immediately with the power to 
multiply and transform.  
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Here, with this direct structural correlation of Word and heat, of vital and holy 
spirits, we should return to answer Rogers’s charge of disparity between commands of 
the theological divinity and the action of vitalist materiality. 
 
The vitalist process of material self-organisation is the direct result 
neither of God’s command nor of his vigilant and ongoing 
manipulation of an inert substance… One of the most shocking 
instances of the complete transmission of divine power to the matter 
of creation generates an elaborate figural complex that lies at the heart 
of the political science of Milton’s poem: the figure of self-creation.299
 
 
It is the designation of substance as “inert” that gives away the dualism underlying this 
argument, indeed this logic is also at the heart of the accusations of atheism faced by 
seventeenth-century vitalism: if matter is active then God must be defunct. However, 
rather than rejecting the correlation of bodily spirituality with divine spirituality, Milton 
positively invites it in these sequences. Of course his attribution of divine origin to the 
first matter of the abyss is one counter to such an accusation: thus the action of matter 
does not preclude God’s power since it is a result of God’s power. Nevertheless, 
Rogers’ question about causal agency demands that we pay careful attention not only to 
the matter of creation, but also to how the multiple spiritual impulsions of divinity 
actually function to produce the fermenting embryo of the visible world.  
 
Rogers’s reading of the Creation sequence uses Harvey’s research to support 
itself; Harvey’s theories in Generatione Animalium are described as “daring 
formulations of autonomous generation” and it is thus asserted that the Creation (and 
Harvey’s thesis) represent a process of parthenogenesis: reproduction from an ovum 
without fertilisation.300 Self-creation is undoubtedly a Satanic notion in Paradise Lost. 
Rogers argues at some length that in Paradise Lost “[a] philosophy of self-creation lies 
at the heart of the poem’s most striking and consequential bid for political authority”;301 
by this he is referring to Satan’s claim that the angels are “self-begot, self-rais’d / By… 
[their] own quickening power” and this he then correlates with the process of 
parthenogenesis in the Creation sequences (PL 5. 859-860). There is, Rogers says, a 
“threatening proximity of this official description [by Raphael] of Creation to the 
Satanic claim of self-raising”.302
                                                            
299 Rogers, Matter of Revolution, 114. 
 Claiming that these theories of genesis are 
300 Rogers, Matter of Revolution, 120. 
301 Rogers, Matter of Revolution, 122. 
302 Rogers, Matter of Revolution, 124. 
116 
 
characterised by a self-active materialism which can only preclude the active impulse of 
God the father, he thus reiterates in another register the claim made by Burton, Ross, 
Cudworth and even Giglioni, that materialism is akin to atheism. However, as we can 
see, Milton’s organisation of the Creation process, with material and efficient causes 
preceding form, corresponds perfectly to the re-ordered version of causality adopted by 
Harvey and Glisson that we explored in Chapter 2. Moreover, through this relationship, 
we can see that the medical theories of genesis to which he refers are less atheistic than 
has been assumed. 
 
Conception is in fact presented by all the authors concerned as an interaction of 
spirit and matter out of which form (or body) emerges. Rogers’s assessment of Harvey’s 
thesis relies too heavily on the rebuttal published by Alexander Ross, which caricatures 
it heavily; he claims Harvey’s work as a “thesis of a self-sufficient and implicitly 
gynocentric generation,” and claims Harvey’s use of the “doctrine of the ferment… 
[has] its corollary theory of autonomous generation.”303 In fact autonomous generation 
was widely seen as relevant only to insects and ‘lower’ species which were thought to 
be spontaneously generated out of mud, or rotting bodies and the vivifying power of 
sunlight.304 While there was a dramatic and lurid history of human attempts to create a 
‘homunculus’ by comparable methods in alchemical medicine, mainstream physicians 
such as Harvey were rather more cautious, rational and concerned with genuine 
evidence than figures such as Paracelsus.305 What Harvey does do is to identify the vital 
heat of the body with the vital influence of the sun and stars by suggesting that 
spontaneous generation and the generation of animate life are effected by the same 
process: “all animal generation is effected in the same way... all animals, even the most 
perfect, are produced from worms... for [worms] acquire dimensions before they have 
any definite form.”306
                                                            
303 Rogers, Matter of Revolution, 120. Ross expends a chapter refuting various sentences drawn from 
Harvey’s work. See Alexander Ross, Arcana microcosmi (London, 1652), 224-235. 
 When discussing the process of insemination, Harvey himself 
makes in fact a finer point than to suggest autogeneration; he argues that the vitality of 
the semen works by exuding vital heat, to fertilise all the waiting eggs already in the 
body. His point in the following is that the semen does not render the hen’s body or 
304 William Newman, Promethean Ambitions: Alchemy and the Quest to Perfect Nature (London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), 166. 
305 Newman notes that in Paracelsus’ tract De homunculus even semen which remains in the male body 
can start creating monstrous growths, that pederasty causes intestinal worms in children and that “the 
potential for producing intestinal homunculi is the real reason for St Paul’s injunctions against the abusers 
of children” (Promethean Ambitions, 218). 
306 Harvey, Works, 251. 
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later eggs fruitful beyond this. He states quite clearly that this is a physical process, 
which nevertheless relies upon the vitalising properties of the spirituous semen:  
 
My opinion is that the semen of the cock thrown into the 
commencement of the uterus, produces an influence on the whole of 
the uterus, and at the same time renders fruitful the whole of the yelks, 
and finally of the perfect eggs which fall into it; and this the semen 
effects by its peculiar property or irradiative spirituous substance.307
 
 
This thesis may possibly bestow a metaphysical vital power on the semen, linking it 
again to the ethereal power of the stars and the sun in true Aristotelian fashion, but it 
cannot, even then, be a model for parthenogenesis as Rogers (and Ross) claim it is. 
When Harvey says that “it is certain that the chick is formed by a principle inherent in 
the egg, and that nothing accrues to a perfect egg from incubation,” this is said in 
reference to material additions such as nutrition.308
 
 Harvey, as we have seen, is well 
aware that the egg has already been fertilised by the male spirituous substance. 
Nevertheless, the way in which the vital spirit acts ultimately remains a mysterious 
force for Harvey. 
In Milton’s representation of Creation the overshadowing spirit both cloaks and 
enters the rude mass of chaos, incubating it externally in a feminine mode and vitalising 
it internally just as the spirituous semen of Harvey’s theory radiates into the uterus, 
fertilising the eggs within. It is with a double action that is typical of vital heat that the 
spirit both incubates and fertilises the matter of the “fluid mass,” itself yet dark and 
formless: 
 
Thus God the heaven created, thus the earth,  
Matter unformed and void: darkness profound 
Covered the abyss: but on the watery calm 
His brooding wings the spirit of God outspread, 
And vital virtue infused, and vital warmth 
Throughout the fluid mass, but downward purged  
The black tartareous cold infernal dregs 
Adverse to life: then founded, then conglobed 
Like things to like, the rest to several place 
Disparted, and between spun out the air, 
And earth self-balanced on her centre hung.  
(PL 7. 232-242) 
 
                                                            
307 Harvey, Works, 191. 
308 Harvey, Works, 220. 
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This is the process through which the earth is formed – the movement that spirit sparks 
off in the ‘fluid mass’ that has until now been “promiscuously mingled” is explicitly 
stated to be a separation of like substance to like substance. The first substances spin 
into place with a circular motion; the movement of like to like is a “conglobing,” a 
circling together that we might imagine as a gravitational spinning, and just as the vital 
fluid and seminal matter of the egg has a ‘circumgyration’ or circular movement, so is 
the prolific, genial fluid of the world’s embryo described as “circumfluous waters calm” 
(PL 7. 270).  
 
We can tell that this confluence of matter and vital virtue is also separation 
through fermentation by the motion of the fluid, where like moves towards like with the 
tartar moving to the bottom and the lightest, most active elements flying to the top. 
Glisson describes chymical fermentation as a mode of separating mixed substances 
using the example of brewing: “Separations are made by fermentation; as we see in the 
working of beer or wine, the spume or barme gets up to the top, and the tartar is cast 
towards the bottom, and a clear liquor left purified in the midst.”309 The entry of the 
spirit’s vital virtue matches most clearly perhaps the similary process of separation 
described by Glisson as made “per magisterium: that is, by casting in another ingredient 
which hath more familiarity with one element of the mixture than the other, by means 
whereof the parts before mixed are separated.”310
                                                            
309 Anatomia hepatis, 71. 
 This process corresponds to the 
addition of a chymical ferment to a substance, with the action of assimilating spirit, but 
it is also explained by Glisson in terms of magnetic action. The profound darkness of 
the calmed abyss shifts at line 234 with the word ‘but,’ as the incubation and 
insemination are begun; initially the agent is clearly God, albeit God working in various 
modes of causality. This becomes less clear at line 237, where the repetition of the word 
‘but’ shifts the sense from a vitalising infusion to a downward purge of coldly 
recalcitrant tartareous dregs, which, being adverse to the vitalising principle, congregate 
together in a movement away from it. The word ‘purge’ is almost as rich and ubiquitous 
in contemporary medical and political discourses as ‘ferment’ and there are some 
problems of agency in the vitalism of this sequence that I will come to later. For now, 
we can note that agency is difficult to locate in one agent in these sequences amongst 
the multiple modes of cause that are at play; however, if we trace back to the beginning 
310 Anatomia hepatis, 69. 
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of the process the initiating cause, the origin of all causes is clearly God the father.311
 
 
Overall, this part of Raphael’s account tends to imply the divine spirit as primary agent, 
although there are several accounts of the Creation with which to correlate it: we will 
investigate both that of Uriel and that in the invocation to light.  
Uriel’s narrative makes the similary attraction even clearer, and while God’s 
command is clearly the first agent of movement, the prima materia itself reacts to the 
command/spirit efficient cause by leaping and spinning into place, seeming indeed to be 
self-active: 
 
I saw when at his word the formless mass, 
This world’s material mould, came to a heap: 
Confusion heard his voice, and wild uproar 
Stood ruled, stood vast infinitude confined; 
Till at his second bidding darkness fled,  
Light shone, and order from disorder sprung: 
Swift to their several quarters hasted then 
The cumbrous elements, earth, flood, air, fire, 
And this ethereal quintessence of heaven 
Flew upward, spirited with various forms, 
That rolled orbicular and turned to stars 
(PL 3. 708-18) 
 
Here again we can see evidence of Danielson’s second stage of Creation: this command 
calms and sections off the circle of the ‘vast infinitude’ that will substantiate the visible 
world. The wilderness of chaos is still a formless mass, but it has some sort of 
perception, for it hears and is ruled and confined. Where Raphael’s narrative stressed 
the act of the overshadowing spirit in brooding, infusing and warming the fluid mass, 
this narrative stresses the active responses of the elements of the still formless mass: it 
listens, darkness flees, light shines, and order springs from disorder. The fleeing of the 
darkness is echoed by the downward purging of the ‘black tartareous cold infernal 
dregs’ in the rushing movement of like to like. The movements of the elements, energy 
and atoms of chaos, so dangerous when unordered, become creative when stimulated 
and ruled by the Holy Spirit, the upward motion of the most volatile element leading 
directly to the circular formation of the stars. The Aristotelian character of the elements 
is not, we now know, a signal that other traditions and innovations of natural philosophy 
                                                            
311 “It is not surprising that such an improbable event should find its rhetorical expression in such a 
difficult passage of verse. The reason, I have to assume, that these lines have been paid such scant 
attention by critics, involves our difficulty in assigning agency to the central action” (Rogers, Matter of 
Revolution, 115).   
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are being excluded, since Milton is in fact typical of a number of contemporary medical 
scientists in his tendency to use an Aristotelian framework and elaborate his vitalism 
with chymical theories of substance. And while there are not, in Uriel’s account, the 
references to chymical theory that characterise the other Creation sequences, the matter, 
here more clearly than at any other time, is responding independently to God’s 
command.312
 
 This is the response of substance itself to the perception of its own being 
(materiality) and the efficacy of God’s Word and spirit, and the movement, again, is of 
like to like, a similary attraction that works with a circular flow. The elements “haste” to 
their correct places, the heavier to the lower reaches of the universe, the most rarefied to 
the highest spinning patterns of stars in the skies.  
The voice of God is a cause, the incubating and vitalising holy spirit is a cause, 
the fertile matter of the abyss is a cause, and it seems from Uriel’s account that the light, 
first thing to be created, is a cause. Here a differentiation made by Milton in the Art of 
Logic may be helpful: 
 
a per se efficient cause is one which causes efficiently through its own 
power, that is, one which produces an effect from an intrinsic 
principle... Elements, minerals, plants and animals are things which 
operate through their own nature.313
 
 
This causal agency is genuine, but slightly compromised in comparison to the causal 
agency of a conscious agent: “Causes which act through nature do so out of necessity, 
while those which act through deliberation do so freely.”314
 
 God does not – like natural 
perception – cause through natural necessity. He is, Milton emphasises repeatedly, free 
to act in any way he wishes within the limits of his own wholly good nature (Milton is 
no voluntarist) and the principle of non-contradiction. The voice of God, with its clear 
source in the Father’s will, is the most free of necessity in this causal schema. The spirit 
that incubates and infuses vital virtue occupies a position between command and effect 
and the power of matter hovers, like the power of the light that acts upon it, between the 
necessity of its own intrinsic principle of movement and fertility given to it by God’s 
command, and the fact of the agency and causal force with which that command 
paradoxically endows it.  
                                                            
312 Moreover, as he speaks Uriel stands upon the surface  the sun, which has, in both form and power just 
been described in some of the most direct references to the chymical art that are to be found in the poem. 
313 CPW 8: 226. 
314 CPW 8: 226. 
121 
 
This paradoxical position of being subject to the goodness of God and at the 
same time endowed with creative agency is, again, reminiscent of the peculiar position 
of the rational human (or angel) created by God and living in a universe created by God, 
but endowed with free will. Nevertheless, the source of this creative power and agency 
is undoubtedly God. By the time the earth is ‘formed’ but still fermenting in the ‘womb 
of waters’ God has already sectioned off the part of Chaos to be used. He has already, 
by a spiritual entry and the concomitant command that light should exist, initiated a 
pattern of like moving to like in a series of separations; in the clumping together of the 
thickest matter, earth has come to hang “self balanced” on her centre, and the air has 
been “spun out” between; the firmament and the waters have been divided, and are 
moving with a “circumfluous” motion and two ‘days’ have passed. God’s agency is 
clear in his commanding, brooding and infusion; with the elements’ responses and the 
purging of the tartareous dregs the agency seems to be mutual, as in a medical 
fermentation or purge; the substance of chaos is clearly acting. Whereas Harvey had 
attributed to the semen an ‘irradiative’ spiritual power, Milton’s representation of the 
insemination of the world uses a version of fermentation that allies his Creation to the 
vital fluids and similary attractions of conception proposed by Glisson. The spirit that 
enacts the efficient cause is not described as airy in the way, for example, angels are 
described as airy throughout the poem; it is one powerful element in a mixture which is 
busy composing itself into order. The spirit acts upon the ‘seeds of all good’ in the 
matter of the abyss, which itself responds in the mode of similary attraction to effect 
order through separations and the independent, responsive movement of like to like. 
The power of the Holy Spirit acts, in fact, like a ferment, that is a spiritual impulsion, 
and its action seems to correspond to the process of separation per magisterium 
described by Glisson. This of course begs the question of what it is that is enters into the 
abyss to start this process: what precisely is it that correlates with the spirituous semen 
of conception? Here we can add some detail from another representation of the Creation 
in Paradise Lost. 
 
 
 
iii. Holy light and vital spirit 
 
If we turn to the invocation to light at the beginning of Book 3 there is another 
brief representation of the Creation. Here, the poet calls upon precisely this light as the 
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“offspring of Heav’n firstborn” (PL 3. 1). The first offspring of heaven is of course also 
the Son, who is sent to do the work of the Creation when God tells him that his 
“overshadowing spirit and might with thee” is also sent (PL 7. 165-6). I suggest, 
however, remembering the ‘kindly heat of various influence’ that is vital heat in 
Paradise Lost, that we can correlate the holy light of the invocation with the vital virtue 
being infused into the fluid mass.315
 
 The poet of Paradise Lost declares that: 
                            since God is light, 
And never but in unapproached light 
Dwelt from Eternitie, dwelt then in thee, 
Bright effluence of bright essence increate. 
Or hear'st thou rather pure Ethereal stream, 
Whose Fountain who shall tell? before the Sun, 
Before the Heavens thou wert, and at the voice 
Of God, as with a Mantle didst invest  
The rising world of waters dark and deep, 
Won from the void and formless infinite.  
(PL 3. 3-12) 
 
This sequence correlates the brooding and inseminating spirit of Raphael’s account with 
holy light: the conception of the world is incubated by holy light, the first thing created 
in Genesis. In Raphael’s account God commands: “Let there be Light, said God, and 
forthwith Light /Ethereal, first of things, quintessence pure / Sprung from the Deep, and 
from her native east / To journey through the airy gloom began (PL 7. 243-6). Light 
responds to the voice of God by springing and exhaling out of the darkness of the abyss, 
and hovering in ‘her’ tabernacle until the creation of the form of the sun on the fourth 
day, when it is made “porous to receive / And drink the liquid light” (PL 7. 361-2). Like 
the rare spirits of creation, the light is – if anything – of a liquid consistency. Uriel’s 
narrative makes clear that the formative activity of the generating world is a response to 
the “second bidding” when “light shone and order from disorder sprung.” This light, 
which flows, an “effluence” from the uncreated spiritual essence of the divine, is of the 
same species as vital heat; indeed the poet goes on to address holy light and then to refer 
to the sun as “thy sovereign vital lamp” in his lament for his lost physical vision: the 
divine energy which incubates and vitalises is correlated directly with the known light 
of the sun (PL 3. 22). Like substance (and form), light is plural: it is the warm, physical 
                                                            
315 McDowell correlates this first uncreated light with the spirit that infuses and broods in his comparison 
of Richard Overton’s materialism with that of Milton: “while in Raphael's description of creation in Book 
7 the infusion of God's vital virtue into matter precedes the divine fiat, ‘Let there be light’, in the 
invocation that opens Book 3 it is the ‘pure ethereal stream’ of ’increate’ light which itself ‘invests’ 
matter with life which generates the creation,” ‘Ideas of Creation’, 68. 
123 
 
stuff of physical vision, that is, sunlight; it is also, in the same address, ethereal light 
that specifically precedes the sun at the first moment of Creation, yet, as the “bright 
effluence of bright essence increate” it flows from God, possibly like a fountain with a 
flow that can be followed back to a singular divine origin.  
 
There is, in the representation of the holy light of Creation, a coincidence of 
various different discourses into one event; the circulation of fluid, spirit and matter in 
this model must recall the socio-political readings made of the body politic and the 
circulating blood, especially in the light of Rogers’s attempt to appropriate Milton’s 
natural philosophy as an antecedent to modern neo-liberal economics.316 Nevertheless, 
while the socio-political resonances of the notions of circulation that characterise this 
body are strong, they are themselves quite nascent and as yet unformed. One example of 
this is the delicate intersection of meanings in the process in which God applies vital 
heat to the calmed matter of chaos, the “womb of nature,” and “invests” it.317 Fowler 
glosses the word ‘invest’ as “to cover or wrap,” but there are a number of contemporary 
implications that can be drawn out of the term (PL. 3. 9-12n). The OED offers various 
contemporary meanings among which are indeed, “to clothe, robe, or envelop (a person) 
in or with a garment or article of clothing”; however, the meaning also includes a 
transfer of power or attributes: “to clothe or endue with attributes, qualities or a 
character”; “to endow or furnish with power, authority, or privilege”; and “to clothe 
with or in the insignia of an office, hence, with the dignity itself.” Valerie Forman notes 
that “in contrast to economic investment in which any gain accrues to the investor, in 
early forms of investment, power is transferred from the agent to the object—as in the 
case of an archbishop investing a bishop.”318
                                                            
316 Rogers makes this explicit more than once, stating that “these new maps of physiological order 
constituted in some way a curious engagement of the first and most influential model of decentralised 
organisation: the economic paradigm of the self-regulating market that had been theorised for the first 
time in the 1620s to promote a nearly laissez-faire program of foreign trade” (Matter of Revolution, 22). 
 Nevertheless, Forman points to the 
emergence of the modern, financial meaning of investment in the context of the 
memoranda of the contemporary East India Company, and this rich combination of 
meanings can unfold the implications of the ‘investment’ of the abyss with the power of 
the Holy Spirit. The ‘clothing’ aspect of ‘invest’ is emphasised by the covering of the 
abyss with a mantel, and this covering relates to the brooding of the Spirit; the 
317 For a detailed analysis of contemporary usage of the word ‘invest’ in both the earlier meaning of 
‘envelope’ or ‘endow’ and the newer economic meanings see Valerie Forman, ‘Transformations of Value 
and the Production of “Investment” in the Early History of the East India Company’ in the Journal of 
Medieval and Early Modern Studies 34. 3 (2004), 611-64. 
318 Forman, ‘Transformations of Value’, 1. 
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investment of power and dignity corresponds to the vital virtue and warmth that is 
infused into the rising world of waters.319 The circular motion of spirit and substance, 
the self-generating power of vital heat in the interplay between spirit and substance can, 
to some degree, be identified with the circulation of goods and money in the new body 
politic that Harvey’s discovery echoed. The circulation of the blood in the body and the 
circulation of money and goods in the new economic climate of the seventeenth-century 
body politic are undoubtedly related in what Greenblatt terms “circulations of social 
energy” (a notion to which the former ‘circulations’ are antecedent), but this new 
economic meaning is, while not entirely absent, not the dominant form in Milton’s 
poem.320
 
 
Despite the presence of this economic thread of logic in the newly imagined 
body politic (or, here, body divine), the position of God as holy source is clear. The 
power of holy light enacts this efficient cause, although it is the command of God that is 
the first and primary cause. My case, then, is that this representation of the fertilising 
power of God’s spirit does not imply parthenogenesis any more than the medical theory 
from which it borrows its logic. It rather creates a series of representations of the 
formative interactions of energy, spirits and thicker, but still active, fluids, and these 
representations all illustrate a process of the emergence of body out of spirit. What 
Harvey had described as the semen’s ‘peculiar property or irradiative spirituous 
substance’ corresponds to Milton’s spirit’s power to infuse vital virtue and warmth into 
the fertile, responsive matter awaiting it.  The circular, flowing interactions of 
fermenting vital fluid and warming, incubating holy light, of inseminating spirit and 
active matter in the early stages of the Creation match precisely Glisson’s development 
of Harvey’s work on conception, drawing on Galenic theory, Aristotelian causality and 
chymical substance transformation, just as Glisson’s work does. Milton’s representation 
of the Holy Spirit matches perfectly the double motion of fertile bodily spirit; the earth 
was formed by this confluence of efficient and material causes, just as the foetus was 
imagined to be so formed in contemporary medical research. That formation becomes 
the active, formal cause as the dry land appears and the vegetation and ‘living souls’ 
emerge from the waters and the earth. It is only at the point of the emergence of life-
forms from the earth that the figures of speech start to invoke birth. 
                                                            
319 We might also compare the Son’s clothing of Adam and Eve after the Fall. 
320 Stephen Greenblatt, Shakespearian Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance 
England (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 1-20. 
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Coda 
 
The Creation sequence narrated by Raphael substantiates and imagines a 
Creation ex deo in terms of a vitalist conception in a remarkably coherent way. 
Nevertheless, Rogers asserts that the employment of the notion of fermentation in this 
narrative contains a flaw which ultimately deconstructs Milton’s theodicy in the 
presence and purge of the tartareous dregs in the process of creation. It may seem 
startling that this process, with all its correlations with medical conception, should seem 
also to be a digestion, but the two processes are not, even on the eve of the scientific 
revolution, yet seen as distinct. The same powers and processes of the body that 
transform foodstuffs into the fluids and organs of the body are seen to transform the 
sexual fluids of the body into an altogether new body.  Referring to the work of 
Paracelsus and Van Helmont, Rogers emphasises the seemingly anomalous position of 
the “tartareous dregs” which, “adverse to life,” are purged downwards. Tartar and the 
agonising illnesses it causes are, according to Van Helmont, not of natural origin, but 
consequences of the Fall that “issue wholly from our errour, and the corruption of 
nature.”321
 
 Rogers interprets the relation of the presence of tartar at the Creation to 
Milton’s theodicy thus: 
If we extend the logic of Van Helmont’s analysis of Paracelsus to our 
own reading of Milton’s Creation, we can come closer to the terrible 
implications of Raphael’s inclusion of the ‘black tartareous cold 
Infernel dregs’ as an externally generated, precreative substance that 
must be purged from the original matter… The presence of these 
dregs empties Milton’s natural philosophy of its theodical force. The 
radical moral power of Milton’s animist materialism quite simply 
evaporates if even a portion of the material universe cannot be shown 
to have derived from the intrinsically good substance of an 
intrinsically good God.322
 
 
This is an interesting point; nevertheless, there are two problems with it. First, the 
presence of the tartareous dregs adds nothing new to the debate on the origin of evil, 
which already exists in both potential and actuality at the point of Creation: the fact that 
                                                            
321 Van Helmont quoted in Rogers, Matter of Revolution, 136. 
322 Rogers, Matter of Revolution, 137. Rogers goes on to make a political allegory, correlating the 
inassimilable dregs with the ‘encroaching political chaos’ of the period that lead up to the Restoration; his 
reading of the scale of nature alongside the proposed system of election in The Readie and Easie Way 
(1660) becomes yet more profound and illuminating once a clear perspective on the order of value in the 
scale of nature is restored. 
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God has withdrawn himself from the matter of chaos and the fact that Satan has already 
invented Sin and fallen are intrinsic to the poem’s overall integrity, both literary and 
theodical. Secondly, it is unlikely that Milton would have drawn directly on the more 
exuberant theory of the Paracelsians, the focus of whose work was the alchemical 
reversal of the effects of the Fall. 
 
 The ‘Tincture of the Philosophers’ (that is the elixir of life) is described by 
Paracelsus as: 
 
A Universal Medicine... [that] extends the life of the body beyond 
what is possible to its congenital nature... and consumes all diseases, 
by whatsoever name they are called... [it is] such purgation of the 
body, by means of which all superfluity is radically removed from it 
and transmuted... [it is] the regeneration of the nature, and the 
restoration of youth.323
 
  
Milton believed in the Fall and the compelling opening sequence of Paradise Lost states 
with some power that the only exit from fallenness is through the redemptive act of 
“that one man.” To attempt one’s own redemption through tampering with created 
substances would be blasphemy indeed. In fact this description recalls nothing in 
Paradise Lost so powerfully as Satan’s description of the Tree of Knowledge to Eve on 
the day of the Fall as a “sacred, wise and wisdom-giving plant / Mother of science” 
which gives power “not only to discern / Things in their causes, but to trace the ways / 
Of highest agents” (PL 9. 679-683).324
 
 He claims that Eve’s “eyes that seem so clear, / 
Yet are but dim, shall perfectly be then / Opened and cleared, and ye shall be as gods” 
and supplements his argument with the comment that “what are gods that man may not 
become / As they, participating god-like food?” (PL 9. 706-717). Her response, as she 
begins to lose her judgement and to fall, is to look at the fruit through confusion as “the 
cure of all, this fruit divine” (PL 9. 776). We can also recall the equivocal representation 
of human efforts in transmutational alchemy in Paradise Lost that we touched on in 
Chapter 2; paradise may be a place of transformation but that transformation is the 
ongoing work of divinity in natural substance rather than a human art. 
                                                            
323 Paracelsus, ‘The Tincture of the Philosophers’ (1543), in Hermetic and Alchemical Writings of 
Paracelsus: Part 1. I have used the 1910 edition, ed. A. E. Waite (Whitefish: Kessinger, 2009), 19-30, 30. 
324 For an illuminating comparison of Satan’s temptation with contemporary accounts of the Italian 
mountebank or medical trickster see Edwards, Milton and the Natural World, chapter 1, ‘Corrupting 
experience: Satan and Eve’, 15-39. 
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I propose that, rather than calling directly upon the Paracelsian meeting of 
Creation theory and alchemical transmutation, Milton is much more likely to be using 
the sort of medical alchemy that Newman terms chymistry, which was part of a 
coherent contemporary materialist vitalism and was relevant to his gradual descent into 
blindness and the painful gout of which he eventually died. We have only to look at the 
end of the invocation to the light that is both the vital, visible effluent of that ‘vital 
lamp’ the sun, as well as the celestial light beyond mortal comprehension, to encounter 
the poet’s request that this light  
 
Shine inward, and the mind through all her powers  
Irradiate, there plant eyes, all mist from thence  
Purge and disperse, that I may see and tell  
Of things invisible to mortal sight.  
(PL 3. 51-55) 
 
Within this most central moment the light itself is invoked to act as a medicine for the 
poet’s inner, spiritual eye and, with one of the disconcerting dualities of the poem, that 
medicine is like that offered to Eve in her disobedience, a purge to open and clear the 
eyes. Of course the fundamental difference is that one is prayed for as a gift of grace 
made in faith and obedience, the other is proposed by Satan as a justifiable theft from a 
jealous, manipulative God. This notion of the purge as medicine to which Milton 
appeals, and with which Eve is swindled, gives us the best way of approaching the 
spiritual purge that is part of the Creation. In the introduction, we examined the shifts in 
medical theory that concerned these diseases and happened amongst Milton’s friends 
and their colleagues during the middle years of the seventeenth century, but let us revisit 
them again, briefly. Gout, or tartar formation in the joints was, like gutta serena, 
originally thought to be the result of excessive, often phlegmatic humours being 
produced in the stomach through bad digestion; they were then thought to exceed their 
bounds and flow out from their due places and collect, be it in the eyes or in the joints 
(this explains the etymological link between ‘gutta serena’ and ‘gout’). However the 
work of Francis Glisson and other experimental physicians such as Walter Charleton 
developed another theory of tartar entirely based on the active, vital blood.  
 
These theories cite a poisonous fermentation in the blood rather than poor 
concoction and wandering humours; the production of vinous tartareous substance may 
lead to a number of health problems, in particular gout of the joints and gutta serena of 
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the optic nerve. Giglioni explores this aspect of Glisson’s anatomy of the bodily fluids 
in some detail and it is worth quoting in full. He states that: 
 
The real cause [of tatareous deposits in the body] is a process of 
fermentation occurring in the blood, and especially in the serum, 
which brings the mass of the blood to a “vinous condition”. This is 
also proven by excesses of wine and sex, which increase the 
disposition to arthritis by facilitating the fermentation of the blood and 
consequently the exaltation of the spirits. The result of this 
fermentation is a tartareous residue which takes the form of a 
calculous sedimentation in the joints. Fernel's humoral etiology of the 
gout, like his explanation of arthritis, because it presupposes a 
pervasive motion of phlegmatic humors outside the vessels, is rejected 
by Glisson. In this case, too, chemistry gives the anatomist both 
explanatory and experimental resources. Gout, in Glisson's view, 
depends on the faulty disposition of the blood, which is caused by its 
“vinous” character, increase of tartar, and the specific nature of the 
humors running in the bloodstream.325
 
  
This fermentation is a malignant version of the normal activity of the blood, but even 
the normal activity of the blood, in this schema, produces waste matter. The mication of 
the blood, that is the ceaseless production and consumption of spirit and vital heat, itself 
generates excrements of the body. When analysed, these substances: 
 
separate according to the pattern of the five chemical principles: the 
"clotted part" which dissolves into the phlegm, the bitter part which 
enters the composition of the bile, the watery part which melts into the 
urine, the salty and earthy parts which form the tartar. As far as the 
ultimate elements of the blood are concerned, they are traced back to 
the five principles: mercury (which can be present in two forms, fatty 
and meager), sulphur, salt, water, and earth.326
 
 
Each element of the blood leaves its own waste product; each element of the blood can 
be identified in terms of the chymical elements. The tartar, like the tartar of Milton’s 
Creation, which is cold and ‘adverse’ to life, corresponds to and produces ‘dead 
earth’.327
                                                            
325 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 149. Giglioni cites MS 
Sloane 3310 (“Arthritidis causa non est necessario frigid”), ff. 45r-50r; also (“Podagra est curabilis”), ff. 
123r-124v, 127r-128v. 
 Indeed, Thomas Willis’s tract on fermentation states that:  
326Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 124. Giglioni cites MS 
Sloane 3309, f. 95r; also 3309, f. 99r; also (“Sanguis est fons catarrhorum”), ff. 360r-361r for the sources 
of his translation and paraphrase.  
327 Incidentally, tartar and the production of tartar is a notion at the centre of considerable debate between 
Van Helmont and Glisson. “One detailed question concerns the origin of tartar, that is, the formation of 
stony precipitates in the body, but Glisson's attitude is critical all the same. In Glisson's opinion, Helmont 
tried hard (but vainly) to demonstrate that there is no tartareous sediment in urine,” Glisson argues that 
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In Distillations, Earth ascends the Alembic, almost not at all, or but in 
a very little quantity: for the most part it is left, with a portion of Salt, 
for a Caput Mortuum, or Dead Head; therefore it is called Terra 
Damnata, or damned Earth: because, when the other Principles are 
freed, the Prison being as it were broken, this is still detained: besides 
Earth being deprived of the Company of the rest, is of no Use, nor 
capable of change, or exaltation.328
 
 
 Here, in the work of a most careful experimental iatrochemist, we can see the residue of 
the mystical alchemy of figures such as Fludd and Paracelsus in the association of the 
dead earth with damnation. Milton, like Willis, makes this association, but it is part of a 
correlation between the spirits of the body and the Holy Spirit made in the light of an 
absolute commitment to free will; thus it is a delicate delineation of the problem of evil. 
The sources for the ‘fermentation’ of the beginning of the world are not those of 
mystical alchemy, but medical chymistry. 
 
The purging of the tartareous dregs as process derived from vitalist physic must 
also be considered in terms of the wider literary and theological integrity of the poem; 
from this angle there are two significant factors. First, there are typological references to 
the Fall throughout the representation of the unfallen world. For example, a few lines 
later in the Creation sequence the flow of the newly created rivers will prefigure the 
tragedy of the human Fall with their “torrent rapture” which is shortly followed by 
“serpent error” (PL 7. 299-302). This need not signify a fatal inconsistency of theology, 
as Christopher Ricks showed many years ago.329
                                                                                                                                                                              
Van Helmont makes his mistakes because he lacks a detailed understanding of organic anatomy (Giglioni, 
‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 129). 
  Moreover, the references to fallenness 
do not need to be confined to the figurative or pre-figurative and typological; as we 
have already noted, there is already at this point fallenness in both potential and in 
actuality in Paradise Lost. There is natural evil in the substance of chaos; the substance 
has already “gone out from God” and a careful reading of the geology of heaven, hell 
and earth quickly shows that the potential for natural evil is everywhere, just under the 
surfaces of all these places, profane or sacred. The ground of heaven itself yields 
materials that can be used to make infernal damage and mischief, as Satan notes during 
the war in heaven: 
328 Willis, Of Fermentation, in Dr. Willis's practice of physick being the whole works of that renowned 
and famous physician, trans. S. Pordage (London, 1684),  6. 
329 Christopher Ricks, Milton’s Grand Style (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); see in particular 
chapter 3 ‘Enhancing Suggestions’, 78-117. 
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Which of us who beholds the bright surface 
Of this ethereous mould whereon we stand, 
This continent of spacious heav’n, adorned 
With plant, fruit, flower ambrosial, gems and gold, 
Whose eye so superficially surveys 
These things as not to mind from whence they grow 
Deep under ground, materials dark and crude, 
Of spirituous and fiery spume, till touched 
With heaven’s ray, and tempered they shoot forth 
So beauteous, op’ning to the ambient light. 
These in their dark nativity the deep 
Shall yield us, pregnant with infernal flame  
(PL 6. 472-483) 
 
The interaction of matter and spirit is intrinsic to the whole natural world; we have seen 
this interaction on the borders of chaos and nature, within the conception of the visible 
world, and in the natural philosophy of paradise and heaven as well. Satan’s discovery 
is an example of matter that has gone out from God and become the property of another 
and he misappropriates it according to his free will and to its potential. There is no need 
to posit a pre-creative substance that must be purged from the Creation by God, for the 
matter of Chaos has already been divided from the divine influence; allegorical figures 
have set up court in it, Satan and his legions have fallen though it and Hell has been 
sectioned off out of it.330 The downward motion of these tartareous dregs (elements 
which originate in metaphysical evil and which substantiate natural evil in the universe 
of Paradise Lost), recalls poetically the downward plunge of Satan, personification of 
moral evil, and the other angels who have already been purged out of heaven: the dregs 
are adverse to life as Satan is “the adversary of God and man” (PL 2. 629).331
 
  
The notion of purgation as Glisson conceives of it in terms of natural 
perception is particularly applicable in the context of this comparison, since Satan and 
his followers, like the animated stuff of Creation, respond to the holy might of God by 
throwing themselves into the ordered place ordained for them. They are not, in the end, 
pushed, nor do they fall accidentally: rather, like the inchoate substances of creation and 
the animated substances of the body, they leap to the place that suits them best, which is 
                                                            
330 For a compelling correlation of literary allegory and metaphysical evil see Fallon, Milton Among the 
Philosophers, Chapter 6 ‘Sin and Death: The Substance of Allegory,’ 138-168. 
331 Danielson identifies natural evil as the seemingly senseless destruction effected by such causes as 
illness or natural disaster; moral evil exists in the cruel or destructive actions of rational agents, and  
metaphysical evil is defined as “the essential... finitude, imperfection and limitation of all created things” 
(Milton’s Good God, 38-69). 
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ultimately designated by the all-informing will of God. There is no question that the 
apostate angels are driven out of heaven (“Pursue these sons of darkness, drive them 
out,” God the Father commands at 6. 715). However, like the naturally perceiving 
substances of Glisson’s natural philosophy, they refuse assimilation and choose to leap 
downward. Terrified of the Son’s might they look through the gap in the crystal wall of 
heaven 
 
Into the wasteful deep; the monstrous sight 
Strook them with horror backward, but far worse 
Urged them from behind; headlong themselves they threw 
Down from the verge of heav’n, eternal wrath 
Burnt after them to the bottomless pit. 
(PL 6. 862-866) 
 
It is not a pleasant or easy choice, but in the end it is their own; the Son has put on his 
face of terror and ridden towards them, his chariot flashing with lightning and 
“pernicious fire” but not a blow is struck (PL 6. 849). Unlike Adam and Eve, whose 
expulsion from paradise and back to the dust from whence they came might fruitfully be 
compared to this expulsion, they are not conscious of remorse or guilt. Thus the 
material reality of the level to which they have fallen is infinitely worse. If one is 
searching for an expulsion that is effected purely by a combination of divine energy and 
the free will of the expulsed, this stands as a clear example.  
 
We have explored in some detail the sources and implications of the 
representation of the emergence of body from spirit in Paradise Lost. It is clear that 
medical vitalism, with its revision of Aristotelian vital heat and similary attraction, is a 
coherent structuring device in Milton’s representation of Creation. ‘Soul’ and animation 
clearly derive from the interaction of originally divine ontological categories, and 
monist vitalism, despite its reputation for atheism, can be and is employed in the service 
of theodicy. These circular motions of transformation work body out of spirit, but they 
also work spirit out of body. The next chapter will explore the implications of Milton’s 
natural philosophy for his human body-soul composites, examining his traducianism 
and showing how the emergence of the rational soul from material process can be 
structured by the same vitalist theories of body that we have encountered in the 
Creation. This process encompasses theories of nutrition and digestion and deals with 
God’s ordinary, rather than extraordinary providence.    
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Chapter 5 
 
Body into spirit 
 
 
i. Models of transformation in the animate body 
 
Milton uses the language and concepts of the alchemical/hermetic tradition, but 
he uses them in a very particular way in his representation of the unfallen soul in 
paradise. From a fallen perspective the poem makes clear that the exit from fallenness is 
not through the consumption of magical medicines that are the “cure of all,” indeed the 
Fall itself illustrates that this is precisely the sort of thinking that leads away from God. 
Redemption is no more to be found in the promises of the medical charlatan who offers 
the cure of all than it is to be found in the laborious art of transmutation of metals 
practised by the alchemist in his laboratory. Nevertheless, despite the disjunction 
between the claims made by much of the alchemical tradition and its representation in 
Paradise Lost, transformation of substance is at the very heart of Milton’s theodicy and 
it is to be found, with another disturbing doubling of the poem, precisely through the 
ingestion of the fruit of paradise. One of the additions made to the accounts of paradise 
in Genesis is that of Adam and Eve’s option to rise, and become rarefied and closer to 
God given time and obedience: 
 
And from these corporal nutriments perhaps 
Your bodies may at last turn all to spirit, 
Improved by tract of time, and winged ascend 
Ethereal as we, or may at choice 
Here or in heavenly paradises dwell; 
If ye be found obedient, and retain 
Unalterably firm his love entire 
Whose progeny you are  
(PL 5. 496-503) 
 
As has often been noted, the conditions of this transformation are patience and 
obedience, but the mechanism by which it is imagined is that of diet and digestion; their 
bodies may turn to spirit in a process which starts biologically with corporal nutriments 
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and ends with the emergence of such a light, rare, active and ethereal body that flight to 
heaven is possible. A recent body of illuminating scholarship deals with the materialism 
of angelic digestion and the natural philosophy of the scala naturae to which it is 
related. Schoenfeldt has explored in detail the consonance between the moral choices of 
the mind and the tensions and choices in eating and digestion in Milton’s work.332 Both 
he and Fallon correlate the clear comparison made between the process of digestion and 
the “metabolic logic” of the wider natural philosophy in Paradise Lost; they both 
observe Galenic theories and influences in this use of digestion.333
 
 There are, 
nevertheless, some additions that I would like to make to this line of debate.  
Contemporary physic, like the ancient medicine that it relied upon, saw 
conception and generation as almost the same process as digestion and nutrition. Both 
bodily processes involved the transformation of one substance, body or fluid into 
another, therefore the model of vital, active and transformative fluid that we have 
charted in Milton’s representation of the Creation can also open up and elaborate our 
reading of the scale of nature that Raphael describes and the various places of human 
and angelic characters upon that scale. The radical difference between the medical 
tradition that orders this transformation in Paradise Lost and the use to which Milton 
puts it is in the representation of the relationship between the spirits of the body and that 
(or those) of the rational soul. For Milton’s unfallen humans, the transformation of one 
spirit into another continues into the traditionally immaterial realms of consciousness, 
rather than being of a fundamentally different character. 
 
Although the final form of his vitalism suggests it, Glisson does not, in his 
earlier work, propose that his model of bodily transformation extends to the realm of the 
rational soul. Milton, on the other hand, takes the system of bodily spirit and matter to 
its logical conclusion – precisely that feared by religious critics of medicine. In the 
Christian Doctrine he states clearly that “the human soul is generated by the parents in 
the course of nature, and not created daily by the immediate act of God.”334
                                                            
332 See Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves, chapter 5 ‘Temperance and temptation: the alimental vision in 
Paradise Lost, 131-168. 
 In Paradise 
Lost such a statement is not made directly, but traducianism is an explicit result of the 
way the animate souls of paradise are represented, for their highest rational faculties are 
shown to be not just connected to, but a production of the lower faculties of body and 
333 Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, 102-107. 
334 CPW 6: 319. 
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spirit. This was an unusual solution. Traducianism, like antinomian excess or atheism 
itself, seems to have a much stronger presence in the writings of those who inveigh 
against it than in the work of anyone endorsing it. Very few authors make an outright 
statement of support; Jakob Boehme is one and the English translation of his Forty 
Question of the Soul states clearly: “the Soul is not every time newly created and 
breathed in, but is humanely propagated, as a Branch groweth out of a Tree; or as I may 
better render it, as a Man setteth Grain or soweth Corn, and so a Spirit and Body 
groweth or sprouteth out of it”.335 This declaration is one that the orthodox medical 
profession made about the grades of soul up to and including the sensitive soul and its 
instrument, the animal spirit. Willis, as well as lesser authors such as Charleton and 
Henry Power, proposes just such a model; Descartes too proposes a similar model, 
which retains the animal spirits while dispensing with the notion of the sensitive soul.336 
However, authors such as Henry More and Thomas Brown who treat traducianism as a 
reasonable theory (if not their own) are, just by doing this, taking arms against a sea of 
detractors.337
 
  
Browne’s rejection of traducianism is not religious, and he gently marks the 
excesses of the debates about generation, commenting: “I am not of Paracelsus minde, 
that boldly delivers a receipt to make a man without conjunction, yet cannot but wonder 
at the multitude of heads that doe deny traduction... either opinion will stand well 
enough with religion”.338
 
  Even authors such as John Webster and Thomas Vaughan, 
who clearly have radical agendas and interests in chymical transmutation, deny the 
possibility of traducian generation on the grounds of the immateriality of the highest 
level of ‘soul’. Webster states: 
Upon the supposition that the rational Soul be not ex traduce, but be 
infused after the bodily organs be fitted and prepared, which is the 
firm Tenent of all Divines Ancient, middle and Modern, and must 
upon the granting of it to be simply, and absolutely immaterial and 
incorporeal (which is indisputable) of necessity be infused, because no 
immaterial substance can be produced or generated by the motion of 
                                                            
335 Jacob Boehme. Forty Questions of the Soul concerning its Original, Essence, Substance, Nature or 
Quality, and Property, trans. John Sparrow (London, 1663), 182. 
336 See Charleton, Natural history of nutrition, 63; 140; 186; Willis, Two discourses, 22-42; Power, 
Experimental Philosophy, 60-70; see also Woolhouse, Chapter 8 ‘Descartes, Spinoza and Liebniz, and 
Thinking Substance’, 150-163. 
337 Browne, Religio Medici  69-70; Joseph Glanville Lux Orientalis  (London, 1662), 26. 
338 Browne, Religio Medici, 69-70. 
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any agent, that is meerly material, or forth of any material substance 
whatsoever.339
  
 
Vaughan (writing under the pseudonym Eugenius Philalethes) seems to allow for 
traducianism, in his meditation upon light in which he characteristically shifts between 
the notions of soul and holy light: 
 
They who maintain, that the Soul of Man is derived ex traduce, hold 
withall that the Father in begetting the sons Soul looses none of his 
own, it being tanquam Lumen de Lumine, as one Light from another: 
nay, more then so, it is the very resemblance that the Nicene Fathers 
thought not unmeet to express the unexpressible Generation of the 
second Person in the Trinity from the First; who is therefore termed by 
the Apostle The brightness of his Glory, Heb.1. 3.340
 
 
However, he declares later that it is held by “both Divines and Philosophers, that the 
reasonable Soul of Man is not converted into him by his Parents, but infused 
immediately by the Creatour... [thus] the inequality and disparity of actions, which they 
produce, arise from the diverse temper of the matter which they informe, and by which, 
as by an instrument they work.”341 In fact, as Michael Hunter has argued of atheism in 
the period, traducianism is constructed more by those who fear it and associate it with a 
number of political and theological implications, rather than by proponents of godless 
physic.342
 
 
Physic did, however, provide a certain weight of evidence for such heresies as 
traducianism and those who did propose it were often involved in medical practice, 
although Paracelsian doctors and empirics were often directly at odds with figures of 
university medicine such as Harvey, Glisson and Willis. Since transformation is given 
in Paradise Lost as digestion, I would like to begin by examining the way this process is 
underpinned by medical chymistry, which was, itself upon the brink of discovering acid 
digestion in the middle years of the seventeenth century. Using the model of vitalism 
that was developed in Chapter 3 I will re-read Milton’s body-soul composites and chart 
how the link between the lower grades of soul and the rational soul is represented, and 
how progressive contemporary medical theory is used to fulfil Milton’s traducian 
                                                            
339 John Webster, The displaying of supposed witchcraft (London, 1677), 319. 
340 Eugenius Philalethes, A brief natural history intermixed with variety of philosophical discourses and 
refutations of such vulgar errours as our modern authors have hitherto omitted (London, 1669), 36. 
341 Vaughan,  Brief Natural History, 95.  
342 Michael Hunter, ‘Science and heterodoxy: An early modern problem reconsidered’ in Reappraisals of 
the Scientific Revolution, ed. David C. Lindberg and Robert S. Westman (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 437-460. 
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statements in the Christian Doctrine.  The rational soul, in Aristotelian terms the nous, 
drawn from the metaphysical Aristotelian tradition is, I argue, re-imagined as part of a 
system which derives from Aristotle’s ‘scientific’ legacy. The same system of natural 
philosophy that substantiates the emergence of body out of spirit in Creation and 
conception is used to substantiate and order the emergence of sensitive and then rational 
spirit out of body. In this instance, the influence of chymical medicine is yet more 
apparent. The model of fermentation in medical vitalism that corresponds to and 
supports the natural philosophy of Creation can also embody and support the materiality 
of angelic digestion and the linkages between different degrees of spirit required by 
Milton’s traducianism. In section two I will elaborate on some of the implications of the 
specifically medical terms that are uncovered in section one. 
 
 
 
ii. Digestion and sublimation in the scala naturae 
 
The vital heat of Aristotle has been reinterpreted by both Milton and Glisson to 
be identified as both the cause and the product of chymical spirit. This combination of 
Aristotelian structure and categories radicalised by chymical theories of substance 
creates a broadly comparable natural philosophy in the two men’s work. Perhaps the 
most dramatic and prominent example of such a correlation in Milton’s natural 
philosophy is the version of the scale of nature described by Raphael for his human 
hosts.  
 
O Adam, one almighty is, from whom 
All things proceed, and up to him return, 
If not depraved from good, created all 
Such to perfection, one first matter all, 
Indued with various forms, various degrees 
Of substance, and in things that live, of life;  
But more refined, more spirituous, and pure, 
As nearer to him placed, or nearer tending 
Each in their several active spheres assigned, 
Till body up to spirit work, in bounds 
Proportioned to each kind. So from the root 
Springs lighter the green stalk, from thence the leaves 
More airy, last the bright consummate flower 
Spirits odorous breathes: flowers and their fruit 
Man’s nourishment, by gradual scale sublimed 
To vital spirits aspire, to animal, 
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To intellectual, give both life and sense, 
Fancy and understanding, whence the soul  
Reason receives, and reason is her being, 
Discursive, or intuitive; discourse 
Is oftest yours, the latter most is ours 
Differing but in degree, of kind the same.  
(PL 5. 468-490) 
 
It is a critical commonplace that this scale of nature described by Raphael is Aristotelian 
in origin, and we have already noted in Chapter 3 the profound similarity between this 
system and the system of vitalist natural philosophy developed by Francis Glisson. 
Rumrich, Fallon and, more recently, Diane McColley, all explore the material unity of 
this sequence, emphasising the dynamic, transformative character of this version of the 
scala naturae.343
 
 The one first matter here is transformed upwardly through the 
heretofore fixed Aristotelian system of species, with matter, body and material form 
itself becoming ever more spirituous and perfect on a scale that links the unimaginable 
chaos of unformed matter with both the rational soul and their common divine origin 
and end. The simultaneous upwardness and circularity of this process is exquisitely 
rendered in Adam’s response, with his immediate comprehension that Raphael has 
depicted a “scale of nature set / From centre to circumference, whereon / In 
contemplation of created things / By steps we may ascend to God” (PL 5. 509-12).  
The sources and implications of the “one first matter all” sequence are many 
and complex and it has received much critical consideration. The focus of my proposal, 
however, is upon two particular questions, one of which concerns the precise nature or 
process of the new dynamism that Milton proposes: essentially, how does this 
transformation happen? While the demarcating bounds and spheres are Aristotelian, the 
dynamism noted and explored by critics is, as in contemporary medical theory, the 
chymical process of sublimation. These references to alchemical theory and practice 
have been noted before, as have Milton’s silence on natural spirits and additional 
category of intellectual spirits, but I would like to examine the process of sublimation in 
the model of a vitalist body-soul composite (and, later, in the positioning of the angels 
in relation to humans) with its medical significance at the forefront of this analysis. The 
other question concerns the precise quality of the different levels of substance. Where 
we have found prime matter and the different ontological categories of the Creation 
                                                            
343 Rumrich, Matter of Glory, 61-69; Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, 102-7; McColley, Poetry 
and Ecology in the Age of Milton, 121-5. 
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(spirit, light, matter) to be responsive, to show activity, percipience and appetite, which 
are the defining features of vitalist matter in the Creation, Raphael seems to imply here 
that while the spheres are active, life is a quality of living things only. What then are the 
‘degrees of substance’? Is this a vitalist model, or is it simply a model in which the 
lower orders of substance are active, rather than vital? Mechanist experimental 
philosophers and physicians of the period were not, as John Henry shows, averse to 
proposing active matter and they managed to navigate the potentially treacherous 
theological implications by declaring a voluntarist position (which itself neutralised 
some of the deist implications that were emerging from the mechanist hypothesis).344
 
 
However, voluntarism sits well neither with Milton’s Arminianism, nor with his 
fundamental concern with free will. Furthermore, mechanists also managed to combine 
their radical notions of active matter with a clear dualism between their theories of the 
body and the rational soul; Milton, on the contrary, takes a clear traducian position in 
which the rational soul is produced by the material interactions of the body’s fluids and 
spirits. For this chapter I will concentrate primarily upon the similarities of the body-
soul models, observing only briefly some of the differences in what it is that transforms, 
while noting the similarities in the mode of transformation. 
Raphael’s famous speech is undoubtedly a pivotal moment of learning for 
Adam and Eve; it paints a picture of the mind/body relation that is primarily biological 
in comparison to the one that Adam has already intuited, where, in the soul: 
 
Are many lesser faculties that serve 
Reason as chief; among these fancy next 
Her office holds; of all external things, 
Which the five watchful senses represent, 
She forms imaginations, airy shapes, 
Which reason joining or disjoining, frames 
All what we affirm or what deny, and call 
Our knowledge or opinion.  
(PL 5. 101-8) 
 
Not only does this process enable us to order sensory input, it incorporates moral 
ordering as well. Adam famously follows this meditation with the statement: “Evil into 
the mind of god or man / May come and go, so unapproved, and leave / No spot or 
blame behind” (PL 5. 117-9). Fowler notes the sequence on the faculties of the soul as 
                                                            
344John Henry, ‘Occult Qualities and the Experimental Philosophy: Active Principles in pre-Newtonian 
Matter Theory’, History of Science, 24 (1986), 335-81.  
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“common knowledge,” but it also corresponds to specialist medical knowledge of the 
period. Thomas Willis, Sedleian Professor of Natural Philosophy at Oxford (1660-75), 
is a significant figure in the history of neuro-anatomy. His De anima brutorum 
describes the relation between reason, the senses and the imagination thus: 
 
The Knowing Faculty of the Corporeal Soul is Phantasie or 
Imagination, which being planted in the middle part of the Brain, 
receives the Sensible Species, first only impressed on the Organs of 
sense, and from thence by a most quick Irradiation of the spirits 
delivered inwards, and so apprehends all the several corporeal things, 
according to their Exterior Appearances.345
 
 
Willis is difficult to place in the context of contemporary medical factions; an 
iatrochemist, he also made use of the mechanical philosophy and declared a strident 
dualism between the rational soul and the sensitive soul.346
 
 Nevertheless, his atomist 
theory of substance proposes active atoms, which have motion if not intention and 
appetite, and he even seems to imply a certain vitalism on occasion; we shall explore 
aspects of his model of the soul in more detail in the next section on fallenness and 
dualism. For now we can note that here the fancy is the first destination of sensory 
impressions, but these are unreliable, since: “we Imagine the Sun no bigger than a 
Bushel, the Horizon of the Heaven and the Sea to meet, and then the Stars not to be far 
distant from us in the Horizon” and the intellect must work these ‘airy shapes’ into 
order: 
the Intellect presiding o're the Imagination, beholds all the Species 
deposited in it self, discerns and corrects their obliquities or 
hypocrisies the Phantasie there drawn forth sublimes, and divesting it 
from matter formes universal things from singulars;  moreover, it 
frames out of these some other more sublime Thoughts, not 
Competent for the Corporeal Soul.347
 
 
The relation of the particular sensory information to the universal rational is a marker of 
the Aristotelian heritage that Willis shares with his contemporaries. This model clearly 
conforms to that offered by Adam to Eve before his lessons in natural philosophy from 
Raphael, where the imagination serves the intellect. However, Willis also touches upon 
                                                            
345 Willis, Two discourses, 38. 
346 In the preface Willis declares: “the ends and bounds of the aforesaid Corporeal Soul being defined, the 
Rational Soul, Superior and Immaterial, may be sufficiently differenced from it; nor is that Argument 
admitted so easily, confounding them together, whereby some deserving very ill of themselves, have 
affirmed the Souls of Man and the Beasts only to differ in degrees of Perfection; and so that either alike 
must be either Mortal or Immortal, and alike propagated ex traduce” (Two Discourses, 1). 
347 Willis, Two discourses, 38-9. 
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Raphael’s addition given to this model when he imagines the information of the animal 
spirits to be ‘sublimed’ by the fantasy to the intellect. The intellect then ‘frames out of 
these some other more sublime thoughts’. In Adam’s model the link between the 
imagination and reason is simply one of service; in Raphael’s model the bodily spirits 
give life (vital spirits), sense, fancy (animal spirits) and understanding (intellectual 
spirits), and it is out of these material phenomena that the soul receives reason itself, the 
traditionally immaterial aspect of soul. This is the basis and functional model of 
Milton’s traducian heresy, since the rational soul is itself produced from the lower 
orders of spirit and substance. The connection between these levels is the process of 
sublimation. Willis’s model describes something very similar in relational structure, 
with the proviso that the shift between the animal spirits of the sensitive soul and the 
ratiocination of the intellect is a meeting point of material and immaterial phenomena 
and reason itself acts upon the sensory information of the lower orders rather than being 
produced from them. 
 
I suggest that in Willis’s work this is one of the moments in which the notion 
of ‘subliming’ begins the shift from its chymical origin to its modern literary and 
psychological set of meanings. Willis is quite clear that the shift from the animal spirits 
to the rational soul must be a leap from the material to the immaterial, but in this 
process the terminology has to change its meaning, too. To ‘sublime’ begins to shift 
towards ‘the sublime’ of the Enlightenment and, more pointedly, toward the 
psychological ‘sublimation’ of Freud that will follow. Nevertheless, Willis’s use of the 
notion of sublimation remains fundamentally chymical; his tract on fermentation of 
1659 begins by declaring, “all Bodies... consist of Spirit, Sulphur, Salt, Water, and 
Earth, and from the diverse motion, and proportion of these, in mixt things, the 
beginnings and endings of things, and chiefly the reasons, and varieties of Fermentation, 
are to be sought”.348
 
 His account of the relation between the imagination and the 
rational faculty is structured similarly to that suggested by Adam; the detail that it adds 
in the action of the spirits matches the information that Raphael will add to the model 
intuited by Adam. Spirits act through a process of subliming. 
                                                            
348 Willis, Of fermentation,  2. 
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Sublimation is the central bio-mechanism offered by Raphael to Adam and Eve 
in his sketch of the transformative body-soul composite, but it is a slippery word.349 In 
chymical terms it means a process of purifying a compound substance through heat, 
whereby the purest element is extracted in the change from a solid state to a vaporous 
state, with distillation the comparable process for liquids or solids dissolved in solvents; 
the various different sediments are collected from the lower and upper portions of an 
alembic, the vessel designed for precisely this use. This is the process described by 
Boyle and Willis, as we shall see. Newman notes that while alchemists did make a 
distinction between distillation and sublimation, “they were not as fastidious as modern 
chemists… [and] frequently speak of liquids, such as mercury, subliming.”350 Indeed in 
Anatomia hepatis Glisson notes, “Separations of Elements are made by distillation, 
which may also be referred sublimation.”351
 
 Although today the notion of distilling may 
invoke more clearly than subliming ideas of purification and the extraction of a 
powerful essence (not least through the idea of the distillation of alcoholic spirits), in 
contemporary usage the terms are much closer.  
Adam’s understanding of his body-soul composition shifts and grows through 
the poem. Raphael’s lessons are the main source for the first expansion of his 
comprehension, and one of the additions Raphael makes is that the linkage between the 
different levels is not simply that of service, but that of sublimation. Experimental work 
was being done through the years in which Paradise Lost was written to try to 
understand and perhaps even replicate in the laboratory the natural chymical motions of 
the blood. Boyle’s character Carneades notes of the artificial distillation of human blood 
that different strengths of fire cause differing separations. He continues: 
 
If into a red-hot earthen or iron retort you cast the matter to be 
distilled, you may observe... that the predominant fire will carry up all 
the volatile elements confusedly in one fume, which will afterwards 
take their places in the receiver, either according to the degree of their 
gravity, or according to the exigency of their respective textures.352
 
 
                                                            
349 The word “sublime” also retains in Paradise Lost its straightforward sense of raised height; as Satan 
emerges upwards from chaos and coasts the edge of heaven that is shadowed by night, he flies “In the dun 
air sublime” (PL 3. 72). Nevertheless, following an investigation of the OED I also suspect a Latin pun on 
the sense of being below heaven’s threshold, sub-limen, and maybe a further reference to Satan’s 
tendency to fly on the oblique angle in limus. This fits with the tendency Satan has to look initially 
impressive, but in actuality or detail (Satan’s sublime motion being also in relation to God’s immense 
Empyrean height) to be much less so. 
350 Newman, Atoms and Alchemy, xiii. With Newman I adopt the contemporary usage. 
351 Anatomia hepatis, 69.  
352 Boyle, The Sceptical Chymist, 55.  
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Willis too notes that artificially applying the ‘philosophy of fire’ to the blood results in 
imperfect results. His search in this sequence is for the quality of the transformative 
agent that he imagines as a form of fire, but he, like many medical figures, concludes 
that the terrestrial fire familiar to us is not the generative heat of the body, but is more 
akin to chymical spirit: 
 
 neither by heat put to it [the blood], nor by reason of Salts and 
Sulphurs, which are Corrosives of a divers Kind being put together, 
can the blood be made to boyl; wherefore it follows, that it is 
inkindled like the spirit of Wine, and so as it were flames forth and 
boyls up. Further we shewed, that it is truly inkindled in hot living 
Creatures, because the proper Passions of Fire and Flame, are found 
only besides in the Life of the Blood; for in like manner both to this, 
and to them, there is need constantly of an Internal Sulphureous Food, 
together with the External nitrous... this is not visible and destructive 
as the common Flame, but as it is Subordinate to the Corporeal Soul, 
as to a Superiour Form, it admitting a proper Species, and serving to 
the uses of Nature, destinated by the Creator, silently burns with a 
gentle and friendly heat.353
 
 
This gentle and friendly heat is shortly afterwards identified with ethereal heat, and the 
animal spirits will be sublimed out of the vital as light is emitted from fire. Willis, like 
Glisson, combines his Aristotelian legacy with chymical transformation, imagining the 
brain as an alembic: 
 
it seems to me that the Brain with Scull over it, and the appending 
Nerves, represent the little Head or Glassie Alembic, with a Spunge 
laid upon it, as we use to do for the highly rectifying of the Spirit of 
Wine: for truly the Blood when Rarified by Heat, is carried from the 
Chimny of the Heart, to the Head, even as the Spirit of Wine boyling 
in the Cucurbit, and being resolved into Vapour, is elevated into the 
Alembic; where the Spunge covering all the opening of the Hole, only 
transmits or suffers to pass though the more penetrating and very 
subtil Spirits, and carries them to the snout of the Alembic: in the 
mean time, the more thick Particles are stayed, and hindred from 
passing.354
 
 
The ‘subliming’ bodily substance was a popular notion among leading physicians and 
natural philosophers of the 1650s in a tradition of knowledge that was fast being 
radicalised by chymistry. The questions and questionable reputation that dogged 
practitioners of artificial transmutation compared to a perfect mysterious natural 
                                                            
353Willis, Two discourses, 22.  
354Willis, Of fermentation, 12-13.  
143 
 
transmutation of the animate body clearly emerge in Paradise Lost, in which 
postlapsarian artifice is a shadowy type of the natural exaltations of body and spirit. 
 
Processes of chymical transformation therefore characterise the living 
body/soul composites of unfallen paradise. Indeed the whole ‘ecosystem’ of paradise 
relies upon the logic of transformative substance; however, as Michael Lieb has pointed 
out, there is a distinct dichotomy between the treatment of artful and natural chymical 
transformation in Paradise Lost. Milton’s references to human attempts at alchemy are 
always qualified with scepticism if not with condemnation. The alembic is mentioned as 
part of the shadowy world of the alchemist in Book 3 of Paradise Lost, in which the 
search for the lapis philosophorum contrasts unfavourably with the magisterial natural 
chemical power of the sun. The stone found in abundance on the surface of the sun is: 
 
                     that which here below  
Philosophers in vain so long have sought, 
In vain, though by their powerful Art they bind 
Volatile Hermes, and call up unbound 
In various shapes old Proteus from the Sea, 
Drained through a Limbec to his Native form 
(PL 3. 600-605) 
 
The ‘limbec’ is the alembic here and ‘volatile Hermes’ and ‘old Proteus’ stand for 
volatile mercury and matter respectively. The native form of matter would be the first 
matter, as pure as that which God provided at the Creation (in Helmontian terms this 
would be water, in the Paracelsian tradition the tri prima of mercury, sulphur and salt; 
the prime matter of medical chymistry would be ‘perfect’ substances such as semen, 
nutritive juice or the colliquament of the egg).355
 
 Despite the description of the art as 
powerful, the repetition of the phrase ‘in vain’ gives no doubt as to the poet’s unbelief 
in the power of earthly alchemy to discover the lapis thus far. Despite his extensive use 
of chymical research and concepts, Glisson too rejects the medical efficacy of those 
who claim to have discovered a universal agent of transmutation:  
Chemists boast of being able to prepare the philosophical stone, says 
Glisson, and they claim that many philosophers, such as “Hermes, 
Raymond Lull, Paracelsus, and I know not who” were in possession of 
this stone. But then -- Glisson wonders using the classic argument -- 
how could it be that they themselves did not manage to keep immune 
                                                            
355 Pagel, Van Helmont, 49; Debus, Chemical Philosophy, 226-9.  
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from diseases, to delay old age, and prolong the natural limits of 
life?356
 
  
The argument for the efficacy of the lapis is discounted by both the doctor and the poet; 
for Milton, human attempts at alchemical art are distinctly fallen types of the endless 
natural transformations of unfallen paradise. The overarching natural chymical power of 
the sun contains on its surface something that equates to the stone itself and its influence 
is fundamental to all life; it is the light of sun and moon. These “two great sexes 
animate the world” in Raphael’s speech on the appetite for knowledge (PL 8. 151).  
 
Lieb points out that in alchemical tradition this relation is mythologised 
between the sublunar and astral levels: “the sun (Sol), the natural alchemist, is 
traditionally an alchemical symbol of gold whose ‘marriage’ or cohabitation with the 
moon (Luna), the alchemical symbol of silver, generates the Philosopher’s Stone.”357
 
                                               nor seemingly 
 
However, the human (and demonic) efforts to transform substance in Paradise Lost 
belie the mystical aspirations common in writers such as Fludd and Paracelsus, leaving 
them looking instead cheap, pallid or outright dangerous. When angelic digestion is 
described, the shadowy earthly type is that of alchemy, with its sooty coal fire and the 
labour of the ‘empiric alchemist’: 
The angel, nor in mist, the common gloss 
Of theologians, but with keen dispatch 
Of real hunger, and concoctive heate 
To transubstantiate; what redounds, transpires 
Through spirits with ease; nor wonder; if by fire 
Of sooty coal the empiric alchemist 
Can turn, or holds it possible to turn 
Metals of drossiest ore to perfect gold 
As from the mine.  
(PL, 5, 435-443).  
 
In 1633 Daniel Sennert had defended the transmutation of metals with the example of 
the bodily transmutation of substance in digestion.358
                                                            
356Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 121-2 Giglioni cites MS 
Sloane 3310, f. 320v; Sloane 3310, f. 133r. 
 Milton makes the same 
comparison and although human effort is not dismissed, it is not given the unqualified 
validation accorded to the sublimation of the natural philosophy of unfallen paradise. 
Stanton J. Linden observes that the angel’s digestion is “imaged with great vividness 
357Lieb, Dialectics of Creation, 234. 
358 Debus, Chemical Philosophy, 195. 
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and precision in the metaphor of alchemical transmutation.”359
 
 I, however, follow 
Fallon, Lieb and Scheonfeldt in suggesting that this comparison is more than a 
metaphor; the relation between the two processes is closer than the metaphorical, or 
even the typological. It is, rather, a matter of degree. 
Degree, in Paradise Lost, is what separates human substance from thought and 
ultimately from the angels. Fallon delineates clearly the difference between Milton’s 
angels and not only the traditionally immaterial scholastic angels, but the more 
equivocal ontological status of the angels of Henry More.360 These, like the angels of 
the Platonist tradition, are essentially “souls lodged in attenuated bodies”361
 
 unlike those 
of Paradise Lost, who clearly consist of active similary substance, and are not reliant 
upon organs for their sensory experience: 
All heart they live, all head, all eye, all ear, 
All intellect, all sense, and as they please, 
They limb themselves, and colour, shape or size 
Assume, as likes them best, condense or rare  
(PL 6. 350-353) 
 
An important differentiation has been added to Fallon’s work by Phillip Donnelly, who 
notes that material and corporeal are in fact different ontological states.362
 
 Spirit can be 
material without having what we have been referring to as organic form, but the 
corporeal must refer to a material body that is, in some way formed. Thus, although the 
angels do seem to have a ‘proper shape’ it is not final or functional, like form: their 
ethereal substance can be material without being corporeal. Having a proper shape is not 
the same as relying upon the mechanism of organs for the processes of life. This 
differentiation is precisely that which is made in medical discourse between similary 
and organic substances, and it is central to the question I am asking about how corporeal 
substance can ‘to incorporeal turn’. Milton’s consuming angels illustrate the necessity 
for digestion to work through the activity of inorganic substance. 
Angelic biology is significant in part because it is (a higher) part of the same 
scale of nature that includes the visible creation and Adam and Eve themselves. Joad 
                                                            
359 Stanton J. Linden, ‘”By Gradual Scale Sublim’d”: Jean D’Espagnet and the Ontological Tree in 
Paradise Lost Book V’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 52. 4 (1991), 603-615, 607. 
360 See Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, chapter  5 ‘The Substance of Epic Angels’, 137-167. 
361Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, 157. 
362 Phillip J. Donnelly ‘“Matter” versus Body: The Character of Milton’s Monism’ in Milton Quarterly 
33. 3 (1999), 79-85. 
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Raymond has recently proposed that the use of angels in contemporary narrative (and 
particularly Milton’s angels, given his concern with truth in his epic) enables the 
depiction of an imagined reality that occupies a nevertheless non-fictional position as 
opposed to literary modes such as allegory or metaphor.363
 
 My study seeks to elaborate 
upon this intersection of imaginative representation with proposed literalism in the 
‘science’ of angelic and human spirit. Milton takes considerable pains to emphasise the 
physical reality of the angel’s need for food and the process of digestion, and he 
proposes the process in terms of comparable processes, rather than as a figurative 
comparison: no wonder the one thing can happen given that the other does. When talk 
of the art of alchemy comes up, Raphael has, of course, already made it clear that his 
digestion is a biological process rather than a mystery or a matter of illusory social 
graces, explaining to Adam that 
                 food alike those pure 
Intelligential substances require 
As doth your rational; and both contain 
Within them every lower faculty 
Of sense, whereby they hear, see, smell, touch, taste, 
Tasting concoct, digest assimilate, 
And corporeal to incorporeal turn.  
(PL 5. 407-413) 
 
Concoction is an Aristotelian concept, but the digestive transformation of the formed 
(corporeal) into the unformed (incorporeal) is not. The insistence on the part of both 
angel and poet that a transubstantiation is effected from fruit to spirit without digestive 
organs requires a closer examination. Through these references to alchemy and 
particularly through the use of some key words such as ‘sublime’ and ‘odour’, there are 
signs of exactly what sort of transformative power is imagined in Paradise Lost within 
the animate human and angelic beings and in the wider natural philosophy of the created 
world. We have a number of key facts about digestion: in humans it is a sublimation of 
food with lower levels of bodily spirit and matter joining and separating and ultimately 
effecting a transformation into lighter, more volatile and active degrees of matter. This 
process is matched by the transformations of natural philosophy that characterise 
unfallen paradise, where the motions of plants and flowers participate in this ascension. 
In angels it is a comparable process but, somewhat oddly, it is characterised twice by 
the more traditional Aristotelian notion of ‘concoction’; finally, there are waste products 
                                                            
363Joad Raymond, Milton’s Angels: The Early-Modern Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 169-88. 
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but they are easily excreted through a process of ‘transpiration’. Both processes have, at 
their summit, the transformation not of food into bodily organ (although this must 
constitute a lower level of human digestion) but a movement from body into spirit. The 
angel’s incorporeal body must use a purely similary digestion to transform the corporeal 
directly into the incorporeal: the gradual scale of sublimation in the human process may 
– with obedience to God – turn their corporeal bodies, at last, all to incorporeal spirit.364
 
  
This system of biological transubstantiation is clearly Aristotelian in its 
“concoction” but it relies on the action of what can only, in the angel at least, be 
similary, inorganic substance. Glisson’s writings on nutrition and digestion, as we shall 
see, focus upon the interactions of fluid and spirit within the body, giving a model 
amenable to the transformation of similary substance. This model parallels precisely the 
accounts of natural transformation in Paradise Lost.  
 
the inborn spirits which, irradiated by the vital heat, gradually strive to 
spread and extend the limits of their power by attracting, retaining, 
assimilating the food that is similar to them, by separating the 
excrements and finally placing what has been acquired in the 
appropriate places. This tendency (nixus), which is the essence of 
heat, since it is diffusive, dissipates and wastes the inborn spirits 
which, for this reason, are commonly said to be the original moisture 
in its being continuously fed upon by the heat. 365
 
 
The actions of this process all take place among similary spirit and thicker matter. Paré, 
in contrast, describes a traditional model of digestion whereby the emphasis is on the 
transformation of crude matter and bodily fluid into the organic parts of the body. In the 
section which deals with “the Naturall faculty which hath chosen its principall seate in 
the Liver” he subdivides nutrition into four “other faculties, which as servants attend 
upon the nourishing faculty; which are the Attractive, Retentive, Digestive, and 
Expulsive.”366
 
 These faculties work thus: 
The Attractive [faculty] drawes that juice which is fit to nourish the 
body, that I say which by application may be assimulated to the part. 
This is that faculty which in such as are hungry drawes downe the 
                                                            
364 The doctrinal implications are emphasised with the key work ‘transubstantiate’; the unfallen language 
of paradise may accommodate fallen words such as wanton, but the religious implications of 
transubstantiation cannot be taken as without significance. The Catholic mystery is a universal fact of the 
body in paradise. See Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves, 140. 
365Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 78. Giglioni cites De 
Rachitide, 41-42; 92-93; also MS Sloane 3308, f. 278. 
366 Paré, Workes, 22. 
148 
 
meat scarse chawed, and the drinke scarse tasted, into the gnawing 
and empty stromacke. The Rententive faculty is that which retaines 
the nourishment once attracted untill it be fully laboured and perfectly 
concocted; And by that meanes it yeelds no small assistance to the 
Digestive faculty. For the naturall  heat cannot performe the office of 
concoction, unlesse the meat be embraced by the part, and make some 
stay therein.367
 
 
We can pause to notice the attractive faculty here; this is the model which drew ire from 
mechanists such as Glanville and Charleton (in his later works) for the occult nature of 
its action. The simple correlation of the action of the organic body that gulps its food 
with ravenous hunger and the assimilative action of the organs to attract nutritious chyle 
within this body was no longer satisfactory to the experimental model of knowledge that 
had begun to prevail; it offered no comprehensible bio-mechanical schema that could be 
demonstrated. The digestion itself, that is, the transformation of swallowed food into the 
chyle, is imagined by Paré in terms of the action of simple heat: 
 
The Digestive faculty assimulates the nourishment, being attracted 
and detained, into the substance of that part whose Faculty it is, by the 
force of the inbred heate & proper disposition or temper of the part. So 
the stomacke plainely changes all things which are eat and drunke into 
Chylus, & the Liver turnes the Chylus into blood... if it happen those 
faculties do rightly performe their duty, the nourishment is changed 
into the proper substance of the part, and is truly assimulated.368
 
 
We know that it is precisely this assertion that the liver sanguifies the chyle, making the 
venous blood, that Glisson overturned with anatomical, experimental evidence in 
Anatomia hepatis. It is therefore not surprising that there are some distinct differences 
between this model of digestion and that offered by Glisson. In an academic 
determinatio, Glisson seems to repeat the sort of model proposed by Paré, which 
associates assimilation and attraction: “The nutritive humors are drawn to the parts to be 
nourished in such a way that the humors are attracted to what is similar to them. Hence 
a part of the juice is carried to the fatty parts, another to the bones, another to the 
tendons and ligaments, another to the brain, another to the vitreous humor.”369
                                                            
367Paré, Workes, 22. 
 We 
should, however, remember that Glisson’s notion of attraction is that of the chymical 
philosophers; there is a bio-mechanism by which this attraction impels itself and it can 
be demonstrated by the action of substances in chymical transformations. Like Milton 
368Paré, Workes, 22-3.  
369 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 90. Giglioni cites MS 
Sloane 3309, f. 57r; also 3309, f. 246r. 
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he argues from the sensible evidence of the imperfect art of the laboratory to the theory 
of the body’s natural transformations. The process is similary and the impulsion relies 
upon the activity of material spirits, both those in food and those in the body already, 
and their reactions to each other. 
 
In Anatomia hepatis, Glisson argues that the transformation of the chyle into 
blood arises not from a process of separation, as happens in excretory processes and the 
action of the liver, but from a process of volatilisation through which the natural spirit is 
changed into vital spirit.370
 
 Giglioni summarises the vital economy of the body thus: 
the transformation of the fixed spirits of food into the volatile spirits 
of the vital blood occurs through three main stages connected to the 
processes of nutrition and circulation of the blood: spirits are initially 
fixed (when they are closely entangled with the other elements [of the 
food]), then melted (through a process of ripening or fermentation) 
and, finally, they become volatile (when they are completely exalted) 
and transformed partly into the vital spirits of the blood and partly into 
the animal spirits of the nutritive juice. As a whole, the process of 
nutrition is described as a change of the nutriment from the state of 
undigested food (cruditas) to that of its digestion (coctio), that is, a 
process of increasing volatilization of the spirits toward a greater 
degree of activity.371
 
 
 
The heart is the location of the chymical reaction which endows the blood with its vital 
power, but the reactions all happen within and between different degrees of matter and 
spirit in the ‘mixt’ of bodily substances. It is worth repeating here that it is an unusual 
and distinctively ‘modern’ materialism to have the active vitalising process located in 
the blood. Mechanist physicians such as Willis, Charleton and Power all relied heavily 
on this model of the active blood and, like the bodies they describe, Milton’s Eve has 
animal spirits exhaling directly from her blood rather than the organic centres of the 
heart (Aristotle) or the rete mirabile (Galen). Later we will examine the mechanist 
versions of this chymical process, and its relevance to contemporary ideas of the soul, 
but for now we can differentiate clearly between the ancient version of digestion that 
had lasted for so long and the innovations brought about by chymical experimentalism.  
                                                            
370 Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 124-5. 
371 Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 125-6. Giglioni cites Anatomia hepatis,  
287; 376; 326; 339-341; also De ventriculo, 233. Glisson spent much effort developing the notion first 
proposed by George Ent, that the pure and delicate substance of the nutritive juice must travel through the 
nerves with the animal spirits, rather than being part of the turbulent vital economy of the blood; the 
evidence is against Milton using this aspect of the model of the body, nevertheless, it belongs to the sort 
of radical revision of ontological categories that characterises vitalist materialism. 
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While Glisson was extremely heretical in his vitalist natural philosophy, his 
work in all areas is inclusive rather than engaging in the combat of different factions. In 
his lecture on the anatomy of the inner parts of the stomach, Glisson notes that “coction 
is made by means of fermentation.”372 So when Raphael talks of concoction in his 
explanation of digestion, there is, as with Willis, a medical precedent for Milton’s 
inclusive terminology. Moreover, in this lecture Glisson also notes how fat in the 
stomach serves to “foment and warm the ventricle and the guts and so help their 
digestion” even while noting that the vital organs (heart and lungs) require a membrane 
to protect them from the “fumes of the meat and drink fermenting in the stomach.”373
 
 
The warmth that characterises Galenic concoction is still a factor in the newer theory of 
fermentation, so Milton’s use of both influences on the body’s digestion is genuinely 
medical. The differences between the old and new models are, however, clear. Where 
Paré proposed a Galenic bodily suction of hunger and associated it with the body’s 
suction of suitable nutrition in the organs, Glisson elaborates and revises the original 
thesis, reducing the ‘hunger’ of the organ down to the mimina naturalia of the 
chymistry of the body. Instead of the organic suction of the ventricle or stomach, 
Glisson argues for hunger as 
suction such as may be made by the matter contained in the ventricle, 
towit for that raking or gnawing of the inner coat made by the acid 
humours it contains (which in some sort may be styled a suction, as 
being an endeavour to draw or suck out the tinctures of the said coat) 
then, I say, Galen’s sensus suctionis may so far be admitted. For acid 
humours are always predatory and apt to extract or suck out the 
tinctures of bodies next [to] them; wherefore there being nothing next 
[to] the acid relicts of the ventricle but its inner coat, these acid relicts 
must endeavour to draw out  the tincture of that coat. Of this kind of 
suction (though it be improperly so called, and though, perchance it 
was not intended by Galen, yet there being no other in the ventricle), I 
say of this kind of suction we must understand him, or else totally 
reject this expression of his.374
 
 
This suction relies upon the active nature of the body’s fluids and spirits, rather than 
organic activity or mechanist logic; it can, without doubt, be a ‘scientific’ basis for the 
incorporeal spiritual assimilation of the eating angel. There is no doubt that Glisson has 
adopted the chymical theories of Van Helmont in his theory of digestion. The discovery 
                                                            
372Glisson, Six Anatomical Lectures, 81. 
373 Glisson, Six Anatomical Lectures, 73. 
374Glisson, Six Anatomical Lectures, 95.  
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of the action of the acid quality of the stomach’s digestion that replaced the ancient 
notions of heat and concoction emerged from his work: “it had escaped the Galenists 
that cooking fails to interfere with the ground-structure of the tissue, by contrast with 
digestion, which does: for the latter is transmutation, a profound change which heat 
even of the highest degree could never bring about.”375 We already know that it is a 
feature of the chymical ferment to be acid in nature; it was, then, through the 
discrimination and volatilisation of active matter and degrees of spirit that we have 
examined already that a chymical ferment would do the transformative work of the 
digestion. This acid ferment will bring us back to Milton and the body-soul composites, 
for an acid ferment effects, in the works of the chymists, a sublimation of the most 
active elements of a substance. In medical chymistry, “gastric acid has to fulfil the 
vitally important task of separating the pure from the harmful in the stomach.”376
 
 The 
echoes between the activities of the contemporary conscience and the matter of the body 
are, again, clear and this process is a key to the genuinely monist combination of body 
and soul that Milton makes. 
Let us then build a picture of precisely how the borrowings from chymistry 
contribute to the scala naturae described by Raphael. The most conspicuously chymical 
term is that of sublimation. Man’s nourishment is transformed through sublimation of 
the bodily spirit, sublimation transforms the food we eat (in unfallen paradise there is 
fruit of sufficient variety to live and eat well) into vital spirit, about which we now have 
a lot of information. Vital spirit reproduces and expands itself in a motion through 
which the suitable natural spirits become more volatile and expansive; some thicker 
elements will not be assimilated and in this struggle the vital heat is produced.377
                                                            
375 Pagel, Van Helmont, 130. 
  While 
the implication is that this transformative sublimation functions throughout the creation, 
the term itself is sited directly in the passage that deals with the transformations of the 
animate human body. The system of fermentation is one whereby solid, corporeal food 
376 Pagel, Van Helmont, 136.  
377 Vital spirit ‘aspires’ to the greater rarefaction and active perfection of animal spirit, but the word 
‘aspire’ has both negative and positive connotation in Milton’s work. Satan ‘aspires’ to raise himself 
further above his ‘bad eminence’ in Books 1 and 2: Adam criticises Nimrod for similar aspiration (PL 12. 
64). Aspiration has a positive religious aspect, however, in Comus, (12) and in stanza 9 of On the Death 
of a Fair Infant Dying of a Cough. In Paradise Regain’d the dual aspect of ‘aspiration’ is interrogated as 
Satan questions Jesus as to how he will fulfil his kingship in a stratified world in which he is only a 
carpenter’s son: “A Carpenter thy Father known, thy self / Bred up in poverty and streights at home; / 
Lost in a Desert here and hunger-bit: / Which way or from what hope dost thou aspire / To greatness?” 
(PR 2.414-418). Jesus’ answer clarifies this oscillation of meaning, fixing holy aspiration to do God’s will 
as the positive aspect and the aspiration to overcome God’s will as the negative.  
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can be ingested and acted upon by superior levels of spirit; the form is broken down and 
the thicker substance and fixed spirits of the food are volatilised and assimilated to the 
higher order of vital spirit which acts upon it. The food is thus transformed into chyle, 
which can be volatilised further into either (sanguine) vital or (sensitive) animal spirits. 
This, I argue, is a system of bodily spirit that can substantiate Milton’s assertion that the 
rational soul emerges from the individual body, rather than being infused by God into 
the foetus. If the power of the chymical ferment works to volatilise and perfect all 
different grades and degrees of matter up to and including the animal spirits of the 
sensitive soul, why, rather than stopping, or leaping mysteriously from material to 
immaterial realms, should it not continue with its “exaltation,” especially since Milton 
has added to the system his own innovation of intellectual spirits? 
 
The innovation in Raphael’s system of subliming spirit and matter that 
immediately invites comment is the invention of a new sort of bodily spirit: intellectual 
spirits. Critics have noted that this is Milton’s central connecting point between the 
lower faculties and the traditionally immaterial rational soul, but I am not aware of any 
critical explanation of how this process happens, beyond the observation that the 
process is one of digestion. The ongoing upward motion of transformative spirit 
sublimes into the realm of the nous, making, in Willis’s work, a leap from one category 
to the next and in Milton’s work, making a dynamic ontological scale. In this model of 
sublimation the higher, more volatile, active spirit tries to assimilate the next level down 
up to its own purer and more rarefied level. This is, in Glisson’s early work, in part a 
seduction and in part an act of aggression; we have only to think the Holy Sonnets of 
Donne to remind us that spiritual life was regularly conceived as such, sometimes in the 
most dramatic of terms. Fallenness will bring a new set of relationships between 
subliming substances; as we shall see, that which does not assimilate has a different fate 
before the Fall than it does after, but for the time being I will focus on identifying the 
scientific basis of the process in the unfallen entity.  
 
In order to make further sense of the conceptual leap that joins one dualist 
category to the other in Paradise Lost, I would like to turn from the upper reaches of the 
intellectual spirits (we will return to them) and draw attention to the initial stages of the 
process and another, rather less dramatic discrepancy from the traditional model: the 
exclusion of the lowest order of spirits, the natural or vegetative spirits. We cannot 
doubt the significance of the fact that Milton’s angel proposes a new degree of bodily 
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spirit altogether, but neither should we underestimate the significance of the exclusion 
of the natural spirits, the very order of spirits that should indicate an interest in the early 
stages of medical vitalism. Glisson’s early interest in the similary substance of the body 
is expressed in De rachitude as a fascination with the natural constitution and the 
body’s vegetative functions; however, natural spirits are precisely what have 
disappeared from the scala naturae described by Raphael. I suggest, in this case, that 
the vitalism represented in Paradise Lost is at a more sophisticated stage than that of 
Glisson’s early work; indeed, it seems likely that this particular revision emerges 
directly out of the chymical tradition that was, in the work of Van Helmont, a dualist 
philosophy, but which gave so much to contemporary materialism.378
  
 If we look again, 
there are spirits in the vegetation that Adam and Eve eat: they are not labelled ‘natural’ 
or ‘vegetative’, but they are present as the ‘spirits odorous’ breathed by the flowers 
shortly before they are eaten. 
 
 
iii. A wilderness of sweets: odour in paradise 
 
Odour is a significant concept in Helmontian natural philosophy and 
medicine.379
 
 It is the active element of a medicine; that is, if the odour is gone from a 
herb or spice its efficacy will also be spent. From this, Van Helmont extrapolates odour 
as an element of a ferment; it predisposes matter to take on the new image (image being 
here something like a Platonised version of proper form) that is the other part of the 
ferment, the part which designates the new form that will emerge. The ‘odour’ of a 
natural object or entity is a herald, a preparation and a foretaste of the change that will 
be wrought: 
the seeds of all living creatures also, must needs have their specifical 
odours whereby there are made suitings or fittings of the Archeus to 
the matter and the more Easie obedience for transchanging. For 
                                                            
378 Willis notes that ‘odour’ is a constituent part of a fermentation, but confines it to a discussion of 
putrefying fermentation (Of fermentation, 25). 
379 It is not the work of this thesis to elucidate the theories of Van Helmont with any breadth, and I shall 
simply investigate the concepts that are already borrowed and elaborated by his later medical interpreters 
and that can also be seen in Milton’s poetry. Nevertheless, I believe there is the potential for a study yet to 
be done upon the relationship between his vitalist dualism and Milton’s vitalist materialism.   
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whence at length are made diversities of impressions into any bowels, 
Organs, and powers, and in the strength and life.380
 
 
The fragrant flowers and fruits (and it is not often noted that flowers, although they 
were more commonly used as food then than they are today, are also nourishment in 
Milton’s paradise) are awash with odorous spirits, which make them more easily 
assimilable to the bodies of those who eat them through their delightful scent.381 Like 
medicinal odours they are beneficial to the body’s generative and digestive ferments.382 
Willis notes that even in death spices are preservative through their power to initiate 
fermentation: “Spices, as they consist of very active Principles, stir up a new Ferment in 
the Subject, the dead Carcase; and the implanted Elements of this, joyn into the society 
of their motion, and retain many of their Particles flying away, yet longer in the 
Body.”383
 
 They enable and enact the fertility that characterises paradise. Van Helmont 
continues, 
surely specificall odours do affect the matter and subdue it into their 
own protection: and an inclination and self-love ariseth from the 
specificall odour: Next, through custom, there is an easie receiving 
and a more perfect fitting: and at length a love-match into all desire of 
itself.384
 
 
This process parallels that in which Glisson imagines the fermenting elements of the 
blood in seductive, assimilative relationship. (Indeed, Giglioni charts the increasing 
influence of Van Helmont upon Glisson throughout his career and writings). The scent 
of the flowers is literally seductive, softening and opening the ontological barriers 
between one thing and another; from Van Helmont’s perspective, as from Glisson’s and 
Milton’s, the very elements are as fertile and sexual as individuals of higher or self-
consciousness.  
 
                                                            
380 Van Helmont, Oriatrike, or, Physick refined. The common errors therein refuted, and the whole art 
reformed & rectified: being a new rise and progress of phylosophy and medicine for the destruction of 
diseases and prolongation of life (London, 1662), 114. The Archeus is, in Helmontian medicine, 
essentially the ruling spirit/form of the entity. All things have an archeus, which constitutes causal 
impulsion and formative intention in it. Glisson is initially suspicious of the notion but it gradually comes 
to be an important antecedent of his materialist theory of natural perception. See Giglioni, ‘Genesis of 
Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 127-133. 
381 It is also relevant to the position of flowers in the scale of nature that throughout chymical writings 
from Albertus Magus through Paracelsus and to Boyle and Newton, the purified active elements separated 
by a sublimation are referred to as ‘flowers’ of the substance.  
382 Pagel, Van Helmont, 71. 
383 Willis, Of Fermentation, 23. 
384 Van Helmont, Oriatrike, 114. 
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The science of digestion in unfallen paradise engages with the substance 
vitalism and bodily subconscious that is central to medical monism, but, just as the 
Catholic mystery of transubstantiation is materialised into biological actuality, there is a 
theological aspect to the cleansing, life-giving power of these odours. Pagel observes 
that Van Helmont’s assigning of such powers to odour has spiritual (in the traditional, 
dualist sense) significance as part of its material effect: “The sweet smell (euodia) of the 
heavenly worlds and the banishing of demons by the smell of the consecrated ointment 
are among specific gnostic doctrines relevant in this context.”385 In dualist terms, the 
odours of paradise have both physical and spiritual power; Edwards has explored the 
life-giving properties ascribed to the ‘balmy air’ of paradise, focusing in particular upon 
the sweetness of Satan’s first encounter with it.386
 
 This increasingly pure air:  
Meets his approach, and to the heart inspires 
Vernal delight and joy, able to drive 
All sadness but despair: now gentle gales 
Fanning their odiferous wings dispense 
Native perfumes, and whisper whence they stole 
Those balmy spoils. As when to them who sail 
Beyond the Cape of Hope, and now are past 
Mozámbic, off at sea north-east winds blow 
Sabean odours from the spicy shore  
Of Arabie the blest, with such delay 
Well pleased they slack their course, and many a league 
Cheered with the grateful smell old Ocean smiles. 
So entertained those odorous sweets the fiend 
Who came their bane.  
(PL 4. 154-167) 
 
Edwards observes that ultimately the balm and “balmy air” of paradise cannot be 
reduced to a commodity, an import, or a particular medicinal herb, resin or spice, 
precisely because the poem evokes a variety of different geographical, cultural and 
                                                            
385 Pagel, Van Helmont, 75. The Catholic Online Encyclopaedia defines Gnosticism: “A collective name 
for a large number of greatly-varying and pantheistic -idealistic sects, which flourished from some time 
before the Christian Era down to the fifth century, and which, while borrowing the phraseology and some 
of the tenets of the chief religions of the day, and especially of Christianity, held matter to be a 
deterioration of spirit, and the whole universe a depravation of the Deity, and taught the ultimate end of 
all being to be the overcoming of the grossness of matter and the return to the Parent-Spirit, which return 
they held to be inaugurated and facilitated by the appearance of some God-sent Saviour”; it then 
comments somewhat acidly that  “However unsatisfactory this definition may be, the obscurity, 
multiplicity, and wild confusion of Gnostic systems will hardly allow of another”. It also states that “In 
Trismegistic literature... we find much that is strangely akin to Gnosticism” 
(http://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=5209 [09/04/10]). 
386 For a comprehensive account of the medical significance of ‘balm’ in the period (as well as an account 
of the commercial charlatanism associated with it) see Edwards, Milton and the Natural World, ‘The 
balm of life’, 182-198. 
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botanical contexts for ‘balm’.387 This is compatible with the Helmontian concept of the 
odour as a universal ontological category, a constituent part of all living substance, as 
the active substrate and initial power of the life-giving ferment. The “odorous sweets” 
of the air of paradise are, like the other similary substances we have encountered, active: 
they come to greet Satan, they are not simply breathed in, they inspire, acting to 
dissipate spiritual ills. Edwards notes that the balm of paradise has limitations – it 
cannot reverse despair, for, “To despair is to lose faith in God’s omnipotence, which is 
to mis-understand his deity, which is to fail to know that God is God. There can be no 
balm for despair, even in paradise; Satan, in despair, is always in hell.”388 Satan in this 
passage is a colonist and exploiter, enjoying the very beauty he comes to appropriate to 
his own paradigm with tragic results: “In his greed to possess the garden, he ends up 
poisoning the garden’s balmy air, one of its chief attractions for the infernal spirits.”389
 
 
However, the power of the odour is profound, even in the face of despair: in a 
graceful combination of spiritual and geographic state, the human sailors in the simile 
have passed beyond the Cape of Hope and continue to suffer winds from the north-east. 
The despair of demons may not respond to the overtures of balmy odour and the 
transformative power of the ferment, but humans who are past hope and still suffering 
adversity may, it is implied, still find relief. Thus the balmy air, like the sunshine, works 
as divine grace, free to all in Milton’s Arminian view.390
                                                            
387 Edwards, Milton and the Natural World, 196.  
 In Milton’s monist world spirit 
and body truly are on an interactive scale, when odour and sunshine may be varieties of 
divine grace, literally acting on the conscious body-soul composite that encounters 
them. Like the prayers of repentance, made as Adam and Eve struggle past despair, 
which are “sighs now breathed / Unutterable, which the spirit of prayer / Inspired and 
winged for heaven,” these odours work as incense in their spiritual efficacy (PL 11. 5-
7). The prayers “passed / Dimensionless through heavenly doors; then clad / With 
incense, where the golden altar fumed, / By their great intercessor,” and Fowler notes 
that, along with associations with both Catholic ritual and Jewish temple, “the imagery 
may simply be related to Milton’s spiritual materialism” (PL 11. 16-9n). This 
spiritual/physical impact is, like the vivifying of the ‘mystery’ of transubstantiation in 
388 Edwards, Milton and the Natural World, 183. 
389 Edwards, Milton and the Natural World, 194. Edwards relates this to the demon Belial’s desire for 
balmy air in Book 2. 
390 Rumrich notes the problem of excessiveness in the fertility of paradise and in Eve’s beauty and the 
particular problem that this poses to a Platonic philosophy; he answers it by aligning this excessiveness 
with “the concept of grace: “undeniably good, undeniably excessive and undeniably irrational” (Milton 
Unbound, 140). 
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the Catholic Eucharist, a sign of Milton’s monism; it is part of the materialisation, the 
endowing with living reality, of spiritual events and rituals which (particularly in the 
context of Catholicism) Milton regarded as dead outer actions. 
 
As Edwards has noted, sweet fragrance is continually associated with the 
presence or voice of God, as foul smells are associated with the decay of sin.391
 
 
Nevertheless, I suggest that ‘odour’ supports both this biblical tradition and, crucially, 
the Helmontian medical sense of the word. We meet floral, spicy and balmy odours at 
various times in paradise, but they seem to be a particular part of the initial encounter 
with paradise for the angels who visit, and in their responses we can read again, and 
more subtly, something of the relation between their inorganic consciousness and that of 
unfallen, human ontology. Raphael, upon landing, “shook his plumes, that heavenly 
fragrance filled the circuit wide,” but when he enters paradise the scent of the “spicy 
forest” gives the impression of a different, purer and more active air than is anywhere 
else present. Raphael comes 
Into the blissful field, through groves of myrrh, 
And flowering odours, cassia, nard, and balm; 
A wilderness of sweets; for nature here 
Wantoned as in her prime, and played at will 
Her virgin fancies, pouring forth more sweet, 
Wild above rule or art; enormous bliss.  
(PL 5. 292-7) 
 
Myrrh, cassia, nard and balm all have biblical significance as well as well-documented 
medicinal value (particularly in the case of balm and myrrh).392
                                                            
391 Cf. God’s speech on free will in Book 3 (PL 3. 95-135). 
 However, I suggest that 
the syntactical positioning of “odours” as the subject of the sentence is more than a 
poetic flourish or a result of Milton’s Latinate style. The odour is the active, preparatory 
element in the wild profusion of edenic fertility that Raphael is entering; it inspires in 
preparation for a fermentation that is responsible for digestive and generative 
transformation and which is blooming all around.  At this moment Adam is sitting in the 
shade “while now the mounted sun / Shot down direct his fervid rays to warm / Earth’s 
inmost womb, more warmth than Adam needs” (PL 5. 300-302). The glorious, 
passionate natural fecundity of this paradise exceeds that of its human inhabitants and 
392 Fowler gives them thus: myrrh as defence against devils (it is also the expensive embalming substance 
given at Jesus’ birth); cassia as a cinnamon-like spice “used in the holy oil for anointing the Tabernacle 
(Exodus 30:24)”; nard as an “ointment poured over Jesus’ head to anoint him ‘to the burying’ (Mark 14:3, 
8)” (PL 5.292-4n). 
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its angelic guest; the sunlight and the odours literally stimulate and generate. Of course, 
for angels who do eat and make love, but do not have physical borders to overcome and 
who do not procreate, the effect is – I would suggest – almost overwhelming. The 
responses of the different angels are telling.  
 
When Satan arrives on earth his first act is to confront himself in a tortured 
monologue in which he encounters his own despair (the only ill that the balmy odour 
cannot work on). His encounter with the glory of paradise culminates in vitriolic envy 
of Adam and Eve’s blessed state and mutual love and a frenzy of frustrated desire (PL 5 
505-511). Raphael’s entry begins a meditation upon the natural sexuality of paradise 
that is, in the faint uneasiness of the repeated notion of unruly wantonness and wildness, 
a precursor to his warnings to Adam about his passion for Eve. Following Adam’s 
paean to Eve’s absolute grace and beauty in Book 8, Raphael warns that his love is too 
extreme and irrational, noting somewhat sourly that:  
 
     if the sense of touch whereby mankind  
Is propagated seem such dear delight  
Beyond all other, think the same vouchsafed   
To cattle and to each beast; which would not be 
To them made common and divulged, if aught 
Therein enjoyed were worthy to subdue 
The soul of man, or passion in him move. 
What higher in her society thou findst 
Attractive, human, rational, love still; 
In loving thou dost well in passion not, 
Wherein true love consists not; love refines 
The thoughts and the heart enlarges, hath his seat  
In reason, and is judicious, is the scale 
By which to heavenly love thou mayst ascend, 
Not sunk in carnal pleasure, for which cause 
Among the beasts no mate for thee was found  
(PL 8. 579-594)  
 
Paradise seems excessive to the angels, as does human love, but Raphael has both 
exceeded his brief (which is not to provide marriage guidance at all, but to warn about 
Satan) and misunderstood this alien love. This is partially, I think, because as a creature 
of rarefied inorganic spirit he is convinced that angelic love is enjoyed “in eminence” to 
human love and he misses the difference between the animal pleasure which is “made 
common” to all and the physical aspect of married love which is, by definition, not. His 
lecture demands no response so much as the poet’s meditation upon Adam and Eve’s 
sexual love that declares: 
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Whatever hypocrites austerely talk 
Of purity and place and innocence, 
Defaming as impure what God declares 
Pure, and commands to some, leaves free to all. 
Our maker bids increase, who bids abstain 
But our destroyer, foe to God and man? 
Hail wedded love, mysterious law, true source 
Of human offspring, sole propriety, 
In Paradise of all things common else. 
By thee adulterous lust was driven from men  
Among the bestial herds to range, by thee 
Founded in reason, loyal, just and pure, 
Relations dear, and all the charities 
Of father, son and brother first were known. 
Far be it, that I should write thee sin or blame, 
Or think thee unbefitting holiest place, 
Perpetual fountain of domestic sweets, 
Whose bed is undefiled and chaste pronounced.  
(PL 4. 744-752) 
 
Raphael is not a hypocrite because he cannot know the pleasures that are not for him 
ordained, but this meditation on love, that almost counters Raphael’s concerns point for 
point, is precipitated by a vision of perfect human sexuality.393 That sexuality is not, as 
Raphael suggests in this most Platonic of moments, bestial: it is shared with the rest of 
the natural world (which is also commanded by God to go forth and multiply), but it is 
also profoundly different.394
                                                            
393 Edwards has made a convincing case for the modelling of this relationship upon that of Milton and his 
friend Chales Diodati, who remained a virgin until his early death, in "Raphael, Diodati." In Of Paradise 
and Light: Essays on Henry Vaughan and John Milton in Honor of Alan Rudrum, ed. D. Dickson and H. 
Nelson (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2004), 123-41.  
  Like Satan who despises the “man of clay,” Raphael 
cannot quite accept that the whole of the visible world is feverishly generative and 
wildly beautiful while being utterly pure; neither has he accounted for the fact that 
Adam and Eve are rational animals and their love is wedded love; he sees only an 
animal otherness of organic, corporeal sexuality. The truth is that their marriage, 
designed and presided over by God, is both a creaturely and a rational state, as Adam 
attempts to explain, according to his sexual experience, “mysterious reverence,” linking 
this to the “thousand decencies that daily flow / From all her words and actions, mixed 
with love / And sweet compliance, which declare unfeigned / Union of mind, or in us 
both one soul” (PL 8. 601-604). That he has to explain to the angel that their union is 
394 As I noted in Chapter 1, Milton makes precisely this correlation between human fertility (and 
traducianism) and God’s command to go forth and multiply in the Christian Doctrine: “the force of the 
divine blessing, that each creature should reproduce in its own likeness, is as fully applicable to man as it 
is to all other animals” (CPW 6: 320). 
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unfeigned shows a slight discomfort at the dualism that Raphael has implied (it is after 
all the gap between seeming and being that opens up in the fall of Satan); reason, he 
insists, is not subject to passion, whatever Raphael thinks: that will be an effect of the 
Fall.  
 
It is Adam’s questionable success in explaining the (unfallen) relation between 
human reason and sexual love that prompts him to ask about angelic love, and here we 
come to another scientific feature of Milton’s monism. Angelic love relies upon the 
possibility of penetration of substances. Angels, Raphael declares,   
  
                     obstacle find none 
Of membrane joint or limb, exclusive bars: 
Easier than air with air, if spirits embrace, 
Total they mix, union of pure with pure 
Desiring; nor restrained conveyance need 
As flesh to mix with flesh, or soul with soul  
(PL 8. 624-629) 
 
As humans we may or may not question the value of a sexuality that lacks the restraint 
required by the overcoming of bodily borders and boundaries, and prefer the “sweet 
reluctant amorous delay” of human union, but then, these are not pleasures for us 
ordained (PL 4. 311). Raphael certainly does not pause to discuss the differences, but 
the information he gives us tells us a lot about the natural philosophy of body and spirit 
that is assumed in the poem, for the notion that substances could penetrate one another 
was, as Giglioni notes, a monstrum.395
 
 This brings us back up the scale of nature, from 
the ubiquitous power of the odorous ferment in paradise to the upper reaches of 
consciousness, to examine the ‘intelligential’ spirits that are angels, in particular, raising 
some questions about angelic substance. Glisson’s work gives us a chymical model of 
similary transformation in the assimilative transformations of digestion, and the power 
of ‘odour’ stands in the place of the older notion of ‘natural spirits’, but I would also 
like to examine angelic substance in the light of the medical significance of both its 
penetrability, and its transpiration of excess food, both of which correlate with aspects 
of contemporary experimental medicine. 
 
 
                                                            
395 Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 139.  
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iv. Penetration of substances 
 
The anomalousness of the penetration of angelic substance relies upon the fact 
that Milton’s angels do not consist of an immaterial consciousness animating a body. 
One person who claimed that spirit could penetrate substance was Henry More, but, as 
is often the case, his natural philosophy seems initially like that of Milton, only to 
diverge into dualism as soon as it is looked at in detail. His definition of a created, finite 
spirit (that of a human or an angel) is characterised by penetrability, elasticity and, given 
its immaterial nature, indivisibility. He summarises his definition thus: “A substance 
Indiscerpible, that can move it self, that can penetrate, contract, and dilate it self, and 
can also penetrate, move, and alter the matter.”396
 
 Given that spirit is defined by its 
penetrable quality for More (along with indiscerpibility, or a quality of being 
indivisible) we might take the mutual penetration of two spirits to be the sort of process 
that Raphael describes, but a comparison between More’s penetrable spirit and those in 
Paradise Lost immediately throws up problems. For More spirit must be penetrable in 
part because that is a logical consequence of its incorporeality, and in part because he 
uses it in binary opposition to matter, which retains the dull, lifeless intractability of the 
dualist system. Spirit must be penetrable because it is the dimensionless cause of 
movement and change in otherwise dead extended matter. One can sense the mechanist 
tendencies of the presumed reader in More’s slightly defensive declaration:  
there is such a thing as a Spirit in the world, from which activity is 
communicated to Matter. And indeed if Matter as Matter had motion, 
nothing would hold together but Flints, Adamant, Brass, Iron; yea this 
whole Earth would suddenly melt into a thinner Substance then the 
subtil Aire, or rather it never had been condensated together to this 
consistency we finde it.397
 
 
Active matter would cause a complete dissolution of all solid form.398
                                                            
396 More, Immortality of the Soul, 25. 
 More’s focus 
upon the ‘seminal forms’ as lower grades of bodily spirit seems to recall Milton’s 
inclusiveness, as does his definition of the human soul:  
397 More, Immortality of the Soul, 42-3.  
398 This is a comment upon the proposal of active matter, rather than vital (and therefore active) matter. 
Where Cudworth had made a similar reductio ad absurdam in response to vital matter, More is probably 
responding to atomist theories that we will come to shortly. It may be fanciful to read this response to the 
162 
 
 
If we adde to Vegetation and Sensation Reason properly so called, we 
have then a setled notion of the Soule of Man; which we may more 
compleatly describe thus: A created Spirit indued with Sense and 
Reason, and a power of organizing terrestrial matter into humane 
shape by vital union therewith.399
 
  
The similarity to Milton’s body-soul composite is, however, superficial. More’s dualism 
is often pronounced, and poses such a problem that he never manages to answer the 
question of how spirit moves and controls matter: “The greatest difficulty is to fancy 
how this Spirit, being so incorporeall, can be able to move the matter, though it be in it” 
and he concludes by restating that “a firm union of Spirit and Matter is very possible, 
though we cannot conceive the manner thereof.”400 Although he claims incorporeality 
as a feature of his notion of spirit it becomes clear in his discussion of Descartes and 
Hobbes that, for him, incorporeality is directly coincident with immateriality.401
 
  
More’s angels are immaterial consciousness actuating a body of air. Unlike 
Milton’s angels, who are material spirits exalted beyond the corporeal to a higher and 
more active degree of sublimity, they retain a dualist nature: “herein alone, I conceive, 
does the Spirit or Soule of an Angel... differ from the Soule of a Man, in that the Soule 
of an Angel may vitally actuate an aëreal or aethereal body, but cannot be born into this 
world in a terrestrial one.”402
 
 Milton’s angels are not in terrestrial bodies, but, despite 
their liquid texture, they can metabolise terrestrial food. Moreover, they are not in the 
end, ‘indiscerpible’ as Satan finds out during the war in heaven when he is cut by 
Michael’s sword: 
                     then Satan first knew pain, 
And writhed him to and fro convolved; so sore 
The griding sword with discontinuous wound 
Passing through him, but the ethereal substance closed 
Not long divisible, and from the gash 
A stream of nectarous humour issuing flowed 
Sanguine, such as celestial spirits may bleed  
(PL 6. 327-333) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
new dynamic body politic as a precursor to the famous Marxian comment that in a capitalist economy ‘all 
that is solid will melt into air’. 
399 More, Immortality of the Soul, 52. 
400 More, Immortality of the Soul, 45; 47.  
401 More, Immortality of the Soul, 54-5. 
402 More, Immortality of the Soul, 52.  
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This substance is not divisible for long, but it is divisible. Like humans, angels have 
bodily fluid that issues from a division in that substance. That humour resembles both 
the sanguine humour of humankind and the “rubied nectar” of the angels’ feast, just as 
human blood is repeatedly compared to wine by Glisson, Willis and other physicians. 
Of course the damage sustained by Satan is not only attributable to the might of 
Michael; he is also starting to grow “gross through sinning” and his thickening 
substance is therefore growing more ‘discerpible’ as he shifts down the dynamic scale 
of nature.  
 
Penetration of material substances is a monstrum because it complicates or 
disables dualist systems, but the dynamism of Milton’s monist natural philosophy 
requires it, as does Glisson’s. Milton’s angels are, of course, material intelligential 
spirit, but they are without the organic form of body, being constituted by pure, active 
similary substance: 
 
                    For spirits when they please 
Can either sex assume, or both; so soft 
And uncompounded is their essence pure, 
Not tied or manacled with joint or limb, 
Nor founded on the brittle strength of bones, 
Like cumbrous flesh; but in what shape they choose 
Dilated or condensed, bright or obscure, 
Can execute their airy purposes, 
And works of love or enmity fulfil.  
(PL 1. 423-431) 
 
 These angels are not compounded into form but they are composed of material spirit, 
which includes sensory faculties (in eminence) without the need for the mechanisms of 
organ; Milton’s angels are an outstanding example of active similary substance, and we 
know that they can metabolise the fruits of paradise by the same similary sublimation of 
matter as the human, organic body. The problem this poses, as Schoenfeldt has noted, is 
that of excretion; after all, the processes of sublimation and distillation tend to suppose 
that there will be some sort of residue of inassimilable matter, as there is in the ferment 
of the Creation and the medical ferment in general. The answer given is that of 
‘transpiration’: “what redounds, transpires / Through spirits with ease” (PL 5. 438-9).403
                                                            
403 Schoenfeldt makes this point, but limits the meaning to sweating (Bodies and Selves, 141-2).  
 
The ferment of the lower orders of fixed natural spirits clearly volatilises them through 
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degrees up through the intellectual to the level of angelic intelligential spirit; there are 
elements that ‘redound’ but these ‘transpire’ – what does this mean?404
 
 
In a lecture probably given at the Royal Society, Glisson states that “one half 
of what a temperate man eats and drinks is spent by insensible transpiration, as is 
experimentally proven by Sanctorius in his Medicina Statica”.405 Transpiration is, it 
seems, a medical term for effluviums out of the bodily parts; in orthodox and mechanist 
accounts they are made through pores, for “if all parts have transpiration, then they must 
needs have pores by which transpiration is made.”406
 
 There are natural pores and vital 
pores for the corresponding spirits and if these get blocked or mixed then illness ensues. 
Thomas Willis notes that transpiration is part of a cleansing process. In sleep: 
the Blood is soon quieted, and passes more slowly thorow the place of 
inkindling, to wit, the Lungs; wherefore being there first more 
inkindled, it burns with a clearer Flame, and also more mildly, and so 
the smoak presently ceasing, and some Heterogenious Particles being 
burnt, all the rest extricating themselves from Confusion, what are 
profitable are imployed in their designed Offices, and what are 
unprofitable, are bolted or sifted forth, partly by Breathing, 
Transpiration, or Sweat, and partly thorow the other Emunctories.407
 
 
Willis’s model of the transformative body is more Baconian than that of Glisson (or 
Milton) in the fieriness of the reactions, and his reactions are clearly those happening 
between atoms rather than between elements of a fluid substance. Transpiration, though, 
is clearly some sort of sweating, although not, it seems, precisely the same as sweating. 
 
Glisson had commented upon transpiration and the penetration of substances 
together in the Prolegomena to Anatomia hepatis in 1654. Obstruction in the body 
causes illness, but Glisson dismissed the debate on the penetration of substances, 
initially on the pragmatic grounds of a practicing physician, stating that: 
 
                                                            
404 The term ‘redound’ is used by God to refer to the revenge that Satan attempts (PL 3. 85-6); one can see 
in this the rejection of Satan’s inassimilable evil, for that which cannot be sublimed or turned to good by 
God is excreted, with a brief echo of the Milton of Colasterion, upon Satan’s unfortunate head. 
405 Francis Glisson, Two Anatomical Lectures on the Stomach, in English Manuscripts of Francis Glisson 
2. Lectures and other papers, ed. Andrew Cunningham (Cambridge: Wellcome Unit for the History of 
Medicine, 1998), 5-40, 32. Glisson cites Sanctorius Sanctorius, Ars... de Statica Medicina (Venice 1614). 
See also Willis, Two Discourses, 48; also Power notes “those fuliginous effluviums which pass constantly 
out of us by insensible transpiration; which Sanctorius hath proved to exceed the bulk and weight of all 
our sensible evacuations whatsoever” (Experimental Philosophy, 67). 
406 Glisson, Two Anatomical Lectures, 3.  
407 Willis, Two discourses, 92.  
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whether the obstructions happen in the pores or in the very substance 
of the parts, will in no way upset [their] medical principles; nor will 
the mode of cure be greatly varied... one should enquire what kind of 
permeating matter it is: viz., whether it is an exhalation (like a 
breathing in or breathing out, which penetrate the skin by an 
insensible transpiration), or a liquor (like sweat, which also permeates 
the skin).408
 
 
Transpiration is an outward exhalation of a substance finer than liquid through pores, 
skin or substance itself; this is the definition of 1654 to which he refers in his lectures of 
the 1660s.409 By the 1660s he is less hesitant about and yet more defensive of his thesis; 
the outer layer of the body’s skin may seem like a covering, but it participates in 
vitality, it “hath the last farewell of the vital spirits, which in their breathing out pass 
through it.”410 He has every reason in this lecture to sound defensive: Descartes had 
insisted that impenetrability was a result of the extension of material substance in 
dimensional existence.411 This insistence was shared by other mechanists for a very 
good reason: “unless bodies were mutually impenetrable they would not displace each 
other in the collisions and exchanges of motion which, according to the mechanical 
philosophy, are what lie at the basis of natural phenomena.”412
 
 
Glisson’s medical experience persuaded him otherwise. He knows the potential 
difficulty with what he is saying, but insists: 
 
It may be objected that this... seems to admit of penetration of bodies. 
I answer, that in some sort it does, but so as not to make two 
dimensions or two distinct bodies in one place. For in the very instant 
of penetration they are united and become one body and have one 
dimension. Indeed there are two kinds of this union, the one 
permanent, when bodies united rest in that union; the other transient, 
when the body entering the other rests not but continues on its motion 
till it pass through the same... some bodies can pierce each other, yet 
                                                            
408 Glisson, Anatomia hepatis, 101.  
409 Glisson, Six Anatomical Lectures, 53. 
410 Glisson, Six Anatomical Lectures, 51 
411 Woolhouse, The Concept of Substance, 80-81. Although he borrows heavily from Glisson, Charleton 
denies Glisson’s thesis that the separations of the nutritious and the excrement are made by similary 
attraction: “Nor by Spontaneous Coition, or A[...]traction Similary; [Note: Nor that it is Attracted by the 
like Excrement contained in that part: ] because in Nature there is no Motion by Attraction, but all from 
Impulsion”. Instead he gives a mechanist solution, citing: “the Correspondence of Magnitude and Figure 
betwixt the minute particles of this or that peculiar excrementitious humor to be separated from the blood, 
on one side; and the small passages leading into, and insensible pores in this or that part, peculiarly 
constituted for the separation thereof, on the other: together with the help of that particular Fermentation, 
which each humor doth suffer either neer unto; or in the place of its separation; to Nature nothing being 
more frequent, than to make use of a certain Fermentation, greater or lesser, where she intends a 
separation of various humors one from another” (Natural History of Nutrition,  99-100). 
412 Woolhouse, The Concept of Substance, 96. 
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so that in the transition they become one: as the elements are united in  
mixture, and the nourishment augmenting parts is taken into the part 
nourished, and the augmentation is uniform in the whole and not made 
by apposition of part to part, especially in living creatures.413
 
 
Penetration of bodies is anathema to the mechanist philosophy, but it is also antithetical 
to much Aristotelian thought. Glisson picks up the weak point of the Aristotelian 
rebuttal by invoking the notion of the mixt. In Aristotelian terms, a substance was not 
simply equivalent to matter, but was “primary, that which can exist of itself,” that is, it 
was essential and to be opposed to accidents or secondary qualities.414 The mixture of 
the elements (earth, air, fire, water) into a complete homogenous substance (Newman 
gives the example of a bird) could only be effected by the power of form. Nevertheless, 
even before the rejection of Aristotelian physics that founded the new philosophy, there 
were technical difficulties with this model (for example the question of why the 
elements do not fly off in their different natural directions). Medieval scholastic 
‘pluralists’ argued for a plurality of possible forms in a given substance, and one of the 
innovations later wrought by chymical philosophy was the interpolation (or 
substitution) of the elements of chymistry into this system.415
 
  Glisson’s insistence upon 
penetration of bodies touches upon the old philosophical equivocation and relies in part 
upon the new, but it is also clearly drawn from his own work on nutrition.  
It also underpins his vitalist materialism: “To Glisson, the penetration of 
substances was a crucial argument to demonstrate the intrinsic life of the material 
substratum.”416
 
 In his teaching notes Glisson states: 
Nothing prevents substances from penetrating each other. In fact, the 
dimensions do not penetrate each other: what happens is that a new 
dimension immediately originates in substances that subdue each 
other. For the quantity and the determinate extension of a body is an 
accident and, accordingly, can change and be altered. When two 
bodies join up, they remain two as far as their potential nature is 
concerned, but they gain one dimension with respect to their actual 
nature.417
 
  
                                                            
413 Glisson, Six Anatomical Lectures, 55.  
414 Newman, Atoms and Alchemy, 35.  
415 Newman, Atoms and Alchemy, 356.  
416 Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 139.  
417 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 139. Giglioni cites MS 
Sloane 3309 (“A simplici sanguinis transvasatione per habitum partium nulli inducuntur morbid”), ff. 
317r, 318r-318v. 
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This perspective as a philosophy makes sense in the context of the laboratories of the 
alchemist, as it does in the study of nutrition. The process Glisson describes implies the 
action of the ferment, where one spirit, odour or active substance encounters another 
and assimilates and transforms it. It is, nevertheless, an unpopular solution to the 
phenomena there observed with both Aristotelian and mechanist thinkers. What Raphael 
describes in his sketch of angelic love and desire is clearly the penetration of 
substances, and the model of transpiration gives us a system whereby vital spirits exhale 
from the body through the skin, and therefore higher degrees of spirit exude from the 
angel’s spiritual substance “with ease.” His plastic, ethereal body is clearly using just 
the system of active, assimilative spirit described by Glisson to excrete “what redounds” 
from his food. Like Milton, Glisson’s materialism relies upon this model of active spirit, 
for the body’s fluids (chyle, blood, semen) and spirits must be able to interact, 
assimilate, vitalise and exalt one another. 
 
 
 
v. Active matter 
 
Inevitably, the debates and experiments of the chymical philosophy often 
imply some sort of penetration of substances; transmutation would seem to require it 
and this posed problems for contemporary iatro-mechanists. Boyle debates for some 
time in The Sceptical Chymist whether substances are created de novo out of chymical 
reactions, or whether the reactions reveal substances that were already present within 
the previous form.418 To the mechanists, minute corpuscles were the solution; matter 
could interact and transmute, as we saw in the burning heterogeneous particles proposed 
by Willis, but they would still be impenetrable, because “These corpuscles have a 
definite position and size, and within their volume are solid and impenetrable. They are 
the ultimate atoms, since they cannot be broken up.”419
                                                            
418 Boyle, Sceptical Chymist, 46.  
 They are often treated as active, 
too. As we can see from More’s rather defensive tone, active matter was not as unusual 
or heretical as has been assumed. Henry corrects the critical assumption that all 
seventeenth-century mechanical philosophers adhered to the Cartesian principle of inert 
matter. He also amends the corresponding position that, of the same natural 
philosophers, those who attributed activity to matter were “ipso facto held to be 
419 Ian J. Thompson, ‘The Nature of Substance’, Cogito, 2 (1988), 17-19. 
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subversive radicals.”420
 
 The notion of active matter (which, as we shall see is not 
exactly the same as vital matter) was subjected to sustained scrutiny and was not 
rejected by many mechanists. Henry notes that figures in the Royal Society such as 
Thomas Willis and John Mayow  
developed corpuscular systems of philosophy which assumed from the 
outset a hierarchy from active matter down to passive matter; from 
spirit and sulphur (Willis) or sulphur and mercury (Mayow) to earth. 
Different combinations of the various kinds of particle, Willis 
suggested, gave rise to ‘ferments’ which were responsible for 
initiating and conserving many vital processes and which, in adverse 
circumstances could cause pathological conditions. Neither Willis nor 
anyone else try to explain the operation of fermentation in strict 
mechanical terms, the motions of the ‘ferment’ are simply assumed.421
 
  
The corpuscular interactions are normally explained by the differing shapes of the 
corpuscles; they might have hooks, indentations or be elastic. This sort of interaction 
does not, as Henry notes, formulate the motions of the ferment. So when we look at the 
systems of fermentation proffered by proponents of mechanism, we see something very 
similar to Glisson’s medical ferment.  
 
Henry Power, at one time Glisson’s student, hovers on the border of mechanist 
and chymical models of substance, defining animal spirits as: “this aetherial substance 
or subtle particles” first created by Nature “to be the main (though invisible) Agent in 
all Natures three Kingdoms Mineral, Vegetal, and Animal.”422
 
 Like Glisson, he 
proposes a three-stage process of fermentation, consisting of fixation followed by 
fusion, and finally volatilisation. In the initial stage of fixation, the volatile spirits 
are so complicated with the grosser parts of Matter, and locked therein 
so fast, that they can hardly be separated, and dis-imprisoned as in 
Minerals, but most especially in Gold... The state of Fusion, I call that, 
when the Spirits by any kind of help have so wrought themselves 
towards a Liberty, that they are in the middle way to Volatility, as in 
half-concocted Minerals, fermenting Vapours or Liquors, and half-
ripened Fruits &c. Thirdly, The Spirits are in their third state of 
Volatility, when after a colluctancy with the grosser Particles they 
have so subjugated and overcome them, that they are just upon wings, 
and ready to fly away; as in Wine when it is in the height of its 
fermentation, and in some part of our arterial bloud always.423
                                                            
420 Henry, ‘Active Principles’, 357. 
 
421Henry, ‘Active Principles’, 343.  
422 Power, Experimental Philosophy, 61. 
423 Power, Experimental Philosophy, 61.  
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Power continues to observe that from this fermentation “there is a palpable and sensible 
heat produced” and to extend this process specifically to the development of minerals 
underground.424 This echoes Glisson’s formulation, simply substituting particles for 
similary substance, but would seem to correlate the mechanist notion of fermenting 
matter with that we have found in Paradise Lost. Nevertheless, there are a number of 
problems with this association. To begin with, Milton mentions corpuscles not at all and 
assigns the only mention of atoms to the realm of Chaos; second, the concept of active, 
corpuscular matter held a very different (if perilously close) place to that of vital matter, 
not least because of the theological implications of the two theories. Henry notes that 
the “aggregation of concepts of animated and merely active matter was, to say the least, 
embarrassing for one or two of the leading mechanical philosophers. Certainly Boyle 
was always very careful to deny that matter could think or display percipience or 
appetite.”425
 
  
For the vitalist, God had endowed matter with active power: matter itself gave 
rise to basic percipience and motive force, whereas for the mechanists, matter was 
moved purely by the force of other matter in motion, the origin of all motion being God 
at the beginning of the world. The difference is subtle indeed, and to uncover the most 
substantial differentiation between the active atoms of the iatro-mechanists and the vital 
spirits of the chymical Galenists, one must, in the end, turn to the contemporary 
theological and political motivations and constraints in which they operated. The notion 
of active matter answered problems of evidence, particularly in the realm of physiology, 
but could be divided from the pantheistic implications of vitalism and supported by a 
devout, voluntarist theological stance. So, given that Milton’s natural philosophy is 
predicated upon the universal principle of fermentation, just as that of Willis and Power 
was, where are the differences? For Milton, as for the atomists, God is first cause, and 
nature is constituted by secondary causes. However, the mechanists saw the secondary 
causes as being external, and thus reduced down to efficient cause only, in the force of 
atoms upon one another, exchanging and circulating a set amount of motion imparted 
by God at the creation. The acts of creation are reduced to setting matter in motion.426
                                                            
424 Power, Experimental Philosophy, 62.  
 
425 Henry, ‘Active Principles’, 356. 
426 For a detailed exploration of the translation of Aristotelian notions of final cause into elements of the 
mechanical philosophy, see Margaret J. Osler ‘Whose Ends? Teleology in Early Modern Natural 
Philosophy’, Osiris 16 (2001), 151-168, 162. 
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This is a transition from multiple modes of causality to a new form of explicit binary 
dualism.  
 
Mechanist philosophies were theologically suspect: in the classical sources of 
atomist theory Epicurean philosophy posited an eternal world and a purely fortuitous 
conjunction of the atoms that made up that world. Mechanists such as Gassendi and 
Charleton Christianised Epicurean atomism, denying the eternal world and chance 
collisions of atoms of the classical authors and recasting atomism within a Christian 
metanarrative of God’s intentional creation.427 Atoms had, at the beginning, been 
endued with motion by the First Cause and Milton’s Creation does not exclude this 
formula, but neither is his Creation so reduced. The risk of the resulting Creation posed 
by the mechanists is that of deism and an absent God, who made the world like a clock 
and departs, having set it running. Active principles, however, “were used to undermine 
the atheistic interpretation of the strict mechanism – that the universe may always have 
existed with the same amount of motion it now has... On the other hand, active 
principles provided a series of hypothetical physical entities which fulfilled a useful 
explanatory role and were susceptible to philosophical investigation. They therefore 
prevented the heterodox and blasphemous invocation of God as continual agent 
immanent in matter.”428
 
 
Notions of active matter, as Henry has shown, could argue from a voluntarist 
perspective; after all, is it truly devout to state that God could not imbue atoms with 
active force? John Locke puts the voluntarist position on active matter: “I see no 
contradiction in it, that the first eternal thinking Being should, if he pleased, give to 
certain Systems of created senseless matter, put together as he sees fit, some degrees of 
sense, perception and thought.”429
 
 Lesser writers make the same point; Richard Baxter, 
a regular defender of Glisson’s work, takes issue with both More and Glanville: 
I confess I am too dull to be sure that God cannot endue matter itself 
with the formal Virtue of Perception: That you say the Cartesians hold 
the contrary, and that your Writings prove it, certifieth me not. O the 
marvellous difference of mens Conceptions! Such great Wits as 
Campanella, Dr. Glisson, &c. were confident that no Matter in the 
world was without the una-trina Virtus, viz. Perceptive, Appetitive, 
and Motive; I agree not with them... But that it is uncapable of it; and 
                                                            
427 Osler ‘Whose Ends? Teleology in Early Modern Natural Philosophy’, 158. 
428 Henry, ‘Active Principles’, 357.  
429 Locke quoted in Henry, ‘Active Principles’, 359. 
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that Almighty God cannot make perceptive living Matter, and that by 
informing it without mixture, I cannot prove, nor I think you: Where is 
the Contradiction that makes it impossible? Nor do I believe that it 
giveth a man any more cause to doubt (as you add) of the Existence of 
God, or the Immortality of the Soul, than your Opinion that saith, God 
cannot do this.430
 
 
Baxter makes a simple but devastating critique of More’s complex conceptual 
constructions, using a voluntarist perspective to throw open the field of scientific 
possibility; indeed voluntarism generally was a theological position that supported the 
new philosophy. An experimental approach to the workings of the world was justified if 
the only true structuring force was an unknowable God who was not subject to 
rationalist analysis. Voluntarism, as we have seen, supported dangerous theses like that 
of active matter, but Milton does not take refuge in this line of argument. As Danielson 
points out: 
 
Voluntarism... plays havoc with the doctrine of Christ’s divine 
sacrifice for sins, for if God is absolutely free to do whatever he wills, 
then the work of the atonement was not really necessary... God... in 
Milton’s view, is absolutely free to exercise or refrain from exercising 
his creativity... but this freedom is quite compatible with necessity, 
given God’s essential goodness.431
 
 
The theological subtlety which counterpoints freedom and necessity in a perfect balance 
through a profound belief in the goodness of God matches again the delicate balance of 
active matter and substantial light, which are simultaneously ruled by God and yet 
endued by the rule of God with activity, percipience and power  
 
John Henry states that Robert Boyle took refuge in a voluntarist religious 
position and maintained that although it was impossible to say that God could not imbue 
matter with activity and force, there was no evidence to prove that he had done so.432
                                                            
430 Richard Baxter, Of the immortality of mans soul, and the nature of it and other spirits (London, 1682), 
28-9.  Baxter has a refreshing turn of phrase and comments, drily: “I marvel that when you have dealt 
with so many sorts of Dessenters you meddle not with so subtile a piece as that old Doctor's de Vita 
Naturae: I have talkt with divers high pretenders to Philosophy here of the new strain, and askt them their 
judgment of Dr. Glissons Book, and I found that none of them understood it, but neglected it as too hard 
for them, and yet contemned it” ( 6). 
 
Likewise, Osler shows that Boyle’s account of the origin of motion in matter entwines 
his religious imperatives subtly with his ‘science’, identifying God’s providence with 
the system of secondary causes, just as Milton does: 
431 Danielson, Milton’s Good God, 153.  
432 Henry, ‘Active Principles’, 356.  
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[B]y his infinite wisdom and power, he did so guide and overrule the 
motions of these parts at the beginning of things, as that... they were 
finally disposed into that beautiful and orderly frame we call the 
world; among whose parts some were so curiously contrived as to be 
fit to become the seeds or seminal principles of plants and animals. 
And I further conceive that he settled such laws or rules of local 
motion among the parts of the universal matter, that by his ordinary 
and preserving concourse the several parts of the universe, thus once 
completed, should be able to maintain the great construction or system 
and economy, of the mundane bodies and propagate the species of 
living creatures.433
 
 
The system of causes maintains itself through God’s ‘ordinary and preserving 
concourse’ of, we might say, ordinary providence. This echoes Milton’s account of the 
Creation in a number of ways. Boyle’s first matter here seems already to have motion 
that is overruled by divinity at the beginning of creation, to be made ‘beautiful and 
orderly’ just as Milton’s first matter is disposed in the Christian Doctrine. The equation 
of the system of causes with God’s ordinary providence is also shared. However, 
Boyle’s secondary causes are profoundly mechanist in their reduction to ‘laws or rules 
of local motion’; Catherine Gimelli Martin notes: 
 
By limiting the deity’s role to the necessary yet automatic functions of 
creating and imparting motion to matter he grants God the entire 
operation of the machine of the world only to reduce him to the role of 
first atom, rather than First Cause... Thus like the eighteenth century 
deists inspired by Newton, Boyle’s schema merely creates a 
clockmaker, not the personal God he had intended to conserve.434
 
 
In Milton’s Creation, as we have seen, the atoms of chaos are more than active. They 
are already “the seeds of all subsequent good” that is, they have vital fertility, being 
already “embryon atoms” (PL 2. 900).435
 
 Moreover, God endues chaos with much more 
than motion. Aristotelian final causes are retained in a system which gives matter 
percipience and appetite as well as motive force, as shown in the vitalising matter of 
creation, odours of paradise and living qualities of mineral and vegetable life on the 
Sun, in Heaven and in paradise on Earth. 
There is, therefore, more detail held in common between the natural 
philosophy of Milton’s Paradise Lost and the theories of the new philosophy than has 
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been commonly noted. Active principles in matter often behave very much like vital 
matter, particularly in the representation of fermentation of substances. Nevertheless the 
fundamental feature through which the philosophies are differentiated is Milton’s 
retention of vitalist animism, which extends rather a version of percipience and choice 
into the natural, and makes of free will a natural principle, refusing the extreme 
voluntarist position. Milton’s inclusion of atoms in chaos but not elsewhere clearly 
consigns atomism to the realm of God’s lack of influence without consigning it to non-
existence. Milton’s chaos is, among other things, an atomist chaos – it has “embryon 
atoms,” which recall the seminal principles of Gassendi and it is ruled by chance; in fact 
Milton emphasises the blind fury of fortune by giving a peculiarly dramatic horror in 
Satan’s journey through the abyss, when he only avoids an eternal vacuum by a chance 
explosion of fire and nitre. 
 
Through this chapter I have observed the close parallels between medical 
theories of digestion (themselves closely related to the ferment of conception) and the 
natural philosophy that Adam learns from Raphael. I have explored some of the key 
notions of ‘sublimation’ and ‘odour’ that are shared by the poem and the medical theory 
and extrapolated from this a more nuanced account of transformative prelapsarian 
ontology.  Finally, I have placed Milton’s peculiarly medical natural philosophy in 
relation to more dualist systems (in particular that of Henry More) through an 
exploration of angelic bodies and their digestion, their excretion through transpiration 
and their coincident materiality and penetrability. When angels make love they 
penetrate each other wholly, but they are shown not to understand the sexuality of 
God’s earthly Creation. Adam and Eve are imagined in a biological form from which 
exalting vital and animal spirits are exhaled through the skin. Interestingly, penetration 
of substance is more evident in unfallen digestive transformation and angelic sex than in 
the model of Satan’s attempt upon Eve, which corresponds to the Aristotelian model of 
the intelligential act in one mode and to a sort of infection of the animal spirits in 
another. The question of what happens to Eve when Satan attempts to penetrate her 
animal spirits could be considered here, but that particular penetration will instead be 
revisited in the next section which charts the process and effects of falling and 
fallenness. 
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Chapter 6 
 
The corrupted monism of the fallen soul 
 
 
i. Discordance in the vitae chorea 
 
We have explored the functional similarities of the medical ferment in iatro-
mechanist and vitalist models, and marked some of the differences of theology that the 
two models involved. Milton’s commitment to free will matches his vitalist natural 
philosophy, avoiding the determinism and voluntarism that so often characterised 
materialist and mechanist paradigms. It is not surprising then, that despite the similarity 
of function between the atomist or corpuscular ideas of fermentation and the active 
fluids of vitalist fermentation, there are distinct differences between the body and soul 
envisioned by Willis and those envisioned by Milton in Paradise Lost. The work of 
Harvey and Glisson had proposed a vitalist materialist generation but, unlike Milton, 
they stop short of making a causal connection between this (and the corresponding 
vitality of the body’s substance), and the source of the rational soul. Willis and 
Charleton both proposed active corpuscular matter, but also propounded a clear 
dualism, not simply of soul and body, but in the technical detail of the relation of the 
corporeal sensitive soul to the immaterial, rational soul. Through this chapter I will 
compare the dualist model of the soul and the active matter that constitutes it proposed 
by the iatro-mechanists with the fragmenting and turbulent falling soul of paradise, 
asking if and how Milton maintains his monism through the drama of the Fall. 
 
For Willis, the body is an instrument, activated by the rational soul: “the 
rational Soul, sustains the part of the Musitian playing on it, which governing and 
directing the animal spirits, disposes and orders at its pleasure, the Faculties of the 
Inferior Soul.”436
                                                            
436 Willis, Two Discourses, 34. 
 He meditates upon the analogy, noting that it is the workmanship 
rather than the material that creates the extraordinary power of a musical instrument. 
The instrument works thus: 
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Wind sent into musical Organs, and that being carryed variously 
thorow manifold openings of Doors, into these or those pipes... 
create[s] a most grateful Harmony, and Composed Measures of every 
Kind; this I say deservedly amazes us, and we acknowledg this Effect, 
far to Excel both the matter of the Instrument, and of the hand of the 
Musitian striking it. Further, altho the Musical Organ very much 
requires the labour of him playing on it, by whose direction, the spirit 
or wind being admitted, now into these, anon into those, and into other 
Pipes, causes the manifold harmony, and almost infinite Varieties of 
Tunes; yet sometimes I have seen such an Instrument so prepared, that 
without any Musitian directing, the little doors being shut up,  by a 
certain law and order, by the mere Course of a Water, almost the same 
harmony is made, and the same tunes, equal with those Composed by 
Art.437
 
 
The creative agency or efficient cause of the instrument is given prime place here, 
beyond the hand of the musician or the material qualities of the metal; the choice of 
instrument both recalls Satan’s attempts upon the organs of Eve’s fancy and is 
appropriate  to represent the body into which ‘spirit or wind’ is blown to activate it. 
Willis is also trying to extend the analogy to the animal soul, imagining the model 
without the guiding hand of the musician/rational soul. The debate touched upon is the 
Cartesian mechanist position that the animal is effectively a machine, subject only to the 
efficient causality of the maker and then of matter in motion, as the instrument with a 
rationally conscious player is compared to a mechanised instrument, propelled not by 
intention but by flowing water, itself propelled ‘by a certain law and order’ in nature.438
 
 
With regard to the human set of inter-relating spirits he is making a clear case for the 
sensitive soul itself as the bodily instrument of the rational. Milton uses the same 
analogy of the animate self as musical instrument in a subtler and less explicit manner 
in Paradise Lost, and it gives a very different sense of the relation between the different 
orders of body and spirit in humans and animals. 
There is, in fact, no doubt that Adam experiences himself as the whole 
instrument rather than its player; arguing for his need for human companionship, he 
expresses himself thus: 
                                                            
437 Willis, Two Discourses, 33-34. Charleton replicates the use of this analogy in Natural History of the 
Passions, 37-8. This use of the figure of the musical organ is also reminiscent of the creation of 
Pandemonium in Book 1 of Paradise Lost. 
438 Willis does go on to criticise this model with a number of examples of animal capacities; his use of 
this analogy is clearly in line with the Cartesian thesis, but he specifies that it should apply to ‘lower’ 
orders of animals (Two Discourses, 34-38). 
176 
 
 
Among unequals what society 
Can sort, what harmony or true delight? 
Which must be mutual, in proportion due 
Giv’n and receiv’d; but in disparity 
The one intense, the other still remiss 
Cannot well suit with either, but soon prove 
Tedious alike: of fellowship I speak 
Such as I seek, fit to participate 
All rational delight, wherein the brute  
Cannot be human consort; they rejoice 
Each with their kind.  
(PL 8. 379-393) 
 
Fowler notes that musical analogies with human society originated with Plato’s 
Republic and were a well-known trope: “Adam’s argument is that for true harmony 
there must be the right mathematical proportion – here punningly described as 
reciprocal. In a stringed instrument the strings should be in the right ratio of length and 
frequency. But the human string is intense (strained and high in pitch); the animal string 
too remiss and low” (PL 8. 384-9n). Adam is here using the same analogy as Willis but, 
unlike Willis’s model, in which the consciousness is of a different order from the 
instrument, he senses himself as musical instrument, resonating as a string, seeking 
proper experiential harmony with another rather than instrumentally controlling an 
objectified lower self. Willis differentiates the models, noting the pure mechanist 
impulsion ascribed by Descartes to animal consciousness as opposed to the deliberate 
activation of an instrument by a rationally conscious agent. This model may fit with that 
of Satan’s attempts upon the organs of Eve’s fancy, but it is contradictory to Adam’s 
use of the analogy; Adam differentiates animal fellowship as a lower (and therefore 
inharmonious) frequency compared to that of human “rational delight,” but the 
difference is only that of degree. It is, in Paradise Lost, a satanic mode to overcome 
lower consciousnesses and treat them as object/instruments. Adam’s use of the analogy 
shows that the rational soul is a living and intrinsic part of what, for Willis, is an 
instrument to be manipulated, but of course this is in unfallen paradise; the question 
remains as to what effect the Fall will have upon the ideal monism that characterises 
paradise thus far. 
 
The originally Platonic notion of ontological musical harmony, figured in this 
instance through the trope of the self as musical instrument, is ubiquitous in Paradise 
Lost and throughout the intellectual environment in which Milton was writing. We meet 
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it in the ‘starry dance’ of Milton’s cosmology and, more prosaically, in Of Education 
with the prescription of musical activities to assist and cherish nature in her first 
concoction” after eating.439
 
 The harmonious musicality of the unfallen world is explicit 
in the morning of prayers in which Adam and Eve have both “various style” and “holy 
rapture” and throughout which every aspect of the natural world of paradise seems to 
take a part (PL 5. 146-7). But the microcosmic world is also imagined in these terms: it 
is no coincidence that Glisson terms the interactions of spirit and grosser matter 
subliming in the blood the ‘vitae chorea’ or the ‘dance of life’. Concurrently, the lack of 
harmony inherent in God’s absence is figured as discord, both in the realm of chaos and 
within the human body-soul and the fallen natural world that surrounds it. In chaos the 
allegorical persona of Discord has “a thousand various mouths” (PL 2. 967); discord 
emerges in the fallen body-soul with the uprising of terrible passions (PL 9. 1124), and 
in the fallen natural world it appears in the change to a seasonal climate of extremes and 
the new ‘antipathy’ between the animals (PL 9. 1123-4). This motif is clearly related to 
the ‘barbarous dissonance’ of the Bacchic revellers who tear Orpheus to pieces in the 
invocation to Urania at the beginning of Book 7: distance from God is figured as 
physically destructive and chaotic discordance. Writing on At A Solemn Music Mattison 
states that Milton alludes to 
the Pythagorean theory of harmony, in which the perfect intervals are 
created by mathematically elegant ratios between the lengths of 
equally tense plucked strings, and the more dissonant an interval, the 
more arithmetically complicated the ratio. What matters here is the 
simile: sin acts on the moral harmony of the world as a discordant 
note upon a triad.440
 
 
This clearly corresponds to the place of music in unfallen paradise, but although in 
Milton’s earlier work this relation may be that of simile, I argue that at the end of 
Paradise Lost the relation of moral discordance and physical discordance becomes 
explicitly self-identical, perhaps even uncomfortably so in the overlapping of natural 
evil with moral evil. Just as in a fallen world the body’s most mundane functions 
                                                            
439 CPW 2: 411. 
440 Andrew Mattison ‘Sweet Imperfection: Milton and the Troubled Metaphor of Harmony’ in  Modern 
Philology 106. 4 (2009), 617-647. 643. Mattison is referring to the prayer of the following sequence: 
That we on Earth with undiscording voice 
May rightly answer that melodious noise; 
As once we did, till disproportion’d sin 
Jarr’d against natures chime, and with harsh din 
Broke the fair musick that all creatures made 
To their great Lord, whose love their motion sway’d (17–22). 
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respond to the ordering influence of music, at the disaster of the Fall the functional 
order and activity of those spirits and thicker matters are thrown into corruption and the 
vitae chorea shifts into discord, opening up the possibility of a notion of disease that 
hovers between the contained inner discordances of Galenic distemper and the still-
developing notions of corruption as infection by an outside agent. 
 
The vitalist materialism of Francis Glisson is a precise analogue for the vitalist 
natural philosophy of unfallen paradise, but the Fall clearly changes everything, from 
the position of the sun and stars to the relationships between animals, the quality of the 
air and, of course, the minds and bodies of Adam and Eve. The upward motions of ever-
more-perfect ontology are expressed in Raphael’s ‘one first matter all’ speech as 
sublimation, which fits with a natural philosophy that is characterised by a ubiquitous 
underlying process of fertile fermentation. When, however, the downward movement of 
the scale begins, we must ask how this model of natural philosophy might underlie and 
substantiate it. I suggest that it is in the work of Glisson and Willis that we find the best 
analogues for the bodily/spiritual corruption that the Fall constitutes. The consumption 
of the fruit brings ‘death into the world, and all our woe’ but, as Adam and Eve struggle 
to understand during the first hours that follow the disaster, death does not simply mean 
the death of the body. Rather, as in the Christian Doctrine, the sentence of death 
includes a proliferation of various effects in the body, mind and natural world, with 
physical death taking the place of a merciful release.  
 
In this chapter I will argue that one way the discords of fallenness are 
represented is in the corruption of the perfect sublimations of spirit and matter that 
characterised the natural philosophy of unfallen paradise. Corruption, Glisson notes, is a 
natural separation of the constituent elements of the mixt, and the body and spirit 
described by Willis are constituted by ontologically separate and antagonistic modes of 
spirit and matter, their relations based upon a model of sublimation as burning particles. 
Willis in particular focuses upon the highest levels of spirit (in his schema the animal 
spirit) where Glisson’s slightly earlier work specialises in the motions of bodily 
substance at all levels. In the works of both doctors there are central examinations of the 
power of toxic, febrile fermentation in the body. This chapter will show that what 
Milton terms “all man’s component parts” are subject to a particular degree of death 
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after the Fall and this dissolution is a partial undoing of the perfect monist system of 
prelapsarian ontology.441
 
 
 
 
ii. Vital heat and toxic fermentation 
 
As might be expected of a practising doctor, Glisson spends much of his effort 
upon differentiating the peaceful motions of the healthy body from the troubled motions 
of the diseased. 
 
The elements of the mixt are the struggling parts. Once this motion 
arises, the parts of the mixt, which before dwelt together united and 
peacefully, disagree and break into factions. This motion is as it were 
a civil war aroused among the elements of the mixt. The external 
cause, that is to say the cause that excites this sedition, is a ferment 
mingled with the other elements or a part of the mixt which takes the 
ferment's place. Both causes drive the spirits of the mixt to a greater 
activity than that which fits well with the thicker parts of it. Hence a 
disagreement quickly starts, and the spirits strive to fly away and 
abandon the thickest elements; these, in turn, resist and provoke riots 
and factions.442
 
  
The body politic at war with itself is clearly in evidence here, as it so often is in 
seventeenth-century representations of disease. In this political reading of the diseased 
body we might note that it is a seditious addition, a new ferment, which provokes the 
higher orders of spirit into extra energetic activity. They abandon their lower cohorts 
and chaotic conflict follows; the riots and faction of the lower orders are caused by the 
unhealthy upward aspiration in the upper orders. What is also significant, however, is 
the impact that the theories of fermentation are having upon the Galenic notion of 
distemper: this disorder may be caused by elements that are already there, in Galenic 
style, but it may also be caused by an outside influence, figured as a poisonous ferment. 
 
Both Willis and Glisson identify different kinds of fermentation. For Glisson 
they are “the one perfectiva et exaltativa, the other degradativa,” and the perfecting, 
exalting ferment is the “natural enkindling (accensio) of the vital spirits” that is the 
                                                            
441 CPW 6: 404. 
442 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 162. Giglioni cites MS 
Sloane 3308 ("Probabile est Lienem fermentationi sanguinis inservire"), ff. 303r-304r. 
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natural motion of the spirit and matter of the blood, perfecting and exalting the lower 
spirits and matter of the food, assimilating it and imbuing it with “nobler qualities.” 
This model is familiar from the last two chapters. The ferment of degradation is, in 
contrast, an unnatural “enkindling” of the spirits, which arises from impurities present 
in the blood. The dual aspect of this process means that “life and death, the enkindling 
of the spirits and putrefaction dwell close to each other.”443 Willis too identifies two 
comparable types of fermentation: one is a pure exaltation, where even the caput 
mortuum or dead earth can be volatilised by repeated distillation: “Chymists, in 
Distilling, that the Liquor may be made better, separate the subtile and spirituous parts, 
from the Caput Mortuum, and then pour them on it again; and this work they so often 
repeat, till the Caput Mortuum... is by frequent Distillation Volatilized, and the Liquor 
rightly exalted, even in all its Particles.”444
 
 This process of repeated distillation is 
hesitantly suggested as the province of the still-mysterious spleen. The other is a 
fermentation which brings dissolution and putrefaction. Although Willis’s model is one 
of active corpuscular matter subject to the laws of motion and Glisson’s proposes 
instead the model of vitally self-active substance, both doctors give a parallel account of 
these different ferments, adding them as new explanations of the originally Galenic 
temperate or distempered body. The perfecting and exalting ferment is that in which the 
highest order of spirit is most active, energetically struggling to fly upwards, expanding 
but still assimilating. The putrefying ferment, in contrast, is characterised by the flying 
away of the highest orders of spirit and results in the dominant activity of the lower 
order of substance in the blood, the sulphurous component. 
The power of the poisonous ferment will finally give a basis in natural 
philosophy for the second attempt Satan makes upon Eve while she sleeps. We know 
that Satan’s attempts upon the ‘organs of her fancy’ recall mechanist and dualist models 
of consciousness in various ways, but Milton’s other descriptor of Satan’s work is 
rooted firmly in the similary workings of vital and animal spirit. So, if her mental 
organs are not to be manipulated, he hopes that, 
 
       inspiring venom, he might taint 
Th' animal spirits that from pure blood arise  
Like gentle breaths from rivers pure, thence raise 
At least distempered, discontented thoughts, 
                                                            
443 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 162. Giglioni cites MS 
Sloane 3310, ff. 103r-104r. 
444 Willis, Of Fermentation, 13. 
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Vain hopes, vain aims, inordinate desires 
Blown up with high conceits engendering pride  
(PL 4. 804-09) 
 
This is a rather scientific representation of the well-established contemporary subject of 
demonic possession. As Stuart Clark observes, the medical establishment were 
generally in accordance with the notion that the devil could interfere with human spirits 
and affect the body and the mind.445
 
 In this particular instance, however, Eve is subject 
to an invasion that stands on the cusp between demonic possession and newly 
developing notions of medical infection. In his work on contagious fever, Willis 
describes the effect that the poisonous ferment has upon the body if it attacks the blood 
and animal spirits first: 
When a Pestilential Breath or Vapour, hath invaded any one, and that 
Poyson hath first laid hold on the Animal Spirits, or those of the 
Bloud, or both of them at once... the taint is quickly derived from the 
subtil and more thin substance of these, into a more thick matter: 
because it quickly ferments the whole Mass of Bloud, or of the 
Nervous Juice, and the Excrementitious Humors, every where 
abounding, and from thence is deduced into the solid parts, and fixes 
the evil in them. If this Disease, first possesses the Animal Spirits, 
presently the hurt is communicated to the Brain, and the Nervous 
stock... [causing] Phrensies, Deliriums, or pertinacious Watchings.446
 
 
This infection, should it gain access, spreads and breeds, primarily affecting the mind, 
although a putrid fever quickly commences. Satan, of course, describes himself as 
“wrapped in mist / Of midnight vapour,” although the natural dews and exhalations of 
paradise will not become pestilent until after the Fall, of which more later (PL 9. 158-9). 
The transition of the Helmontian ferment, with its vital properties, sense of intention 
and relation to the Paracelsian spirit, into the inanimate corpuscular ferment of the iatro-
chymists occurred through the 1650s and 1660s and Milton’s Satan with this attempt 
upon Eve’s blood and spirits is clearly located in this period of transition.447
 
  
The attack on Eve corresponds to the ferment that for Willis causes pestilent 
brain fever, but in contemporary medicine the toxic ferment has a number of effects on 
                                                            
445 Stuart Clark, Thinking with Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe (Oxford, OUP, 
1997), 188. 
446 Willis, Of Feavers, in Dr. Willis's practice of physick being the whole works of that renowned and 
famous physician, trans. S. Pordage (London, 1684), 103. 
447 For a detailed examination of the transition of the notion of spirit during this period (and the place of 
Glisson, Charlton and Willis in that transition) see Clericuzio, ‘The Internal Laboratory: The Chemical 
Reinterpretation of Medical Spirits in England (1650-1680)’ in Alchemy and Chemistry in the Sixteenth 
and Seventeenth Centuries, ed. P. Rattansi and A. Clericuzio (London: Kluwer, 1994), 51-84. 
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man’s component parts. In the toxic ferment described by Glisson the highest level of 
spirit is over-stimulated and flies away; then the riots and factions of the lowest levels 
of sulphur in the blood result in it becoming “impure and corrupted by fumes of sulphur 
instead of being imbued with vital spirits,” and the resulting ferment gives rise to a 
“preternatural and febrile heat.”448 Likewise, Willis notes that “if the Blood becomes 
too luxuriant, and apt to grow turgid, by reason of plenty of Sulphur being carried 
forth... either its Accension or Fermentation in the Heart, is very much increased, so that 
from thence a Feaverish heat, and greater effervescencies than usual, are stirred up in 
the whole.”449 In both writers this ascension of the lower order of sulphurous matter is 
characteristic of rotting rather than ripening, so disease can be seen as a rotting of the 
living body. Willis, with a classical pragmatism, places the two processes in one 
overarching system of natural philosophy.450
 
 The following passage illustrates a process 
of upward chymical transformation similar to the one described by Raphael in the 
perfecting motion of the one first matter: 
it behoves Nature to perfect her Work, and to Cook and ripen the 
substance, as yet rude and undigested; wherefore the active Principles 
leisurely extricate themselves from the more thick, and creep forwards 
towards the top, there being placed with a mutual increase, they are 
formed into Flowers and Blossoms, from which at length (for that they 
are of a soft and light texture) spirit and sulphur easily evaporate and 
the frame of the mixture quickly decays.451
 
 
This is a fallen scale of nature: the spirit and sulphur fly away altogether at the 
culmination of ripening, leaving the lowest remnants to decay. The freedom from death 
and corruption in Milton’s unfallen paradise drew upon the utopian enthusiasm of 
alchemist theory (without legitimating the claims for an alchemical purification of the 
fallen world) in the vision of a perfectly pure, yet transformative natural philosophy and 
human ontology. However, medical chymistry also offers a perfect paradigm for the fall 
of the natural world into corruption.  
 
                                                            
448 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 163. Giglioni cites MS 
Sloane 3310, f. 177r; also De Ventriculo, 478-479. 
449 Willis, Of Feavers, 55. 
450 Giglioni notes that Glisson criticised Willis for using the notion of fermentation in numerous contexts 
with a resulting lack of precision (Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’), 164. 
451 Willis, Of Fermentation, 11. 
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Willis superimposes a chymical interpretation on to the old classical notion of 
generation and corruption as part of the same ripening/rotting movement of natural and 
living things. All natural bodies, including that of man, 
 
tend from Crudity and Confusion towards Perfection, for the sake of 
which, when they have reach'd the height, they are able to come to, 
they are not quiet in this point; but from thence they make hast 
towards the dissolution of that thing. Those which are more volatile do 
first of all break forth from the loosened bond of the mixture; then the 
rest separate into parts, until the form of the mixture wholly perishes: 
The Spirit being carried forth to the top, flies away first with the 
water, and the more pure Sulphur, and by its expiration, diffuses a 
very grateful odour; afterwards the more thick Sulphur, with the Salt, 
being loosened from the band wherewith they were tyed, and having 
gotten a flux, by degrees evaporate, and together disperse a very 
stinking smell: together with these, the watery parts flow forth, and 
the frame of the subject breaks, or falls down into Earth, or a Caput 
Mortuum.452
 
 
The natural philosophy of unfallen paradise had been imagined as a system where this 
process culminates in perfection without the constituent spirits, odours and matter 
continuing into dissolution. In this sequence, Willis has purged the Helmontian odour of 
its mysterious active vitality, and maintains a natural continuity between the generative 
ferment and the decay that follows it. Glisson, despite his fascination with the close 
relation of the different processes (one of the production of vital heat, the other of the 
corrupt ferment), differentiates more carefully their qualities, demarcating with more 
precision the fine lines between healthy fermentation, diseased fermentation and the 
corruptions that follow death.  
 
Like any other kind of putrefaction, febrile putrefaction is ‘a 
preternatural motion aroused in the mass of the blood’. It may also be 
seen as a form of heat, but unlike vital heat, ‘it arises from mutual 
conflict and hatred among the elementary parts of the blood’ and it 
differs from the putrefaction that occurs in corpses (cadaverosa 
putredo). Whereas vital heat is a placid and uniform motion, 
putrefaction represents a riotous and violent alteration of that 
motion.453
 
   
The animism of this description enables a more powerful political allegory to be made, 
and avoids the naturalising of Willis’s classical inclusiveness. Glisson’s more 
                                                            
452 Willis, Of Fermentation, 22. 
453 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 155. Giglioni cites MS 
Sloane 3310, f. 233r; also 3309, f. 107r; 3309, f. 183. 
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differentiated approach is thus closer to Milton’s own, since for Milton, the shift from 
one mode to the other is part of the tragic ontological trajectory of the Fall. “Glisson 
conjectured that, within the spectrum of the different degrees of vital heat, fever could 
be seen as a transformation of the ‘friendly and gentle’ motion of life into the 
‘tumultuous and seditious’ motions of fermentation, putrefaction, and illness.”454
 
 The 
transition from perfect bodily sublimation to a corrupted and diseased fermentation 
characterises, as we shall see, the physiological changes in Adam and Eve at the Fall.  
For Glisson, in the healthy body “The spirits which are the cause of the vital 
motion enjoy dwelling together with the thicker parts of the blood,” and, in contrast, in 
the diseased body “the fermenting spirits are provoked to motion by a sort of nausea 
resulting from their having to dwell with the thicker matter.” Differentiating between 
the two, he notes that the production of “the vital heat tends to secure and maintain the 
tone and continuity of the parts” whereas the febrile ferment “heavily contributes to the 
scattering and dissolution of the bodies with which it is mixed.”455
 
 The repulsion of the 
higher and more rarefied spirit toward the lower and more solid matter in the body 
echoes the aristocratic repulsion of Satan towards the “creature formed of earth” who is, 
Exalted from so base original, 
With heavenly spoils, our spoils: what he decreed 
He effected; man he made, and for him built 
Magnificent this world, and earth his seat, 
Him lord pronounced, and, oh indignity! 
Subjected to his service angel wings, 
And flaming ministers to watch and tend 
Their earthy charge  
(PL 9. 150-6) 
  
Seeing the scale of nature only in terms of power and domination, Satan is jealous and 
repulsed. This error (which again inverts the order of service that Milton’s unfallen 
ethereal spirits work within) is equivalent to the nausea of the highest spirits in the 
effects of the poisonous ferment on the diseased body, which likewise inverts or 
disrupts the corresponding healthy assimilation of the lower orders of bodily substance 
to the higher. In all these models of corrupted bodily spirit and matter, there is a 
fundamental motion of the excessive upward aspiration and flight of the higher spirits, 
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455 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’,  163. Giglioni cites MS 
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the neglect of the lower orders of sulphurous  spirit in particular, and their 
corresponding riotous disorder and dissolution into foulness and chaotic shapelessness. 
Illness or diseases occur when the putrefying ferment invades or is produced in the 
healthy body. Let us compare this to the effects of the ‘fallacious fruit’ on Adam and 
Eve, focusing first upon the bodily spirits, then upon the shifts of mental and emotional 
perspective that follow. 
 
 
 
iii. Effects of the fruit 
 
How can eating the fruit cause the array of effects of the Fall? The immediate 
effect of sin is to open up a space between what seems and what is. Thus there are two 
ways in which to read the physiological effects of the fruit: one is through what Adam 
and Eve believe they are experiencing and the other is to take a wider and more careful 
approach to the narrative as a whole, to give what we might call a diagnosis of their 
symptoms. When Eve makes her momentous decision to disobey God and eat the fruit, 
the immediate effect is intoxication: 
 
      such delight till then, as seemed, 
In fruit she never tasted, whether true 
Or fancied so, through expectation high 
Of knowledge, nor was godhead from her thought. 
Greedily she engorged without restraint, 
And knew not eating death: satiate at length, 
And heightened as with wine, jocund and boon 
(PL 9. 787-793) 
 
The seeming delightfulness of the fruit’s taste is suspicious and the poet emphasises this 
immediately. When she describes the effects to the horrified Adam as: “opener mine 
eyes, / Dim erst, dilated spirits, ampler heart, / And growing up to godhead” we cannot 
take this as an accurate account of the true effects (PL 9. 875-877). Rather, they emerge 
out of the grandiose sensations and reduced ontological reality of drunkenness. 
Nevertheless, the fancied sense of height and the sense of the spirits’ dilation are 
repeated in the more reliable description given by the poet following Adam’s decision 
to eat: 
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As with new wine intoxicated both 
They swim in mirth, and fancy that they feel 
Divinity within them breeding wings 
Wherewith to scorn the earth: but that false fruit 
Far other operation first displayed, 
Carnal desire inflaming, he on Eve 
Began to cast lascivious eyes, she him 
As wantonly repaid; in lust they burn. 
(PL 9. 1008-1015) 
 
The fruit causes a fallacious expansion of spirits, and their highest faculties engage in a 
false spiritual ascent that “scorns” the earth, just as the highest orders of bodily spirit are 
revolted by the lowest and fly away at the beginning of the toxic ferment of the diseased 
body. Satan’s attempt to inspire vain hopes and aims and inordinate desires has finally 
worked. Later the poet notes the effect as “the force of that fallacious fruit, / That with 
exhilarating vapour bland / About their spirits had played, and inmost powers / Made 
err” (PL 9. 1046-9). In this instance the power of the fruit’s ‘vapour’ or the spirit that it 
exhales is clearly shown to have exhilarated their bodily spirits and created error in their 
inner powers, which could to refer to all and any of their internal faculties.  
 
This shift into a diseased ontology that characterises the responses of Adam 
and Eve’s body-soul composites to the ingestion of the fruit is the physiological 
foundation of the Fall as a fall into corruption. The sentence for disobedience is death, 
but death, even within a mortalist framework, is, as noted above, more than the 
departure of bodily life.456 In the Christian Doctrine Milton’s main polemical concern is 
with the mortalism that corresponds logically with his materialism and traducianism. He 
delineates four degrees of death to which we are subject following the Fall. These 
degrees can be productively compared to the degrees of substance in the dynamic scale 
of nature: the degrees by which we move down the scale and further from God. He 
notes that “physical death, as it is called, did not follow on the same day as Adam’s sin” 
and distinguishes the four degrees of death beneath the heading of “all evils which tend 
to death and which, it is agreed, came into the world as soon as man fell.”457 The first 
degree is that of guilt, but this degree of death is not the first in terms of sequence.458
                                                            
456 For a close examination of Milton’s mortalism in a theological context, see Nicholas McDowell, 
‘Dead Souls and Modern Minds? Mortalism and the Early Modern Imagination, from Marlowe to 
Milton’, Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 40.3 (2010), 559-592. 
 
457 CPW 6: 393. 
458 It is described as “a sort of partial death or prelude to death in us, by which we are fettered to 
condemnation and punishment as by some actual bond” (CPW 6: 393). It is, “accompanied or followed by 
terrors of conscience... [and] also by the loss of divine protection and favour, which results in the 
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Instead, the second degree described, that of spiritual death, is, in accordance with 
Milton’s materialist view of human spirit, simultaneous with the first moment of 
disobedience: “The second degree of death is called spiritual death... this death took 
place at the same moment as the fall of man, not merely on the same day.”459 
Theologically, it matches the medical pattern of events we have charted, with the first 
effect being the flying away (or darkening) of human rationality: “This death consists, 
first, in the loss or at least the extensive darkening of that right reason, whose function it 
was to discern the chief good, and which was, as it were, the life of understanding.”460
 
 
The linkages between this mode of death and the imagining of bodily spirits illustrate 
the power of the religious determinants that still order the experiments and theories of 
contemporary medicine, and nowhere is this more clear than in the ‘darkening’ of the 
mind. 
This is then a loss of rationality expressed in part through medical terms; what 
feels like flight is actually a deprivation, for the highest powers of the rational have 
flown the body-soul composite. This loss is immediately obvious in Eve’s increasingly 
confused meditation on the fruit and its significance, when she looks forward to 
growing “mature / In knowledge, as the gods who all things know; / Though others 
envy what they cannot give; / For had the gift been theirs, it had not here / Thus grown” 
(PL 9. 803-807). As Fowler observes, this is a muddled version of the serpent’s 
arguments (PL 9. 803n). The exhilarated flight of the highest powers of the human 
rational faculty (and their concurrent partial loss) leads to a number of further effects. 
Adam and Eve will encounter an inner alienation, at first unnoticed because of their 
encounter with the more seductive effects of riotous burning that follow the exhilarating 
flight of the highest spirits. Eve’s muddled thinking is accompanied by the wondering 
thought of how (and if) she is going to tell Adam about her new state: 
 
                     to Adam in what sort  
Shall I appear? Shall I to him make known 
As yet my change, and give him to partake 
Full happiness with me, or rather not, 
But keep the odds of knowledge in my power 
Without co-partner? So to add what wants 
In female sex, the more to draw his love, 
And render me more equal, and perhaps, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
lessening of the majesty of the countenance and the degradation of the mind” (CPW 6: 394). A result it 
brings shame and ‘defilement’. 
459 CPW 6: 395. 
460 CPW 6: 395. 
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A thing not undesirable, sometime 
Superior; for inferior who is free? 
(PL 9. 816-25) 
 
Eve’s mistake is by now a familiar one: she takes the position of being lower down the 
scale as a denigration of her value, much as Raphael had implied it was in the lecture he 
gave Adam. The vitalist materialist natural philosophy of unfallen paradise, as well as 
the relation of earth and sun in Raphael’s earlier lessons, however, declare this to be 
untrue: it is not the position on the scale that matters as much as the direction of travel. 
The satanic confusion of the meaning of liberty is also here – as a creation of God 
humanity must always be inferior to something, despite the possibility of rarefaction 
and flight to heaven that had been there in the unfallen world. To understand being free 
as being superior is a truly satanic position. However, what concerns me most of all 
here is Eve’s question of how she should “appear” since this fracture between her 
exterior and her own authentic sense of herself has not been present until now. Adam 
too encounters an inner alienation that is evident before he actually realises it. 
 
 Adam’s first words after his Fall are flirtatious, ironic wordplays on the notion 
of sapience: the word sapience is derived from the Latin word sapientia, meaning 
wisdom. Related to this word is the Latin verb sapere, which means “to taste, to be 
wise, to know,” and Adam makes full use of this rich constellation of meanings. His 
speech, which ends in seduction, begins thus: 
 
Eve, now I see thou art exact of taste, 
And elegant, of sapience no small part, 
Since to each meaning savour we apply, 
And palate call judicious  
(PL 9. 1017-1020) 
 
Just as Eve wonders how she should appear to Adam upon ingesting the fruit, Adam’s 
words indicate a new internal division; hovering between alternative meanings of 
“sapience” Adam’s words in fact signify that the integration between mind and body 
that preceded the Fall is broken. The pun would not work if the pleasures of taste and 
the development of the mind to wisdom were not suddenly divergent, only to be wittily 
(and fallaciously) conjoined again. Where Raphael had combined pleasure and wisdom, 
in that the pleasure of eating fruit of paradise was fuel to actualise spiritual ascension, 
tasting and knowing are now separate from understanding. Sexual knowing is just about 
to suffer the same fracture; sex is clearly pleasurable, but is no longer mysterious, holy 
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and begun with lingering foreplay, but immediate, inflamed and impersonal. Just as Eve 
is prey to jealousy and power play, Adam no longer sees her as a sexual agent: as an 
object of desire, she and his enjoyment of her are instead “bounty of this virtuous tree” 
(PL 9. 1033). 
 
This alienation of the sensory from the rational will become the basis for the 
internal warfare that Adam and Eve will suffer after their first, wild intoxication. 
Jumping ahead to see how this inner fracture looks the following morning, we find that: 
 
They sat them down to weep, nor only tears 
Rained at their eyes, but high winds worse within 
Began to rise, high passions, anger, hate, 
Mistrust, suspicion, discord, and shook sore 
Their inward state of mind, calm region once 
And full of peace, now tossed and turbulent: 
For understanding ruled not, and the will 
Heard not her lore, both in subjection now 
To sensual appetite, who from beneath 
Usurping over sovereign reason claimed  
Superior sway: from thus distempered breast, 
Adam, estranged in look and altered style, 
Speech intermitted thus to Eve renewed 
(PL 9. 1121-1133) 
 
This makes explicit what was implicit in Adam’s earlier, seductive speech: his 
estranged look and altered style are focused upon Eve, but they also emerge from the 
process that has estranged him from himself, separating sensual knowing from rational 
understanding. Their inner alterity and estrangement mean that different aspects of their 
beings are now in discord, in contrast to the monist harmonious mutual resonation they 
had before the Fall. We will explore more thoroughly the resonances between this new 
order of body-soul and the representation of the realm of chaos later. For now we can 
note that the first death (guilt) emerges here, in the inner alterity, with the shame and 
self-rejection that are to come; this new distempered relation between the lower orders 
of sensuality and what is left of human rationale now begins to look like the more 
orthodox Pauline body and soul, where the spirit and the flesh are in constant conflict.  
 
This orthodox mode of spirit and flesh also finds itself represented in 
contemporary medical research. The commitment to dualism in Charleton’s work of the 
1670s is inspired in part by Willis’s work of the decades before, which he often comes 
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close to replicating. He describes the relation between the corporeal, sensitive soul and 
the immaterial rational soul thus: 
 
this intestine War, seeing it cannot arise from one and the same thing 
possessed with affections mutually repugnant, and inclining us two 
contrary waies at once; argues a Duumvirate of Rulers reciprocaly 
clashing, and contending for superiority; and such too that are as 
remote in their natures, as different in the modes of their subsistence.  
Upon this War depend all the Passions by which the restless Mind of 
Man is so variously, and many times also violently agitated, to his 
almost perpetual disquiet and vexation.461
 
 
What is very difficult to find in these texts, however, is a corpuscular model of how this 
war between the highest ontological levels works. We know that the animal spirits are 
sublimed into the immaterial realm of the rational soul, but there is no model for the 
downward impact of the rational upon the sensitive system. The omission is significant 
because the animated body that these doctors are proposing relies entirely upon models 
of sublimation and fermentation for its functioning. It is, perhaps, part of the ubiquitous 
problem of how the immaterial can be linked to the material and in both the poetry and 
the medical texts this particular division remains within the older discursive mode. The 
corruption of the blood, however, is progressively theorised and re-theorised during the 
period and in Milton’s model, where the intellectual spirits are a material distillation of 
the animal, there is no ontological abyss to cross from the senses to the rational soul. 
Thus, in this theory of corruption we can find not only how the intellectual spirits are 
supposed to fly away, but also how they are imagined as being darkened.  
 
Despite the more orthodox implications of this fracture between the animate 
body and the rational soul, the medical patterns of meaning in the process of the Fall 
continue to correspond to the newest available models of corruption and disease. While 
Adam and Eve are still what we might describe as ‘high’, their fancy also suggests that 
their divine ascent is ‘breeding’ wings in their bodies; this hallucination covers the fact 
that – as Adam later finds out – what is actually breeding in the body is a film over the 
eyes. When he prepares Adam for his divine visions, Michael “from Adam’s eyes the 
film removed / Which that false fruit that promised clearer sight / Had bred” (PL 11. 
412-4). The hallucination of new organs ‘breeding’ in the body, and the reality of 
breeding substances in the body (and particularly the breeding of this barrier over the 
eyes) suggest again a poisonous fermentation, which charges the higher powers to fly 
                                                            
461 Charleton, Natural History of the Passions, 54. 
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away and the sulphurous elements to burn up, and which produces effluviums or excreta 
in the wrong bodily place, in particular the eyes. This is a good moment to pause and 
note again that Glisson diagnosed gout as caused by a poisonous ferment in the blood 
similar to that which, in the new iatro-chemical medicine, caused gutta serena: one that 
brought the blood to a “vinous condition” and produced tartareous residues.462
 
 In 
Glisson’s view, 
This is also proven by excesses of wine and sex, which increase the 
disposition to arthritis by facilitating the fermentation of the blood and 
consequently the exaltation of the spirits. The result of this 
fermentation is a tartareous residue which takes the form of a 
calculous sedimentation in the joints.463
 
  
Drunkenness and overindulgence in sex are two of the causal factors invoked repeatedly 
by doctors who write about the unhealthy ferment in the blood that leads to deposits of 
stone or waste matter. As Adam and Eve initially explore the new passions of 
fallenness, they promptly discover the self-generating nature of sin and the natural evil 
of disease, for intoxication and sexual indulgence in a fallen world will lead to a sight 
further darkened and a literal build up of ‘the stone’ in the body that may indeed be 
mortal. In a theological mode, Milton remarks that “sin is its own punishment... As sins 
increase so they bind the sinners to death more surely.”464
 
 The concurrent medical 
theory underlying the Fall substantiates this statement with precision, but in an entirely 
different mode. Critics have often noted the consonance between the darkened sight 
brought on by the Fall and the blindness suffered by Milton himself. I propose that these 
linkages are in fact part of a more coherent understanding of contemporary medical 
notions of fermentation in the animate body than has yet been established. 
 If we explore a little further the pattern of the toxic bodily fermentation that 
has featured in the physiology of the Fall so far, it becomes clear that the flying away of 
the intellectual spirits is part of the same process that darkens them. Adam and Eve 
“play” until they are exhausted and the less pleasant effects of the fruit start to emerge: 
 
                                          
                                                            
462 Willis concurs, but wonders why gout does not bring a fever, if “impurities falling off from the heated 
Blood, and received by the joints, is the material cause of the Goutish pain,” but he then designates the 
impurities of gout as particularly saline in nature, which apparently accounts for the difference (Two 
Discourses, 214). 
463Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 162.  Gigioni cites MS 
Sloane 3310 ("Arthritidis causa non est necessario frigida"), ff. 45r-50r. 
464 CPW 6: 395. 
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                                 till dewy sleep 
Oppressed them, wearied with their amorous play. 
Soon as the force of that fallacious fruit, 
That with exhilarating vapour bland 
About their spirits had played, and inmost powers 
Made err, was now exhaled, and grosser sleep 
Bred of unkindly fumes, with conscious dreams 
Encumbered, now had left them, up they rose 
As from unrest, and each the other viewing, 
Soon found their eyes how opened, and their minds 
How darkened. 
(PL 9. 1044-1054) 
 
We know that the vapour of the fruit has exhilarated their spirits, but I would like to 
extend this analysis to the darkened minds and the burning of lust that they encounter.  
In Willis’s model, as in Glisson’s, one level of spirit is distilled, or sublimed out of the 
lower level, therefore the exhalations of the blood are the animal spirits. We have 
already noted that in the highest levels of sublimation, Willis’s theory diverges from the 
chymical model of animate, seductive and struggling similary substance in that 
corpuscular animal spirits are sublimed into the immaterial realm of the rational soul, 
and that the imagined conflict between the rational and the sensitive actually work 
better in Milton’s materialist paradigm. In representing the reactions between the levels 
Willis also emphasises the burning of particles. Thus he ends with a model whereby the 
vital spirits of the blood are ‘flamy’ and the animal spirits that emerge from these 
flames are in fact like nothing so much as light itself: “the Animal Spirits... we say are 
most subtil Bodies, and highly active, instilled from the inkindled Blood into the Brain, 
and its Appendix... they are lucid and aerial.”465
 
  
The darkening of the mind takes on a new, material resonance if the animal 
spirits themselves are made of light sublimed out of the ‘flamy’ vital spirit of the blood, 
particularly if we imagine the intellectual spirits as the next level of distilled purity. 
Willis describes the effect of the disposition of the blood upon the mind in his re-
evaluation of mental disorders such as melancholy: 
 
when as they [the animal spirits] ought to be transparent, subtle, and 
lucid, become in Melancholy obscure, thick, and dark, so that they 
represent the Images of things, as it were in a shadow, or covered with 
darkness... we have already shewed, that the Animal Spirits flowing 
forth from the inkindled Blood, go forth after a manner, as the rays of 
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light from a flame. And it sufficiently appears, that the light shews and 
illustrates it self diversly, according as it proceeds from the burning of 
bodies, flaming forth after a various manner; as of Spirits of Wine, 
Oyl, Fat, Mineral Sulphur, Nitre, and others: in like manner the 
Animal Spirits, forasmuch as stilled forth from the Blood, having got 
this or that, or some other disposition, they are either subtil, clear, or 
dull, thick, and as it were sooty, they variously pass thorow and 
irradiate the organs of the Animal Functions, and so for that reason, 
diversly pervert their actions.466
 
 
Quite literally, the light of the mind is darkened by the burning in the blood. And Adam 
and Eve do, indeed, burn with contagious fire. We might then attribute the burning of 
lust that follows the initial effects as the riotous burning of the lower, sulphurous 
elements of the blood. The inflammation of the burning of lust is an ontological mode 
so steeped in Pauline theology that it is not necessarily obvious that one might 
interrogate it further, but the subtle interlinking of medical theory and theological 
narrative gives the burning body multiple resonances. Adam and Eve’s desire is most 
clearly evident in their eyes, which “darted contagious fire”; this is clearly a real, 
physiological event, rather than the result of ‘high expectation’ (PL 9. 1036). Indeed, 
according to Willis it is passion that lights the spirits of the eyes up in this way, since 
from the iris there is “a certain vigor, and mighty conflux of Animal Spirits, by the 
Exertion of which, the Eye seems to beam forth, and to cast forth outwardly certain 
darts like Lightning, according to the Instinct of the Passions.”467
 
 The perversely 
darkening effect of this flame recalls the “darkness visible” of the flames of Milton’s 
Hell, adding to the already consonant notions of burning sulphur in the body and 
traditional representations of the brimstone of Hell. It is important to remember that, 
even when research was not deliberately mingling the theological notion of spirit with 
the medical, as the work of Paracelsus or Fludd did, medical theories of chymical 
reaction still functioned in a religious paradigm. This common origin gives a root from 
which multiple meanings can diverge and interrelate, and Milton’s poetry is richly 
inclusive in its weaving of different medical theories with their religious counterparts.  
 
 
                                                            
466 Willis, Two Discourses, 189. 
467 Willis, Two Discourses, 85. The word instinct does not of course carry its modern meaning here; we 
should rather think of it as inflamed or intrinsically charged, as in the moment in chaos when Satan is 
carried aloft by a cloud that is “Instinct with fire and nitre” (PL 2. 937). 
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iv. Sulphur and nitre in Paradise Lost 
 
At this point we can again employ the wider natural philosophy of the poem to 
illuminate Milton’s rather brief representation of human physiology. Some of the most 
well known lines in Paradise Lost make explicit correlations between landscape and 
physiology: Satan’s jealous leer at Adam and Eve being “Imparadised in one another’s 
arms” (PL 4. 506) is substantiated later by Michael’s promise that on leaving paradise 
they will find a happier “paradise within” (PL 12. 587). There is also of course the 
famous revelation that Satan’s 
 
                     horror and doubt distract 
His troubled thoughts, and from the bottom stir 
The hell within him, for within him hell 
He brings, and round about him, nor from hell 
One step no more than from himself can fly 
By change of place.  
(PL 4. 18-23) 
 
These are telling moments, but they are also open to interpretation: these versions of 
paradise and hell within may refer to states of mind rather than states of body-soul that 
involve physiological systems. What, in contrast, is not metaphorical is the information 
we have from Raphael about the scale of nature. Raphael has explicitly placed all 
conscious creatures in the same scale of nature, and that scale includes the animal, 
vegetable and mineral levels of creation, too. Moreover he explains his own (and Adam 
and Eve’s) physiology through precisely the same set of processes of transformation 
that characterise the rest of the scale. The correlation between natural philosophy and 
physiology (both human and angelic) is made in various shades of metaphor throughout 
the poem, but it is also shown to be literal. We can also note Satan’s cry, “I to hell am 
thrust, / Where neither joy nor love, but fierce desire, / Among our other torments not 
the least, / Still unfulfilled with pain of longing pines,” which illustrates a material 
suffering and a burning that crosses the boundaries between the livid, sulphurous flames 
of hell, the burning of desire and the agonised mind that all occur in descriptions of 
ontological fallenness (PL 4. 508-11). 
 
We have already noted that hell is characterised by motifs of industrial 
alchemy; it is also true that, although body imagery abounds in the landscapes of 
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Paradise Lost, hell is the most bodily of them all. It has veins, ribs, entrails, a womb, 
and a mouth and it both swallows the demons and cries out in horror at their tumultuous 
approach. It can seem that burning sulphur is hell’s most antiquated attribute. Satan’s 
description of his own suffering quoted above is clearly linked to the poet’s earliest 
description of hell where “torture without end / Still urges, and the fiery deluge, fed / 
With ever-burning sulphur unconsumed” (PL 1. 67-9). However, as we have seen, 
sulphurous burning was also a topic of contemporary developments in natural 
philosophy and medicine. The weapons proposed by Moloch for a second military 
attempt on heaven are the “Tartarean sulphur, and strange fire” of hell, and I suggest 
that the ‘strange fire’ added here to the more traditional Tartarean sulphur (which 
clearly nods to biblical and classical legacies) is informed by the newer model of the 
sulphur and nitre mix (PL 2. 69). Marjara notes that Milton’s use of the sulphur/nitre 
theory of substance rather than the tria prima of the Paracelsians shows a close 
engagement with contemporary developments in natural philosophy.468 Guerlac argues 
further that the sulphurous fire of hell in Paradise Lost is related to Mayow’s 
sulphur/nitre theory of earthquakes and thunder, but he also notes that this 
iatrochemistry was a popular model borrowed by contemporary physiology. 469
 
 Willis in 
particular represents the sublimations of the body’s substances as being based on the 
reactions of sulphur and nitre. In his tract The Ascension of the Blood, Willis compares 
the reactions in the blood to other natural examples of sublunary fire, describing the 
vital spirit as a burning reaction between the sulphurous elements of the blood and the 
nitrous ‘food’ inhaled in the air: 
there is need of a free and undiscontinued access of Air, and that not 
only, that the vaporous Effluvia's, threatning the suffocation of the 
flame, may be carried away, and always depart, but much rather, that 
the nitrous food necessarily requisite for the burning of any thing, may 
be supplied by the Air. For indeed every sublunary fire, and especially 
flame, is compounded or made up altogether of sulphureous Particles, 
breaking out in heaps from a combustible Body, and of nitrous 
Bodies, which every where flow in the Air, meeting with them.470
 
 
This is a model in which the blood literally burns. However, the natural philosophy of 
hell also involves sublimation: the ground of hell 
 
                                                            
468 Marjara, Contemplation of Created Things, 173-4. 
469 Henry Guerlac, ‘The Poets’ Nitre’, Isis 45. 3 (1954), 243-255, 251; 255.  
470 Willis, The Ascension of the Blood , in Dr. Willis's practice of physick being the whole works of that 
renowned and famous physician, trans. S. Pordage (London, 1684), 22. 
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        appeared in hue, as when the force 
Of subterranean wind transports a hill 
Torn from Pelorus, or the shattered side 
Of thundering Ætna, whose combustible  
And fuelled entrails thence conceiving fire, 
Sublimed with mineral fury, aid the winds, 
And leave a singèd bottom all involved 
With stench and smoke: such resting found the sole  
Of unblessed feet. 
(PL 1. 230-8) 
 
The simile is given astonishing perspective and immediacy by the suddenly intruding 
vision of the unblessed feet that step into it. In this instance hell is described as a half 
destroyed volcanic landscape through the meteorological theory of subterranean sulphur 
and nitre that is exhaled into the atmosphere before exploding into storms. This 
sublimation is burning fiercely, however, with a ‘mineral fury’ that implies that (as in 
the fevered body) the sulphur itself is enraged, and is quite unlike the gentle 
sublimations of precisely the same substances in heaven and earth.  
 
The parallels and divergences between the sublimations of hell and those of 
heaven can, I suggest, illuminate the differences between the sublimation of the healthy 
body-soul composite and its diseased counterpart. Significantly, the geology of earth, 
heaven and hell is all constituted by this sulphur/nitre mixture, just as all elements of the 
creation derive from the same first matter. Chaos, that turbulent but morally neutral 
zone of uncreated matter, includes exploding clouds of fire and nitre that are 
dramatically foregrounded in the moment that Satan is blown out of an eternal vacuum 
by one (PL 2. 935-8). Like the first matter, the ‘entrails’ of the different areas of the 
creation are the same, so in heaven, when the fallen angels open up the surface of 
heaven, “The originals of nature in their crude / Conception; sulphurous and nitrous 
foam / They found” (PL 6. 509-11). Despite its long-standing associations with hell, 
sulphur (along with nitre) also constitutes the grounds of heaven and earth and thus does 
not hold any intrinsic moral significance whatsoever.  
 
What, then, is the difference between the chymical processes of these different 
landscapes if they are fundamentally constituted by the same elements? The answer is 
that although they all have sulphur and nitre at their most basic level, their sublimation 
also relies upon other levels of spirit. Raphael recounts Satan’s discovery thus: 
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This continent of spacious heav’n, adorned 
With plant, fruit, flower ambrosial, gems and gold, 
Whose eye so superficially surveys 
These things, as not to mind from whence they grow 
Deep under ground, materials dark and crude, 
Of spirituous and fiery spume, till touched 
With heaven’s ray, and tempered they shoot forth 
So beauteous, op’ning to the ambient light. 
These in their dark nativity the deep 
Shall yield us, pregnant with infernal flame. 
(PL 6. 474-83) 
 
In heaven the sulphur and nitre is in the ground and always already has the potential to 
yield “infernal flame” but, crucially, this sulphur and nitre is constantly being gently 
touched and tempered by heavenly light and thus stimulated into healthy, living activity. 
This process is equivalent to the gentle upward assimilations imagined in the animate 
body-soul composites of the poem and their own realm of earth. The explosive power of 
fiery sulphur and spirituous nitre parallels the first, active matter in its intrinsic energy 
and moral potential for either good or bad, depending on the intention of the higher 
agent that interacts with it. The matter of chaos contains these ingredients (God’s “dark 
materials”) and at the edge of the visible world the situation is the same; the boiling gulf 
meets the borders of that which is created, shaped and formed through nature, when, 
 
         now at last the sacred influence 
Of light appears, and from the walls of heaven 
Shoots far into the bosom of dim Night 
A glimmering dawn; here nature first begins 
Her farthest verge.  
(PL 2. 1034-8) 
 
The parallel ‘science’ of these representations coheres perfectly with the theology of 
God as light, and can be fruitfully compared to such instances as the poet’s request to 
the holy spirit, “what in me is dark / Illumine, what is low raise and support” (PL 1. 22-
3), or the later invocation to celestial light to “Shine inward, and the mind through all 
her powers / Irradiate, there plant eyes, all mist from thence / Purge and disperse” (PL 3. 
51-4). The request that the mind be touched, raised and clarified by the holy light also, 
however, requests a partial, temporary undoing of the darkening effects of fallenness, 
the natural philosophy of which is precisely coherent with contemporary medical 
theory. 
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Unlike heaven and earth, the grounds of hell burn without the influence of any 
higher light or spirit; the fallen angels are, in their first awakening after their fall 
“o’erwhelmed / With floods and whirlwinds of tempestuous fire” (PL 1. 76-7). Like the 
sick body studied by the physiologists, the lower, darkening fires of sulphur are burning 
without the assimilating influence of the highest levels of the scale, whether subliming 
animal spirits, rational spirits or holy light. The misuse of hell’s still neutral geological 
properties is a feature of Milton’s representation of industrial alchemy that we have 
already noted: 
 
                sulphurous and nitrous foam 
They found, they mingled, and with subtle art, 
Concocted and adusted they reduced 
To blackest grain. 
(PL 6. 512-15) 
 
This artful concoction burns the materials and thereby reduces them to gunpowder, an 
agent of death and violent dissolution. This transformation, through concocting and 
making adusted, or burnt, also characterises accounts of feverously fermenting blood. 
Willis describes the transformations of the body that suffers a mortal fever, following 
the crisis point: 
 
From a bad Crisis... the Liquor of the Bloud (like Wine too much 
Fermented) degenerates, almost into a vappidness, or lifelesness; its 
Spirit is greatly diminished; the Reliques which remain, are intricated, 
and, as it were, overwhelmed, with the Particles of Adust Matter, from 
whence there is yet a continual growing hot remaining in the Bloud, 
yet without concoction, or assimilation, of the Alible Juice, or 
separation of the profitable, from the unprofitable... from the Adust 
Recrements, and also the Salt, and Earth being too much carried forth, 
it perpetually burns in the Vessels, with thirst and heat. And because it 
is dayly depauperated, the Spirit and benign Sulphur being waste  
and more infected, with the Salt, and Earthy dregs being too much 
exalted, its Liquor in a short time becomes tastless, and is made unfit 
for circulation, and for the inkindling in the Heart, for the sustaining 
the Vital fire: wherefore there is a necessity that life be lost, even as 
the flame of a Lamp is extinguished, when instead of the wasted Oil, a 
Salt and Muddy Liquor only supplies it.471
 
  
The deathly fermentation in the blood has wasted the spirit and the highest level of 
sulphur, leaving excess “adust matter” that, like its hellish counterpart concocted by the 
fallen angels, continues to provoke disproportionate heat and burning. This burning 
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does not succeed, however, in the upward assimilation that the spirit had effected. The 
morally significant digestive motion is disordered, so the profitable cannot be separated 
from the unprofitable and the salty and earthy tartareous dregs are multiplied. This 
increase finally ends the ability of the blood to vitalise the body’s parts or sublime 
animal spirits to the higher levels, and the patient dies. This deathly process can be 
marked out as the reductive burning and concoction practised by the fallen angels, 
where the good and the bad can no longer be differentiated, and the ingredients of life 
itself are mixed and compounded to bring death and destruction. 
 
 
 
v. Curse and contagion 
 
Poisonous fermentation is responsible for illnesses that involve a build up of 
tartareous matter, or stone in the body, but the burning of the sulphurous components of 
the blood is also characteristic of what Willis called putrid fever, which can also stem 
from the digestive system when, “by the depravation, or rather corruption of the alible 
Juice, fresh carried into the blood, the various fits, inequalities, and critical motions 
arise.”472
 
 The fundamental sulphurous burning is described thus: 
if the Sulphureous, or Oily part of the Blood, grows hot, beyond its 
Natural disposition, presently it becomes fierce, and improportionate 
with the rest, so that, almost the whole being acted, as it were into a 
flame, by the Ferment of the Heart, compels the mass of Blood to 
grow immoderately hot, and to boil up.473
 
 
This upward motion matches the rise of the passions and sensuality in Adam and Eve 
when they awaken from their first sleep after the Fall. This fundamental shift in the 
ontological status of their body-soul composites from purest sublimation to burning is 
the source of contagion for the corruption that will affect the rest of the human race. 
Sickness, and the corrupted will that indulges appetite and causes it, are, Michael says 
(with another bout of angelic misogyny), “Inductive mainly to the sin of Eve” (PL 11. 
519). Michael invites Adam to open his eyes and 
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                                    first behold 
The effects which thy original crime hath wrought 
In some to spring from thee, who never touched 
The excepted tree, nor with the snake conspired, 
Nor sinned thy sin, yet from that sin derive 
Corruption to bring forth more violent deeds.  
(PL 11. 423-428) 
 
The poem faces head-on the problem of why it is that, although the actual sin was 
committed by Adam and Eve, their descendents will also suffer from corruption and 
death. Although his first vision of death horrifies Adam, it is actually the corruptions of 
the first two deaths that are given as the worst effect of sin. Physical death will 
ultimately be represented as a mercy both by God’s direct words and in the visions that 
Michael shows Adam. Death is the remedy of the corruption that sin brings. The violent 
death of Abel, who “fell, and deadly pale / Groaned out his soul with gushing blood 
effused,” shocks Adam (PL 11. 446-7). Michael, however, directs his horror away from 
the death itself, which “Will be avenged, and the other’s faith approved,” and towards 
the corruption of human mind and body that is the result of the Fall (PL. 11 458).  
 
In one of the most famous visions of Book 11 Adam sees: 
 
A lazar-house it seemed, wherein were laid 
Numbers of all diseased, all maladies 
Of ghastly spasm, or racking torture, qualms 
Of heart-sick agony, all feverous kinds, 
Convulsions, epilepsies, fierce catarrhs, 
Intestine stone and ulcer, colic pangs, 
Demoniac frenzy, moping melancholy 
And moon-struck madness, pining atrophy, 
Marasmus, and wide-wasting pestilence, 
Dropsies and asthmas, and joint-racking rheums. 
Dire was the tossing, deep the groans, despair 
Tended the sick busiest from couch to couch; 
And over them triumphant death his dart 
Shook, but delayed to strike, though oft invoked 
With vows, as their chief good, and final hope. 
(PL 11. 479-493) 
 
Adam wants to know how this degradation of humanity, bearers of the image of God, 
can happen and Michael’s answer conforms to his role as the teacher of moral lessons. 
He explains that the divine image 
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Forsook them, when themselves they vilified 
To serve ungoverned appetite, and took 
His image who they served, a brutish vice, 
Inductive mainly to the sin of Eve  
(PL 11. 516-9) 
 
The sick in the vision of the lazar-house have succumbed to the ‘brutish vice’ of 
‘ungoverned appetite’ and now bear that image, in the deformities of disease, rather 
than that of their maker. It seems that the ethically difficult position of blaming the sick 
for their own suffering is given by Michael as the central explanation of the sufferings 
caused by natural evil, and we may not be inclined to “yield it just” as Adam does. 
However, we should remember that this is a moral and didactic interaction between 
Michael and Adam. The vision serves first and foremost as a warning and a teaching: 
not least conspicuous is the representation of death as a blessed release from the 
corruptions of fallenness. Secondly, an inductive investigation into the causal history of 
this suffering brings us back to the first human fall, that of Eve, so it is also an 
explication of the origin of sickness that leads to a moral reproof. It is a mark of the 
enormity of the choice that Adam and Eve have made that this contagion is not only 
inherited by their offspring, but it spreads, like the infectious ferment, throughout the 
whole of the visible creation.  
 
While it is clear that the corruption of fallenness has had profound effects 
throughout the natural world, the monistic system does not collapse in the face of the 
Fall, and this will have profound consequences for the human regeneration that is to 
come. We can see monism functioning, in fact, through the very processes of the Fall. 
God has ordered (in what Rogers would term a “theocentric mode”) the shift in the 
sun’s angle to the earth, so the sun “Had first his precept so to move, so shine, / As 
might affect the earth with cold and heat / Scarce tolerable” (PL 10. 652-4). However, 
the sun also acts with what we might term its own similary repulsion, since “At that 
tasted fruit / The sun, as from Thyéstean banquet, turned / His course intended” (PL 10. 
688-9). The effects of this turn will bring a natural corruption that is dangerous to 
human health:  
 
These changes in the heavens, though slow, produced 
Like change on sea and land, sidereal blast, 
Vapour and mist, and exhalation hot, 
Corrupt and pestilent.  
(PL 10. 692-5) 
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Despite the actual discordance that is introduced into what was a perfect system of 
natural philosophy, there is a wider monism that remains. God orders the shift in the 
angle of the sun, but the sun itself retains the natural intention of the first light of the 
Creation when it is figured as turning away in disgust at the tragic horror of the Fall. 
The reduced and now erratic influence of the sun matches the reduced and erratic 
powers of the highest order of human spirit following the Fall, and the body’s warring 
elements and poisonous vapours are replicated in the discords of the natural world. The 
distempered meteorological environment is one aspect of this, as is the violence of the 
animal world, which also seems to erupt spontaneously, when, “Discord first, / 
Daughter of Sin, among the irrational / Death introduced through fierce antipathy: / 
Beast now with beast gan war” (PL 10. 707-10). 
 
 
So how is the intervention of a poisonous ferment related to these changes? 
Ideas on contagion, as such, had been present in the public consciousness in the 
calamitous form of the outbreaks of plague as well as lesser epidemics throughout the 
century, and Milton’s intersection of natural evil and moral evil was hardly unusual, as 
Neill’s study of the rhetoric of theatre closures testifies.474 What the swift development 
of the notion of fermenting natural substance offered to this, however, was an organised 
theory of external cause that was beginning to lead towards modern notions of 
infection. Giglioni notes that the “peccant matter” that causes plague has, like a leaven, 
the ability “to multiply almost endlessly in a predisposed matter,” that is, to stimulate in 
another body, “a motion that is similar to itself, in the same way as we see a ferment 
multiply.”475
                                                            
474 Michael Neill, Issues of Death: Mortality and Identity in English Renaissance Tragedy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 22-26. 
 But the ferment in contemporary poetry and prose is still far from the sort 
of entity that can be compared to modern knowledge of bacteria; it may still emerge 
simply from the distempered bodily constituents (Galenic or chymical). Its animistic 
resonances also mark it as being within the context of demonic interventions in the 
human body-soul. “What multiplies,” according to Glisson, “is supposed to put new 
matter under its own yoke and somehow to impress its own poisonous form on it,” but 
475 Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 160. Giglioni cites MS Sloane 3309 
("Fumus Nicotianae tubulo haustus grassanti peste est conveniens profylaktikon"), f. 48r. The term 
peccant is particularly rich in this context; its Latin origin is peccare, to sin or commit a fault, but through 
the seventeenth century it begins to take on the meaning of causing disease. Milton’s God terms the fallen 
angels as “peccant” (PL 11. 70). 
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Giglioni also notes that this may happen “because man's body itself has a certain ability 
to produce poisons and a receptivity to them.”476
 
 In the impression of a new and 
poisonous form we can hear echoes of the chosen new image of brutish vice that 
Michael points to in the vision of the lazar house. The poisonous ferment may also stem 
from and proliferate through a body’s own natural depravity. The natural philosophy of 
fermentation thus stands, sometimes precariously, upon the intersection of these 
different religious, classical and proto-scientific conceptions of motive life and 
destructive disease. Its delicate relations with them give a unity and coherence that is 
invaluable in a poem of universality like Paradise Lost. Indeed, although Glisson 
criticised the ubiquity of the theory of fermentation in the work of both Helmont and 
Willis, it is precisely this ubiquity that makes the infection of paradise by Adam and 
Eve a logical possibility.  
God explores this aspect of the human fall in his response to the Son’s 
intercession on behalf of Adam and Eve, offering the requested mercy, but stating: 
 
       longer in that paradise to dwell, 
The law I gave to nature him forbids: 
Those pure immortal elements that know 
No gross, no unharmonious mixture foul, 
Eject him tainted now, and purge him off 
As a distemper, gross to air as gross, 
And mortal food, as may dispose him best 
For dissolution wrought by sin, that first 
Distempered all things, and of incorrupt 
Corrupted. (PL 11. 48-57) 
 
The intense purity of the air of paradise, and the profusion of balmy odours emanating 
from the flowers and fruit, are aspects of its natural philosophy that we have looked at 
in some detail. It is one of the fears that Eve voices when she cries out, “Must I thus 
leave thee Paradise? Thus leave / Thee native soil” and continues, asking how “shall I 
part, and whither wander down / Into a lower world, to this obscure / And wild, how 
shall we breathe in other air / Less pure, accustomed to immortal fruits?” (PL 11. 269-
85).  What she has not yet absorbed is the reality that they are now corrupted, as her 
blunder, crying for “immortal fruits,” shows. This tainted distemper, increasing 
grossness, inharmonious mixt and ultimate dissolution can only endanger the fertile 
                                                            
476 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’,  160. Giglioni cites MS 
Sloane 3309, f. 90r.  
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balm of paradise if it functions as a poisonous ferment, for then it can spread and infect 
the rest of the natural world, as it has already begun to do.  
 
To summarise the physiology of the Fall: we have two body-soul composites 
whose highest spirits, in Milton’s schema the intellectual spirits, have partly deserted 
the rest of the composite body-soul through the hallucinatory exhilaration of these 
spirits by the vapours of the fruit. The resulting lack of upward sublimation and 
assimilation of the lower orders of spirit and matter in their blood has led to a 
sulphurous burning, which is partially connected to lust, and part of a cycle of 
corruption and disease in the body-soul. On one level this corruption emerges as illness 
or susceptibility to illness, but it also emerges in mental distemper, in chaotic passions 
that overwhelm the mind and in a partial alienation of different elements of the self. 
Their remaining understanding is quite literally darkened by the ‘adust’ effluvia of the 
newly disordered activity of the blood, which process gives a medical basis for the 
traditional loss of rationality that the Fall brings. Their inner alienation is represented as 
dividing Eve’s sense of seeming and being; in Adam’s case we see a fracture between 
sensory knowing and the mind’s understanding. As in the rest of the poem, these 
differences reverberate between human physiology and the natural philosophy of the 
angels and the rest of creation. In fact, once they are fallen and these effects start to 
mount up, their ontological condition is like nothing so much as chaos itself.  
 
 
 
vi. Fallen physiology and the atoms of chaos 
 
One central question that emerges from the reading of the Fall as the infection 
of a poisonous ferment is whether or not it is just coincidence that the fallen animate 
body is ontologically most similar to that described by atomist and corpuscular theorists 
such as Willis and Charleton. The only sequence in which atomism is referred to 
directly is in the description of chaos in Book 2. The Aristotelian qualities of heat, cold, 
wet and dry employ, at the microscopic level,  
              
Their embryon atoms; they around the flag 
Of each his faction, in their several clans, 
Light-armed or heavy, sharp, smooth, swift or slow, 
Swarm populous, unnumbered as the sands 
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Of Barca or Cyrenë’s torrid soil, 
Levied to side with warring winds, and poise 
Their lighter wings. To whom these most adhere, 
He rules a moment. (PL 2. 900-07) 
 
This representation of atomic chaos works as both an assertion and a critique of 
atomism. Atoms are here the materials out of which Creation is made. The different 
shapes and powers of atoms were an important aspect of how they were thought to fit 
together or react to each other and motive force generally, and the comment on the 
differing qualities of the ‘several clans’ is therefore a significant accuracy. Their 
warring state and position in chaos, however, recalls criticisms of deist mechanism and 
Hobbesian materialism; in short, atoms there may well be at the smallest level of 
existence, but without the tempering touch of God’s creative virtue nothing can come of 
them. Chaos is 
 
The womb of nature and perhaps her grave, 
Of neither sea, nor shore, nor air, nor fire, 
But all these in their pregnant causes mixed 
Confusedly, and which thus must ever fight, 
Unless the almighty maker them ordain 
His dark materials to create more worlds  
(PL 2. 911-16) 
 
We have looked in some detail at how chaos may be the womb of nature, or involved as 
material cause in the creation of the visible world. It is also true that chaos is given as 
nature’s grave, and thus chaos must also be an effect of un-creation, dissolution and 
death. Indeed the allegorical figure of Chaos claims directly: “Havoc and spoil and ruin 
are my gain” (PL 2. 1009).477 This ontological position of chaos as grave as well as 
womb of nature has prompted arguments that it is in direct opposition to the creative 
work of God. However, a clearer example of active ‘uncreation’ (rather than being in a 
state of uncreation) can be attributed to the allegorical narrative in which Sin and Death 
construct the bridge over the ‘vexed abyss’ which until now has provided a barrier 
between hell and earth.478
 
   
                                                            
477 For a reading of chaos that emphasises its fundamental opposition to God to the point of being evil, 
see Regina Schwartz, Remembering and Repeating: On Milton's Theology and Poetics (London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988). 
478 Here I rely on – and to some extent repeat - the assertions made by Fallon and Rumrich on this topic, 
particularly that “evil in Milton is a principle of inverted order, not of chaotic indeterminacy” Rumrich 
paraphrased in Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, 191n. 
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Chaos is once again subject to forces which educe form out of its wildly 
formless matter; Sin and Death 
 
Flew diverse, and with power (their power was great) 
Hovering upon the waters; what they met 
Solid or slimy as in a raging sea 
Tossed up and down, together crowded drove 
From each side shoaling towards the mouth of hell  
(PL 10. 284-8) 
 
It is a critical commonplace that “hovering upon the waters” recalls the brooding of the 
Holy Spirit on the waters of Creation and thus signals an infernal anti-creation in this 
sequence. The more precise model of vitalism that we developed in examining the 
creation, however, gives a richer context to this process. Sin and Death precisely reverse 
the process of creation, pushing matter into shape, with a mechanist force, rather than 
calling up vital action in it. It is Death who with his mace transforms the uncreated 
matter into cold, dry stone, the agent of death in the body: 
 
                            The aggregated soil 
Death with his mace petrific, cold and dry, 
As with a trident smote, and fixed as firm  
As Delos floating once; the rest his look 
Bound with Gorgonian rigour not to move  
(PL 10.293-7) 
 
Significantly, Sin believes herself to be subject to the force of sympathetic attraction in 
the urge she feels to enact this anti-creative act: 
 
Methinks I feel new strength within me rise, 
Wings growing, and dominion given me large 
Beyond this deep; whatever draws me on, 
Or sympathy, or some connatural force  
Powerful at greatest distance to unite 
With secret amity things of like kind 
By secretes conveyance  
(PL 10. 243-9) 
 
Where the spirit, light and matter of creation were vital and responsive to the voice of 
God and the power of the sun and stars are given as magnetic, this version of 
sympathetic attraction shows instead the tradition of occult causes and mystical 
speculation. The “connatural force” works by sympathy, or likeness; drawing like things 
together, it works over distance, as the weapon salve was supposed to do. The force 
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itself, the “amity,” and the process of conveyance are all described as secret. The 
weapon salve controversy, introduced to England by Robert Fludd and promoted later 
by Kenelm Digby, was central ground on which the conflicts about natural magic were 
fought. According to Pagel, Van Helmont concurred with the view that 
 
Magnetic effects... may be wrought in dead-looking metal, or through 
the ‘will of nature’ intrinsic in flesh and blood; they may act by touch 
as in the shock dealt by the electric fish, or at long distance as by the 
destructive stare of the basilisk. In all instances they are perfectly 
legitimate and natural, nature being the magician by virtue of 
universal sense and sympathy.479
 
 
Helmont’s choices of magnetism, electric fish, and even the basilisk as explanatory 
figures illustrate his focus upon natural philosophy as an explanatory system for 
sympathetic attraction; Milton’s corresponding attribution of “Gorgonian rigour” to the 
action of Death roots the natural magic of the un-creation in the effect of an explicitly 
fabulous beast with richer mythic associations and less claim to actuality. Attributing to 
her actions a secret mystical knowledge, Sin places her own actions in the midst of the 
contemporary controversy, and specifically with proponents such as Fludd, rather than 
with the more cautious experimentalism of Harvey, Boyle and Glisson. The speculative 
mysticism of the proponents of the weapon salve is not treated by Milton as a natural 
force; indeed the attribution of sympathetic attraction to the “will of nature” brings us 
back to Milton’s statement in the Christian Doctrine that the natural law set up by God 
at the creation is “too often called nature”. Later in the poem, God adds the explanation, 
“I called and drew them thither / My hell-hounds, to lick up the draff and filth / Which 
man’s polluting sin with taint hath shed / On what was pure” (PL 10. 629-32). The 
natural magicians of the un-creation do not know that they enact only the natural law of 
God’s will. 
 
This narrative of uncreation is allegorical. Chaos is peopled with allegorical 
figures who personify the new forces at work in Adam and Eve (for example, 
Confusion, Chance, Rumour, Tumult and Discord), just as the disordered matter and 
anarchic misrule figure their new ontological fractures. Fallon’s study of Paradise Lost 
still gives the finest account of how allegory functions in the poem. Arguing in essence 
that allegory is used to represent ontological deficiency (a position based upon the 
Augustinian notion of evil as privation), he focuses primarily on Sin and Death. They 
                                                            
479 Pagel, Van Helmont, 11. 
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are “not substances; they are ‘accidents in a substance’ and that substance is Satan and 
his devils.”480
 
 I suggest that the allegorical figures of chaos are directly related to the 
chaotic results of eating the fruit. The reduction of created perfection within human 
ontology is expressed through the same tropes of storm, confusion and political misrule 
that characterise chaos: 
                      high winds worse within 
Began to rise, high passions, anger, hate, 
Mistrust, suspicion, discord, and shook sore 
Their inward state of mind, calm region once 
And full of peace, now tossed and turbulent: 
For understanding ruled not, and the will 
Heard not her lore, both in subjection now 
To sensual appetite, who from beneath 
Usurping over sovereign reason claimed  
Superior sway (PL 9. 1120-1129) 
 
What chaos lacks, however, are the defining features of the poisonous ferment that 
characterise hell and, in particular, the satanic misuse of matter and spirit. Like 
humanity and everything else, chaos is made up of matter that is originally good, 
although susceptible to misuse. God’s human creations are created originally righteous; 
in the Christian Doctrine Milton states that the term original sin is “too narrow, because 
this evil desire, this law of sin, was not only inbred in us, but also took possession of 
Adam after his fall, and from this point of view it could not be called original.”481
 
 
Chaos is characterised by wild uprising storms, and is subject to mistrust, uncertainty, 
anarchy and political “misrule.” These tropes are precisely those used by Willis in the 
representation of the disordered relation between mind and body. He compares the 
natural philosophy of storms with that of mental disorder, proposing, in fact, the same 
causal mechanism. When the air is 
imbued with Sulphureous, and other Elastick Bodies, being become 
presently raging, they often break forth into Meteors, viz. Winds, 
Hurricanes, and horrid Thunder. After the same manner, the Animal 
Spirits, whilst pure, are carried in the open spaces of the Head, and its 
Appendixes remain quiet enough; but they... being mixed with 
Sulphureous Particles from the Blood, and sometimes in other places, 
with an heterogeneous matter, become very impetuous.482
 
 
                                                            
480 Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers 185; see also 168-193. 
481 CPW 6: 389. 
482 Willis, Two Discourses, 23-4. 
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The relation of the human microcosm to the macrocosmic world is imagined by Milton 
as it is by Willis, both in terms of metaphor, and, crucially, in terms of the natural 
philosophy of substance. 
 
This dissertation is not primarily a political reading of Milton’s poem, and 
neither is it an in-depth study of metaphorical motifs; it is rather a study of the literalism 
of the poem’s representation of the soul.483 Nevertheless, the clear parallels between the 
political metaphors used by both the doctors and the poet can illustrate not only the 
sickness of the fallen body-soul composite, but also something of the cures that might 
be offered in a fallen world. Just as sensual appetite is a usurper in the fallen body-soul 
of Paradise Lost, the sensitive soul is represented as a seditious rebel in Willis’s study 
of animation: “the lower Soul, growing weary of the yoak of the Other, if occasion 
serves, frees it self from its Bonds, affecting a License or Dominion... This Kind of 
Intestine Strife, does not truly cease, till this or that Champion becoming Superior, leads 
the other away clearly Captive.”484 The point of moral philosophy is to maintain the 
power of the rational soul over the lower orders: “to the Establishing the Empire of the 
Rational Soul, also for the Vindicating of its Right and Principality, from the Usurpation 
of the Sensitive Soul, the Precepts of Philosophers, and Moral Institutes are framed”.485 
In Willis’s schema, then, the healing process for the different levels of soul works 
through the development of the highest spiritual faculties, through the intervention of 
rational thought and, finally and most potently, “Sacred Religion gives far more potent 
helps, whose Laws and Precepts being rightly observed, are able to carry Man, not only 
beyond the Brutes, but himself, to wit, above his Natural State”.486 This model of 
healing has for its theological counterpart the Pauline struggle between the spirit and the 
flesh. Paul’s exhortations to the Romans state that “the carnal mind is enmity against 
God: for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be,” likewise in Galatians 
he states, “the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh.”487
                                                            
483 Although as Rogers has shown, the natural philosophy of the body and soul is of vital political 
significance in contemporary culture, so the evidence I have gathered of how Milton’s vitalism works 
could certainly contribute to a study of the politics of Paradise Lost. 
 This is 
a model that emerges repeatedly in the works of Paul, but the working of grace in 
Paradise Lost is neither so cerebral nor so controlling; it does not divide the body and 
the spirit in this way; rather it works to re-combine them properly. 
484 Willis, Two Discourses, 43. 
485 Willis, Two Discourses, 43. 
486 Willis, Two Discourses, 43. 
487 Romans 8: 7; Galatians 5: 17. 
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vii. Regeneration and mercy 
 
The descent of the Son, the descent of God’s prevenient grace and the descent 
of the angels (as higher spirits) and their re-ordering of Adam and Eve’s position – 
spiritually, mentally and physically – enacts not only God’s decree, but also the motion 
of curative action of the highest spirits in the body after fever strikes. The recovery of 
the diseased body has theological resonances. The highest ontological category, the 
spirit, is not entirely flown away or extinguished, and manages to overcome the toxic 
ferment, expelling it and instituting again a healthy sublimation from a functional 
digestive process: 
 
From a good Crisis, the Spirit, tho’ made weaker, yet gets the upper 
hand, wherefore, what is left of the Feaverish matter, it by degrees 
overcomes, and expels; and concocts, and assimilates (so what is 
brought be thin or slender) the Nutritious Juice: from thence, the mass 
of Bloud is amended anew, with Spirit and Sulphur; and the Bloud 
which now being Salt and sharp, did continually grow hot, acquires at 
length a Sweet and Balsamic Nature, and being quickned with a lively 
motion and heat, rightly performs the offices of life and sense.488
 
 
Recovery relies upon the reinstatement of the higher bodily spirit that should assimilate 
and order the lower levels, leading to the blood’s renewed “sweet and balsamic nature.” 
Rogers unaccountably claims that the natural philosophy of the substance of paradise is 
at odds with the “theocentric narrative.” He claims that the difference in mode between 
the representation of vital substance in paradise and the corresponding decrees given by 
God to Michael are “rather more than an inconsequential poetic blunder. The confusion 
reflects in an acute form some of the poem’s profoundest contradictions in the 
philosophy... of agency and organisation”.489
 
 The different narrative modes of the 
expulsion from paradise work perfectly in harmony, however, if one accepts in monist 
terms the descending powers of heaven as the highest orders of spirit in the universe of 
Paradise Lost.  
In the action of prevenient grace there is a rich intersection of the medical 
concern with the effects of tartarous deposits of stony matter and the biblical tradition of 
the removal of stone from the heart. As Adam and Eve finally pray with repentance, the 
                                                            
488 Willis, Of Feavers, 82. 
489 Rogers, Matter of Revolution, 152. 
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explanation is that “from the mercy-seat above / Prevenient grace descending had 
removed / The stony from their hearts, and made new flesh / Regenerate grow instead” 
(PL 11. 2-5). Although the replacement of the stone heart for a heart of flesh was (and 
still is) a popular motif of regeneration, the biblical source is one brief verse from 
Ezekiel: “Anew heart also I will give you, and a new spirit will I put within you: and I 
will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you an heart of flesh” 
(Ezekiel 36: 26). While regeneration in Willis’s work seems to draw more clearly upon 
the Pauline tradition of the inner struggle between the spirit and the flesh, Adam and 
Eve undergo a regeneration that validates the flesh, indeed in which flesh is the 
regenerated gift of God. To add to this distinctively materialist choice of biblical motif, 
the wording of the process in Paradise Lost differs slightly from almost any translation 
available.490
 
 The standard sense of the verse is that the heart of stone or the stony or 
stubborn heart will be removed and replaced with a living heart of flesh. Milton’s God, 
in contrast, has sent grace which removes the stone from their hearts and makes flesh 
grow instead. The heart is not so much replaced as cured of its stony deposits and 
revitalised in living growth. This action upon the heart recalls the purging of the visual 
nerve and removal of the film that darkened them performed by Michael. Moreover, the 
figuration of this biblical image of regeneration recalls again the life-giving powers of 
the lowest levels of matter in vitalist theories of the animate body.  
Christ’s intercession on man’s behalf is richly suggestive in its use of agrarian 
terminology. This time the sources are Pauline as well as Old Testament, but again the 
struggles of spirit and flesh are passed over in favour of images that relate to the 
vegetative soul: 
 
See Father, what first fruits on earth are sprung 
From thy implanted grace in man, these sighs 
And prayers, which in this golden censor, mixed 
With incense, I thy priest before thee bring, 
Fruits of more pleasing savour from thy seed 
Sown with contrition in his heart, than those 
Which his own hand manuring all the trees 
Of Paradise could have produced, ere fallen 
From innocence... 
                                     all his works on me 
Good or not good engraft, my merit those 
Shall pérfect, and for these my death shall pay. 
                                                            
490 Translations of this chapter of Ezekiel from a large number of versions, including the Latin Vulgate 
and the Geneva Bible can be found at: http://www.biblestudytools.com/ezekiel/36-26-compare.html.  
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(PL 11. 22-36)491
 
 
The physiology of the Fall and its effects were expressed through sulphurous burning 
that recalled hell and stormy confusion that recalled chaos; the pictures of redeemed 
humanity that emerge are, however, those of the fertile “earthy” body cultivated. These 
correspondences do not have a contemporary medical model ordering them as do other 
processes represented in Paradise Lost such as Creation, the scale of nature and the 
Fall. These, as we have seen, correspond precisely to models of conception, digestion 
and venomous fermentation, respectively. However, the removal of stone from a bodily 
organ and the vegetative basis for major biblical themes like implanting and engrafting 
can only work to support the distinctively vitalist natural philosophy that orders and 
enriches those other processes. Grace works on the fallen heart as the Holy Spirit works 
on the turbulent and ontologically deficient matter of chaos during the Creation. Indeed 
Milton makes the connection explicitly in the Christian Doctrine in his argument that 
the human soul should not be treated as an anomaly in the created world. He states 
“God breathed the breath of life... and when he had breathed it, he mixed it with matter 
in a very fundamental way, so that the human form, like all other forms, should be 
propagated and produced as a result of that power which God had implanted in 
matter.”492
 
 The implanting of fertile power in matter at the Creation and the implanting 
of prevenient grace in the fallen human heart work on precisely the same, vitalist logic. 
Moreover, the descent of the Son, of prevenient grace, and of the angels reverses the 
‘scornful’ attempted ascent of Satan and the hallucinatory ascent of the fallen pair, 
paradoxically ennobling those who descend, just as the attempted ascents of the fallen 
paradoxically reduce them. These fertile spiritual descents will find their finest (and 
final) form in the incarnation of Christ, who is repeatedly termed “the seed of the 
woman” in the later books of Paradise Lost. In the mean time the higher spiritual 
agencies work to re-order the infected body of creation, calming some of the burning 
and divisive disorders of fallenness, although the Creation remains corrupted. Following 
the natural philosophy of corruption that has infected the creation at the Fall, 
immortality would indeed bring endless suffering, and physical death is given as part of 
the remedy to the infected world.  
                                                            
491 The Feast of First Fruits delineates required sacrifice at harvest and can be found in Leviticus 23:9-14. 
The Pauline expression of incorporation in Christ as engrafting can be found in Romans 11. 
492 CPW 6: 325. 
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In his final lesson in Paradise Lost Adam is thus offered a route to death other 
than that of succumbing to the fermentation degradativa: Michael offers an alternative 
death whereby his body will ripen, rather than rot. This death follows a temperate life, 
when “like ripe fruit thou drop / Into thy mother’s lap, or be with ease / Gathered, not 
harshly plucked, for death mature” (PL 11. 535-7). This explanation answers and adds 
to some of the questions that had run through Adam’s tortured mind as he tried to 
understand what death would be. He fears “deathless pain” (PL 10. 775) and 
contemplates with horror the notion that “in the grave, / Or in some other dismal place, 
who knows / But I shall die a living death” (PL 10. 786). Adam’s examination of death 
deserves more attention than can be given to it here, particularly in the light of Milton’s 
theology of mortalism; however, what is directly relevant to this study of vitalism in 
Paradise Lost is the final explication given by Michael. Already corrupted, but only 
beginning to know what that means, Adam cries, “How gladly would I meet / Mortality, 
my sentence, and be earth / Insensible, how glad would lay me down / As in my 
mother’s lap” (PL 10. 775-8). Michael’s alternative to succumbing to corruption echoes 
and elaborates this wish; not only will he drop into his mother’s lap, the process that 
brings him there will be that of ripening. 
 
Again the work of Francis Glisson is the best analogue for Milton’s natural 
philosophy and the physiology that it orders. The key to the differentiation between one 
death and the other is in the difference between degrading corruption and the ripening 
motion of vital heat. Giglioni paraphrases from Glisson’s late work, explaining that in 
Glisson’s schema, 
 
Vital heat, in particular, is a motion which is “much nobler” than that 
of fermentation. Glisson... differentiates fermentation from ripening. 
Fermentation starts where ripening ceases. The latter is not a quick 
motion of fusion and dissolution, but it is a slow process of 
coagulation that needs a certain amount of time to reach the appointed 
goal. Likewise, all functions of life, nutrition, and growth belong to 
the process of ripening rather than to fermentation: nutrition is 
“constantly calm and self-pleasing; it does not expect to be irritated by 
the action of some ferment, nor does it suffer the tumult that originates 
from fermentation.” 493
 
  
                                                            
493 Glisson quoted in Giglioni, ‘Genesis of Francis Glisson’s Philosophy of Life’, 165-6. Giglioni cites De 
Ventriculo, 571-574. 
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This calm, gentle process mirrors the temperate life that Michael offers, where life is 
growth and death is a culmination and almost a fulfilment.  
 
So mayst thou live, til like ripe fruit thou drop 
Into thy mother’s lap, or be with ease 
Gathered, not harshly plucked, for death mature: 
This is old age; but then thou must outlive 
Thy youth, thy strength, thy beauty, which will change 
To withered weak and grey; thy senses then 
Obtuse, all taste of pleasure must forego, 
To what thou hast, and for the air of youth 
Hopeful and cheerful, in thy blood will reign 
A melancholy damp of cold and dry 
To weigh thy spirits down and last consume 
The balm of life.  
(PL 11. 535-46) 
 
This may not seem comforting. We live in a culture with medical resources that are 
incomparable with any other time and most other places; a brief flick through the works 
of the best doctor contemporary with Milton will leave a modern reader sick with fear at 
the amputations without anaesthetic, the chemical medicines and the lack of 
understanding of infection and sanitation. Disease still strikes us, but we have morphine 
when all else fails. We also, however, live in a predominantly secular society; perhaps 
this vision of death as a welcome release can open a window of meaning into a world of 
the past where life was more painful, diseases more dire and death less frightening. 
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Conclusion 
 
The early sections of this dissertation set up a number of antinomies and 
questions that emerge out of the materiality of the soul in the Christian Doctrine and 
Paradise Lost. Initially, the coherence of Aristotelian monism posed a problem, but of 
course the Aristotelian inheritance of the seventeenth century was heterogeneous, and 
medical and biological scientists, like Milton, adjusted and revised the ‘scientific’ 
legacy with which they worked, rather than engaging in outright dismissal. Milton’s 
science is Aristotelian, but as we have seen more than once, his Aristotelianism is 
modified to give a vital primacy to matter and the power of matter by the integration of 
chymical concepts and categories. The integration of chymical spirit with pneuma, or 
vital heat is central to this process. Matter and material forms can be more spirituous or 
more gross, but the scale of nature in Paradise Lost gives multiple forms and degrees of 
spirit-matter that – crucially – interact, move, shift, change, perfect and corrupt. 
Likewise, the chymical anatomy of the body’s spirits and fluids shifts the paradigm 
from a dualist imposition of form on matter to multiple, interacting elements with 
differing qualities, specifically, spirit, oil, water, salt and dead earth. In both cases the 
most powerful vitalising category is that of spirit. The chymical spirit, for Glisson and 
Milton, works as vital heat or pneuma in the Aristotelian tradition, but it offers itself as 
a distinctively material category. In both the healthy body and the unfallen Creation the 
motion is an upward assimilation of rougher, less perfected matter or material forms to 
their highest possible perfection. God remains both the source and the ultimate 
culmination of this process. Like vital heat, God’s spirit (and matter) effects an upward 
movement that is simultaneously circular. It is this dynamic order that, for Milton, 
makes the traducian emergence of the rational soul from the procreating human body-
soul composite a literal truth. Traducianism, despite its position as heresy, is a 
cornerstone of theodicy in the Christian Doctrine. Thus vitalisit natural philosophy, 
exemplified in the work of Glisson, supports Milton’s theodicy.  
 
Traducianism, in the Christian Doctrine is the theodical manoeuvre that 
ensures that the fallen soul cannot originate from God in its fallen state; it demands that 
from the corporeal body must come the abstract faculty of the rational soul. The 
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perfecting motion of spirit-matter turns the corporeal to the incorporeal through a 
process of sublimation that is a literal truth within the scientific discourse of 
experimental medicine. The discovery of acid digestion was part of a revision in 
anatomy that attributed the power of sublimation to the similary parts, the fluids and 
spirits of the animate body. This process, imagined as progressive purification, 
continues in Milton’s schema through all orders of the body-soul composite, so from the 
food is sublimed the vital blood, from which sublimes the animal spirit and from the 
animal spirits sublime intellectual spirits, which constitute reason itself. The 
sublimations of transformative spirit correlate with Milton’s rehabilitated holy matter, 
giving scientific credence to the assertion of theological materialism. The shifting 
meaning of sublimation makes possible the insertion of the traditionally immaterial 
nous or abstract intelligence, into the transformative materiality ascribed to the lower 
levels of the created world by orthodox Aristotelian natural philosophy. This 
sublimating spirit and matter does indeed reconcile immanent soul with transcendent 
soul in the animate bodies of paradise and in the fundamental system of causality upon 
which creation and regeneration stand in Paradise Lost.  
 
Sublimation, like the fermentation with which it was compared in 
physiological study, was not the sole preserve of vitalism. It was also borrowed by the 
iatro-mechanist physic of doctors such as Willis, Power and Charleton, but mechanist 
physic supposed a different theology to that of Milton. Relying upon a voluntarist 
stance to justify investigative experiment, the mechanists still risked the deist Deus 
absconditus, as opposed to Milton, who represents, “a conception of the deity 
surprisingly similar to that of his French contemporary [Pascale]: no longer a mere first 
mover in some Thomistic version of the big bang theory, but a central and functional 
force at work in the interstices of the infinite universe.”494
                                                            
494 Martin, ‘Milton, Pascale and the Theology of Relative Space’, 52. 
 Moreover, the active matter 
of the iatro-mechanists was subordinated in a system which retained an orthodox 
dualism of body and soul. This dualism, like the Aristotelian dualism of intelligential 
act and subordinate animal consciousness that characterises Satan’s intrusion into the 
serpent, is present in the falling and fallen soul, rather than the perfect anatomia 
animata of unfallen paradise. The fragmenting and corrupted soul in Paradise Lost 
borrows from the warring, Pauline model elaborated in particular by Willis, and the 
physiology of the Fall itself matches the medical processes of the putrid, corrupting 
ferment that was already leading away from the orthodox Galenic notion of disease as 
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imbalance and towards the concept of infection by an outside agent. Healing in both 
vitalist physic and mechanist physic retains, however, primary religious determinants; 
the replenishment of higher orders of spirit act to reinstitute healthy sublimation in the 
blood, just as the descent of angelic spirits, the Son and prevenient grace initiate 
regeneration in the fallen humans of Paradise Lost. 
 
Perhaps the most urgent contemporary question that could be asked of Milton’s 
natural philosophy of the body and soul is that of the religious significance of vital 
matter, and Milton’s work does contain answers and solutions to such questions. The 
notion that matter is vital causes an epistemological shift. Matter, rather than suffering 
ontological deprivation, is prior to form, it is perpetual and self-existent; it has an 
intrinsic causal power that gives rise to form, and that power has its own, self-
determining teleological force. Commentators such as Cudworth argue that this 
envisioning of matter precludes any necessity for God’s intervention; all the traditional 
acts of the divine are already attributed to corruptible, changeable matter, and thus 
ultimately to nothing at all. However, as Fallon has shown, Milton’s materialism 
functions within an Augustinian paradigm in which evil lies in the reduction of 
ontological status, and materiality and the material are in positive opposition to this 
lack, reduction and ultimate corruption. What Milton’s peculiarly medical version of 
vitalism does, is to take just such a heretical model of matter and place it within a 
theological system in which the power of that matter originates with God and continues 
to urge towards its own highest possible perfection unless corrupted by the free will of 
another agent. This vital matter shares the active attributes of a version of the iatro-
mechanist corpuscular theory of matter, which likewise stems from chymical theory. 
Like Boyle and like Locke, Milton sees no reason to limit the power of God to imbue 
matter with life and intention; unlike them, he proposes that God did so. Balancing this 
voluntarist position, however, Milton places matter in the same liminal, paradoxical 
position as light, spirit and human agency: animate, but simultaneously subject to the 
terrible goodness of God.  
 
As critics like Schwarz and Rogers point out, Milton does not solve the 
problem of evil. What his poem does do, however, is use a delicate and complementary 
fusion of discourses to represent the intrinsic paradoxes of free will, determinism and 
the origin of evil as literally encoded into all levels of being. Thus matter, spirit, light 
and bodily fluid all act with some level of autonomy and intrinsic creative power, but 
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they, like the free human beings that they constitute, do not set the terms of the 
paradigm in which they work, and thus they do not control the final consequences of 
their activity. All that has ontological presence has some degree of agency, but the 
ultimate order (both moral and – crucially – natural) is set from the beginning by God. 
Thus there is freedom to slide further away from God, down the scale of nature, 
refusing spiritual assimilation into higher orders of being 
 
For traditional theology, to be in hell is to fall out of the hands of God 
by deliberately spurning his love... In this sense, hell is the most florid 
compliment to human freedom one could imagine. If one can even 
reject the blandishments of one’s Creator, one must be powerful 
indeed. But... there can be no life outside God, who is the source of all 
vitality... a terrorist of love, whose implacable forgiveness is bound to 
seem like an intolerable affront to those who cannot let go of 
themselves.495
 
 
Satan’s claim to autonomy rests upon his claim to be self-caused, and thus denies the 
implacable forgiveness of God because it denies God as Creator. The ontological 
autonomy claimed by Milton for intelligences of heaven, humans and vital matter itself 
relies not upon self-creation, but upon the liberty to transform or destroy oneself, to 
accept life on God’s terms or to reject it in favour of a static and fantasmatic power. The 
self-determination of a material body-soul composite, generated out of vital matter and 
spirit, does not preclude the causal agency of divinity because, as we have seen in 
chapter four, the generation of the visible world is clearly the result of God’s efficient 
causality. The origin of life is securely sited in the commands of the Creation, but once 
the visible world is constituted, it has intrinsic power to generate, multiply and 
metamorphose. The fundamental differential between spirit and matter turns out to be 
fictitious, although it is a mark of the entrenchment of dualist thought that even monist 
writers continue to make a convenient verbal expression in talking about causality and 
creation. Once we have explored the medical sources and systems of vital matter that 
were available to Milton and that are congruent with and supportive of his theodicy of 
free will, there are then deeper layers of coherence to be found within the poem itself as 
a work of art.  
 
 
 
                                                            
495 Terry Eagleton, On Evil (London: Yale University Press, 2010), 24-5. 
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